上周彈藥已全部打出偎球，靜等國運(yùn)。若市場再下跌20%锰霜，則需要加杠桿再入了筹误。

近來無事桐早，再溫習(xí)下巴菲特早期給合伙人（股東）的信件（1957-1970）癣缅，只當(dāng)鞏固英語了。

（獲得1957-1970書信原件哄酝，關(guān)注微信TGame的學(xué)習(xí)筆記友存，回復(fù)巴菲特）

先從1957開始：

1956年，在為自己的導(dǎo)師格雷厄姆工作了2年后陶衅，25歲的巴菲特（8.?30,1930 出生）離開紐約屡立，回到了自己的家鄉(xiāng)奧馬哈，開始了合伙人投資之旅搀军。第一次是和七個(gè)人合伙膨俐，包括繼父勇皇、妹妹、大學(xué)室友焚刺、aunt Alice敛摘，共集資105000美元，其中巴菲特出資100美元乳愉。全年成立投資合伙企業(yè)3家兄淫，總投資額30萬美元。1957年中期蔓姚，又成立2家捕虽。

1957巴菲特致合伙人的信（翻譯）：

（1957-1970書信原件，關(guān)注微信TGame的學(xué)習(xí)筆記坡脐， 回復(fù)巴菲特）

1957 年市場分析

在去年寫給合伙人的信中泄私，我寫道：

“我認(rèn)為股市整體價(jià)格高于內(nèi)在價(jià)值，主要是藍(lán)籌股估值過高备闲。如果確實(shí)如此挖滤，所有股票都存在大幅下跌的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，無論是否低估浅役。無論如何斩松，我認(rèn)為，五年之后回過頭來看觉既，人們不太可能覺得現(xiàn)在的價(jià)格很便宜惧盹。就算大規(guī)模熊市出現(xiàn)，我們的套利類 (work-outs) 部分投資的市場價(jià)值也不會(huì)受到影響瞪讼。

如果整個(gè)市場回歸到低估狀態(tài)钧椰，我們會(huì)增加普通股 (general issues) 投資倉位，可能還會(huì)借一部分錢來買低估的股票符欠。反之嫡霞，假如市場繼續(xù)大幅走高，我們的策略是希柿，將普通股賣出兌現(xiàn)利潤诊沪，并增加套利類投資(work-outs)組合的比重≡罚”

上面幾句話是關(guān)于市場分析的端姚，但是我首要考慮的不是市場分析。無論什么時(shí)候挤悉，我都把主要精力放在尋找嚴(yán)重低估的股票上渐裸。

去年，股市出現(xiàn)了溫和下跌，我要強(qiáng)調(diào)的是“溫和（moderate）”二字昏鹃。我們聽新聞或與剛進(jìn)入股市的人聊天時(shí)尚氛，會(huì)產(chǎn)生股市跌了很多的感覺。實(shí)際上洞渤，在我看來怠褐，與當(dāng)前經(jīng)濟(jì)情況下公司盈利能力下跌的幅度相比，股價(jià)的下跌幅度太小了您宪。公眾仍然對(duì)藍(lán)籌股和宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)強(qiáng)烈看多奈懒。我無意預(yù)測經(jīng)濟(jì)或股市。我只是想告訴你們宪巨，不要產(chǎn)生這樣的錯(cuò)覺磷杏，以為股市已經(jīng)出現(xiàn)了大幅下跌，不要以為整體市場目前處于較低水平捏卓。從長期投資價(jià)值出發(fā)极祸，我仍然認(rèn)為當(dāng)前股市整體高估。

1957年投資回顧

隨著股市下跌怠晴，投資低估股票的機(jī)會(huì)越來越多遥金。總體上蒜田，與去年相比稿械，我們的投資組合中普通股所占比重高于套利類。下面我解釋一下什么是“套利類”冲粤。套利類投資與普通低估類股票投資不同美莫，它的獲利途徑不是來自一般意義上的股價(jià)上漲，而是取決于公司的某些活動(dòng)梯捕。套利投資機(jī)會(huì)出現(xiàn)在出售厢呵、并購、清算傀顾、要約收購等公司活動(dòng)中襟铭。 在每一筆套利投資中，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)不是經(jīng)濟(jì)形勢(shì)會(huì)惡化短曾，也不是股市下跌寒砖，而是可能出現(xiàn)意外事件，打亂原有計(jì)劃错英，公司不按原計(jì)劃行事入撒。1956年末隆豹，我們持有的普通低估類和套利類倉位比重為 70：30椭岩，現(xiàn)在比例是 85：15。

去年，我們?cè)谶@兩只股票上的持股數(shù)量已經(jīng)達(dá)到可以影響公司決策的規(guī)模判哥。其中一只股票占比為 10% 到 20% 之間献雅，另一只占比約 5%。這兩只股票都大概需要三到五年時(shí)間實(shí)現(xiàn)利潤塌计，但是現(xiàn)在看來挺身，它們都風(fēng)險(xiǎn)極低，而且可以實(shí)現(xiàn)很高的年化收益率锌仅。雖然它們不屬于套利類章钾，但這兩只股票受大盤影響非常小。當(dāng)然了热芹，如果大盤大幅上漲贱傀，預(yù)計(jì)這部分投資會(huì)落后于市場漲幅。

1957年業(yè)績

1957年伊脓，我們?cè)?1956年成立的三個(gè)合伙人賬戶大幅跑贏大市府寒。1957年年初，道指為 499 點(diǎn)报腔，年末 435 點(diǎn)株搔，下降 64 點(diǎn)。買入指數(shù)可以獲得 22 點(diǎn)的分紅纯蛾，虧損可以降低到 42 點(diǎn)纤房，也就是全年虧損 8.470%。投資大多數(shù)基金獲得的差不多就是這個(gè)收益翻诉，據(jù)我所知帆卓，今年投資股票的基金沒有一個(gè)取得正收益的。

1956年成立的三個(gè)合伙人賬戶均取得正收益米丘，按照 1956年凈值計(jì)算剑令，收益率分別為 6.2%、7.8% 和 25%拄查。你肯定會(huì)注意到吁津，前兩個(gè)合伙人賬戶的投資者一定也存在這樣的疑問，最后一個(gè)合伙人賬戶的收益率為什么高出這么多堕扶。這個(gè)業(yè)績差異表明碍脏，短期內(nèi)運(yùn)氣很重要，特別是何時(shí)投入資金稍算。第三個(gè)合伙人賬戶是 1956年最晚成立的典尾，當(dāng)時(shí)市場更低，有幾只股票特別便宜糊探。我用當(dāng)時(shí)收到的這批資金大筆買入了這幾只股票钾埂。由于先前成立的兩個(gè)合伙人賬戶中的資金已經(jīng)大量用于投資河闰，所以這兩個(gè)賬戶只能以較小的倉位買入這幾只便宜的股票。

所有合伙人賬戶基本上都投資同樣的股票褥紫，持股比例都相差不多姜性。在成立初期，資金投入時(shí)間不同髓考，股市所處點(diǎn)位不同部念，所以我們剛開始時(shí)業(yè)績會(huì)有較大差別，將來差別會(huì)縮小氨菇。我的目標(biāo)是能夠長期取得每年領(lǐng)先指數(shù) 10% 的收益率儡炼，按照這個(gè)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，這三個(gè)合伙人賬戶 1957 年的業(yè)績都很好查蓉，甚至可以說是相當(dāng)好了射赛。1957年年中，我新建立了兩個(gè)合伙人賬戶奶是，在 1957年下半年里楣责，這兩個(gè)賬戶的業(yè)績與指數(shù)差不多，在此期間下跌了大約 12%∧羯常現(xiàn)在這兩個(gè)賬戶的投資組合將逐漸與1956年合伙人賬戶投資組合同步秆麸，將來所有合伙人賬戶的收益率差距會(huì)縮小。

業(yè)績解讀

1957年及汉，我們的業(yè)績高于一般水平沮趣，一部分原因是今年大多數(shù)股票表現(xiàn)普遍較差。與一般水平相比坷随，我們?cè)谛苁欣飼?huì)比牛市里做得更好房铭。我們今年的業(yè)績不錯(cuò)，但在這樣的年份中温眉，我們的表現(xiàn)本來就應(yīng)該比指數(shù)更好缸匪。當(dāng)股市整體大幅上漲時(shí)，只要能跟上指數(shù)漲幅类溢，我就非常滿意了凌蔬。

我可以肯定地說，與 1956年末相比闯冷，1957年末我們的投資組合價(jià)值更高了砂心。原因有兩方面，一是股價(jià)整體更低了蛇耀，二是我們有更多時(shí)間來收集嚴(yán)重低估的股票辩诞，收集這種股票就需要耐心。我前面提到了纺涤，我們最大的這一只股票占公司資產(chǎn)的 10% 到 20%译暂。我計(jì)劃將這只股票配置為公司資產(chǎn)的 20%抠忘，但是這不可能一步到位。毫無疑問秧秉，無論是買哪只股票褐桌，我們最希望看到的都是這只股票原地不動(dòng)或下跌衰抑，而不是上漲象迎。正因?yàn)槿绱耍瑹o論什么時(shí)候呛踊，我們的投資組合中都有相當(dāng)大的一部分是處于沉寂階段砾淌。這個(gè)投資策略需要耐心，但會(huì)給我們帶來最高的長期收益谭网。

在這封信中汪厨，我盡量講到所有你可能關(guān)心的話題，講解我們的理念愉择，盡量不深入討論具體投資細(xì)節(jié)的情況劫乱。如果有關(guān)于我們投資活動(dòng)的任何問題，請(qǐng)告訴我锥涕。

英文原版：

1957 Letter

WARREN E. BUFFETT

5202 Underwood Ave. Omaha, Nebraska

SECOND ANNUAL LETTER TO LIMITED PARTNERS

The General Stock Market Picture in 1957

In last year's letter to partners, I said the following:

“My view of the general market level is that it is priced above intrinsic value. This view relates to blue-chip securities. This view, if accurate, carries with it the possibility of a substantial decline in all stock prices, both undervalued and otherwise. In any event I think the probability is very slight that current market levels will be thought of as cheap five years from now. Even a full-scale bear market, however, should not hurt the market value of our work-outs substantially.

If the general market were to return to an undervalued status our capital might be employed exclusively in general issues and perhaps some borrowed money would be used in this operation at that time. Conversely, if the market should go considerably higher our policy will be to reduce our general issues as profits present themselves and increase the work-out portfolio.”

All of the above is not intended to imply that market analysis is foremost in my mind. Primary attention is given at all times to the detection of substantially undervalued securities.

The past year witnessed a moderate decline in stock prices. I stress the word "moderate" since casual reading of the press or conversing with those who have had only recent experience with stocks would tend to create an impression of a much greater decline. Actually, it appears to me that the decline in stock prices has been considerably less than the decline in corporate earning power under present business conditions. This means that the public is still very bullish on blue chip stocks and the general economic picture. I make no attempt to forecast either business or the stock market; the above is simply intended to dispel any notions that stocks have suffered any drastic decline or that the general market, is at a low level. I still consider the general market to be priced on the high side based on long term investment value.

Our Activities in 1957

The market decline has created greater opportunity among undervalued situations so that, generally, our portfolio is heavier in undervalued situations relative to work-outs than it was last year. Perhaps an explanation of the term "work-out" is in order. A work-out is an investment which is dependent on a specific corporate action for its profit rather than a general advance in the price of the stock as in the case of undervalued situations. Work-outs come about through: sales, mergers, liquidations, tenders, etc. In each case, the risk is that something will upset the applecart and cause the abandonment of the planned action, not that the economic picture will deteriorate and stocks decline generally. At the end of 1956, we had a ratio of about 70-30 between general issues and work-outs. Now it is about 85-15.

During the past year we have taken positions in two situations which have reached a size where we may expect to take some part in corporate decisions. One of these positions accounts for between 10% and 20% of the portfolio of the various partnerships and the other accounts for about 5%. Both of these will probably take in the neighborhood of three to five years of work but they presently appear to have potential for a high average annual rate of return with a minimum of risk. While not in the classification of work-outs, they have very little?dependence on the general action of the stock market. Should the general market have a substantial rise, of course, I would expect this section of our portfolio to lag behind the action of the market.

Results for 1957

In 1957 the three partnerships which we formed in 1956 did substantially better than the general market. At the beginning of the year, the Dow-Jones Industrials stood at 499 and at the end of the year it was at 435 for a loss of 64 points. If one had owned the Averages, he would have received 22 points in dividends reducing the overall loss to 42 points or 8.470% for the year. This loss is roughly equivalent to what would have been achieved by investing in most investment funds and, to my knowledge, no investment fund invested in stocks showed a gain for the year.

All three of the 1956 partnerships showed a gain during the year amounting to about 6.2%, 7.8% and 25% on yearend 1956 net worth. Naturally a question is created as to the vastly superior performance of the last partnership, particularly in the mind of the partners of the first two. This performance emphasizes the importance of luck in the short run, particularly in regard to when funds are received. The third partnership was started the latest in 1956 when the market was at a lower level and when several securities were particularly attractive. Because of the availability of funds, large positions were taken in these issues. Whereas the two partnerships formed earlier were already substantially invested so that they could only take relatively small positions in these issues.

Basically, all partnerships are invested in the same securities and in approximately the same percentages. However, particularly during the initial stages, money becomes available at varying times and varying levels of the market so there is more variation in results than is likely to be the case in later years. Over the years, I will be quite satisfied with a performance that is 10% per year better than the Averages, so in respect to these three partnerships, 1957 was a successful and probably better than average, year.

Two partnerships were started during the middle of 1957 and their results for the balance of the year were roughly the same as the performance of the Averages which were down about 12% for the period since inception of the 1957 partnerships. Their portfolios are now starting to approximate those of the 1956 partnerships and performance of the entire group should be much more comparable in the future.

Interpretation of results

To some extent our better than average performance in 1957 was due to the fact that it was a generally poor year for most stocks. Our performance, relatively, is likely to be better in a bear market than in a bull market so that deductions made from the above results should be tempered by the fact that it was the type of year when we should have done relatively well. In a year when the general market had a substantial advance I would be well satisfied to match the advance of the Averages.

I can definitely say that our portfolio represents better value at the end of 1957 than it did at the end of 1956. This is due to both generally lower prices and the fact that we have had more time to acquire the more substantially undervalued securities which can only be acquired with patience. Earlier I mentioned our largest position which comprised 10% to 20% of the assets of the various partnerships. In time I plan to have this represent 20% of the assets of all partnerships but this cannot be hurried. Obviously during any acquisition period, our primary interest is to have the stock do nothing or decline rather than advance. Therefore, at any given time, a fair proportion of our portfolio may be in the sterile stage. This policy, while requiring patience, should maximize long term profits.

I have tried to cover points which I felt might be of interest and disclose as much of our philosophy as may be imparted without talking of individual issues. If there are any questions concerning any phase of the operation, I would welcome hearing from you.

1957信件解讀

三類投資：

一是低估類普通股票（undervalued/general issues）衷戈，購買完了以后坐等股票上漲。二是套利（work-outs）层坠，通過公司重組等賺取價(jià)差,后面巴菲特會(huì)多次解釋套利的細(xì)節(jié)殖妇。還有一種，具備控制權(quán)的投資（control）破花，即信件里提到的占到公司倉位的10%-20%的一項(xiàng)投資谦趣，這一類投資后面巴菲特會(huì)詳細(xì)講到。

第一種方法是我們值得學(xué)習(xí)的座每，后面兩種前鹅，現(xiàn)在還是算了，條件不具備啊峭梳。

巴菲特反復(fù)提及嫡纠，他的投資方式，在熊市肯定比指數(shù)好的多延赌，在牛市不一定比得上指數(shù)除盏。但巴菲特合伙企業(yè)十三年的成績驚人，無論熊市牛市挫以，沒有一年虧損者蠕，而且所有年份都超過指數(shù)平均水平。這可能就是價(jià)值投資吧掐松，不要期望牛市能夠獲得多么高的收益踱侣，但要在熊市保證不能虧的太多粪小。

以后，會(huì)逐個(gè)學(xué)習(xí)早期的巴菲特合伙人信件抡句，參考意義非常大探膊。

獲得1957-1970書信原件，關(guān)注微信?TGame的學(xué)習(xí)筆記待榔，回復(fù)巴菲特逞壁。