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They are only tools, not a competing form of intelligence. But they will reshape what work means and how wealth is created, leading to unprecedented economic inequalities and even altering the global balance of power.它們只是工具麻养，而非某種與人類競爭的智慧形式。但它們將重塑工作的含義和財富的創(chuàng)造方式，引發(fā)前所未有的經(jīng)濟(jì)不平等耐量，甚至改變?nèi)蛄α烤鶆荨?/p>
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Roughly speaking, it’s technology that takes in huge amounts of information from a specific domain (say, loan repayment histories) and uses it to make a decision in a specific case (whether to give an individual a loan) in the service of a specified goal (maximizing profits for the lender). Think of a spreadsheet on steroids, trained on big data. These tools can outperform human beings at a given task.
今天的人工智能是什么竞川？大致來說，它是一種從特定領(lǐng)域（例如貸款償還記錄）獲取大量信息，并利用這些信息在特定情況下作出決定（是否貸款給某人）排抬，服務(wù)于特定目標(biāo)（讓貸方實現(xiàn)利潤最大化）的技術(shù)栈拖。它就好比是打了雞血——接受了大數(shù)據(jù)訓(xùn)練——的電子表格程序连舍。執(zhí)行特定任務(wù)時，這些工具的表現(xiàn)可以好于人類涩哟。
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Instead, it is poised to bring about a wide-scale decimation of jobs — mostly lower-paying jobs, but some higher-paying ones, too.相反索赏，它有可能造成工作崗位的大規(guī)模減少——其中大多是低薪崗位，但也會有一些高薪崗位贴彼。
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This transformation will result in enormous profits for the companies that develop A.I., as well as for the companies that adopt it.
這種轉(zhuǎn)變將為開發(fā)人工智能以及運(yùn)用人工智能的企業(yè)帶來大量利潤潜腻。
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The solution to the problem of mass unemployment, I suspect, will involve “service jobs of love.” These are jobs that A.I. cannot do, that society needs and that give people a sense of purpose.The volunteer service jobs of today, in other words, may turn into the real jobs of the future.
我猜想，大規(guī)模失業(yè)問題的解決方案會牽涉到“愛心服務(wù)工作”器仗。這些工作人工智能做不了融涣，社會需要桥氏，又能給人以使命感吹菱。換句話說，今天的志愿者服務(wù)工作或許可以在未來變成真正的工作浩嫌。
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In all cases, people will be able to choose to work fewer hours than they do now.
管怎樣杂拨，人們都將可以選擇讓自己的工作時間比現(xiàn)在短专普。
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It strikes me as unavoidable that large chunks of the money created by A.I. will have to be transferred to those whose jobs have been displaced. This seems feasible only through Keynesian policies of increased government spending, presumably raised through taxation on wealthy companies.
在我看來，由人工智能創(chuàng)造的財富有一大部分要不可避免地被轉(zhuǎn)移給那些因之失去工作的人弹沽√醇校看起來筋粗，這一點似乎只有通過實行增加政府開支的凱恩斯經(jīng)濟(jì)政策才能做到，而政府開支的增加或許可以通過對有錢的公司征稅實現(xiàn)炸渡。
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To fund this, tax rates will have to be high. 要給這些福利提供資金娜亿，勢必要提高稅率The Keynesian approach I have sketched out may be feasible in the United States and China, which will have enough successful A.I. businesses to fund welfare initiatives via taxes.
我設(shè)想的凱恩斯政策方案在美國和中國或許是可行的，這兩個國家會有足夠多成功的人工智能企業(yè)來通過稅收資助福利措施蚌堵。
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A.I. is an industry in which strength begets strength: The more data you have, the better your product; the better your product, the more data you can collect; the more data you can collect, the more talent you can attract; the more talent you can attract, the better your product. It’s a virtuous circle, and the United States and China have already amassed the talent, market share and data to set it in motion.
工智能是一個強(qiáng)者更強(qiáng)的行業(yè)：你獲得的數(shù)據(jù)越多买决，產(chǎn)品就會越好；產(chǎn)品越好吼畏，收集的數(shù)據(jù)越多督赤；數(shù)據(jù)越多，就能吸引更多人才泻蚊；人才越多躲舌，產(chǎn)品也會越好。這是一個良性循環(huán)性雄，美國和中國已經(jīng)積聚了足夠多的人才没卸、市場份額和數(shù)據(jù)來啟動這個循環(huán)。
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.It seems American businesses will dominate in developed markets and some developing markets, while Chinese companies will win in most developing markets.
看起來秒旋，美國的公司將主導(dǎo)發(fā)達(dá)國家市場和一些發(fā)展中國家市場约计，而中國企業(yè)將在大多數(shù)發(fā)展中國家市場獲勝。
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.While a large, growing population can be an economic asset (as in China and India in recent decades), in the age of A.I. it will be an economic liability because it will comprise mostly displaced workers, not productive ones.
盡管不斷增長的龐大人口也可以成為經(jīng)濟(jì)資本（就像中國和印度最近幾十年的情況）迁筛，但在人工智能時代病蛉，它會成為一個經(jīng)濟(jì)責(zé)任，因為這些人口會構(gòu)成大多數(shù)的失業(yè)工人瑰煎，而不是多產(chǎn)的員工铺然。
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.Unless they wish to plunge their people into poverty, they will be forced to negotiate with whichever country supplies most of their A.I. software — China or the United States — to essentially become that country’s economic dependent, taking in welfare subsidies in exchange for letting the “parent” nation’s A.I. companies continue to profit from the dependent country’s users. Such economic arrangements would reshape today’s geopolitical alliances.
除非它們愿意讓民眾陷入貧困，否則就必須與供應(yīng)最多人工智能軟件的國家——中國或美國——談判酒甸，最終成為這個國家的經(jīng)濟(jì)依賴者魄健，以允許“母”國的人工智能企業(yè)繼續(xù)從依賴國的用戶身上獲利，來換取福利補(bǔ)貼插勤。這樣的經(jīng)濟(jì)安排將重塑現(xiàn)有的地緣政治聯(lián)盟沽瘦。
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A.I. is presenting us with an opportunity to rethink economic inequality on a global scale. These challenges are too far-ranging in their effects for any nation to isolate itself from the rest of the world.
要么就得把這件事看得更樂觀一些：人工智能給我們提供一個在全球范圍內(nèi)重新思考經(jīng)濟(jì)不平等的機(jī)會。這些挑戰(zhàn)太過廣泛农尖，任何國家都無法將自己孤立起來析恋，獨自解決。
