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Historical Excursus

In order properly to appraise the sign if cance of the review, it is important to realize that in 1781, the same year as Kant’s Critique,Berkeley’s Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous were also published for the first time in German translation.4

This work caused considerable puzzlement. One r eviewer predicted that out of a hundred readers there would hardly be one who “will fail? to view this idealistic system, so very appalling and confusing to the common understanding,? as nonsense and as clear proof of the philosophers’ aberrations,and throw away with indignation a book that contains such fantasies.” For? , as the reviewer goes on, in Berkeley’s idealism “all matter is completely annihilated,its reality denied, and its existence r educed merely to the mind’s representations of it.”5

Although the tone of the G?ttingen review of Kant’s Critique is less disparaging,the association with Berkeley is pr esent? from the outset. For Kant’s work, writes the reviewer, “is a system of higher , or, as the author calls it, transcendental idealism; an idealism that comprehends spirit and matter in the same way , transforms the world and our self into representations . . . All our cognitions arise fr om certain modif cations? of our self that we call sensations? . . .?

Upon these concepts of sensations? as mere modifcations? of our self (upon which Berkeley also mainly built? his idealism), of space, and of time, rests? the one foundation pillar of the Kantian system.”6

This passage is suffcient to demonstrate that the r eviewer has failed to understand? the basic question posed by the Critique—and hence also the idea of transcendental? philosophy. For the Critique is not at all concer ned with objects

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“matter”), but rather with our a priori concepts of objects in general.7 Berkeley’s idealism is metaphysical, Kant’s is not. Kant is concerned instead with investigating the possibility of metaphysics. Indeed, it was for precisely this reason that he introduced the term ‘object in general’ in order to cast into relief the difference from traditional metaphysics. The fact that the r? eviewer has utterly failed to notice this is also evidenced by his overall appraisal of the table of categories and the? principles: “They are the commonly known principles of logic and ontology? ,expressed accor ding to the idealistic r estrictions of the author .”8 Kant’s? reaction? is documented by numer ous handwritten remarks as well as bythe three notes to section 13 and the appendix to the Prolegomena.

In section 13 he again summarizes his theor y of space as the for m of outer appearances. Secondly,? he points out that in contrast to all the other idealists he does not in the least? deny the existence of exter nal objects, but only claims that we do not know them as they are in themselves, but only by way of the representations they arousein us. Thir dly, he rejects the criticism that his theor y transforms the sensible world into “mere illusion”; on the contrar y, his theor y is the only way both to guarantee the certainty and exact applicability of mathematics to actual objects while at the same? time guar ding? against the “transcendental illusion” by which metaphysics has always been deceived and which f? nds its starkest expr ession in the antinomy .

In the appendix, f? nally,? Kant challenges the anonymous r eviewer? to step forward and enter into a public debate with him, and he invites him to choose any one of the antinomial pr opositions? and to attack Kant’s pr oof of the contradictory proposition.? If Kant succeeds in defending the pr? oof,? “then by this means it is settled that there is an hereditary defect in metaphysics,” since both the pr oposition and its contradiction ar e equally pr ovable—an hereditary defect which can not? be explained, much less r? emedied,? unless we examine pur e? reason? itself: “and so my Critique must either be accepted or a better one put in its place, and therefore? it must at least be studied; which is the only thing I ask for now”(4:379).? At the same time, however ,? Kant also makes an important? and highly consequential? concession. Since the Critique as a whole is diff cult to grasp, an

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since a certain prolixity and obscurity cannot be denied, Kant makes the following “proposal”:? “I propose? these Prolegomena as the plan and guide for the investigation, and not the work itself” (4:381). This means that the r eader is not to start from the question how a priori representations? can refer to an object in general,but rather from the question how synthetic pr opositions a priori ar e possible.

Not long after the publication of the Prolegomena,the author of the review did in fact contact Kant; he did so, however , not in order to carry on the discussion of the? antinomy as Kant had suggested, but to explain how his r? ? eview? had come about.? The wellknown Popul?rphilosoph? Christian Gar ve confesses that he took on the review of Kant’s work without having r ead it. He soon came to see that he would not be able to do it justice, and his discussion of it gr ew to such length that the editor of the G?ttingische Anzeigen shortened it by two- thirds and signifcantly rewrote important passages of the remainder. He could not r ecognize the printed version as his own.

Kant’s? answer was immediate. He praises Garve as the man of noble sentiments he had always known him to be. He goes on to write, “Fur? thermore, I must admit that I have not counted on an immediately favorable r eception of my work . . .

In time, a number of points will become clear (per haps my Prolegomena will help this).? These points will shed light on other passages, to which of course a clarifying essay from me may be requisite from time to time. And thus, f? nally, the whole work will be sur veyed and understood, if one will only get star? ted with the job,beginning with the main question on which ever ything depends (a question that I have stated clearly enough)” (10:338–39). The main question to which he r efers is that of the Prolegomena:How are a priori synthetic pr opositions? possible??

Here again Kant suggests that one should take this question as the starting point. On August 21, 1783, Garve sends his original version of the r eview to Kant. It is considerably? more? circumspect? than the r ewritten? version that appear ed? in the G?ttingische Anzeigen. Nor is the comparison with Berkeley to be found in Garve’s own version. What lends Gar ve’s original version its special impor tance, however,is something? else.? It is his judgment of the chapter on the canon of pur? e reason,which I mentioned above and in which God and a life after death ar e introduced as necessar y postulates of r eason? in order to explain why moral actions are obligatory. On this point we r ead in the published r eview in the G?ttingische Anzeigen:

“We prefer to pass over without r emark the way the author intends to use moral concepts to lend suppor t to the common mode of thought after having r obbed it of speculative concepts, for this is the par t with which we find ourselves least able to agree. There is of course a manner of connecting the conceptions of tr? uth and the most? general laws of thought with the most general concepts and principles of right behavior which is gr ounded in our nature . . .?

But we do not recognize it in the

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guise in which the author dr esses it . . .

First and foremost,? the right employment of the understanding must accor d with the most general concept of right behavior , the? basic law of our moral natur? e,? that is, the pr omotion? of happiness” (Malter 198– 99).9 The notes Kant wr ote? while pr eparing? the Prolegomena

make it clear that he found this passage especially of fensive:? “Instruction by the reviewer in morality? . . .I, too, lear n— only not morality” (23:59). For the principle of happiness which is

here promoted? to the fundamental law of our moral natur? e can never lead to apure morality, but only to a pr udential doctrine oriented towar d one’s own advantage, in other wor ds what today would be called instr umental reason oriented toward means and ends. The imperatives which have their sour? ce in instr umental reason are always conditioned and dependent on an assumed end, wher eas moral imperatives command categorically and without r egard to aims and inter ests.? Thus there is either only instr umental reason or there is a completely dif ferent kind of practical reason as well, namely moral r eason,? which presupposes? the possibility of an unconditionally commanding imperative. On this point Kant makes the following note: “Now the question is, how? is a categorical imperative possible[;]

whoever solves this pr oblem has found the tr ue principle of morality. The reviewer will

probably not dare to undertake a solution to this pr oblem as he has not dar ed to take on the impor tant problem of transcendental philosophy which has a remarkable similarity to that of morality” (23:60).

Indeed,? if instead of the question of the possibility of objective r? eference one starts from the main question of the Prolegomena, the similarity is striking. For the categorical imperative is also a synthetic a priori pr? oposition.? It connects my will with a deed, and it does so a priori and necessarily? , without the connection being prescribed by a prior end willed by myself. What, then, is the thir d term that makes the synthetic connection a priori possible? Since it is not possible experience as in the case of theor etical propositions of this kind, what is it then?

Based? on what Kant says in the “Canon of Pur? e Reason,” we have to assume that it is the idea of a possible highest good, in which happiness is thought as proportional? to vir tue,? that makes such a connection possible and is thus in a position? to motivate action. But it is pr? ecisely? this thought which Gar? ve? findswholly unconvincing. He writes: “It is ver y true that it is only moral sentiment that makes the thought of God impor tant to us; it is only the per fection of that sentiment which improves our theology. But that it is supposed to be possible to maintain this sentiment and the tr uths founded on it, after one has eliminated all the

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other sentiments that r elate to the existence of things and the theor y derived from them—

that one is supposed to be able to live and abide in the kingdom of grace,?? after the kingdom of natur e has disappear ed before our eyes—? this, I think, will find its way into the hear ts and minds of ver y few people indeed” (Malter 237–? 38).In the dialectic Kant had, on the one hand, shown that we cannot know anything about God and that theor etical? cognition of supersensible objects must?

be ruled out as impossible in principle. On the other hand, he ar? gues that certain propositions? of practical r eason cannot be tr ue, or rather, cannot motivate action unless? we can assume the existence of God and a futur? e life. It is thus the validity and obligator y force of the moral law itself which r e- introduces? God into theoretical cognition, while at the same time it is the idea of God which ser? ves to explain the bindingness and validity of the law . For “reason? f nds itself constrained to assume” the existence of God, Kant writes in the Critique,since “other wise it would have to r egard the moral laws as empty f? gments of the brain” (A811).

Kant is thus guilty of a petitio principii which only becomes clear to him through Garve’s? objection (for the published version of the r? eview had passed over this point as incomprehensible).? His explanation pr esupposes? the very thing it is supposed to explain.

Hence it is equally clear that Kant still owes an explanation of how the categorical imperative is possible as a synthetic pr? oposition? a priori. What is the source of the obligation which connects the will with action in the absence of a deter? minate? purpose? What ever? the case, a suff? cient? explanation cannot be derived from? the Critique’s? Canon of Pur e? Reason.10 And until such an explanation is given, the moral skeptic is just as entitled to claim that up to now ther? e has been no metaphysics of morals, as Kant is in claiming that up to now ther? e has been no metaphysics of nature.

The? moral skeptic’s counterpar t? is the moral dogmatist who insists that the moral laws can be derived fr om human nature and are thus subordinated to happiness.? And this is the view shar ed by Garve and his editor in G?ttingen. Gar ve, too,believes? that morality can be deter mined on the basis of human nature,? and he

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explicitly questions whether “this wor thiness counts as the final end of nature and for more than happiness itself” (Malter 240). And since he had just published his views on this matter with gr eat success in a two- volume translation of Cicer o’s De officiis,? commissioned by the King of Pr? us

sia? himself and enlar ged? by Gar ve’s commentary and annotations, Kant was for ced to admit that the first principle of morality? was not at all as clear and evident as he had assumed in the Critique under the inf uence of Rousseau. In place of the simple r esponse? to the G?ttingen review he had initially planned, he now saw that he himself was still missing something. He could not possibly make a dir ect transition to metaphysics fr om the Critique and Prolegomena.

Rather the f? rst order of business would be to give a perfectly? clear account of the supr eme principle of morality and to demonstrate the possibility? of a categorical imperative as a synthetic a priori pr? oposition.? In other words, he would have to write a Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals

Before? turning? to? that? work,? however,? I? would? like? briefly? to? address? a further fundamental objection raised in the G?ttingen review. Though Garve does not explicitly refer to Berkeley, he too questions whether Kant’s principles? provide? a? basis? for? explaining? the? difference? between? experience on the one hand and dream and fantasy on the other. For even in dreams we see what we imagine as though in space and time and as following causally upon what precedes it. Nevertheless, we later recognize it as unreal.Does Kant have a response to this objection?

Let us return, then, once more to the Prolegomena.After elucidating his doctrine of space and time as the a priori forms of all appearances,Kant writes: “From this it follows: that, since truth rests upon universal and necessary laws as its criteria, for Berkeley experience could have no criteria of truth, because its appearances (according to him) had nothing underlying them a priori; from which it then followed that experience is nothing but sheer illusion, whereas for us space and time (in conjunction with the pure concepts of the understanding) prescribe a priori their law to all possible experience, which law at the same time provides the sure criterion for distinguishing truth from illusion in experience” (4:375).

As it stands, this claim is hardly convincing. For in the third Dialogue,Berkeley had explained, “[I] place the reality of things in ideas, flieeting indeed, and changeable; however not changed at random, but according to the fixed order of nature. For herein consists that constancy and truth of? things,? which? secures? all? the? concerns? of? life,? and? distinguishes? that which? is real ? from? the? irregular? visions? of? the? fancy”? (Berkeley? 1713,

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254). And Kant himself seems to share precisely this same view, which he had expressed for instance at A493 of the Critique and reaffirms in the Prologomena:“The difference between truth and dream, however, is not decided through the quality of the represen tations that are referred to objects, for they are the same in both, but through their connection according to the rules that determine the connection of representations in the concept of an object, and how far they can or cannot stand together in one experience” (4:290). How, then, are we to interpret Kant’s objection that Berkeley has no criterion of truth?

Let us suppose for a moment that Berkeley is right and space is not a priori but has an empirical origin in the abstraction from given appearances.11 Initially, therefore, all we have are the appearances as representations in inner sense. They arise successively, in continuous flux, one after the other. In order for me now to form the representation of space,I require representations of something permanent or simultaneous. Two things are ‘simultaneous’, as Kant explains in the third analogy, when the perception of the one (A) can both follow and be followed by the perception of the other (B), that is, when apprehension (and not only thought) can proceed both from A to B as well as from B back to A. This, however,is not possible in inner sense, for there everything is successive and hence every new perception is later than the one which precedes it. Under these conditions, then, it is wholly impossible to represent a manifold as being simultaneous and thus to refer it to something distinct from myself. On the? basis? of? inner? sense? alone,? it? is? not? possible? to? distinguish? between? representation and external object and hence neither is it possible to distinguish between illusion and reality. Or as Kant will later say, “No one can have inner sense alone, and indeed on behalf of cognition of his inner state, yet that is what idealism asserts” (18:616). Therefore, space cannot have an empirical origin as Berkeley supposed it to have. Experience is impossible—and hence self- consciousness, too, is impossible, as Kant has demonstrated in the transcendental deduction of the categories—if

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pace is not presupposed as an a priori form of intuition along with inner sense.12 This? argument? refutes? Berkeley’s? theory? of? space,? but? it? also? has? an important? implication? for? Kant’s? own? position.? As? we? have? seen,? Kant demonstrated? the? objective? validity? of? the? categories? by? showing? how they can refer to their object in an a priori manner. This, of course, could not take place a posteriori, but rather transcendental philosophy must, in a purely a priori fashion, “formulate by universal but suffi cient marks the conditions under which objects can be given in harmony with these concepts. Otherwise the concepts would be void of all content, and therefore mere logical forms, not pure concepts of the understanding” (A136). At this point, however, it becomes obvious that Kant had not presented such“sufficient? marks.”? Although? he? had? shown? in? the? schematism? chapter how an object can be given “in concreto”(A138) as corresponding to the categories, he had done so only for the inner sense. For the schemata are “nothing but a priori determinations of time in accordance with rules”(A145). The reason for limiting schemata to inner sense seems to be that all appearances are to be met with in inner sense, whereas only some of them are present also in outer sense: “For the original apperception stands in relation to inner sense (the sum of all representations), and indeed a priori to its form” (A177, cp. 98– 99). Thus Kant was able to believe that the schemata contain the necessary and hence “universal” conditions of the objective reality of the categories: “Thus an application of the category to appearances becomes possible by means of the transcendental determination of time” (A139).

In the course of his encounter with Berkeley, however, it becomes clear that there can be no temporal determination without space, since inner sense cannot contain the elements of permanence and simultaneity required for? any? temporal? determination.? Space? itself,? however,? cannot? be? perceived. Rather, for us it must be represented by way of the simultaneity of the objects within it. Thus in addition to the schemata, there must also be

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something like an ‘a(chǎn) priori spatial determination in accord with rules’which can explain how we are able a priori to distinguish something, which is supposed to be an object of outer sense, from the space which it occupies. The following statement from the Critique cannot therefore be correct: “The schemata of the pure understanding are thus the true and sole conditions under which these concepts obtain relation to objects and so possess signifi cance” (A145– 46, fi rst emphasis added). A sufficient demonstration of the objective validity of the categories still requires something along the lines of a schematism of space.

Thus it was the fi rst review of the Critique which made Kant realize that not just one, but two books would be necessary before he would be able to turn to metaphysics: in addition to the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, which came out in 1785, another work as well, which, though completed in the same year, was not published until the year after:Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science.In regard to this latter work,he wrote to Christian Gottfried Schütz on September 13, 1785: “Before I can compose the metaphysics of nature that I have promised to do, I had to write something that is in fact a mere application of it but that presupposes an empirical concept.13I refer to the metaphysical foundations of the doctrine of body . . So I fi nished them this Summer under the title ‘Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science’ ” (10:406).

To these two works I now turn.