In retreat 節(jié)節(jié)敗退

The multinational company is in trouble

跨國公司的困局

Global firms are surprisingly vulnerable to attack

跨國公司居然如此不堪一擊

AMONG the many things that Donald Trump dislikes are big global firms. Faceless and rootless, they stand accused of unleashing “carnage” on ordinary Americans by shipping jobs and factories abroad. His answer is to domesticate these marauding multinationals. Lower taxes will draw their cash home, border charges will hobble their cross-border supply chains and the trade deals that help them do business will be rewritten. To avoid punitive treatment, “all you have to do is stay,” he told American bosses this week.

唐納德·特朗普討厭的事情有許多，大型跨國公司就是其中之一。鳥盡弓藏祠够，兔死狗烹，跨國公司不愧是“荼毒”美國老百姓的罪魁禍?zhǔn)祝麄儼褔鴥?nèi)就業(yè)機(jī)會(huì)帶到國外露泊，將工廠開到國外闹击。面對這些四處掠奪的跨國公司，特朗普的答案是：回頭是岸凹联。通過減稅沐兰，吸引跨國公司資金回流；增加收費(fèi)蔽挠，阻礙他們的跨國供應(yīng)鏈住闯，此外瓜浸，助其經(jīng)營的貿(mào)易協(xié)定也將被改寫。要想不打板子比原，“你們除了留下插佛，別無選擇”，本周量窘，特朗普對美國商界大佬們?nèi)缡钦f雇寇。

Mr Trump is unusual in his aggressively protectionist tone. But in many ways he is behind the times. Multinational companies, the agents behind global integration, were already in retreat well before the populist revolts of 2016. Their financial performance has slipped so that they are no longer outstripping local firms. Many seem to have exhausted their ability to cut costs and taxes and to out-think their local competitors. Mr Trump’s broadsides are aimed at companies that are surprisingly vulnerable and, in many cases, are already heading home. The impact on global commerce will be profound.

說到霸道的保護(hù)主義論調(diào)，特朗普真的無人能及蚌铜。然而在許多方面锨侯，他真的很落伍。作為全球一體化的代理人冬殃，跨國公司在2016年民粹主義揭竿而起之前囚痴，早就已經(jīng)節(jié)節(jié)敗退了。與本地公司相比审葬，財(cái)務(wù)狀況下滑的跨國公司的優(yōu)勢已經(jīng)不在深滚。在削減成本、賦稅方面涣觉，他們已經(jīng)黔驢技窮痴荐，在思維方面，他們亦不再是本地公司的對手官册。特朗普猛烈抨擊的目標(biāo)生兆，正是那些不堪一擊到令人驚訝的跨國公司，而且攀隔，在多數(shù)情況下皂贩，他們已經(jīng)打算回國發(fā)展了。這將給全球商業(yè)帶來了深遠(yuǎn)影響昆汹。

The end of the arbitrage 無利可圖

Multinational firms (those that do a large chunk of their business outside their home region) employ only one in 50 of the world’s workers. But they matter. A few thousand firms influence what billions of people watch, wear and eat. The likes of IBM, McDonald’s, Ford, H&M, Infosys, Lenovo and Honda have been the benchmark for managers. They co-ordinate the supply chains that account for over 50% of all trade. They account for a third of the value of the world’s stockmarkets and they own the lion’s share of its intellectual property—from lingerie designs to virtual-reality software and diabetes drugs.

跨國公司（那些海外業(yè)務(wù)為主要業(yè)務(wù)的公司）的雇員只占全球員工的1/50明刷。但是他們卻舉足輕重。幾千家公司影響著數(shù)十億人口的衣食住行满粗。像IBM辈末，麥當(dāng)勞、福特汽車映皆、H&M挤聘、Infosys、聯(lián)想捅彻、本田這樣的公司组去，都屬于行業(yè)的標(biāo)桿。這些公司合作的供應(yīng)鏈占全球貿(mào)易的半數(shù)以上步淹，其股票占全球股市市值的1/3之多从隆，而且擁有絕大部分的知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)诚撵，從內(nèi)衣設(shè)計(jì)，到虛擬現(xiàn)實(shí)軟件键闺，再到糖尿病藥物寿烟，不一而足。

They boomed in the early 1990s, as China and the former Soviet bloc opened and Europe integrated. Investors liked global firms’ economies of scale and efficiency. Rather than running themselves as national fiefs, firms unbundled their functions. A Chinese factory might use tools from Germany, have owners in the United States, pay taxes in Luxembourg and sell to Japan. Governments in the rich world dreamed of their national champions becoming world-beaters. Governments in the emerging world welcomed the jobs, exports and technology that global firms brought. It was a golden age.

隨著1990年代初期中國和前蘇聯(lián)打開國門以及歐洲一體化辛燥，跨國公司迎來了蓬勃發(fā)展筛武。投資人熱衷于跨國公司的經(jīng)濟(jì)規(guī)模和效率】嫠跨國公司沒有將自己經(jīng)營成國家封地徘六，而是對功能進(jìn)行了細(xì)化。一家中國工廠使用的工具可能是德國制造的勃蜘，投資人可能在美國硕噩，在盧森堡繳稅假残，產(chǎn)品銷售到日本缭贡。富裕國家的政府夢想著他們的民族企業(yè)成為世界的強(qiáng)者。而新興市場國家政府則對跨國企業(yè)帶來的就業(yè)機(jī)會(huì)辉懒，出口貿(mào)易和技術(shù)表示歡迎阳惹。真可謂是一個(gè)黃金時(shí)代。

Central to the rise of the global firm was its claim to be a superior moneymaking machine. That claim lies in tatters (seeBriefing). In the past five years the profits of multinationals have dropped by 25%. Returns on capital have slipped to their lowest in two decades. A strong dollar and a low oil price explain part of the decline. Technology superstars and consumer firms with strong brands are still thriving. But the pain is too widespread and prolonged to be dismissed as a blip. About 40% of all multinationals make a return on equity of less than 10%, a yardstick for underperformance. In a majority of industries they are growing more slowly and are less profitable than local firms that stayed in their backyard. The share of global profits accounted for by multinationals has fallen from 35% a decade ago to 30% now. For many industrial, manufacturing, financial, natural-resources, media and telecoms companies, global reach has become a burden, not an advantage.

跨國公司崛起之核心在于眶俩，他們自詡為絕佳的賺錢機(jī)器莹汤。只可惜這種說法已經(jīng)被粉碎了。在過去五年間颠印，跨國公司的利潤下降了25%纲岭。資本回報(bào)率跌至20年來的最低水平。美元走強(qiáng)和油價(jià)下跌解釋了業(yè)績下滑的部分原因线罕。技術(shù)領(lǐng)域的超級(jí)巨星和大牌消費(fèi)者公司依然興旺止潮。然而，這種痛苦彌漫之廣泛钞楼，影響之深遠(yuǎn)喇闸，已經(jīng)絕非是曇花一現(xiàn)了。在所有跨國企業(yè)中询件，有大約40%的股本回報(bào)率均低于10%燃乍，即業(yè)績良莠分水嶺。與土生土長的本土企業(yè)相比宛琅，大部分行業(yè)的跨國公司都發(fā)展越來越慢刻蟹，效益越來越差『俦伲跨國企業(yè)在全球利潤中的占比已從十年前的35%下降至如今的30%舆瘪。對于許多工業(yè)痢艺、制造業(yè)、金融介陶、自然資源堤舒、傳媒和電信公司而言，全球布局已經(jīng)不再是一種優(yōu)勢哺呜，而是一種負(fù)擔(dān)了舌缤。

That is because a 30-year window of arbitrage is closing. Firms’ tax bills have been massaged down as low as they can go; in China factory workers’ wages are rising. Local firms have become more sophisticated. They can steal, copy or displace global firms’ innovations without building costly offices and factories abroad. From America’s shale industry to Brazilian banking, from Chinese e-commerce to Indian telecoms, the companies at the cutting edge are local, not global.

這是因?yàn)椋瑸槠?0年的套利窗口期已經(jīng)接近尾聲了某残。公司的稅務(wù)賬單已經(jīng)壓縮得低到不能再低国撵；在中國，工廠工人的工資正在上漲玻墅。本土公司也變得更加老道起來介牙。他們不用花費(fèi)成本在海外設(shè)立機(jī)構(gòu)或建廠，就能夠剽竊澳厢、復(fù)制跨國公司的創(chuàng)新成果环础，甚至取而代之。從美國的頁巖氣產(chǎn)業(yè)到巴西銀行業(yè)剩拢，從中國的電子商務(wù)到印度的電信業(yè)线得，處于行業(yè)前沿的均為本土公司，而非跨公公司徐伐。

The changing political landscape is making things even harder for the giants. Mr Trump is the latest and most strident manifestation of a worldwide shift to grab more of the value that multinationals capture. China wants global firms to place not just their supply chains there, but also their brainiest activities such as research and development. Last year Europe and America battled over who gets the $13bn of tax that Apple and Pfizer pay annually. From Germany to Indonesia rules on takeovers, antitrust and data are tightening.

風(fēng)云突變的政治前景讓跨國公司的日子更加難挨贯钩。在世界范圍內(nèi)，跨國公司鉆在手里的賺錢砝碼在不斷被搶走办素，特朗普就是這種轉(zhuǎn)變的最新角雷、最霸道的例證。中國希望跨國公司來當(dāng)?shù)夭季值牟粌H是供應(yīng)鏈性穿，還包括最費(fèi)腦子的生產(chǎn)活動(dòng)勺三，例如研發(fā)。去年季二，英國和美國為誰來收取蘋果公司和輝瑞公司每年繳納的130億美元稅金而打得不可開交檩咱。從德國到印度尼西亞，收購胯舷、反壟斷和數(shù)據(jù)方面的規(guī)定都在收緊刻蚯。

Mr Trump’s arrival will only accelerate a gory process of restructuring. Many firms are simply too big: they will have to shrink their empires. Others are putting down deeper roots in the markets where they operate. General Electric and Siemens are “l(fā)ocalising” supply chains, production, jobs and tax into regional or national units. Another strategy is to become “intangible”. Silicon Valley’s stars, from Uber to Google, are still expanding abroad. Fast-food firms and hotel chains are shifting from flipping burgers and making beds to selling branding rights. But such virtual multinationals are also vulnerable to populism because they create few direct jobs, pay little tax and are not protected by trade rules designed for physical goods.

特朗普的到來只會(huì)加速血腥的重組過程。有許多跨國公司的確太大了：他們是該給自己的帝國瘦瘦身了桑嘶。而其他公司炊汹，在各自的海外市場的根基卻越來越深。通用電氣和西門子都在本地化逃顶，將供應(yīng)鏈讨便、生產(chǎn)充甚、就業(yè)和納稅等環(huán)節(jié)融入到地區(qū)或國家單位當(dāng)中。另一個(gè)策略是“隱身術(shù)”霸褒。硅谷的各路明星公司伴找，從優(yōu)步到谷歌，依舊在進(jìn)行海外擴(kuò)張废菱〖及快餐公司和連鎖酒店也在從賣漢堡、鋪床單向出售品牌經(jīng)營權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)變殊轴。但是衰倦，在民粹主義面前，這樣的虛擬跨國企業(yè)也是不堪一擊的旁理，因?yàn)樗麄冎苯觿?chuàng)造的就業(yè)機(jī)會(huì)樊零，納稅也非常少，而且孽文，也不受為實(shí)體商品設(shè)計(jì)的貿(mào)易規(guī)則的保護(hù)驻襟。

Taking back control 奪回控制權(quán)

The retreat of global firms will give politicians a feeling of greater control as companies promise to do their bidding. But not every country can get a bigger share of the same firms’ production, jobs and tax. And a rapid unwinding of the dominant form of business of the past 20 years could be chaotic. Many countries with trade deficits (including “global Britain”) rely on the flow of capital that multinationals bring. If firms’ profits drop further, the value of stockmarkets will probably fall.

跨國公司的敗退讓政客們有了一種更強(qiáng)的控制感，因?yàn)檫@些公司承諾叛溢，將聽從政府的號(hào)令塑悼。但是劲适，在不同國家中楷掉，相同公司的生產(chǎn)、就業(yè)和納稅所占的份額未必就會(huì)增加霞势。作為過去20年中的主導(dǎo)商業(yè)形式烹植，如果跨國公司撤退的太快，就有可能帶來混亂愕贡。許多有貿(mào)易赤字的國家（包括“全球化的英國”）都依賴于跨國公司所帶來的資金流草雕。如果公司利潤進(jìn)一步減少，那么股市的市值也很可能出現(xiàn)下跌固以。

What of consumers and voters? They touch screens, wear clothes and are kept healthy by the products of firms that they dislike as immoral, exploitative and aloof. The golden age of global firms has also been a golden age for consumer choice and efficiency. Its demise may make the world seem fairer. But the retreat of the multinational cannot bring back all the jobs that the likes of Mr Trump promise. And it will mean rising prices, diminishing competition and slowing innovation. In time, millions of small firms trading across borders could replace big firms as transmitters of ideas and capital. But their weight is tiny. People may yet look back on the era when global firms ruled the business world, and regret its passing.

而消費(fèi)者和選民又會(huì)如何呢墩虹？他們劃著屏幕，穿著衣服憨琳，保持著身體健康诫钓，使用的產(chǎn)品卻來自于他們討厭的那些公司，那些鮮廉寡恥篙螟、竭澤而漁菌湃、麻面無情的跨國公司”槁裕跨國公司的黃金時(shí)代也是消費(fèi)者選擇及效率的黃金時(shí)代惧所。它的消亡或許能讓這個(gè)世界看起來更公平一些骤坐。但是，跨國公司的撤退并不能帶回特朗普等人所承諾的全部就業(yè)機(jī)會(huì)下愈。而且纽绍，它還意味著拉高價(jià)格，抑制競爭势似，及減緩創(chuàng)新顶岸。遲早，成千上萬的小型跨國貿(mào)易公司將代替大型公司叫编，成為思想和資金的傳送者辖佣。但是，目前他們還很弱小搓逾【硖福回想當(dāng)年跨國公司統(tǒng)治商業(yè)世界的那個(gè)時(shí)代，人們或許會(huì)為它的消逝而感到惋惜霞篡。

原文出處：經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)人網(wǎng)站

譯者：linda10030

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