The Rise of Made-in-China Diplomacy
中國(guó)制造外交的興起
While political leaders trade threats, the pandemic has made Americans even more reliant on China’s manufacturers.
當(dāng)政治領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人互相威脅的時(shí)候玛歌，這種流行病使得美國(guó)人更加依賴中國(guó)的制造商检痰。
作者: 彼得 · 赫斯勒
March 8, 2021?2021年3月8日
After the U.S. government issued stimulus checks, “the next day we saw an increase in sales,” a Chinese businessman said.?一位中國(guó)商人說蹂午，在美國(guó)政府發(fā)布刺激計(jì)劃支票后岭埠，“第二天我們看到銷售額有所增長(zhǎng)埃脏」枷伲”Photograph by Guligo Jia for The New Yorker?攝影: Guligo Jia/紐約客
On Amazon.com, if you search for running shoes, drop the price point to around thirty dollars, and scroll past the initial pages, you’ll eventually encounter brands that you’ve never heard of. Some seem to follow an alphabetic theme—Zocavia, Zocania, Zonkim—while others are pure etymological puzzles: Biacolum, Qansi, NYZNIA. Study the product images, and pieces of the puzzle start to connect. The Qansi Men’s Sneakers Mesh Ultra Lightweight Breathable Athletic Running Walking Gym Shoes look exactly the same as the Biacolum Men’s Running Shoes Non Slip Gym Tennis Shoes Slip Resistant Air Knitted Sneakers Walking Workout Sport Shoes, which in turn appear to be identical to the Zocavia Men’s Running Shoes Ultra Lightweight Tennis Gym Shoes Slip On Mesh Fitness Slip Resistant Walking Workout Shoes. The language of these listings could be described as Amazonglish: awkward but basically intelligible, redundant but highly searchable. Often, a product description has just enough linguistic accuracy to sail past a computer’s grammar check. Zocavia: “Ultra lightweight material leaves few weight on your feet.” Zocania: “Your feet can breathe easy in the latest iteration of fabric upper.”
在亞馬遜網(wǎng)站上调鲸，如果你搜索跑鞋写烤，把價(jià)格降到30美元左右撒强，滾動(dòng)瀏覽最初的頁(yè)面禽捆，你最終會(huì)遇到你從未聽說過的品牌。有些似乎是按字母順序排列的——佐卡維亞飘哨、 Zocania胚想、 zonkim ——而有些則是純粹的詞源謎題: Biacolum、 Qansi芽隆、 NYZNIA浊服。研究產(chǎn)品圖片统屈，拼圖的各個(gè)部分開始連接起來。Qansi 男士運(yùn)動(dòng)鞋網(wǎng)格超輕透氣運(yùn)動(dòng)跑步健身鞋看起來和 Biacolum 男士跑步鞋防滑運(yùn)動(dòng)鞋網(wǎng)球鞋防滑空氣針織運(yùn)動(dòng)鞋步行運(yùn)動(dòng)鞋完全一樣牙躺，這反過來看起來和 Zocavia 男士跑步鞋超輕網(wǎng)球運(yùn)動(dòng)鞋防滑網(wǎng)球運(yùn)動(dòng)鞋防滑運(yùn)動(dòng)鞋完全一樣愁憔。這些列表的語言可以被描述為亞馬遜式英語: 笨拙但基本上可以理解，冗余但高度可搜索孽拷。通常吨掌，一個(gè)產(chǎn)品描述的語言準(zhǔn)確度足以通過計(jì)算機(jī)的語法檢查。索卡維亞: “超輕質(zhì)材料讓你的雙腳幾乎沒有重量脓恕∧に危”佐卡尼亞: “你的腳可以輕松地呼吸在最新款式的面料上×夺＃”
One word that almost never appears in Amazonglish is “China.” Marketplace Pulse, which analyzes e-commerce, has said that nearly half of Amazon’s top sellers—those with more than a million dollars in annual sales in the U.S.—are in China. An Amazon spokesperson recently described this as inaccurate, although he declined to disclose the number of Chinese sellers, saying only that the majority of third-party venders on the U.S. site are based in America. On product pages, Chinese sellers rarely advertise their location, and the Zocavias and Zocanias don’t mention where they are manufactured. For more information, it helps to head over to the Web site of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, whose registrations are full of useful details. (“The wording ‘Biacolum’ has no meaning in a foreign language.”) On the trademark site, Zocavia and Zocania, which sound a little like tennis-playing twins from Serbia, are in fact registered to the same person in Guanting Village, Danling County, Sichuan Province. These brands, along with Zonkim, Biacolum, NYZNIA, and dozens of others, are under the purview of a company called Kimzon Network Technology. The Kimzon headquarters are on the sixteenth floor of an office building in the city of Chengdu, where, in the pandemic spring of 2020, the owner told me that he was reconsidering his approach to the American market.
有一個(gè)詞幾乎從未出現(xiàn)在亞馬遜式英語中秋茫，那就是“中國(guó)”電子商務(wù)分析公司 Marketplace Pulse 表示，亞馬遜近一半的最暢銷產(chǎn)品——那些在美國(guó)年銷售額超過100萬美元的產(chǎn)品——在中國(guó)乃秀。亞馬遜的一位發(fā)言人最近形容這種說法是不準(zhǔn)確的肛著，不過他拒絕透露中國(guó)賣家的數(shù)量，只是說美國(guó)網(wǎng)站上的大多數(shù)第三方賣家都在美國(guó)跺讯。在產(chǎn)品頁(yè)面上策泣，中國(guó)賣家很少宣傳他們的地理位置，Zocavias 和 Zocanias 也沒有提到他們?cè)谀睦锷a(chǎn)抬吟。要了解更多信息萨咕，可以訪問美國(guó)專利商標(biāo)局的網(wǎng)站，該局的注冊(cè)信息非常有用火本。(“‘ Biacolum’這個(gè)詞在外語中沒有任何意義危队。”)在這個(gè)商標(biāo)網(wǎng)站上钙畔，聽起來有點(diǎn)像塞爾維亞打網(wǎng)球的雙胞胎的 Zocavia 和 Zocania茫陆，實(shí)際上是在四川省丹棱縣官?gòu)d村注冊(cè)的同一個(gè)人。這些品牌擎析，連同 Zonkim簿盅、 Biacolum、 NYZNIA 以及其他幾十個(gè)品牌揍魂，都隸屬于一家名為 Kimzon Network Technology 的公司桨醋。總部位于成都市一座辦公樓的十六層现斋，在2020年春季的大流行期間喜最，老板告訴我他正在重新考慮進(jìn)入美國(guó)市場(chǎng)的方式。
It was April 26th, and Li Dewei wore a black Bluetooth headset, a black long-sleeved T-shirt, black trousers, and black sneakers that had not been made in any of his three factories. Li, who owned the company with a partner, was only in his mid-thirties, but he had the serious demeanor of an older man. Chengdu, like all Chinese cities, had already brought the pandemic under control, and Li told me that a week earlier he had stopped requiring masks in the workplace. But he had just started coping with the economic fallout of the virus. The previous month, Li had laid off fifty workers—a third of his Chengdu staff.
那是4月26日庄蹋，李德偉戴著黑色藍(lán)牙耳機(jī)瞬内，穿著黑色長(zhǎng)袖 t 恤迷雪，黑色褲子，黑色運(yùn)動(dòng)鞋虫蝶，這些東西都不是他的三家工廠生產(chǎn)的章咧。與一位合伙人共同擁有這家公司的李年僅三十五六歲，但他的舉止卻像一位老人一樣嚴(yán)肅能真。像所有中國(guó)城市一樣赁严，成都已經(jīng)控制住了疫情，李告訴我舟陆，一周前他已經(jīng)停止在工作場(chǎng)所需要口罩误澳。但他剛剛開始應(yīng)對(duì)病毒帶來的經(jīng)濟(jì)影響耻矮。上個(gè)月秦躯，李解雇了五十名員工---- 占成都員工總數(shù)的三分之一。
Li said that things would have been worse if not for the stimulus checks sent out by the Trump Administration under the?cares?Act. Because Li sold directly to Amazon customers, he could track sales closely. “We check the statistics every day,” he said. “After the American government started issuing the money, the next day we saw an increase in sales.” By the time I visited, two weeks into the stimulus program, Kimzon’s American sales had almost doubled, although they were still slightly lower than usual. “We don’t know whether the current consumption with the U.S. government aid is a short-term trend,” Li said.
李說裆装，如果沒有特朗普政府根據(jù)關(guān)心法案發(fā)放的刺激支票踱承，情況可能會(huì)更糟。因?yàn)槔钪苯用嫦騺嗰R遜的客戶銷售哨免，他可以密切跟蹤銷售情況茎活。“我們每天都檢查統(tǒng)計(jì)數(shù)據(jù),”他說琢唾≡乩螅“在美國(guó)政府開始發(fā)放貸款后，第二天我們就看到了銷售額的增長(zhǎng)采桃±廖酰”到我訪問時(shí)，也就是刺激計(jì)劃實(shí)施兩周后普办，金松的美國(guó)銷售額幾乎翻了一番工扎，盡管仍然比平時(shí)略低∠味祝“我們不知道目前在美國(guó)政府援助下的消費(fèi)是否是一個(gè)短期趨勢(shì),”李說肢娘。
Not long before, Li had had a series of discussions with his partner and some other export entrepreneurs. They had determined that June, 2020, would be a critical month. “If by June the virus is totally under control in the U.S. and the E.U., then we can rebound to the normal level,” Li told me. But the entrepreneurs had all concluded that it was unlikely that the U.S. and other Western countries would handle the pandemic well. Li was also concerned about the ongoing political conflict between China and the U.S.
不久前，李與他的合作伙伴和其他一些出口企業(yè)家進(jìn)行了一系列討論舆驶。他們已經(jīng)確定橱健，2020年6月將是一個(gè)關(guān)鍵的月份∩沉“如果到6月畴博，病毒在美國(guó)和歐盟完全得到控制，那么我們就可以恢復(fù)到正常水平,”李告訴我蓝仲。但是企業(yè)家們都得出結(jié)論俱病，美國(guó)和其他西方國(guó)家不太可能很好地應(yīng)對(duì)這場(chǎng)流行病官疲。李還對(duì)中美之間持續(xù)不斷的政治沖突表示擔(dān)憂。
In a typical year, seventy per cent of Kimzon’s sales were in the United States, with another twenty per cent in Europe and ten per cent in Japan. Kimzon sold nothing in the Chinese market. For Li and his partner, the solution seemed obvious: reduce American exposure by selling Zocavia, Zocania, and the other brands to Chinese consumers. “Many things in China are not being badly affected by the pandemic, like logistics,” Li explained. His staff had already redesigned some shoes and was preparing a domestic marketing campaign; the goal was to have as much as a third of their business in China within a year. Li expected that after three months he would know whether the plan might succeed.
在一個(gè)典型的年份里亮隙，Kimzon 百分之七十的銷售額在美國(guó)途凫，另外百分之二十在歐洲，百分之十在日本溢吻。金宗在中國(guó)市場(chǎng)上什么也沒賣出去维费。對(duì)于李和他的合作伙伴來說，解決方案似乎顯而易見: 通過向中國(guó)消費(fèi)者出售佐卡維亞促王、 Zocania 和其他品牌來減少美國(guó)的曝光度犀盟。“中國(guó)的很多事情都沒有受到大流行的嚴(yán)重影響蝇狼，比如物流,”李解釋說阅畴。他的員工已經(jīng)重新設(shè)計(jì)了一些鞋子，并準(zhǔn)備在國(guó)內(nèi)開展?fàn)I銷活動(dòng); 目標(biāo)是在一年內(nèi)將三分之一的業(yè)務(wù)拓展到中國(guó)迅耘。李預(yù)計(jì)贱枣，三個(gè)月后，他就會(huì)知道這個(gè)計(jì)劃是否會(huì)成功颤专。
In August of 2019, I had moved with my family to Chengdu, where I teach journalism and English at Sichuan University. It was the second time I had arrived in the region during a period of troubled U.S.-China relations. In 1995, the two countries had entered a tense phase after the U.S. State Department granted a visa to Lee Teng-hui, the President of Taiwan, who had been invited to give a speech at Cornell, his alma mater. The Chinese government responded furiously, conducting a series of missile tests in waters near Taiwan. In March, 1996, the U.S. sent ships to join two aircraft carriers in the region—the greatest show of American military strength in Asia since the Vietnam War.
2019年8月纽哥，我和家人搬到了成都，在四川大學(xué)教授新聞學(xué)和英語栖秕。這是我第二次在美中關(guān)系陷入困境的時(shí)候來到這個(gè)地區(qū)春塌。1995年，在美國(guó)國(guó)務(wù)院向臺(tái)灣總統(tǒng)李登輝(Lee Teng-hui)發(fā)放簽證之后簇捍，兩國(guó)關(guān)系進(jìn)入了緊張階段只壳。李登輝應(yīng)邀在他的母校康奈爾大學(xué)(Cornell)發(fā)表演講垦写。中國(guó)政府做出了憤怒的回應(yīng)吕世，在臺(tái)灣附近海域進(jìn)行了一系列導(dǎo)彈試驗(yàn)。1996年3月梯投，美國(guó)派遣軍艦加入該地區(qū)的兩艘航空母艦命辖，這是自越南戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)以來美國(guó)在亞洲最大的軍事實(shí)力展示。
“How do you like the standing throne?”?“你覺得這個(gè)站立的寶座怎么樣?”
Cartoon by Joe Dator?卡通作者: Joe Dator
That summer, I arrived in Chengdu as a Peace Corps volunteer. Along with another young American, Adam Meier, I was assigned to teach at a college in a remote part of Sichuan. Bill Clinton was running for re?lection, and he was frequently attacked by the Chinese state-controlled media. Years later, one of my students wrote a letter in which she described her feelings at the time: “Not long after you became my teacher, I read a piece of news comment that said [if] Mr. Clinton took presidency, one of the reasons was that he would take stronger measure on China. Those days, I hated to see you and Mr.?Meier.”
那年夏天分蓖，我作為和平隊(duì)志愿者來到了成都尔艇。我和另一個(gè)年輕的美國(guó)人亞當(dāng) · 邁耶一起被分配到四川邊遠(yuǎn)地區(qū)的一所大學(xué)任教。比爾 · 克林頓正在競(jìng)選連任么鹤，他經(jīng)常受到中國(guó)官方媒體的攻擊终娃。幾年后，我的一個(gè)學(xué)生寫了一封信蒸甜，描述了她當(dāng)時(shí)的感受: “在你成為我的老師后不久棠耕，我看到一條新聞評(píng)論說余佛，如果克林頓先生當(dāng)選總統(tǒng)，原因之一就是他會(huì)對(duì)中國(guó)采取更強(qiáng)硬的措施窍荧。那些日子辉巡，我討厭見到你和邁爾先生∪锿耍”
But any such opinions were kept quiet. In Sichuan, people generally took a pragmatic approach to politics, and the college accepted the risk of American teachers as part of Deng Xiaoping’s “reform and opening” policy. Most students came from poor rural families, but they had tested well enough to major in English. Along with language classes, they took mandatory political courses with throwback titles like Marxism-Leninism and Building Chinese Socialism. Yet even a glance outside the classroom showed how quickly Chinese socialism was being dismantled. During my second year, the government stopped providing graduates with guaranteed jobs, and the local housing market was privatized, a process that was happening across the country. Some of my most ambitious students left for provinces like Guangdong and Zhejiang, where the export economy was starting to boom.
但任何這樣的意見都保持沉默郊楣。在四川棺榔，人們普遍對(duì)政治采取務(wù)實(shí)的態(tài)度尿贫，學(xué)院接受了美國(guó)教師的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)作為鄧小平“改革開放”政策的一部分。大多數(shù)學(xué)生來自貧窮的農(nóng)村家庭共屈，但他們的測(cè)試結(jié)果足夠好输硝，主修英語今瀑。除了語言課之外，他們還必須參加一些老掉牙的政治課程腔丧，比如馬克思列寧主義和建設(shè)中國(guó)社會(huì)主義放椰。然而作烟，即使只是在教室外瞥一眼愉粤，也能看出中國(guó)的社會(huì)主義正在以多么快的速度被瓦解。在我任職的第二年拿撩，政府停止為畢業(yè)生提供有保障的工作衣厘，當(dāng)?shù)氐姆康禺a(chǎn)市場(chǎng)被私有化，這一過程正在全國(guó)范圍內(nèi)發(fā)生压恒。我的一些最有抱負(fù)的學(xué)生離開了廣東和浙江這樣的省份影暴，那里的出口經(jīng)濟(jì)開始繁榮。
Bill Clinton turned out to be better for China than anybody would have predicted. In his second term, Congress granted China permanent trading privileges, and Clinton began the process of negotiating for China’s admission to the World Trade Organization, which happened in 2001. Throughout successive Administrations, the U.S. mostly followed a strategy of engagement with China. Even President Obama’s “Pivot to Asia” policy, which was intended to counter China’s growing influence in the region, seemed to have little real effect.
事實(shí)證明探赫，比爾?克林頓(Bill Clinton)對(duì)中國(guó)的好處超出了任何人的預(yù)期型宙。在他的第二個(gè)任期內(nèi)，國(guó)會(huì)給予中國(guó)永久的貿(mào)易特權(quán)伦吠，克林頓開始了中國(guó)加入世界貿(mào)易組織的談判進(jìn)程妆兑，這個(gè)進(jìn)程發(fā)生在2001年。在連續(xù)幾屆政府中毛仪，美國(guó)大多采取與中國(guó)接觸的戰(zhàn)略搁嗓。甚至連奧巴馬總統(tǒng)的“轉(zhuǎn)向亞洲”政策——旨在對(duì)抗中國(guó)在該地區(qū)日益增長(zhǎng)的影響力——似乎也收效甚微。
VIDEO FROM THE NEW YORKER?來自《紐約客》的視頻
A Daughter and Her Mother Reconnect Over Chinese Dumplings?女兒和母親重溫中國(guó)餃子
When I returned to Chengdu, the material benefits of the reform era could be seen everywhere: an extensive subway system, a brand-new Sichuan University campus, a high-rise business district where Kimzon and other companies were situated. In my classroom, I felt the change at the most visceral level. My students laughed when I showed class pictures from 1996—at five feet nine inches, I had towered over my students. Now, because of rising living standards, it seemed that I was shorter than most of the boys I taught. Last year, a study in?The Lancet?reported that, out of two hundred countries, China has seen the largest increase in boys’ height, and the third largest in girls’, since 1985. The average Chinese nineteen-year-old male is now more than three and a half inches taller.
當(dāng)我回到成都時(shí)箱靴，改革時(shí)代帶來的物質(zhì)利益隨處可見: 龐大的地鐵系統(tǒng)腺逛、嶄新的四川大學(xué)校園、 Kimzon 和其它公司所在的高層商業(yè)區(qū)衡怀。在我的課堂上棍矛，我感受到了發(fā)自肺腑的變化安疗。當(dāng)我展示1996年的班級(jí)照片時(shí)，我的學(xué)生們都笑了够委，我的身高超過了我的學(xué)生們∶酰現(xiàn)在，由于生活水平的提高慨绳，我似乎比我教過的大多數(shù)男孩都矮掉冶。去年，《柳葉刀》雜志的一項(xiàng)研究報(bào)告說脐雪，在200個(gè)國(guó)家中厌小，中國(guó)的男孩身高增幅最大，女孩身高增幅第三战秋，自1985年以來¤笛牵現(xiàn)在，中國(guó)19歲的男性平均身高超過3.5英寸脂信。
Almost all of my students came from urban middle-class families. The majority were enrolled in a program that sent them to the University of Pittsburgh for their final year or two, joining the nearly four hundred thousand Chinese who study in the U.S. every year. But, at Sichuan University, even students bound for America still took political courses with throwback names: Basic Principles of Marxism, Introduction to Mao Zedong Thought and Socialism with Chinese Characteristics. Next to the building where I taught, a recently completed structure had a gleaming four-story glass fa?ade and a row of enormous golden characters that read “Marxism Institute.” The building reminded me of my students: bigger, stronger, better dressed. The institute had been designed with a large parking garage in the basement, because nowadays a lot of Chinese Marxists buy cars.
我的幾乎所有學(xué)生都來自城市中產(chǎn)階級(jí)家庭癣蟋。他們中的大多數(shù)人都參加了一個(gè)項(xiàng)目，這個(gè)項(xiàng)目把他們送到匹茲堡大學(xué)進(jìn)行最后一兩年的學(xué)習(xí)狰闪，加入到每年在美國(guó)學(xué)習(xí)的近40萬中國(guó)人的行列疯搅。但是，在四川大學(xué)埋泵，即使是前往美國(guó)的學(xué)生也在學(xué)習(xí)一些名字倒退的政治課程: 馬克思主義基本原理幔欧、毛澤東思想概論和中國(guó)特色社會(huì)主義。在我教書的大樓旁邊丽声，是一座剛剛完工的建筑礁蔗，四層玻璃幕墻熠熠生輝，一排巨大的金字招牌上寫著“馬克思主義研究所”這座建筑讓我想起了我的學(xué)生們: 更大雁社，更強(qiáng)壯浴井，穿著更好。這個(gè)研究所在地下室設(shè)計(jì)了一個(gè)大停車場(chǎng)霉撵，因?yàn)楝F(xiàn)在很多中國(guó)馬克思主義者都買汽車磺浙。
The Communist Party’s control was even more powerful than I remembered, and relations with the United States were even worse. Before Donald Trump took office, a consensus had already been building in Washington that the Chinese had benefitted too much from the bilateral relationship. Trump Administration officials frequently advocated “decoupling”—separating from China in economic and technological realms. In the spring of 2018, Trump started imposing high tariffs on Chinese products, and China countered with measures of its own. Exchange programs also came under pressure, in part as a response to a brutal Chinese crackdown in Xinjiang and the suppression of pro-democracy activists in Hong Kong. During my first year at Sichuan University, Trump abruptly ended the China Peace Corps program, along with all Fulbright exchanges with China and Hong Kong.
共產(chǎn)黨的控制比我記憶中更加強(qiáng)大，與美國(guó)的關(guān)系更加惡化喊巍。在唐納德 · 特朗普(Donald Trump)上臺(tái)之前屠缭，華盛頓已經(jīng)形成了一種共識(shí)，即中國(guó)從雙邊關(guān)系中獲益過多崭参。特朗普政府官員經(jīng)常提倡“脫鉤”ーー在經(jīng)濟(jì)和技術(shù)領(lǐng)域脫離中國(guó)呵曹。2018年春，特朗普開始對(duì)中國(guó)產(chǎn)品征收高額關(guān)稅，中國(guó)采取了自己的措施予以反擊奄喂。交流項(xiàng)目也受到了壓力铐殃，部分原因是中國(guó)政府對(duì)新疆的殘酷鎮(zhèn)壓，以及對(duì)香港親民主活動(dòng)人士的鎮(zhèn)壓跨新。我在四川大學(xué)的第一年富腊，特朗普突然中止了中國(guó)和平隊(duì)項(xiàng)目，以及富布賴特與中國(guó)和香港的所有交流域帐。
In Chengdu, most people seemed to respond as they always had. Li Dewei told me that he had no strong opinions about American politics, and that, after tariffs were imposed on his shoes, he simply raised his Amazon prices by fifteen per cent. “The tariff is paid by the customer,” he said.
在成都赘被，大多數(shù)人的反應(yīng)似乎和往常一樣。李德偉告訴我肖揣，他對(duì)美國(guó)政治沒有強(qiáng)烈的意見民假，在他的鞋子被征收關(guān)稅后，他只是把亞馬遜的價(jià)格提高了百分之十五龙优⊙蛞欤“關(guān)稅由客戶支付,”他表示。
In my department, all instructors helped out at a writing center, where students could make appointments for tutoring sessions. Before I arrived, there had been a plan to purchase scheduling software from an American company. But the deal fell through, and an administrator told us in meetings that he believed the reason to be fallout from the trade war. So the department found a U.K. company, Fresha, that provides software for salons, spas, and massage parlors. Whenever I received notice of a tutorial, the student was described as a “customer,” and promotional e-mails pitched me on added features like special settings for “Mani-Pedi or Couples Massage.” In April, the massage e-mails suddenly got a lot more urgent: “The?covid-19 crisis has triggered a tsunami of Salons and Spas switching to Fresha from their current expensive scheduling solutions.”
在我的部門彤断，所有的老師都在一個(gè)寫作中心幫忙野舶，學(xué)生可以在那里預(yù)約輔導(dǎo)時(shí)間。在我到達(dá)之前宰衙，有一個(gè)從一家美國(guó)公司購(gòu)買日程安排軟件的計(jì)劃平道。但是這筆交易最終失敗了，一位行政官員在會(huì)議上告訴我們菩浙，他認(rèn)為原因是貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)帶來的后果巢掺。因此句伶，該部門找到了一家英國(guó)公司劲蜻，F(xiàn)resha，為美容院考余、水療中心和按摩院提供軟件先嬉。每當(dāng)我收到一個(gè)教程的通知，這個(gè)學(xué)生就被描述成一個(gè)“顧客”楚堤，促銷電子郵件就會(huì)向我推薦增加的功能疫蔓，比如“ Mani-Pedi 或 Couples Massage”的特殊設(shè)置今年4月，按摩電子郵件突然變得更加緊急: “2019冠狀病毒疾病危機(jī)引發(fā)了沙龍和溫泉的海嘯身冬，它們從目前昂貴的日程安排解決方案轉(zhuǎn)向了 Fresha衅胀。”
On May 14th, I met Li Dewei for dinner, and he told me that Kimzon was struggling with the shift to the domestic market. “Sales aren’t good yet,” he said. He thought that style might be an issue, so Kimzon was producing shoes with white soles instead of black, believing that these would appeal to Chinese consumers.
5月14日酥筝，我和李德偉共進(jìn)晚餐滚躯，他告訴我金宗正在努力轉(zhuǎn)向國(guó)內(nèi)市場(chǎng)。“目前銷售情況還不好,”他表示掸掏。他認(rèn)為這種風(fēng)格可能是個(gè)問題茁影，所以金宗生產(chǎn)的鞋子是白底而不是黑底，他認(rèn)為這樣會(huì)吸引中國(guó)消費(fèi)者丧凤。
In March, when the pandemic first began to have an impact in America, Kimzon had reduced its production to five hundred pairs a day. But now it was up to two thousand, close to normal. Although Li had laid off people in design and marketing, he never downsized assembly-line workers. He told me that the top priority was to protect the supply chain.
今年3月募闲，當(dāng)疫情首次開始在美國(guó)產(chǎn)生影響時(shí)，Kimzon 已經(jīng)將其產(chǎn)量減少到每天500雙愿待。但是現(xiàn)在已經(jīng)升到了2000浩螺，接近正常水平。盡管李在設(shè)計(jì)和營(yíng)銷領(lǐng)域裁員仍侥，但他從未裁減過流水線工人年扩。他告訴我，當(dāng)務(wù)之急是保護(hù)供應(yīng)鏈访圃。
Despite all of Li’s business on Amazon, he had never visited the U.S. His background was modest: his parents had grown up in farming families, and their educations ended with primary school. Both of them found assembly-line work at a blanket factory, and eventually they started their own small blanket workshop. They spent much of their disposable income on educating Li and his two siblings. Li excelled in high school, and he was admitted to Sichuan University. After graduating, he went to work for a family friend who ran a shoe factory in Fujian Province, where Li learned the trade.
盡管李在亞馬遜做生意厨幻，但他從未去過美國(guó)。他的背景很樸素: 他的父母在農(nóng)民家庭長(zhǎng)大腿时，他們的教育在小學(xué)就結(jié)束了况脆。他們兩人都在一家毛毯廠找到了流水線工作，最后開辦了自己的小毛毯車間批糟。他們把可支配收入的大部分時(shí)間花在教育李和他的兄弟姐妹上格了。李成績(jī)優(yōu)異，被四川大學(xué)錄取徽鼎。畢業(yè)后盛末，他去為一個(gè)家族朋友工作，這個(gè)朋友在福建經(jīng)營(yíng)一家鞋廠否淤，李在那里學(xué)會(huì)了這門手藝悄但。
We always communicated in Mandarin, but Li read English well. He used a virtual private network to skirt the Chinese firewall and access sites like Google Trends, in order to research the American market. “It would help to go to America, but from the Internet we can learn a lot,” he said. “America is a free place—so much information is open. That’s different from China.” Li had developed some long-distance ideas about American characteristics, and he expressed them diplomatically. “Of course, you have more experience, but my thinking is that Americans don’t save much,” he told me once, after describing the way that sales increased in response to the stimulus payments. “Whenever they have money, they’ll spend it.”
我們總是用普通話交流，但李老師英語讀得很好石抡。為了研究美國(guó)市場(chǎng)檐嚣，他使用了一個(gè)虛擬專用網(wǎng)絡(luò)來繞過中國(guó)的防火墻和訪問像谷歌趨勢(shì)這樣的網(wǎng)站。他說: “去美國(guó)會(huì)有幫助啰扛，但是從互聯(lián)網(wǎng)上我們可以學(xué)到很多東西嚎京。”隐解“暗郏“美國(guó)是一個(gè)自由的地方ーー有太多的信息是開放的。這與中國(guó)不同煞茫∨劣浚”李對(duì)美國(guó)人的特點(diǎn)有一些遠(yuǎn)距離的看法岩臣，他用外交的方式表達(dá)出來∠颍“當(dāng)然架谎，你們有更多的經(jīng)驗(yàn)，但我的想法是辟躏，美國(guó)人沒有太多的儲(chǔ)蓄,”他曾經(jīng)這樣告訴我谷扣，在描述了銷售額隨著刺激資金的增加而增長(zhǎng)的方式之后∩铀觯“只要他們有錢会涎，他們就會(huì)花掉∪鸫眨”
Masks for sale at Yiwu’s wholesale market, home to some hundred thousand merchants.?義烏批發(fā)市場(chǎng)出售的面具末秃，這里有大約十萬商人Photograph by Guligo Jia for The New Yorker?攝影: Guligo Jia/紐約客
The Chinese government had botched its initial response to the coronavirus, which first began to spread in Wuhan, a city about seven hundred miles east of Chengdu. After covering up details about the virus, and detaining and punishing early whistle-blowers, the government eventually instituted effective policies aimed at eliminating the spread of infection. But relatively little direct economic support was given to citizens. During the first financial quarter of 2020, the Chinese economy shrank?by nearly seven per cent, the first time the government had reported a contraction since the Mao Zedong era. Nevertheless, the government didn’t issue across-the-board stimulus payments. “If the Chinese government did that, people would just put it in the bank,” Li told?me.
中國(guó)政府最初對(duì)這種冠狀病毒的反應(yīng)是拙劣的，它首先在成都以東大約700英里的武漢開始傳播籽御。在隱瞞病毒的細(xì)節(jié)练慕，拘留和懲罰舉報(bào)人之后，政府最終制定了有效的政策技掏，旨在消除感染的傳播铃将。但是給予公民的直接經(jīng)濟(jì)支持相對(duì)較少。在2020年的第一個(gè)財(cái)政季度哑梳，中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)萎縮了近7% 劲阎，這是自毛澤東時(shí)代以來中國(guó)政府首次報(bào)告經(jīng)濟(jì)出現(xiàn)萎縮。盡管如此鸠真，政府并沒有發(fā)放全面的經(jīng)濟(jì)刺激支出悯仙。“如果中國(guó)政府這么做吠卷，人們只會(huì)把錢存進(jìn)銀行,”李告訴我锡垄。
In fact, many Americans had done the same. Scott R. Baker, an economist at Northwestern University, told me recently that the?cares?Act prompted spending patterns that were unlike what resulted from stimulus programs in 2001 and 2008. “The big difference was less spending on durables,” Baker said. “People weren’t buying new cars and refrigerators.” He continued, “It seems that a majority of checks were saved.”
事實(shí)上，許多美國(guó)人也這樣做了撤嫩。西北大學(xué)的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家 Scott r. Baker 最近告訴我偎捎，關(guān)心法案促進(jìn)了支出模式，這與2001年和2008年的刺激計(jì)劃不同序攘。“最大的區(qū)別是在耐用品上的支出減少了,”貝克說寻拂〕痰欤“人們不再購(gòu)買新車和冰箱〖蓝ぃ”他接著說瞄沙，“看來大部分支票都存了下來。”
Along with four other economists, Baker had analyzed high-frequency bank-transaction data for more than thirty thousand consumers. They concluded that the 2020 stimulus was less effective than previous programs, in part because of the unique nature of the pandemic, which had caused consumers to be wary of visiting a car dealership or having appliances delivered by strangers. “If you can send out a thousand-dollar check and it prompts the purchase of a car, that has a big effect,” Baker said. “Versus the purchase of thirty-dollar shoes from overseas—that’s not doing a lot for the economy.”
貝克和其他四位經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家一起分析了超過三萬名消費(fèi)者的高頻銀行交易數(shù)據(jù)距境。他們的結(jié)論是申尼，2020年的刺激計(jì)劃不如以前的計(jì)劃有效，部分原因是由于流行病的獨(dú)特性垫桂，導(dǎo)致消費(fèi)者對(duì)拜訪汽車經(jīng)銷商或讓陌生人送電器產(chǎn)生警惕师幕。貝克說: “如果你能寄出一張一千美元的支票，并且它提示你購(gòu)買一輛汽車诬滩，這將會(huì)產(chǎn)生很大的影響霹粥。”疼鸟『罂兀“相比之下，從海外購(gòu)買30美元的鞋子對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)影響不大空镜『铺裕”
I had described Li Dewei’s post-stimulus sales. “I’m not surprised that he sees that surge so clearly,” Baker said. “We see that the majority of spending that does happen goes out in the first week or so after receiving the check.” He noted that, while most Americans seemed to have saved their stimulus checks, people with less money in their bank accounts were more likely to spend. These consumers tended to buy food, nondurables, and other inexpensive items—often, the kinds of products manufactured by Chinese entrepreneurs like Li Dewei.
我描述過李德偉在刺激計(jì)劃之后的銷售情況∥庠埽“他能如此清楚地看到這種增長(zhǎng)馋袜，我并不感到驚訝,”貝克說〔案“我們看到欣鳖，確實(shí)發(fā)生的大部分支出在收到支票后的第一周左右就出去了≤罾鳎”他指出泽台，盡管大多數(shù)美國(guó)人似乎已經(jīng)把他們的經(jīng)濟(jì)刺激支票存起來了，但是銀行賬戶里存款較少的人更有可能花錢矾缓。這些消費(fèi)者傾向于購(gòu)買食品怀酷、非耐用品和其他廉價(jià)商品ーー通常是像李德偉這樣的中國(guó)企業(yè)家制造的產(chǎn)品。
In Chengdu, Li and his staff combed through Amazon reviews every day. He described them as a kind of?jiaoliu—an exchange or conversation. Early in the pandemic, many American consumers complained about shipping delays, and, on May 6th, a buyer rated one of Li’s products with a single star: “They were late. Then they were stolen off my porch. I would like a refund immediately.” Li eventually contracted with a more expensive shipping service, and he made other adjustments. When a number of customers complained about a narrow toe box in the Zocania brand of shoes, Li had changes made at the factory.
在成都嗜闻，李和他的員工每天都會(huì)梳理亞馬遜的評(píng)論蜕依。他把它們形容為一種叫做交流的方式ーー一種交流或談話。在大流行早期琉雳，許多美國(guó)消費(fèi)者抱怨運(yùn)輸延誤样眠，5月6日，一位買家給李的一款產(chǎn)品打了一顆星: “他們遲到了翠肘。然后他們從我的門廊被偷走了檐束。我要求立即退款∈叮”李最終與一家更昂貴的航運(yùn)公司簽訂了合同被丧，并做了其他調(diào)整盟戏。當(dāng)一些客戶抱怨 zokania 品牌的鞋子有一個(gè)窄腳趾盒時(shí)，李在工廠做了一些改變甥桂。
Part of the Amazon?jiaoliu?was a glimpse of pandemic life for lower-income Americans. Reviews rarely mentioned exercise or sporting activities; it seemed more likely for customers to buy Li’s shoes to wear at jobs that required them to stand. On May 16th, a customer gave one star, on account of the “non-slip” tread: “I’m a cook at dennys and I almost busted my face just from water on our kitchen floor! Super scary!” Others referred to jobs that had vanished. June 14th, five stars: “I got them for work but just found out my work won’t be opening back up but I still like them.” As the summer wore on, other points of stress emerged. July?13th, five stars: “Bottom tread doesn’t last very long. I was only chased by the police twice while wearing these and they’re down to half the tread life!” August 1st, one star: “Bought two pairs, didn’t return because of the whole pandemic thing (was honestly afraid to get them in mail *nervous chuckle*).”
亞馬遜交流的一部分是對(duì)低收入美國(guó)人大流行生活的一瞥柿究。評(píng)論很少提到運(yùn)動(dòng)或體育活動(dòng); 似乎顧客更有可能購(gòu)買李的鞋穿在工作要求他們站立。5月16日黄选，一位顧客給了一顆星蝇摸，因?yàn)椤胺阑钡男? “我是丹尼斯的廚師，我的臉差點(diǎn)被廚房地板上的水打破了!”糕簿！超級(jí)恐怖!”其他人則提到了消失的工作崗位探入。6月14日，五顆星: “我得到它們是為了工作懂诗，但剛剛發(fā)現(xiàn)我的工作不會(huì)重新開始蜂嗽，但我仍然喜歡它們⊙旰悖”隨著夏天的慢慢過去植旧，其他的壓力點(diǎn)也出現(xiàn)了。7月13日离唐，五星級(jí): “底部的腳印不會(huì)持續(xù)很久病附。我穿著這個(gè)只被警察追了兩次，而且只剩下一半的壽命了!”8月1日亥鬓，一顆星: “買了兩雙完沪，因?yàn)榱餍胁〉氖虑闆]有回來(真的很害怕收到郵件 * 緊張地咯咯笑 *)∏陡辏”
Periodically, Li and his staff tinkered with product photos or Amazonglish descriptions. (“The soft insole fits well and protect your ankle, tongues and feet from hurt.”) Li followed the American news closely, and he always seemed to know the current number of coronavirus cases. “Two million six hundred and fifty thousand,” he told me on July 2nd, when I asked about the situation. “Every day it goes up another thirty to forty thousand. These are not optimistic numbers.” But, even as the pandemic worsened across the Pacific, Li kept an eye out for other opportunities. In June, after Li’s research on Google Trends gave him a new idea, he hired an American lawyer to register yet another application with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. Like the others, the new brand name was a puzzle: Pemily12.
李和他的員工定期修改產(chǎn)品照片或亞馬遜式英語的描述覆积。(“柔軟的鞋墊非常合腳，可以保護(hù)你的腳踝熟呛、舌頭和腳免受傷害宽档。”)李密切關(guān)注著美國(guó)的新聞庵朝，他似乎總是知道目前冠狀病毒病例的數(shù)量吗冤。“265萬,”7月2日九府，當(dāng)我問及情況時(shí)椎瘟，他告訴我∥舳海“每天都在增加三十到四萬降传。這些數(shù)字并不樂觀」磁”但是婆排，即使疫情在整個(gè)太平洋地區(qū)惡化，李仍然密切關(guān)注其他機(jī)會(huì)笔链。今年6月段只，李對(duì)谷歌趨勢(shì)的研究給了他一個(gè)新的想法，他聘請(qǐng)了一名美國(guó)律師在美國(guó)專利商標(biāo)局注冊(cè)了另一份申請(qǐng)鉴扫。和其他品牌一樣赞枕，這個(gè)新品牌也是個(gè)謎: Pemily12。
In late January last year, the U.S. Embassy and five consulates in China, including the one in Chengdu, decided to evacuate non-essential American staff, along with all spouses and children. Many other embassies and foreign companies across China made similar decisions. My wife, Leslie, and I opted to stay, along with our twin daughters, who attend a local public school. Our decision had nothing to do with an estimation of which country was likely to handle the disease better. We simply didn’t grasp the seriousness of the pandemic, and the Chengdu lockdown, which lasted for about a month and a half, struck us as overkill. In a city of more than sixteen million, there were only a hundred and forty-three symptomatic cases reported by the end of February. Afterward, there weren’t any recorded instances of community spread for the rest of the spring. There didn’t seem to be a real risk of catching the disease, so we saw no reason to leave.
去年一月下旬坪创，美國(guó)駐華大使館和包括成都在內(nèi)的五個(gè)領(lǐng)事館決定撤離非必要的美國(guó)工作人員以及所有的配偶和孩子炕婶。中國(guó)各地的許多其他大使館和外國(guó)公司也做出了類似的決定。我的妻子萊斯利和我選擇留下來莱预，還有我們的雙胞胎女兒柠掂，她們?cè)诋?dāng)?shù)氐囊凰W(xué)校上學(xué)。我們的決定與估計(jì)哪個(gè)國(guó)家可能更好地處理這種疾病無關(guān)依沮。我們根本沒有意識(shí)到疫情的嚴(yán)重性涯贞，成都持續(xù)了大約一個(gè)半月的封鎖給我們留下了過度殺傷的印象。在一個(gè)超過一千六百萬人口的城市危喉，到二月底只有一百四十三例報(bào)告有癥狀的病例宋渔。之后，在接下來的春天里辜限，沒有任何社區(qū)傳播的記錄皇拣。似乎沒有感染這種疾病的真正風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，所以我們沒有理由離開薄嫡。
At the end of March, the Chinese government banned the entry of almost all foreign-passport holders, even if they had valid work visas. Officials believed that as long as they could quarantine the relatively few Chinese nationals who returned, and maintain testing and contact-tracing across the country, daily life could proceed with few restrictions. By early May, our daughters’ third-grade section of fifty-four kids was back in the classroom, and within a couple of weeks they stopped wearing masks. That month, when I took a domestic flight for the first time since the lockdown, there wasn’t an empty seat on the plane.
3月底氧急，中國(guó)政府禁止幾乎所有持有外國(guó)護(hù)照的人入境潮饱，即使他們有有效的工作簽證烦绳。官員們認(rèn)為，只要他們能隔離回國(guó)的相對(duì)較少的中國(guó)公民辽社，并在全國(guó)范圍內(nèi)進(jìn)行檢測(cè)和追蹤接觸者费什，日常生活就可以很少受到限制钾恢。到了五月初，我們女兒五十四個(gè)孩子的三年級(jí)班級(jí)又回到了教室鸳址，幾個(gè)星期后她們就不戴口罩了瘩蚪。那個(gè)月，當(dāng)我自封鎖以來第一次乘坐國(guó)內(nèi)航班時(shí)稿黍，飛機(jī)上沒有空座位疹瘦。
Initially, I had assumed that in China we would undergo the pandemic first, and then the rest of the world would follow, step by step: outbreak, lockdown, recovery. But now it became clear how much our experiences had diverged, and Chengdu’s month-and-a-half lockdown began to seem shorter in my memory. I hadn’t missed a single barbershop haircut, and all of our favorite restaurants had reopened completely. The only reason we ever used videoconferencing was to communicate with family and friends in the U.S., mostly out of solidarity. In early May, some old college friends arranged a Zoom meeting, talking about their American lockdown experiences. Afterward, I closed my computer and biked across town to a night club to do some reporting. The club was packed; out of dozens of people on the dance floor, only one woman wore a mask.
起初，我以為在中國(guó)我們會(huì)首先經(jīng)歷這場(chǎng)大流行巡球，然后世界其他地方會(huì)跟隨言沐，一步一步: 爆發(fā)邓嘹，封鎖，恢復(fù)险胰。但現(xiàn)在汹押，我們的經(jīng)歷有多么不同，這一點(diǎn)變得清晰起來起便。在我的記憶中棚贾，成都一個(gè)半月的封鎖似乎變得越來越短。我從來沒有錯(cuò)過理發(fā)店的理發(fā)榆综，我們最喜歡的所有餐館都完全重新開張了妙痹。我們使用視頻會(huì)議的唯一原因是為了與美國(guó)的家人和朋友交流，大部分是出于團(tuán)結(jié)鼻疮。五月初怯伊，一些大學(xué)老朋友安排了一次 Zoom 會(huì)議，談?wù)撍麄冊(cè)诿绹?guó)的封鎖經(jīng)歷陋守。之后震贵，我關(guān)上電腦，騎自行車穿過城市到一家夜總會(huì)做一些報(bào)道水评。俱樂部里擠滿了人猩系，舞池里幾十個(gè)人，只有一個(gè)女人戴著面具中燥。
By the second financial quarter, the Chinese economy was growing again. In July, exports rose 7.2 per cent compared with the same month a year earlier, and I made a long trip across Zhejiang Province, one of the centers of foreign trade. Most entrepreneurs I met there said the same thing: they were surprised by how quickly sales were bouncing back. They also indicated that they had never suffered much from the effects of the U.S. trade war. A couple of small-scale exporters told me that they underreported the value of goods, in order to avoid tariffs, but others said that this practice was too risky for large businesses. In general, they passed at least some of the cost on to American customers, and the Chinese government had a long-standing policy of tax rebates for exporters.
到了第二個(gè)財(cái)政季度寇甸，中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)再次增長(zhǎng)。今年7月疗涉，中國(guó)出口同比增長(zhǎng)7.2% 拿霉。我還長(zhǎng)途跋涉，穿越了浙江省這個(gè)外貿(mào)中心之一咱扣。我在那里遇到的大多數(shù)企業(yè)家都說了同樣的話: 他們對(duì)銷售額恢復(fù)得如此之快感到驚訝绽淘。他們還表示，他們從未遭受過美國(guó)貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)的影響闹伪。一些小規(guī)模出口商告訴我沪铭，他們?yōu)榱吮苊怅P(guān)稅而低報(bào)商品價(jià)值，但其他人說偏瓤，這種做法對(duì)大型企業(yè)來說風(fēng)險(xiǎn)太大杀怠。總的來說厅克，他們至少將部分成本轉(zhuǎn)嫁給了美國(guó)消費(fèi)者赔退，而且中國(guó)政府長(zhǎng)期實(shí)行出口退稅政策。
Entrepreneurs mentioned other ways to avoid negative attention. In Yuhuan, a city near the coast, I met a woman who managed foreign trade for a company that manufactured precision parts for automobiles. She said that U.S. clients had her sign contracts that prevented her from listing their names on her company’s Web site.“We can’t say publicly that we do business with this American company,” she said. “They don’t want people to know they’re getting this part from China.”
企業(yè)家提到了其他避免負(fù)面關(guān)注的方法。在沿海城市玉環(huán)硕旗，我遇到了一位女士窗骑，她為一家生產(chǎn)汽車精密零部件的公司管理外貿(mào)業(yè)務(wù)。她說卵渴，美國(guó)客戶讓她簽了合同慧域，這使她無法在公司網(wǎng)站上列出他們的名字鲤竹±硕粒“我們不能公開說我們和這家美國(guó)公司有生意往來,”她說⌒猎澹“他們不想讓人們知道他們是從中國(guó)得到這個(gè)零件的碘橘。”
“Yes, I do need help. Could you show me where the chocolate chips are and tell me everything’s going to be O.K.?”?“是的吱肌，我確實(shí)需要幫助痘拆。你能告訴我巧克力片在哪里，告訴我一切都會(huì)好起來的嗎?”
Cartoon by Drew Panckeri?漫畫作者: Drew Panckeri
She no longer travelled abroad for trade fairs or meetings, but the lack of direct contact wasn’t much of a problem. Even in Yiwu, the site of China’s largest wholesale market, people had adjusted quickly. Usually, the city is home to around ten thousand foreigners, along with many more who arrive on short buying trips, and neighborhoods cater to various nationalities and regions. But now these places felt abandoned; on one street, I walked past ten Indian restaurants that were closed.
她不再出國(guó)參加貿(mào)易展覽會(huì)或會(huì)議氮墨，但缺乏直接聯(lián)系不是什么大問題纺蛆。即使在中國(guó)最大的批發(fā)市場(chǎng)所在地義烏，人們也很快適應(yīng)了规揪。通常桥氏，這座城市是大約一萬名外國(guó)人的家園，還有更多的外國(guó)人來到這里進(jìn)行短期購(gòu)物旅行猛铅，而且這座城市的社區(qū)也迎合了不同國(guó)籍和地區(qū)的人們字支。但是現(xiàn)在這些地方感覺被遺棄了; 在一條街上，我走過了十家關(guān)門的印度餐館奸忽。
Nearby, on a block of shipping agents that specialized in Russian and Central Asian trade, only one was open. The boss, Mao Yuankui, told me that the pandemic had shifted everybody’s working hours. “They’re closed in the morning, because it’s too early in Russia,” he said. “We’re mostly on the phone and WeChat nowadays. Customers aren’t coming to the stores.”
不遠(yuǎn)處堕伪，在一大批專門從事俄羅斯和中亞貿(mào)易的船運(yùn)代理商中，只有一家開門營(yíng)業(yè)栗菜。老板毛元奎告訴我欠雌，疫情已經(jīng)改變了每個(gè)人的工作時(shí)間「沓铮“他們?cè)缟详P(guān)門富俄，因?yàn)樵诙砹_斯還太早,”他說‰缜福“我們現(xiàn)在大部分時(shí)間都在打電話和微信蛙酪。顧客不會(huì)來商店了∏谈牵”
Mao shipped cargo to Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Russia. In a normal year, he relied on planes for urgent orders, but flight schedules had been slashed. In the years before the pandemic, China’s Belt and Road Initiative had invested in the longest freight rail line in the world, which runs for more than eight thousand miles, from Yiwu to Madrid, passing through Central Asia. Mao said that now he was using trains to move a lot of cargo. During the pandemic, shipping rates rose, and traffic was unbalanced: for every three shipping containers that left China, only one returned, because export sectors in other countries had been decimated. Even before the pandemic, China had produced ninety-six per cent of the world’s shipping containers, and now that industry was also in overdrive. Mao told me to come back late at night, to see how the neighborhood functioned. When I returned, the cargo shops were lit up. Inside, agents were busy on phones and computers, all of them working on Central Asian time.
毛向?yàn)跗潉e克斯坦桂塞、哈薩克斯坦和俄羅斯運(yùn)送貨物。在正常年份馍驯，他依靠飛機(jī)處理緊急訂單阁危，但航班時(shí)刻表被大幅削減玛痊。在疫情爆發(fā)前的幾年里，中國(guó)一帶一路倡議組織投資建設(shè)了世界上最長(zhǎng)的貨運(yùn)鐵路線狂打，從義烏到馬德里擂煞，途經(jīng)中亞，全長(zhǎng)超過8000英里趴乡。毛說对省，現(xiàn)在他用火車運(yùn)輸大量貨物。在流感大流行期間晾捏，船運(yùn)費(fèi)率上升蒿涎，交通不平衡: 每三個(gè)集裝箱離開中國(guó)，只有一個(gè)返回惦辛，因?yàn)槠渌麌?guó)家的出口部門已經(jīng)大幅減少劳秋。即使在疫情爆發(fā)之前，中國(guó)已經(jīng)生產(chǎn)了世界上96% 的集裝箱胖齐，而現(xiàn)在這個(gè)行業(yè)也處于超速運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)狀態(tài)玻淑。毛讓我晚上回來看看周圍的環(huán)境。當(dāng)我回來的時(shí)候呀伙，貨運(yùn)商店燈火通明补履。在里面，特工們忙于打電話和使用電腦区匠，他們都是按照中亞時(shí)間工作干像。
Children had taken over the hallways of Yiwu’s wholesale market. The sprawling structure has nearly ten times the square footage of the Pentagon and is home to some hundred thousand merchants. In past years, I had visited when the market was busy with foreign traders; now it was so empty that many Chinese sellers had brought their children for the summer vacation. Packs of kids rode bikes and scooters down the empty corridors, and they had set up badminton nets and basketball hoops.
孩子們占據(jù)了義烏批發(fā)市場(chǎng)的走廊。這個(gè)龐大的建筑占地面積幾乎是五角大樓的十倍驰弄，并且擁有大約十萬商人麻汰。在過去的幾年里，我曾經(jīng)去過一個(gè)外國(guó)商人很多的市場(chǎng)戚篙，現(xiàn)在市場(chǎng)空空如也五鲫，許多中國(guó)商人帶著他們的孩子去度暑假。一群群的孩子在空蕩蕩的走廊里騎著自行車和踏板車岔擂，他們還架起了羽毛球網(wǎng)和籃球圈位喂。
Most merchants there specialize in a single product sold in bulk. Nothing was more depressing than the hallways dedicated to luggage dealers—lines of glum-faced people sitting next to roller bags that weren’t rolling anywhere. Folks who sold tourist trinkets were also out of luck. But business was booming for dealers who stocked L.E.D. curing lamps, for customers who did their nails at home, and it was also a good year to sell plastic pump heads for hand-sanitizer bottles. Bicycle dealers couldn’t keep product in stock, and a woman with punching bags told me that her sales had doubled. A place called Henry Sport, which specialized in yoga mats, had back orders through September. On the second floor, merchants selling inflatable back-yard pools were also doing great.
那里的大多數(shù)商人專門經(jīng)營(yíng)成批出售的單一產(chǎn)品。沒有什么比行李經(jīng)銷商專用的走廊更令人沮喪的了——一排排愁眉苦臉的人坐在沒有滾動(dòng)的行李包旁邊乱灵。賣旅游飾品的人也不走運(yùn)塑崖。但對(duì)于那些為在家做指甲的顧客提供 l.e.d. 固化燈的經(jīng)銷商來說，生意卻蒸蒸日上痛倚。而且规婆，銷售用于洗手液瓶子的塑料泵頭也是一個(gè)好年景。自行車經(jīng)銷商沒有存貨，一個(gè)拿著沙袋的女人告訴我抒蚜，她的銷售量翻了一番掘鄙。有一個(gè)叫亨利體育的地方，專門生產(chǎn)瑜伽墊嗡髓，到九月份還有訂單操漠。在二樓，賣充氣后院游泳池的商人們也生意興隆饿这。
The Yiwu market niches were so specific, and the pandemic’s effects so unusual, that even products with ostensibly logical connections had different prospects. Near the inflatable-pool dealers, other stalls featured swim caps and goggles, but their sales had plummeted. One dealer explained that in fact goggles have almost nothing to do with back-yard pools. “That’s something people do at home,” she said, gesturing at the pools. Then she pointed at her own products: “They use goggles when they go out. And people aren’t going out now.”
義烏市場(chǎng)如此特殊浊伙，疫情的影響如此不同尋常，以至于即使是表面上符合邏輯的產(chǎn)品也有著不同的前景蛹稍。在充氣泳池經(jīng)銷商附近吧黄，其他攤位擺放著泳帽和護(hù)目鏡，但是他們的銷售量直線下降唆姐。一位經(jīng)銷商解釋說，事實(shí)上廓八，護(hù)目鏡與后院的游泳池幾乎沒有任何關(guān)系奉芦。“這是人們?cè)诩依镒龅氖虑?”她指著游泳池說剧蹂。然后她指著自己的產(chǎn)品說: “他們出門的時(shí)候戴著護(hù)目鏡∩Γ現(xiàn)在人們都不出門了〕璧穑”
A large section of the second floor was newly dedicated to P.P.E. dealers. Many of them had been manufacturing toys or jewelry before the pandemic; they said that with such small products it was relatively easy to retool assembly lines and retrain workers. A woman named Shi Gaolian had a factory that had manufactured bracelets until February, when she abruptly changed the product line; now she exported between two million and three million surgical masks every month. Like most people in the market, Shi wasn’t wearing a mask herself. She didn’t worry that P.P.E. might turn out to be a short-term business. “At the least, it will take two years for the world to manage this,” she said. “After that, I’ll find something else to manufacture.”
二樓的一大部分是專門給 p.p.e 經(jīng)銷商的先巴。他們中的許多人在疫情爆發(fā)前就開始制造玩具或珠寶; 他們說，這樣的小型產(chǎn)品相對(duì)容易改裝流水線和重新培訓(xùn)工人冒冬。一位名叫史高蓮的女士有一家工廠伸蚯，直到今年2月份，她突然改變了生產(chǎn)線简烤，生產(chǎn)手鐲; 現(xiàn)在她每月出口200萬到300萬個(gè)外科手術(shù)口罩剂邮。和市場(chǎng)上的大多數(shù)人一樣，史女士自己也沒有戴面具横侦。她并不擔(dān)心 p.p.e 會(huì)變成一個(gè)短期的生意挥萌。她表示: “至少，世界需要兩年時(shí)間來應(yīng)對(duì)這種局面枉侧∫伲”≌ツ伲“在那之后憨栽，我會(huì)找別的東西來制造。”
On the same floor, merchants were preparing for the upcoming American election. Baseball-cap stalls had?maga?stock, and flag manufacturers were receiving orders for Trump and Biden banners. I talked with a middle-aged dealer named Li Jiang, who first went into business in 1995, producing the inexpensive red scarves worn by Young Pioneers, the Communist Party’s primary-school organization. In 1997, Hong Kong returned?to Chinese control, and the wave of patriotism led to new demand for national flags, so Li expanded his assembly line. Four years after that were the attacks of 9/11, and Li started manufacturing the Stars and Stripes. That was his entry into the international market, and, ever since, his business has been shaped largely by what happens abroad. On the day I visited, he had just sold a few thousand Trump flags—from the Young Pioneers to?maga?in the span of a quarter century. “If people want it, we make it,” Li said. On his desk, a small gay-pride flag sat next to one featuring the face of Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan.
在同一層樓上徒像，商人們正在為即將到來的美國(guó)大選做準(zhǔn)備黍特。棒球帽攤位上有瑪加的股票，旗幟制造商正在接受特朗普和拜登旗幟的訂單锯蛀。我采訪了一位名叫李江的中年商人灭衷，他于1995年開始經(jīng)商，生產(chǎn)共產(chǎn)黨小學(xué)組織“少先隊(duì)”(Young Pioneers)所佩戴的廉價(jià)紅圍巾旁涤。1997年翔曲，香港回歸中國(guó)，愛國(guó)主義浪潮引發(fā)了對(duì)國(guó)旗的新需求劈愚，因此李擴(kuò)大了他的裝配線瞳遍。四年后是9/11恐怖襲擊，李開始制造美國(guó)國(guó)家女子足球隊(duì)菌羽。這就是他進(jìn)入國(guó)際市場(chǎng)的原因掠械，從那以后，他的生意在很大程度上受到了國(guó)外發(fā)生的事情的影響注祖。在我訪問的那天猾蒂，他剛剛賣掉了幾千面特朗普旗幟，從少先隊(duì)到雜志是晨，時(shí)間跨度有25年肚菠。“如果人們想要它罩缴，我們就制造它,”李說蚊逢。在他的辦公桌上，一面小小的同性戀驕傲旗緊挨著一面印有巴基斯坦創(chuàng)始人穆罕默德·阿里·真納的旗幟箫章。
After leaving Yiwu, I stopped at a large flag factory called Johnin, in the city of Shaoxing. A young manager named Jin Gang gave me a tour. On the assembly line, dozens of women sat at sewing machines, stitching flags that read “North Dakota for Trump,” “Keep America Great,” “Trump 2020,” and “Trump 2024.” Since the start of the pandemic, everything seemed to happen first in China, and now I wondered if Johnin knew something that I didn’t.
離開義烏后烙荷，我在紹興一家名為 Johnin 的大型旗幟工廠停留。一位名叫金剛的年輕經(jīng)理帶我參觀了一下炉抒。在裝配線上奢讨，幾十名婦女坐在縫紉機(jī)旁，縫制著寫有“特朗普北達(dá)科他州”焰薄、“保持美國(guó)偉大”拿诸、“特朗普2020”和“特朗普2024”的旗幟自從疫情爆發(fā)以來，中國(guó)似乎每件事都是先發(fā)生的塞茅，現(xiàn)在我懷疑約翰是否知道一些我不知道的事情亩码。
“That’s what they asked for,” Jin said, when I inquired about the 2024 banners. “I guess they have this idea that he will be President again.”
當(dāng)我詢問2024年的橫幅時(shí)，金說野瘦，“這是他們要求的描沟§海”±袅“我猜他們一定認(rèn)為他會(huì)再次當(dāng)選總統(tǒng)泞遗。”
Jin was coy about his customers, though he said that the orders didn’t come directly from Trump’s companies or the Republican Party. During the 2016 campaign, Johnin sold between two million and three million Trump flags, at roughly a dollar each. Now, with the election less than four months away, Trump products represented about seventy per cent of Johnin’s business. There were some orders for Biden flags, but not many.
金對(duì)自己的客戶含糊其辭席覆，不過他表示史辙，這些訂單并非直接來自特朗普的公司或共和黨。在2016年競(jìng)選期間佩伤，約翰林賣出了200萬至300萬面特朗普旗幟聊倔，每面大約1美元。現(xiàn)在生巡，距離大選還有不到四個(gè)月的時(shí)間耙蔑，特朗普的產(chǎn)品在約翰的業(yè)務(wù)中約占七十% 。有一些拜登旗的訂單孤荣，但不是很多甸陌。
In general, the pandemic had been bad for Johnin, because flag-waving events like European soccer tournaments were cancelled. But there were scattered moments of high demand. In June, in the wake of George Floyd’s death, Johnin received a spike in orders of blue-line police flags. Shortly after that, there was a sudden interest in the state flag of Mississippi. “Many customers were telling us, ‘We need Mississippi flags,’?” Jin said. “We made forty thousand. It happened really fast, and then it was finished.” He continued, “I think the people who bought those flags were Black.”
總的來說，這場(chǎng)流行病對(duì)約翰恩來說很糟糕垃环，因?yàn)橄駳W洲足球錦標(biāo)賽這樣的揮旗活動(dòng)被取消了邀层。但也有零星的高需求時(shí)刻。年月遂庄，在喬治 · 弗洛伊德死后，約翰因收到了大量藍(lán)線警察旗的訂單劲赠。不久之后涛目，人們突然對(duì)密西西比州州旗產(chǎn)生了濃厚的興趣×菖欤“許多客戶告訴我們霹肝，‘我們需要密西西比州的旗幟,”’金說∷芗澹“我們賺了四萬沫换。一切發(fā)生得太快了，然后就結(jié)束了最铁⊙渡停”他接著說，“我認(rèn)為買這些旗子的人是黑人冷尉∈妫”
Flags and banners for sale at Yiwu’s wholesale market.?義烏批發(fā)市場(chǎng)出售旗幟橫幅Photograph by Guligo Jia for The New Yorker?攝影: Guligo Jia/紐約客
Jin had read that Mississippi has many Black residents. He was accustomed to manufacturing flags for both sides of foreign elections, sports matches, and other events, so it seemed logical: police supporters had their blue-line flags, while Blacks had Mississippi flags. In Mandarin, it took me a while to explain a counterintuitive fact about democracy: the state with the highest percentage of Black residents might also be the last one to get rid of a Confederate symbol.
金讀到密西西比州有許多黑人居民。他習(xí)慣于為外國(guó)選舉雀哨、體育比賽和其他活動(dòng)的雙方制造國(guó)旗磕谅，所以這似乎是合乎邏輯的: 警方支持者有他們的藍(lán)線國(guó)旗私爷，而黑人有密西西比州的國(guó)旗。用普通話說膊夹，我花了一段時(shí)間來解釋關(guān)于民主的一個(gè)違反直覺的事實(shí): 黑人居民比例最高的州可能也是最后一個(gè)擺脫聯(lián)盟標(biāo)志的州衬浑。
Jin disliked Trump, but he wasn’t worried about November. “After the election, we’ll make flags for somebody,” he said. “Americans always want flags.” He showed me how the factory double-stitched seams. “A lot of other companies don’t do that,” he said. Cut-rate manufacturers also tried to save on fabric for Trump flags, which have a standard size of ninety centimetres by a hundred and fifty centimetres. Jin said that, if you measure some of the cheap ones, you’ll find that everything has been shaved down by about two per cent: eighty-eight centimetres by a hundred and forty-six. In the most literal way imaginable, Chinese manufacturers were working the margins on Trump.
金不喜歡特朗普，但他并不擔(dān)心11月放刨。他說: “選舉結(jié)束后工秩，我們會(huì)為某人做國(guó)旗『觊牛”拓诸。“美國(guó)人總是想要國(guó)旗麻昼〉熘В”他向我展示了工廠的雙縫接縫技術(shù)「“許多其它公司不這樣做,”他表示倍谜。特朗普旗幟的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)尺寸是九十厘米乘150厘米。金說叉抡，如果你測(cè)量一些便宜的尔崔，你會(huì)發(fā)現(xiàn)所有的東西都減少了2% : 88厘米減少了146厘米。用可以想象的最直白的方式褥民，中國(guó)制造商正在利用特朗普的優(yōu)勢(shì)季春。
At the beginning of July, Li Dewei told me that he and his partner had abandoned their plan to sell in the Chinese?market. “The investment is too high,” Li said. “And domestic competition is too fierce.”
7月初，李德偉告訴我消返，他和他的合作伙伴放棄了在中國(guó)市場(chǎng)銷售的計(jì)劃载弄。“投資額太高了,”李表示撵颊∮罟ィ“國(guó)內(nèi)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)過于激烈〕拢”
He had also concluded that U.S.-China tensions were unlikely to have any impact on Kimzon’s business. Trump Administration officials often blamed China for its early handling of the pandemic, but there didn’t seem to be any consumer backlash. In the span of three months, Li’s ideas about risk had completely reversed: now he believed that the poor handling of the pandemic in the U.S. was likely to benefit his sales. “A lot of businesses are closed,” Li explained. “People are afraid of going to shops, because of infections, so they want to buy online.” Even the Amazon reviews of his shoes told him which way the wind was blowing. May 14th, five stars: “I purchased them to wear during the day at work delivering packages for a big online order company that rhymes with am-a-John. So far so good on 10-hour shifts.”
他還得出結(jié)論逞刷，美中緊張關(guān)系不太可能對(duì)金宗的業(yè)務(wù)產(chǎn)生任何影響。特朗普政府官員經(jīng)常指責(zé)中國(guó)過早地應(yīng)對(duì)了疫情妻熊，但似乎并沒有出現(xiàn)任何消費(fèi)者的反彈夸浅。在三個(gè)月的時(shí)間里，李關(guān)于風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的想法完全顛倒了: 現(xiàn)在他相信美國(guó)對(duì)流感大流行的糟糕處理可能會(huì)有利于他的銷售固耘√馀瘢“許多企業(yè)關(guān)門了,”李解釋說√浚“由于感染番枚，人們害怕去商店法严，所以他們想在網(wǎng)上購(gòu)物『”甚至亞馬遜上對(duì)他鞋子的評(píng)論也告訴了他風(fēng)向深啤。5月14日，五星級(jí): “我買它們是為了白天上班的時(shí)候穿著路星，為一家大型網(wǎng)上訂購(gòu)公司送包裹溯街，這家公司的名字和 am-a-John 押韻。到目前為止洋丐，10小時(shí)輪班制還不錯(cuò)呈昔。”
According to an Amazon spokesperson, the company has hired more than four hundred thousand frontline employees worldwide since the start of the pandemic. In Shanghai, I met a young Chinese woman who worked in advertising for the company, and her division had doubled its staff in the past year. She asked me not to use her name, because Amazon hadn’t given her permission to talk. She had returned to China after living abroad, and she often had to explain the Chinese mind-set to Amazon co-workers in Seattle. She said that American entrepreneurs tend to be obsessed with branding. “You want to have a great brand-name story to convince your customers,” she said. “In China, it’s the opposite. They sell things first. And then they think about brand.”
據(jù)一位亞馬遜發(fā)言人稱友绝，自疫情爆發(fā)以來堤尾，該公司在全球范圍內(nèi)已經(jīng)雇傭了超過40萬名一線員工。在上海迁客，我遇到了一位在該公司從事廣告業(yè)務(wù)的年輕中國(guó)女性郭宝，她所在的部門去年將員工人數(shù)增加了一倍。她要求我不要用她的名字掷漱，因?yàn)閬嗰R遜沒有允許她說話粘室。她在國(guó)外生活之后回到了中國(guó)，她經(jīng)常不得不向在西雅圖的亞馬遜同事解釋中國(guó)人的心態(tài)卜范。她說衔统，美國(guó)企業(yè)家往往癡迷于品牌『Ｑ“你希望有一個(gè)偉大的品牌故事來說服你的客戶,”她說缰冤。“在中國(guó)喳魏，情況恰恰相反。他們先賣東西怀薛。然后他們會(huì)考慮品牌刺彩。”
Zack Franklin, an American consultant who has worked for years with Amazon sellers in Shenzhen, told me that Chinese online entrepreneurs had figured out a different way to scale up their businesses. In addition to expanding product lines or exploring new markets, they simply sold the same thing in the same place under different names.
扎克 · 富蘭克林枝恋，一位在深圳亞馬遜賣家工作多年的美國(guó)顧問创倔，告訴我中國(guó)的網(wǎng)絡(luò)企業(yè)家已經(jīng)找到了一種不同的方式來擴(kuò)大他們的業(yè)務(wù)。除了擴(kuò)大生產(chǎn)線或者開拓新市場(chǎng)焚碌，他們只是在同一個(gè)地方以不同的名字銷售同樣的東西畦攘。
“You want to take up as much space on the shelf as possible,” Franklin said. “Just get a different label.” He continued, “You are making money through this illusion of choice.” He explained that in order to get access to a brand registry it’s necessary to apply for a trademark, so Chinese applicants were flooding the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.
富蘭克林說: “你應(yīng)該盡可能多地占用架子上的空間∈纾”懦铺。“換個(gè)標(biāo)簽就行了鬓催⌒加兀”他繼續(xù)說，“你通過這種選擇的錯(cuò)覺來賺錢师逸。”他解釋說，為了獲得品牌注冊(cè)良价，必須申請(qǐng)商標(biāo)，所以中國(guó)申請(qǐng)者涌向美國(guó)專利和商標(biāo)局蒿叠。
Li Dewei had registered about seventy brands, and some of his applications had been handled by a law firm called Ni, Wang & Massand, in Dallas. Hao Ni, one of the firm’s founders, told me that it represents Chinese clients in eighty to a hundred brand applications every month. Ni said that Chinese choose odd brand names because those applications tend to be approved faster by the trademark office, which might reject a name that’s too close to an established brand. “We’ve so far never had a conflict with a Chinese company,” Ni said.
李德偉注冊(cè)了大約七十個(gè)品牌明垢，其中一些申請(qǐng)是由達(dá)拉斯一家名為 Ni，Wang & Massand 的律師事務(wù)所處理的市咽。公司的創(chuàng)始人之一郝妮告訴我痊银，它每個(gè)月代表中國(guó)客戶申請(qǐng)八十到100個(gè)品牌。倪說魂务，中國(guó)人之所以選擇奇怪的品牌名稱曼验，是因?yàn)檫@些申請(qǐng)往往會(huì)更快地得到商標(biāo)局的批準(zhǔn)，商標(biāo)局可能會(huì)拒絕接受一個(gè)與已有品牌過于接近的名稱粘姜。倪表示: “迄今為止鬓照，我們從未與中國(guó)公司發(fā)生過沖突」陆簦”豺裆。
Ni had handled the application for Li Dewei’s most recent brand, Pemily12. On July 2nd, Li showed me the new Web site he was setting up. This time, he hoped to bypass Amazon and sell directly to consumers. But the product names still used Amazonglish: Pet Dog Toy Dog Leakage Food Toy Ball. There was also an introduction to the brand:
倪處理了李德偉最新品牌 Pemily12的申請(qǐng)。7月2日号显，李向我展示了他正在建立的新網(wǎng)站臭猜。這一次，他希望繞過亞馬遜押蚤，直接面向消費(fèi)者銷售蔑歌。但是產(chǎn)品名稱仍然使用 Amazonglish: 寵物狗玩具狗泄漏食物玩具球。該品牌還有一個(gè)介紹:
Why is Pemily?
This is a combination of pet family
Why is it 12?
12?=?12 month?=?1 year?=?forever
Why is Pemily12?
pemily12 means we will always be a family
為什么是帕米莉揽碘？這是一個(gè)寵物家庭的組合為什么是12次屠？12 = 12個(gè)月 = 1年 = 永恒為什么是 Pemily12？Pemily12意味著我們永遠(yuǎn)是一家人
Earlier in the pandemic, Li had noticed on Google Trends that a lot of Americans were searching for products connected to the word “pet.” “Pet clothes,” he said. “Pet toy. Pet health.” A friend in Shenzhen manufactured pet accessories, and he was expanding the product line and partnering with Li on the Web site. They believed that clothes for pets were particularly promising. I asked Li if it had been stressful to make so many major decisions in recent months, but he shrugged it off—as far as he was concerned, he was simply reacting to the situation. “The market decides for us,” he said. “It’s not us deciding.”
在流感大流行的早些時(shí)候雳刺，李在谷歌趨勢(shì)上注意到劫灶，許多美國(guó)人正在搜索與“寵物”相關(guān)的產(chǎn)品“寵物的衣服,”他說∫磋耄「寵物玩具本昏。寵物健康∏雇簦”深圳的一個(gè)朋友制造寵物配件涌穆，他正在擴(kuò)大生產(chǎn)線怔昨，并與李在網(wǎng)站上合作。他們認(rèn)為給寵物穿的衣服特別有前途蒲犬。我問李朱监，最近幾個(gè)月做出這么多重大決定是否讓他感到壓力很大，但他聳聳肩表示不在乎ーー在他看來原叮，他只是對(duì)這種情況做出了反應(yīng)赫编。“市場(chǎng)為我們做決定,”他表示奋隶±匏停“這不是我們能決定的∥ㄐ溃”
American shoe orders were still increasing, and now Kimzon was shipping three thousand pairs every day. “The U.S. government has been sending out more money recently,” Li said.
美國(guó)的鞋訂單仍在增加嘹吨，現(xiàn)在 Kimzon 每天都要運(yùn)送三千雙鞋子【城猓“美國(guó)政府最近一直在提供更多的資金,”李說蟀拷。
“I was told to bring myself, and my ‘overpriced chicken salad’ with me.”?“有人告訴我要帶上自己和我的‘價(jià)格過高的雞肉沙拉’∑剂模”
Cartoon by E. S. Glenn?卡通作者: e. s. 格倫
I told Li that he was mistaken—there hadn’t yet been a second stimulus program. But he swore that government money was reaching consumers: he could see it in sales, and other entrepreneurs had mentioned the same thing. The following day, I received an e-mail from the young woman who was living in our family’s house in rural Colorado. She sent me a list of things that had appeared in our mailbox, including a?cares?Act debit card labelled “Economic Impact.” It was in the amount of thirty-four hundred dollars.
我告訴李问芬，他搞錯(cuò)了ーー當(dāng)時(shí)還沒有出臺(tái)第二套刺激計(jì)劃。但是他發(fā)誓說政府的錢正在到達(dá)消費(fèi)者手中: 他可以從銷售中看出來寿桨，其他的企業(yè)家也提到了同樣的事情此衅。第二天，我收到了一封來自一位年輕女士的電子郵件亭螟，她住在科羅拉多州鄉(xiāng)下我們家的房子里挡鞍。她給我發(fā)了一個(gè)郵箱里出現(xiàn)的東西的清單，其中包括一張 caresact 的借記卡预烙，上面寫著“經(jīng)濟(jì)影響”金額是三千四百美元墨微。
I learned that during the past couple of weeks the government had been sending debit cards to people who had been missed in April, often because their bank information wasn’t on file. I had wondered why we hadn’t received a stimulus check, but I was too distracted by life in China to look into it. Now I realized that Zocavia and Zocania could have kept me updated on the U.S. government’s payment schedule.
我了解到，在過去的幾個(gè)星期里扁掸，政府一直在給那些在四月份被遺漏的人發(fā)借記卡欢嘿，通常是因?yàn)樗麄兊你y行信息沒有記錄在案。我一直想知道為什么我們沒有收到經(jīng)濟(jì)刺激計(jì)劃的支票也糊，但是我被中國(guó)的生活分散了太多的注意力，所以沒有去調(diào)查∠壑妫現(xiàn)在我意識(shí)到狸剃，Zocavia 和 Zocania 本可以讓我及時(shí)了解美國(guó)政府的支付計(jì)劃。
Near the end of July, my daughters’ only American friend still in Chengdu left. Most other Americans had been evacuated in January or February, and as time passed the isolation grew harder for the few families who stayed. In a normal summer, we would have visited Colorado, but now, if we left China, we couldn’t re?nter.
七月底狗热，我女兒唯一一個(gè)還在成都的美國(guó)朋友走了钞馁。大多數(shù)其他美國(guó)人在一月或二月被疏散虑省，隨著時(shí)間的推移，留下來的少數(shù)家庭越來越孤立僧凰。在一個(gè)正常的夏天探颈，我們會(huì)去科羅拉多州，但是現(xiàn)在训措，如果我們離開中國(guó)伪节，我們就不能再去了。
As a Peace Corps volunteer, I hadn’t returned to the U.S. for two years, and now we seemed likely to repeat that experience. But, in the nineteen-nineties, Sichuan still felt remote, and even American commerce seemed a world away; I never saw a McDonald’s during those two years. By 2020, there were more than seventy thousand American companies doing business in China. Meanwhile, the Chinese were producing much of the P.P.E. and many other goods that were bought by Americans during a time of crisis. Almost any event in the U.S.—a protest, a lockdown, a stimulus program—had an immediate economic ripple effect somewhere in the People’s Republic. Decoupling had been envisaged as an economic process, but the market links were stronger than ever: in 2020, U.S.-China trade increased by nearly nine per cent. The separation was happening almost entirely at the human level.
作為一名和平隊(duì)志愿者绩鸣，我已經(jīng)有兩年沒有回到美國(guó)了怀大，現(xiàn)在我們似乎有可能重復(fù)那段經(jīng)歷。但是呀闻，在二十世紀(jì)九十年代化借，四川仍然感到遙遠(yuǎn)，甚至美國(guó)的商業(yè)似乎是另一個(gè)世界; 在那兩年里捡多，我從未見過麥當(dāng)勞蓖康。到2020年，有超過7萬家美國(guó)公司在中國(guó)做生意垒手。與此同時(shí)蒜焊，中國(guó)生產(chǎn)了大量的 p.p.e 和其他許多商品，這些商品在危機(jī)時(shí)期被美國(guó)人購(gòu)買淫奔。在 U.S.ーa 的抗議活動(dòng)中山涡，幾乎所有的事件，比如封鎖唆迁、刺激計(jì)劃鸭丛，都在中華人民共和國(guó)的某個(gè)地方立即產(chǎn)生了經(jīng)濟(jì)漣漪效應(yīng)。脫鉤被設(shè)想為一個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)過程唐责，但市場(chǎng)聯(lián)系比以往任何時(shí)候都更加緊密: 2020年鳞溉，美中貿(mào)易增長(zhǎng)了近9% 。這種分離幾乎完全發(fā)生在人的層面上鼠哥。
On July 24th, the Chinese government announced that it was closing the U.S. consulate in Chengdu and expelling all remaining American staff. The Chinese were retaliating for the recent actions of the Trump Administration, which had shut down the Chinese consulate in Houston, citing espionage. A State Department official told me that, while there was no question that the Chinese had been spying in Houston, the American response could have been less self-defeating. “We have ways of dealing with this stuff, to get the message across without being so absolute,” he said. He believed that in a normal situation the Americans would have expelled some individual Chinese diplomats, rather than closing the entire consulate.
7月24日熟菲，中國(guó)政府宣布關(guān)閉駐成都的美國(guó)領(lǐng)事館，并驅(qū)逐所有剩余的美國(guó)工作人員朴恳。中國(guó)是在報(bào)復(fù)特朗普政府最近以間諜罪為由關(guān)閉中國(guó)駐休斯頓領(lǐng)事館的行動(dòng)抄罕。一位國(guó)務(wù)院官員告訴我，盡管毫無疑問于颖，中國(guó)人一直在休斯頓從事間諜活動(dòng)呆贿，但美國(guó)的反應(yīng)本可以不那么弄巧成拙。他說: “我們有辦法處理這些問題，在不那么絕對(duì)的情況下傳達(dá)信息做入∶拔”。他認(rèn)為竟块，在正常情況下壶运，美國(guó)會(huì)驅(qū)逐一些中國(guó)外交官，而不是關(guān)閉整個(gè)領(lǐng)事館浪秘。
He said that, earlier in the year, White House officials had proposed an even more radical move. “There were people in the Trump Administration who suggested shutting down all of our consulates in China,” he said, “with the idea that it would give us free rein to kick the Chinese out of their consulates.” A similar strategy had been applied to the press. In March, the Trump Administration sharply limited the number of Chinese who were allowed to work in America for state-run news organizations. The Chinese foreign ministry countered by expelling almost all Americans who worked for the?Times, the Washington?Post, and the?Wall Street Journal. By the end of the year, there were only about thirty American journalists left in China.
他說蒋情，今年早些時(shí)候，白宮官員提出了一項(xiàng)更為激進(jìn)的舉措秫逝∷〕觯“特朗普政府有人建議關(guān)閉我們?cè)谥袊?guó)的所有領(lǐng)事館,”他說，“他們的想法是违帆，這會(huì)讓我們自由地把中國(guó)人踢出領(lǐng)事館浙巫。”新聞界也采取了類似的策略刷后。今年3月的畴，特朗普政府嚴(yán)格限制了獲準(zhǔn)在美國(guó)為官方新聞機(jī)構(gòu)工作的中國(guó)人數(shù)量。中國(guó)外交部以驅(qū)逐幾乎所有為《紐約時(shí)報(bào)》尝胆、《華盛頓郵報(bào)》和《華爾街日?qǐng)?bào)》工作的美國(guó)人的方式予以反擊丧裁。到年底，只有大約三十名美國(guó)記者留在中國(guó)含衔。
In Chengdu, after the announcement was made about the consulate, I biked over to the site a couple of times a day. The area was heavily policed, but by the second day large numbers of civilians started to appear, in order to take selfies in front of the building. I overheard one woman tell her companions to hurry up with their photos so that they could make it to Dujiangyan, a tourist site outside the city. They told me that they were on vacation from Wenzhou, and they had added the consulate to the day’s itinerary.
在成都煎娇，在領(lǐng)事館的消息宣布之后，我每天騎自行車去那個(gè)地方幾次贪染。該地區(qū)被嚴(yán)密監(jiān)視缓呛，但到第二天，大量平民開始出現(xiàn)杭隙，以便在大樓前自拍哟绊。我無意中聽到一位女士告訴她的同伴們趕快拍照，這樣他們就可以去都江堰痰憎，一個(gè)城外的旅游景點(diǎn)票髓。他們告訴我他們是從溫州來度假的，而且他們已經(jīng)把領(lǐng)事館列入了當(dāng)天的行程铣耘。
Inside the compound, the Americans were executing what’s known as a “destruction plan.” Along with some hurried packing, they were also shredding documents and smashing computers and telecommunications equipment. The Chinese had given them exactly seventy-two hours, the same amount of time that the Americans had allowed in Houston. The exchange had the ritualized air of a sporting event: each side had one home game and one away game, and everybody collected whatever he could for propaganda. In Houston, U.S. security agents tailed Chinese consular staff on visits to the Home Depot, where they purchased barrels in which to burn documents. American television news carried images of smoke plumes rising from the consulate’s courtyard.
在院子里洽沟，美國(guó)人正在執(zhí)行所謂的“銷毀計(jì)劃”在匆忙打包的同時(shí)，他們還在粉碎文件蜗细，搗毀電腦和通訊設(shè)備玲躯。中國(guó)人給了他們整整72個(gè)小時(shí)，與美國(guó)人在休斯頓給的時(shí)間相同。這種交流有一種體育賽事的儀式化氣氛: 雙方各有一場(chǎng)主場(chǎng)比賽和一場(chǎng)客場(chǎng)比賽跷车，每個(gè)人都盡可能地收集各自的資料進(jìn)行宣傳。在休斯頓橱野，美國(guó)安全部門跟蹤中國(guó)領(lǐng)事館工作人員到家得寶朽缴，在那里他們購(gòu)買了用來燒毀文件的桶。美國(guó)電視新聞播放了領(lǐng)事館院子里升起的煙柱的畫面水援。
In Chengdu, the consulate’s highest building was six stories. When it opened, in 1994, it was the tallest structure in the neighborhood, and rice fields bordered the consulate walls. By the time I first visited, in 1996, the city had already started to grow around the compound. Two decades later, buildings of twenty or more stories loom on three sides. It was an architectural version of my classroom experience: relatively speaking, the Americans were getting shorter.
在成都密强，領(lǐng)事館的最高建筑是六層樓。當(dāng)它在1994年開放時(shí)蜗元，它是附近最高的建筑或渤，領(lǐng)事館的墻邊是稻田。1996年我第一次來到這里的時(shí)候奕扣，這個(gè)城市已經(jīng)開始在這個(gè)院落周圍發(fā)展起來了薪鹦。20年后，二十層或更高層的建筑從三面隱約可見惯豆。這是我課堂經(jīng)歷的一個(gè)建筑學(xué)版本: 相對(duì)而言池磁，美國(guó)人變得越來越矮。
The high-rises had always presented a security risk, and now the Chinese government arranged cameras on the upper floors, in order to live-stream any activity in the consulate’s courtyard. “They were clearly set up to get a shot of us burning documents,” the State Department official told me. “They wanted that picture.”
這些高層建筑一直帶有安全隱患楷兽，現(xiàn)在中國(guó)政府在高層安裝了攝像頭地熄，以便對(duì)領(lǐng)事館院子里的任何活動(dòng)進(jìn)行直播。這位國(guó)務(wù)院官員告訴我: “他們顯然是為了拍攝我們焚燒文件的鏡頭而設(shè)計(jì)的芯杀《丝迹”〗液瘢“他們想要那張照片却特。”
Somebody in the consulate had the idea to commission a local print shop to make a couple of banners, one of which said “Ganxie Chengdu”—“Thank you, Chengdu.” They figured that this would send a more dignified message to viewers, but they knew that any staffers would be followed, like the barrel boys at the Home Depot. The order was made by a private citizen, but, shortly after the banners were supposed to be ready, more than a dozen security officers took her into custody. When she was finally released, after seven hours and an extensive interrogation, the banners were nowhere to be found.
領(lǐng)事館的某個(gè)人想到了在當(dāng)?shù)亻_一家印刷店棋弥，制作兩條橫幅核偿，其中一條寫著“干謝成都”——“謝謝你，成都”他們認(rèn)為這會(huì)給觀眾傳遞一個(gè)更有尊嚴(yán)的信息顽染，但是他們知道任何工作人員都會(huì)被跟蹤漾岳，就像家得寶的油桶男孩一樣。這個(gè)命令是由一個(gè)普通公民下達(dá)的粉寞，但是尼荆，在橫幅應(yīng)該準(zhǔn)備就緒后不久，十幾名安全人員將她拘留唧垦。經(jīng)過七個(gè)小時(shí)的嚴(yán)密審訊后捅儒，她終于被釋放，但那些橫幅卻不見蹤影。
In the end, the Americans finished their destruction before the clock ran out. Shortly after dawn on the third day, the last diplomats in the U.S. consulate unlocked the front door, turned around, and left through the back, driving off in unmarked vehicles. The Chinese seemed to miss that shot, which wasn’t featured on state-run media. Nobody ever saw the banner, either.
最后巧还，美國(guó)人在時(shí)間到之前完成了他們的毀滅鞭莽。第三天黎明后不久，美國(guó)領(lǐng)事館的最后一批外交官打開前門麸祷，轉(zhuǎn)身從后門離開澎怒，駕駛著沒有標(biāo)志的車輛離開。中國(guó)人似乎沒有拍到這張照片阶牍，官方媒體并沒有對(duì)此進(jìn)行報(bào)道喷面。也沒人看過那條橫幅。
“But you’ll never meet anyone if you don’t put yourself out there.”?“但如果你不走出去走孽，你將永遠(yuǎn)不會(huì)遇到任何人惧辈。”
Cartoon by Sofia Warren?作者: Sofia Warren
On September 25th, Li Dewei told me that sales were still strong. This was true for many businesses in China: in the third financial quarter, the nation’s economy grew by nearly five per cent. In recent months, Li had hired a few new employees, but he didn’t plan to return to his pre-pandemic staff numbers. As far as he was concerned, this was a good opportunity to improve efficiency. At the age of thirty-four, Li was the oldest person in his office.
9月25日磕瓷，李德偉告訴我銷售依然強(qiáng)勁盒齿。對(duì)于中國(guó)的許多企業(yè)來說，情況都是如此: 在第三個(gè)財(cái)政季度生宛，中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)了近5% 县昂。最近幾個(gè)月，李已經(jīng)雇傭了一些新員工陷舅，但他不打算回到大流行前的員工數(shù)量倒彰。就他而言，這是一個(gè)提高效率的好機(jī)會(huì)莱睁。三十四歲的李是他辦公室里年紀(jì)最大的人待讳。
Every day, the Pemily12 Web site was receiving four hundred unique visitors, and daily sales were in the thousands of U.S. dollars. Li believed the business’s potential for growth was excellent, given all the pandemic pets in America. As usual, he was diplomatic, but he told me that he was disappointed by the way the virus had been handled in the U.S. He compared it with India, where the numbers were also bad. “India doesn’t have the ability to handle this,” Li said. “But America has the ability. America didn’t have to do it like this.”
每天，Pemily12網(wǎng)站都有400個(gè)獨(dú)立訪問者仰剿，每天的銷售額高達(dá)數(shù)千美元创淡。李認(rèn)為，考慮到美國(guó)流行病肆虐的寵物南吮，這項(xiàng)業(yè)務(wù)的增長(zhǎng)潛力是非常巨大的琳彩。像往常一樣，他很有外交手腕部凑，但他告訴我露乏，他對(duì)美國(guó)處理病毒的方式感到失望。他將其與印度進(jìn)行了比較涂邀，印度的數(shù)據(jù)也很糟糕瘟仿。“印度沒有能力處理這個(gè)問題,”李說比勉±徒希“但美國(guó)有能力驹止。美國(guó)沒有必要這樣做」畚希”
He believed that Trump would win the election, which was the opinion of most Chinese I knew. In early November, Jin Gang, the flag-maker in Shaoxing, told me that a flood of recent Trump orders had convinced him that the Republican would be victorious. At Sichuan University, I polled my students, and fifty-four per cent thought that Trump would win.
他相信特朗普會(huì)贏得大選臊恋，這是我認(rèn)識(shí)的大多數(shù)中國(guó)人的觀點(diǎn)。去年11月初墓捻，紹興的國(guó)旗制造商金剛告訴我捞镰，特朗普最近接到的大量訂單讓他確信，共和黨將取得勝利毙替。在四川大學(xué)，我對(duì)我的學(xué)生進(jìn)行了民意測(cè)驗(yàn)践樱，54% 的人認(rèn)為特朗普會(huì)贏厂画。
A number of students followed the election coverage on Fox News. In a detail that is unlikely to appear in any of the station’s promotional materials, the Communist Party didn’t bother to block Fox’s Web site, unlike those of CNN, the?Times, and other American sources. In class, my students and I discussed what they were seeing on Fox, and I introduced them to Lauren Boebert, who was campaigning in Colorado to represent me and my family in Congress. All November, a student in the front row of my journalism class wore a “Trump: Keep America Great” baseball cap. He referred to the President as Chuan Jianguo, an ironic Chinese nickname that pairs the Trump surname with a Communist-era patriotic moniker—essentially, Make-China-Great-Again Trump.
許多學(xué)生關(guān)注福克斯新聞的選舉報(bào)道拷邢。不像 CNN袱院、《紐約時(shí)報(bào)》和其他美國(guó)消息來源那樣，共產(chǎn)黨沒有費(fèi)心封鎖覆t稼？怂沟木W(wǎng)站忽洛，這個(gè)細(xì)節(jié)不太可能出現(xiàn)在電視臺(tái)的任何宣傳材料中。在課堂上环肘，我和我的學(xué)生們討論了他們?cè)诟欲虚？怂闺娨暸_(tái)上看到的東西，我把他們介紹給勞倫 · 博伊伯特悔雹，她當(dāng)時(shí)正在科羅拉多州競(jìng)選國(guó)會(huì)議員复哆，代表我和我的家人。整個(gè)11月腌零，坐在我新聞?wù)n前排的一名學(xué)生都戴著一頂“特朗普: 讓美國(guó)保持偉大”的棒球帽梯找。他稱總統(tǒng)為“川建國(guó)”，這是一個(gè)頗具諷刺意味的中文綽號(hào)益涧，將特朗普的姓與共產(chǎn)黨時(shí)代的愛國(guó)主義綽號(hào)——本質(zhì)上就是“讓中國(guó)再次偉大”的特朗普配對(duì)锈锤。
Most students said they were personally interested in the outcome of the election. “Yes, because it is related to China and my future life, to study in the USA,” one engineer wrote, in an assignment. “Also, now the politicians are not as polite as in the past. I want to see how crazily the failed candidate’s party will do.”
大多數(shù)學(xué)生說他們個(gè)人對(duì)選舉結(jié)果很感興趣∠醒“是的久免，因?yàn)檫@關(guān)系到中國(guó)和我未來的生活，去美國(guó)學(xué)習(xí),”一位工程師在一份作業(yè)中寫道嘹裂⊥“此外，現(xiàn)在的政客們不像過去那樣彬彬有禮了寄狼。我想看看失敗的候選人所在的政黨會(huì)有多瘋狂丁寄“碧剩”
Others had already abandoned plans for overseas study. In some cases, their parents made the decision, out of concern about diplomatic tensions, the pandemic, and Black Lives Matter protests, which the Chinese media often portrayed as violent. Even with Joe Biden’s victory, it seemed unlikely that the U.S.-China relationship would change quickly. People I spoke with in the State Department were hopeful that at least some academic and cultural exchanges might be re?stablished, but even this would take time.
其他人已經(jīng)放棄了出國(guó)留學(xué)的計(jì)劃。在某些情況下伊磺，他們的父母做出這個(gè)決定盛正，是出于對(duì)外交緊張局勢(shì)、大流行病和黑人生命至關(guān)重要的抗議活動(dòng)的擔(dān)憂屑埋，中國(guó)媒體經(jīng)常將這些活動(dòng)描述為暴力活動(dòng)豪筝。即使喬?拜登(Joe Biden)獲勝，美中關(guān)系似乎也不太可能迅速改變摘能。與我交談過的國(guó)務(wù)院官員都希望续崖，至少可以重新建立一些學(xué)術(shù)和文化交流，但即使這樣也需要時(shí)間团搞。
Meanwhile, the inequality in information was obvious to anybody who had stayed in China. All educated Chinese had studied at least some English, and they could access American culture through Hollywood movies, television shows, and other sources. Many export entrepreneurs, like Li Dewei, used virtual private networks—the Chinese government deliberately allowed such holes in the firewall in part because they were important for business. When I visited Yiwu, my entire hotel was wired through a V.P.N., so that buyers could access Google, Facebook, and other open-society resources. But, for Americans, China was essentially closed. Once the U.S. started losing the small core of diplomats, journalists, and businesspeople who were based in China, the already limited knowledge of the country was bound to be diminished.
與此同時(shí)严望，信息不平等對(duì)于任何留在中國(guó)的人來說都是顯而易見的。所有受過教育的中國(guó)人都至少學(xué)過一些英語逻恐，他們可以通過好萊塢電影像吻、電視節(jié)目和其他資源了解美國(guó)文化。許多出口企業(yè)家复隆，比如李德偉拨匆，都使用虛擬專用網(wǎng)絡(luò)ーー中國(guó)政府故意允許防火墻存在這樣的漏洞，部分原因是這些漏洞對(duì)企業(yè)很重要挽拂。當(dāng)我訪問義烏時(shí)惭每，我的整個(gè)酒店都通過 vpn 連接起來，這樣買家就可以訪問谷歌轻局、 Facebook 和其他開放社會(huì)的資源洪鸭。但是，對(duì)于美國(guó)人來說仑扑，中國(guó)基本上是封閉的览爵。一旦美國(guó)開始失去在中國(guó)的外交官、記者和商人這一小部分核心镇饮，對(duì)這個(gè)國(guó)家本已有限的了解就必然會(huì)減少蜓竹。
From the perspective of the Chinese government, there seemed little incentive to reopen. China was the only major economy that had grown in 2020, and domestic support for the pandemic policies had become stronger as the year went on. Officials were clearly emboldened; in the fall, the crackdowns in Xinjiang and Hong Kong ramped up. Any serious investigations into the early mistakes in Wuhan were censored, and seven journalists and commentators who had reported on the crisis were either in detention or missing. The government had approved for emergency use four vaccines developed by Chinese companies, but there hadn’t yet been a push for mass vaccinations—probably, officials were waiting to see how the situation developed overseas. They could afford to be patient, because there was very little virus spreading in China. When I talked to friends and family in the U.S., people always mentioned the vaccines, but the topic rarely came up in Chinese conversation.
從中國(guó)政府的角度來看，似乎沒有重新開放的動(dòng)力储藐。中國(guó)是2020年唯一實(shí)現(xiàn)增長(zhǎng)的主要經(jīng)濟(jì)體俱济，隨著時(shí)間的推移，國(guó)內(nèi)對(duì)流感大流行政策的支持也變得更加強(qiáng)大钙勃。官員們顯然受到了鼓舞蛛碌，秋天，新疆和香港的打擊更加嚴(yán)厲辖源。對(duì)武漢早期失誤的任何嚴(yán)肅調(diào)查都受到審查蔚携，報(bào)道此次危機(jī)的7名記者和評(píng)論員要么被拘留希太，要么失蹤。政府已經(jīng)批準(zhǔn)了中國(guó)公司開發(fā)的四種疫苗的緊急使用酝蜒，但還沒有推動(dòng)大規(guī)模疫苗接種ーー可能官員們正在等待海外情況的發(fā)展誊辉。他們可以耐心等待，因?yàn)橹袊?guó)幾乎沒有病毒傳播亡脑。當(dāng)我與美國(guó)的朋友和家人交談時(shí)堕澄，人們總是提到疫苗，但在中國(guó)人的談話中很少提到這個(gè)話題霉咨。
Increasingly, our version of 2020 felt like an alternate reality. I had spent an intense year teaching, travelling, and conducting face-to-face interviews, but there had never been a moment when I considered the possibility of contracting the virus. In August, after reporting for a week and a half in Wuhan, I had flown to Hangzhou, where, the following day, I attended a lecture in an auditorium packed with unmasked people. Afterward, I was one of twenty or more who exchanged handshakes—the old-fashioned kind, where you touch your face afterward—with Jack Ma, who had long been known as the richest man in China. Almost nothing had changed in the ways people interacted, and I never heard a Chinese person mention “pandemic fatigue.” Of the thirty million university students who attended in-class sessions during the fall, I could find only two reported infections.
漸漸地蛙紫，我們的2020年版本感覺像是另一個(gè)現(xiàn)實(shí)。我花了一整年的時(shí)間緊張地教書途戒、旅行和進(jìn)行面對(duì)面的采訪惊来，但我從來沒有考慮過感染病毒的可能性。8月份棺滞，在武漢做了一個(gè)半星期的報(bào)道后，我飛到了杭州矢渊。第二天继准，我在一個(gè)擠滿了不戴面具的人的禮堂里聽了一個(gè)講座。之后矮男，我和二十個(gè)或更多的人握了手---- 老式的握手移必，在握手之后，你會(huì)撫摸自己的臉---- 馬毡鉴，長(zhǎng)期以來崔泵，他一直被認(rèn)為是中國(guó)最富有的人。人們之間的互動(dòng)方式幾乎沒有任何改變猪瞬，我也從未聽中國(guó)人提到“大流行性疲勞”在今年秋天參加課堂討論的三千萬名大學(xué)生中憎瘸，我只發(fā)現(xiàn)兩例報(bào)告感染病例。
In many ways, the Chinese system and society were uniquely well suited to handle the pandemic, while the opposite was true of the U.S. For a number of Chinese, the contrast seemed to reflect a permanent change in the world order, but more thoughtful individuals worried about overconfidence. “The pandemic is a very exceptional situation,” Gary Liu, an economist and the founder of the National Affairs Financial Review Institute, a private think tank in Shanghai, told me. “You can’t make a long-term conclusion based on an exceptional situation.” He feared that the pandemic could vindicate certain authoritarian structures.
在許多方面陈瘦，中國(guó)的體制和社會(huì)都非常適合應(yīng)對(duì)這場(chǎng)疫情幌甘，而美國(guó)的情況恰恰相反。對(duì)于一些中國(guó)人來說痊项，這種對(duì)比似乎反映了世界秩序的永久性改變锅风，但是更有思想的人擔(dān)心自己過于自信。經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家鞍泉、上海私人智庫(kù)——國(guó)家事務(wù)金融評(píng)論研究所(National Affairs Financial Review Institute)創(chuàng)始人劉(Gary Liu)告訴我: “疫情是一個(gè)非常特殊的情況皱埠。”咖驮”咂鳎“你不能僅憑一個(gè)特殊情況就下一個(gè)長(zhǎng)期的結(jié)論训枢。”他擔(dān)心這種流行病可能會(huì)證明某些專制結(jié)構(gòu)是正確的饰抒。
My last journalism class of the term was on New Year’s Eve. I asked the students a question: For you, was 2020 a good year or a bad year?
我這學(xué)期的最后一節(jié)新聞?wù)n是在新年前夕肮砾。我問學(xué)生們一個(gè)問題: 對(duì)你們來說，2020年是好年還是壞年袋坑？
Earlier in December, the university had restricted all students to campus, because Chengdu had experienced its first outbreak since February. As the weather grew colder, there were scattered infections across the country. In most instances, the spread started with Chinese citizens who had quarantined after returning from abroad. Chengdu’s outbreak was believed to have begun after an elderly person handled contaminated garbage near a quarantine facility. The first case was reported on December 7th, and, in the following five days, the city tested more than two million residents. Despite having had only a hundred and forty-three non-imported symptomatic cases up to that point, Chengdu had a hundred and forty-one testing locations—a ratio of almost one testing facility for every symptomatic infection. In December, thirteen new symptomatic cases of community spread were reported, and there were targeted lockdowns, but most of Chengdu remained unaffected. In the middle of the outbreak, the city opened five new subway lines.
去年12月早些時(shí)候仗处，由于成都經(jīng)歷了自今年2月以來的第一次疫情，該大學(xué)已經(jīng)限制所有學(xué)生進(jìn)入校園枣宫。隨著天氣越來越冷婆誓，全國(guó)各地都出現(xiàn)了零星的感染病例。在大多數(shù)情況下也颤，傳播始于從國(guó)外回國(guó)后被隔離的中國(guó)公民洋幻。據(jù)信，成都的疫情是在一位老人處理了隔離設(shè)施附近被污染的垃圾后爆發(fā)的翅娶。第一個(gè)病例是在12月7日?qǐng)?bào)道的文留，在接下來的五天里，該市檢測(cè)了200多萬居民竭沫。盡管迄今為止只有143例非輸入性癥狀病例燥翅，但成都有141個(gè)檢測(cè)點(diǎn)ーー幾乎每一個(gè)癥狀性感染都有一個(gè)檢測(cè)設(shè)施。在12月蜕提，十三個(gè)新的有癥狀的社區(qū)傳播病例被報(bào)道森书，有針對(duì)性的封鎖茴迁，但大部分成都仍然未受影響哮笆。在疫情爆發(fā)期間，該市開通了五條新的地鐵線路熊经。
Almost seventy per cent of my students said that it had been a good year. The same was true for many others. Li Dewei told me that Zocavia, Zocania, and the other shoe brands had enjoyed their best holiday sales ever, and the year’s total revenues had increased by about fifteen per cent compared with 2019. For Pemily12, Li believed that the future might involve pet beauty products. “It will be just like beauty products for people,” he said, when we met in early 2021. He showed me an online image of false eyelashes for dogs. “We haven’t started this yet,” he said. “But we can see that other people are making this product. Maybe in two or three years it will be a big market.”
幾乎百分之七十的學(xué)生說這是一個(gè)好年景脏榆。對(duì)其他許多人來說也是如此猖毫。李德偉告訴我，佐卡維亞须喂、 Zocania 和其他鞋類品牌的假日銷售達(dá)到了有史以來最好的水平鄙麦，今年的總收入比2019年增長(zhǎng)了約十五% 。對(duì)于 Pemily12镊折，李認(rèn)為未來可能會(huì)涉及寵物美容產(chǎn)品胯府。當(dāng)我們?cè)?021年初見面時(shí)，他說: “這就像人們使用的美容產(chǎn)品一樣恨胚÷钜颍”。他給我看了一張網(wǎng)上狗用假睫毛的圖片赃泡『ǎ“我們還沒有開始這項(xiàng)工作,”他說乘盼。“但我們可以看到俄烁，其他人正在生產(chǎn)這種產(chǎn)品绸栅。也許在兩三年內(nèi)，這將是一個(gè)巨大的市場(chǎng)页屠〈饪瑁”
After the Capitol was stormed, on January 6th, Jin Gang, in Shaoxing, reported a spike in orders for Trump flags. He sent me pictures on WeChat of the new designs that were being manufactured by the Johnin assembly lines: “Trump 2024: The Revenge Tour,” “Trump 2024: Take America Back,” and “Trump 2024: Save America Again!”
在國(guó)會(huì)大廈遭到攻擊之后，1月6日辰企，紹興的金剛報(bào)告說风纠，特朗普旗幟的訂單激增。他在微信上給我發(fā)了照片牢贸，上面是約翰的裝配線正在生產(chǎn)的新設(shè)計(jì): “特朗普2024: 復(fù)仇之旅”竹观、“特朗普2024: 帶美國(guó)回去”和“特朗普2024: 再次拯救美國(guó)!”
Every Monday, my daughters wore red Young Pioneer scarves to school, as was required of all students. Sometimes they complained about not being able to visit Colorado, and they missed our cat, which was being cared for by our tenant. But increasingly that life felt far away. One afternoon, the twins found an abandoned kitten on the banks of the Fu River, and they took him in and named him Ulysses. That was the best way to cope—one reality here, one reality there. Certain family photographs hung in both our homes, and some pieces of?ikea?furniture were also duplicated. In Colorado, our black Honda CR-V was parked in the barn; now we bought another black Honda CR-V for Chengdu. Our Chinese CR-V had been manufactured in Wuhan. Even there, it had been a good year for assembly lines; Honda reported that, in 2020, its automobile sales in China increased by five per cent over the previous year. We called it our?covid?car. On campus, I parked in the basement of the Marxism Institute.??
每個(gè)星期一，我的女兒們都戴著紅色的少先隊(duì)圍巾去上學(xué)潜索，這是所有學(xué)生都必須戴的臭增。有時(shí)他們抱怨不能去科羅拉多州，他們想念我們的貓竹习，那只貓正由我們的房客照顧速址。但漸漸地，那種生活感覺越來越遙遠(yuǎn)由驹。一天下午，雙胞胎在撫河岸邊發(fā)現(xiàn)了一只被遺棄的小貓昔园，他們收養(yǎng)了它蔓榄，給它取名為尤利西斯。這是最好的應(yīng)對(duì)方式ーー這里一個(gè)現(xiàn)實(shí)默刚，那里一個(gè)現(xiàn)實(shí)甥郑。一些家庭照片掛在我們的家里，一些宜家家具也被復(fù)制了荤西。在科羅拉多州澜搅，我們的黑色本田 CR-V 停在車庫(kù)里，現(xiàn)在我們又為成都買了一輛黑色本田 CR-V邪锌。我們的中國(guó) CR-V 是在武漢生產(chǎn)的勉躺。即使在中國(guó)，對(duì)于組裝線來說觅丰，今年也是不錯(cuò)的一年饵溅。本田報(bào)告稱，2020年妇萄，其在華汽車銷量同比增長(zhǎng)5% 蜕企。我們稱之為我們的無人駕駛汽車咬荷。在校園里，我把車停在馬克思主義研究所的地下室里轻掩。謝謝
Published in the print edition of the?發(fā)表在《經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)人》印刷版?March 15, 2021?2021年3月15日, issue?幸乒，發(fā)行, with the headline “Manufacturing Diplomacy.”?，標(biāo)題為“制造業(yè)外交”
Peter Hessler?彼得 · 赫斯勒?joined The New Yorker as a staff writer in 2000. His most recent book is “?2000年加入《紐約客》 唇牧，擔(dān)任特約撰稿人The Buried: An Archaeology of the Egyptian Revolution?埋葬: 埃及革命的考古學(xué).”?罕扎。」
