北大光華教授 邁克爾·佩蒂斯：中國(guó)的GDP是什么？
北大光華金融學(xué)教授 卡內(nèi)基國(guó)際和平基金會(huì)高級(jí)研究員
翻譯：陳達(dá)飛
原文：What Is GDP in China?
本文發(fā)表于2018年焰雕，但并未過(guò)時(shí)∈缑担現(xiàn)在閱讀苟鸯，意味深長(zhǎng)袱讹。
有兩個(gè)必要條件怎炊，可以讓中國(guó)將GDP增長(zhǎng)作為一個(gè)“外生變量”，這是其他國(guó)家無(wú)法做到的廓译。第一，必須沒(méi)有硬性預(yù)算約束债查，它允許一個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)體年復(fù)一年地從事不創(chuàng)造價(jià)值的活動(dòng)非区。其次，由此產(chǎn)生的壞賬不能沖銷盹廷。一旦這兩個(gè)條件得到滿足(就中國(guó)而言)征绸，中國(guó)政府就可以設(shè)定自己喜歡的任何增長(zhǎng)目標(biāo)，只要擁有必要的債務(wù)能力俄占，就可以實(shí)現(xiàn)這一目標(biāo)管怠。
——Michael Pettis
The Chinese economy is not growing at 6.5 percent. It is probably growing by less than half of that. Not everyone agrees that the rate is that low, of course, but there is nonetheless a running debate about what is really happening in the Chinese economy and whether or not the country’s reported GDP growth is accurate.
中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)增速?zèng)]有6.5%，可能連它的一半都不到缸榄。當(dāng)然渤弛，并不是所有人都同意中國(guó)目前的增長(zhǎng)率有那么低。但關(guān)于中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)到底發(fā)生了什么甚带，以及中國(guó)公布的國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值增速是否準(zhǔn)確她肯，仍存在持續(xù)的爭(zhēng)論。
The reason for the wide spread skepticism is the disconnect between the official data and perceptions on the ground. According to the National Bureau of Statistics, China’s economic growth in every quarter last year exceeded 6.5 percent. While that is much lower than the heady growth rates China has experienced for most of the past forty years, it is still, by most measures, a very brisk rate of growth.
人們普遍持懷疑態(tài)度的原因是鹰贵，官方數(shù)據(jù)與實(shí)際情況脫節(jié)了晴氨。根據(jù)國(guó)家統(tǒng)計(jì)局的數(shù)據(jù)，中國(guó)去年每個(gè)季度的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)都超過(guò)了6.5%碉输。盡管這遠(yuǎn)低于中國(guó)在過(guò)去四十年大部分時(shí)間里所經(jīng)歷的高速增長(zhǎng)籽前，但從多數(shù)指標(biāo)來(lái)看，中國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)仍然非常強(qiáng)勁敷钾。
And yet, when you speak to Chinese businesses, economists, or analysts, it is hard to find any economic sector enjoying decent growth. Almost everyone is complaining bitterly about terribly difficult conditions, rising bankruptcies, a collapsing stock market, and dashed expectations. In my eighteen years in China, I have never seen this level of financial worry and unhappiness.
然而枝哄，當(dāng)你與中國(guó)企業(yè)、經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家或分析人士交談時(shí)闰非，你很難發(fā)現(xiàn)任何一個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)部門(mén)有像樣的增長(zhǎng)膘格。幾乎每個(gè)人都在痛苦地抱怨極其艱難的環(huán)境、不斷上升的破產(chǎn)的概率财松、崩潰的股市以及糟糕的預(yù)期瘪贱。在中國(guó)的18年里纱控，我從未見(jiàn)過(guò)人們有這種程度的財(cái)務(wù)困局和不快樂(lè)。
These concerns have even breached academia. One of my students told me yesterday that there was a huge increase last semester on the university website in the number of students selling their belongings because they are hard up for cash. They are selling their phones, computers, clothing, and lots of other possessions. He said the amount of selling is noticeably higher than last year, enough so that everyone is talking about it. And he indicated that this is apparently happening at other schools too. It seems that the poor and middle-class kids are squeezed for cash because they are getting much less money from home than they have in the past.
這些情況甚至已經(jīng)蔓延到了學(xué)術(shù)界菜秦。我的一個(gè)學(xué)生昨天告訴我甜害，上學(xué)期在學(xué)校網(wǎng)站上出售個(gè)人物品的學(xué)生人數(shù)有了很大的增長(zhǎng)，因?yàn)樗麄兪诸^拮據(jù)球昨。他們正在出售他們的手機(jī)尔店、電腦、衣服和許多其他財(cái)產(chǎn)主慰。他說(shuō)嚣州，銷量明顯高于去年，足以讓所有人都在談?wù)撍猜荨Ｋ赋龈秒龋@種情況在其他學(xué)校也很普遍。窮人和中產(chǎn)階級(jí)的孩子似乎手頭拮據(jù)藐不，因?yàn)樗麄儚募依锏玫降腻X比過(guò)去少得多匀哄。
This isn’t what you’d expect to hear from an economy growing at more than 6.5 percent. So what does it mean exactly to say thatChina’s GDP is growing at that pace? It turns out that there are three completely different sets of problems that affect how China’s GDP growth statistics should be interpreted. Analysts must keep these three problems straightand make sure that they don’t confuse matters by conflating these separate issues.
這不是你所期望的在一個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)率超過(guò)6.5%的國(guó)家里看到的情景。那么雏蛮，中國(guó)GDP以這樣的速度增長(zhǎng)到底意味著什么呢?事實(shí)證明涎嚼，有三種完全不同的問(wèn)題會(huì)影響中國(guó)GDP增長(zhǎng)數(shù)據(jù)的解讀。分析人士必須把這三個(gè)問(wèn)題弄清楚挑秉，并確保他們不會(huì)把這三個(gè)獨(dú)立的問(wèn)題混為一談法梯。
WHATDOES GDP MEASURE?
GDP衡量什么?
The first set of problems relates to the meaning of GDP itself. This challenge affects not just China but the rest of the world aswell. This is especially true for advanced economies with substantial technology and service sectors that employ technology whose value may be substantially understated by an inability to count it accurately.
第一類問(wèn)題與GDP本身的內(nèi)涵有關(guān)。這一挑戰(zhàn)不僅涉及到中國(guó)犀概，也影響世界其他地區(qū)鹊汛。對(duì)于擁有大量技術(shù)和服務(wù)部門(mén)的發(fā)達(dá)經(jīng)濟(jì)體來(lái)說(shuō)尤其如此，這些經(jīng)濟(jì)體使用的技術(shù)的價(jià)值可能由于無(wú)法準(zhǔn)確計(jì)算而被大大低估阱冶。
GDP is typically assumed to measure the creation of real economic value. If a country’s GDP rises by 5 percent over the course of ayear, for example, this is interpreted to mean that the amount of wealth the country produced in the last year is 5 percent greater than in the previous year. In other words, it would be assumed that the country’s ability to servicedebt would have increased by 5 percent, which means roughly the same thing.
GDP通常被用來(lái)衡量實(shí)體經(jīng)濟(jì)的價(jià)值創(chuàng)造刁憋。例如，如果一個(gè)國(guó)家的GDP在一年中增長(zhǎng)了5%木蹬，這就意味著該國(guó)去年創(chuàng)造的財(cái)富比前一年多5%至耻。換句話說(shuō)，這也意味著這個(gè)國(guó)家償還債務(wù)的能力增加了5%镊叁。兩種說(shuō)法基本相同尘颓。
But there is no way to truly measure a country’s creation of real economic value, as GDP is just a proxy for whatever it is thought to measure. Economists have agreed which measurements go into calculating GDP,and the resulting sum is referred to as a country’s aggregate GDP, or the value of everything produced locally in that economy.
但是，無(wú)法真正衡量一個(gè)國(guó)家創(chuàng)造的實(shí)際經(jīng)濟(jì)價(jià)值晦譬，因?yàn)镚DP只衡量它被認(rèn)為應(yīng)該衡量什么的一個(gè)指標(biāo)疤苹。經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家們已經(jīng)就GDP應(yīng)該衡量什么達(dá)成了一致意見(jiàn)，最終的結(jié)果被稱為一個(gè)國(guó)家的GDP總量敛腌，或者該經(jīng)濟(jì)體在當(dāng)?shù)厣a(chǎn)的所有東西的價(jià)值卧土。
Of course, not all value-creating activities arecounted when GDP is measured. For instance, if you teach your friend Spanishfor free, you add to the wealth of the economy, but you do not add to GDP. Bycontrast, if he does pay you, the country’s GDP does increase by the amount ofmoney you are paid, even though you are adding exactly the same value to the economy itself whether he pays you or not. In addition, not all measuredactivity actually creates value: building a bridge to nowhere, for example,creates exactly the same increase in GDP as building a much-needed bridge.
另外惫皱，并不是所有的創(chuàng)造價(jià)值活動(dòng)都被計(jì)入GDP。例如尤莺，如果你免費(fèi)教你的朋友西班牙語(yǔ)旅敷，你增加了一個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)體的財(cái)富，但你沒(méi)有增加它的GDP颤霎。相反媳谁，如果他給你錢，這個(gè)國(guó)家的GDP就會(huì)隨著你收入的增加而增加友酱，即使你給經(jīng)濟(jì)本身增加的價(jià)值與他給你的完全相同晴音。此外，并非所有計(jì)量的經(jīng)濟(jì)活動(dòng)都能創(chuàng)造價(jià)值：例如缔杉，修建一座不通往任何地方的橋梁段多，與修建一座有剛需的橋梁，所帶來(lái)的GDP增幅完全相同壮吩。
No proxy of economic value is perfect, of course, but there are real questions about whether GDP is imperfect to the point of being useless as a proxy. Does GDP really do a good job of capturing all the valuecreation in an economy? While this is a serious problem everywhere, it may beeven more of a problem in China because of the huge amount of investment in nonproductive activities that is counted in China’s GDP data even though this investment does not add to the country’s wealth or its debt-servicing capacity.
當(dāng)然，沒(méi)有一種經(jīng)濟(jì)價(jià)值的指標(biāo)是完美的加缘，但GDP作為一個(gè)指標(biāo)是否不完美到了無(wú)用的地步鸭叙，確實(shí)存在一些問(wèn)題。GDP真的能很好地捕捉經(jīng)濟(jì)中的所有價(jià)值創(chuàng)造嗎?盡管這在世界各地都是一個(gè)嚴(yán)重的問(wèn)題拣宏，但在中國(guó)沈贝，這個(gè)問(wèn)題可能更嚴(yán)重，因?yàn)橹袊?guó)GDP數(shù)據(jù)中計(jì)入了對(duì)非生產(chǎn)性活動(dòng)的巨額投資勋乾，即使這些投資并未增加中國(guó)的財(cái)富或償債能力宋下。
HOWACCURATE ARE CHINA’S GDP STATISTICS?
中國(guó)的GDP統(tǒng)計(jì)有多準(zhǔn)確?
The second set of problems has to do with how carefully and faithfully Chinese statisticians at the National Bureau of Statistics are calculating the agreed-upon elements that go into measuring GDP. Do they tendto collect the data in the way that introduces mistakes that are systematically biased (upward, to show higher than actual GDP, I would assume)? Or are they actually lying to please their political bosses?
第二類問(wèn)題與中國(guó)國(guó)家統(tǒng)計(jì)局的統(tǒng)計(jì)人員如何仔細(xì)、忠實(shí)地計(jì)算用于衡量GDP的公認(rèn)要素有關(guān)辑莫。他們是否傾向于以一種引入系統(tǒng)性偏差的錯(cuò)誤的方式來(lái)收集數(shù)據(jù)(我認(rèn)為是向上偏誤学歧，數(shù)據(jù)高于實(shí)際GDP)?或者他們確實(shí)在為了取悅他們的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)而撒謊?
I am pretty sure that China’s economic data collection is distorted in ways that smooth out volatility, but otherwise I assume, at least until very recently, that theNational Bureau of Statistics has followed generally accepted rules forcalculating GDP more or less correctly. I don’t have a high level of confidencein my assumption though: as I pointed out earlier, it is hard to find any sector of the Chinese economy that is behavingthe way you’d expect a country growing at more than 6.5 percent to behave. Furthermore, especially in recent years, it has been hard to reconcile other economic proxies with the GDP numbers. (See, for example, this article by Johns Hopkins University economists Bob Barbera and Yinghao Hu, which itself refersto a satellite imaging study.)
我很確定，為了消除波動(dòng)性各吨，中國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)數(shù)據(jù)收集方法是扭曲的枝笨。但我認(rèn)為，至少直到最近揭蜒，中國(guó)國(guó)家統(tǒng)計(jì)局在計(jì)算GDP時(shí)或多或少遵循了普遍接受的規(guī)則横浑。不過(guò)，我對(duì)這個(gè)假設(shè)沒(méi)有很高的信心：正如我早些時(shí)候指出的屉更，很難找到任何一個(gè)中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)部門(mén)的表現(xiàn)符合你對(duì)一個(gè)增長(zhǎng)率超過(guò)6.5%的國(guó)家的預(yù)期徙融。此外，特別是近年來(lái)瑰谜，很難將其他經(jīng)濟(jì)指標(biāo)與GDP數(shù)據(jù)協(xié)調(diào)起來(lái)欺冀。(比如树绩，約翰霍普金斯大學(xué)(Johns Hopkins University)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家鮑勃巴貝拉(BobBarbera)和胡英豪撰寫(xiě)的這篇文章，它是一項(xiàng)衛(wèi)星成像研究脚猾。)
What is more, people whose work I greatly respect, like Anne Stevenson-Yang of J Capital, seem very much to doubt the data and argue that China’s actual growth rate is much lower than the posted numbers, largely because the data is falsified at some level of the collection process. But whatever the case may be, if there is indeed a substantial discrepancy between what the statisticians actually measure and what they are claiming to measure,it is very hard to make predictions about how long the over statement will continue and how much of an adjustment it will eventually undergo.
更重要的是葱峡，我非常尊重J Capital的楊思安(Anne Stevenson-Yang)等人的工作，他們似乎非常懷疑這些數(shù)據(jù)龙助，認(rèn)為中國(guó)的實(shí)際增長(zhǎng)率遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)低于公布的數(shù)據(jù)砰奕，主要是因?yàn)閿?shù)據(jù)在收集過(guò)程的某個(gè)層面上是偽造的。但無(wú)論情況如何提鸟，如果統(tǒng)計(jì)學(xué)家實(shí)際測(cè)量的數(shù)據(jù)與他們聲稱測(cè)量的數(shù)據(jù)之間確實(shí)存在巨大差異军援，就很難預(yù)測(cè)這種夸大會(huì)持續(xù)多久，以及最終會(huì)經(jīng)歷多大程度的調(diào)整称勋。
IS GDPMEASURED AS AN OUTPUT OR AN INPUT?
GDP是以產(chǎn)出還是以投入來(lái)衡量的?
The third set of problems with GDP occurs in a very limited number of cases globally (today, China is the main example). But the implications are much greater. This has to do with whether GDP is even beingused as a proxy for economic activity. In China, reported GDP does not tell observers about the economy’s performance; rather, it tells people how rapidly Beijing thinks it can impose the necessary adjustments on the Chinese economy. This is because GDP means something different in China than it does in most other major economies.
GDP的第三類問(wèn)題在全球范圍內(nèi)都是比較少見(jiàn)(今天胸哥，中國(guó)是主要的例子)，但影響要大得多赡鲜。這與GDP是否被用作經(jīng)濟(jì)活動(dòng)的指標(biāo)有關(guān)空厌。在中國(guó)，公布的GDP數(shù)據(jù)沒(méi)法告訴觀察人士它的經(jīng)濟(jì)表現(xiàn)如何银酬；相反嘲更，它告訴人們，中國(guó)政府認(rèn)為自己能夠以多快的速度對(duì)中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)進(jìn)行必要的調(diào)整揩瞪。這是因?yàn)镚DP在中國(guó)的意義不同于在大多數(shù)其他主要經(jīng)濟(jì)體赋朦。
In any economic system, GDP is supposed to be a measure of output, and in most countries that is exactly what it measures, however messily. The economy does what it does, in other words, and at the end of agiven time period, statisticians measure the things economists agree to includein the relevant calculations, and they express the change over time as thescale of GDP growth for that period.
在任何經(jīng)濟(jì)體系中，GDP都應(yīng)該是產(chǎn)出的衡量標(biāo)準(zhǔn)李破。在大多數(shù)國(guó)家宠哄，也確實(shí)如此，盡管標(biāo)準(zhǔn)很混亂嗤攻。換句話說(shuō)毛嫉，經(jīng)濟(jì)自我運(yùn)行，在一個(gè)給定的時(shí)間段內(nèi)妇菱，統(tǒng)計(jì)學(xué)家們會(huì)去衡量經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家們同意在相關(guān)指標(biāo)中包含的東西狱庇。經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家們將這段時(shí)間內(nèi)的產(chǎn)出的變化表示為GDP。
This is not what happens in China, where GDP is actually an input determinedannually as the country’s GDP growth target. The growth target of a given time period is decided well ahead of time, and to achieve it, various entities,including local governments, engage in the requisite amount of activity, usually funded by debt. As long as China has debt capacity, and as long as it can postpone the writing down ofnonproductive assets, Beijing can achieve any growth target it desires.
但中國(guó)的情況并非如此恶耽。實(shí)際上密任，GDP是作為中國(guó)GDP增長(zhǎng)目標(biāo)所確定的一項(xiàng)“外生變量”。一段時(shí)間內(nèi)的增長(zhǎng)目標(biāo)是提前確定的偷俭。為了實(shí)現(xiàn)這一目標(biāo)浪讳，包括地方政府在內(nèi)的各種實(shí)體通常以債務(wù)的形式進(jìn)行必要的活動(dòng)。只要中國(guó)擁有債務(wù)能力涌萤，只要它能夠推遲對(duì)非生產(chǎn)性資產(chǎn)的減記淹遵，中國(guó)政府就能實(shí)現(xiàn)自己希望的任何增長(zhǎng)目標(biāo)口猜。
But this arrangement changes the meaning of GDP. Reported GDP in China is no longer ameasure of economic growth, but rather a measure of political intention. As any systems theorist knows, input data reveals nothing about the performance ofa system. So when analysts discuss what reported GDP indicates about the health of the Chinese economy, such thinking involves a very basic mistake in systems theory—a systems input can only offer insights about the goals of the operators, never about the performance of thesystem itself.
這改變了GDP的含義。中國(guó)公布的GDP不再是衡量經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的指標(biāo)透揣，而是衡量政治意圖的指標(biāo)济炎。任何系統(tǒng)理論家都知道，“外生變量”不能揭示系統(tǒng)的性能辐真。因此须尚，當(dāng)分析人士將中國(guó)的GDP與其經(jīng)濟(jì)健康狀況聯(lián)系在一起時(shí)，這種想法涉及系統(tǒng)理論中一個(gè)非呈淘郏基本的錯(cuò)誤——“輸入變量”（相當(dāng)于外生變量）只能提供對(duì)行為人目標(biāo)的洞察耐床，而不能提供對(duì)系統(tǒng)本身效能的洞察。
In practical terms, this means that once Beijing sets a GDP growth target, local governments are expected to generate enough economic activity to reach that target, and they are able to borrow as much as they needto do so. If this activity were productive, there wouldn’t be a problem,although it would be an amazing coincidence (or a truly incredible feat ofprognostication) for the amount of productive activity truly to equal thegrowth target. What would be more likely in that case is that GDP growth would consistently exceed the target, which is indeed what happened until about adecade or so ago.
實(shí)際上楔脯，這意味著撩轰，一旦中國(guó)政府設(shè)定了GDP增長(zhǎng)目標(biāo)，地方政府反推多少經(jīng)濟(jì)活動(dòng)才足以實(shí)現(xiàn)這一目標(biāo)昧廷，以及他們能夠借到多少錢堪嫂。如果這些活動(dòng)是有經(jīng)濟(jì)效益的，就不會(huì)有問(wèn)題木柬，盡管這將是一個(gè)驚人的巧合(或一個(gè)真正難以置信的神預(yù)測(cè))——生產(chǎn)活動(dòng)的數(shù)量將真正等于增長(zhǎng)目標(biāo)皆串。但在這種情況下，更有可能出現(xiàn)的情況是弄诲，GDP增長(zhǎng)將持續(xù)超過(guò)目標(biāo)，這種情況直到大約10年前才有所改變娇唯。
But if the economic activity isn’t productive, thereare two requirements that allow China to set GDP growth as a system’s input ina way other countries are unable to do. First,there must be no hard budget constraints, so as to allow economic entities topersist in value-destroying behavior year after year. Second, the resulting bad debt cannot be written down. Once these two conditions are met—and they arein China’s case—Beijing can set any growth target it likes and, as long as ithas the necessary debt capacity, it can achieve that target.
但是齐遵，如果經(jīng)濟(jì)活動(dòng)是非生產(chǎn)性的，有兩個(gè)必要條件塔插，可以讓中國(guó)將GDP增長(zhǎng)作為一個(gè)“外生變量”梗摇，這是其他國(guó)家無(wú)法做到的。第一想许，必須沒(méi)有硬性預(yù)算約束伶授，它允許一個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)體年復(fù)一年地從事不創(chuàng)造價(jià)值的活動(dòng)。其次流纹，由此產(chǎn)生的壞賬不能沖銷糜烹。一旦這兩個(gè)條件得到滿足(就中國(guó)而言)，中國(guó)政府就可以設(shè)定自己喜歡的任何增長(zhǎng)目標(biāo)漱凝，只要擁有必要的債務(wù)能力疮蹦，就可以實(shí)現(xiàn)這一目標(biāo)。
But notice that achieving the target reveals nothing about the country’s real economic growth, for which GDP is supposed to be(however imperfectly) a proxy. Once GDP growth becomes a system’s input, rather than an output, it does not indicate anything about the economy’s health or performance.
但請(qǐng)注意茸炒，實(shí)現(xiàn)這一目標(biāo)并沒(méi)有揭示出中國(guó)的實(shí)際經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)情況愕乎，而GDP本應(yīng)(無(wú)論多么不完美)代表實(shí)際經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)阵苇。一旦GDP增長(zhǎng)成為一個(gè)系統(tǒng)的投入，而不是產(chǎn)出感论，它就不能表明經(jīng)濟(jì)的健康或表現(xiàn)绅项。
CONCLUSION
結(jié)論
There is likely to be no end this year to the discussions about China’s economic growth rate and its relationship to GDP. By now, observers widely agree that China’s economy is not as strong as the GDP data suggests. And I suspect that only a handful of the least imaginative resolutely-mainstream economists (and, weirdly enough, this is more likely to be true of foreign than Chinese ones) still believe that China’s economy is as healthy and brisk as would be expected froma country whose GDP is growing at 6.5 percent and is expected to grow next yearby more than 6 percent.
今年有關(guān)中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)率及其與GDP關(guān)系的討論很可能不會(huì)結(jié)束。到目前為止比肄，觀察人士普遍認(rèn)為快耿，中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)不像GDP數(shù)據(jù)顯示的那么強(qiáng)勁。我懷疑薪前，只有一小撮缺乏想象力的迷之自信的主流經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家(奇怪地是润努，他們?cè)谄渌麌?guó)家比在中國(guó)還要多)仍然相信，中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)健康而活躍示括，正如人們所預(yù)期的那樣铺浇。中國(guó)的國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值(GDP)目前增長(zhǎng)6.5%，預(yù)計(jì)明年將增長(zhǎng)6%以上垛膝。
The problems facing the Chinese economy, and the worries expressed by Chinese leaders, are so deep that it no longer requires much imagination to figure out that reported GDP in China simply does not represent what we think it represents elsewhere. Yet some economists have notalways understood the implications, and they often seem to refuse to adjust their methodologies to take into account the aforementioned problems withChina’s reported GDP data. Yesterday, for example, I read a report written by an economist that discussed the implications of China’s PPP-adjusted GDP being the biggest in the world.
中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)面臨的問(wèn)題鳍侣，以及中國(guó)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人表達(dá)的擔(dān)憂如此之深，以至于人們不再需要太多想象就能明白吼拥，中國(guó)公布的國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值并不等價(jià)于我們?cè)谄渌麌?guó)家看到的GDP倚聚。然而，一些經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家并不總是理解其中的含義凿可，他們似乎常常拒絕調(diào)整自己的方法惑折，以考慮中國(guó)公布的GDP數(shù)據(jù)中存在的上述問(wèn)題。例如枯跑，昨天我讀了一位經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家撰寫(xiě)的一份報(bào)告惨驶，該報(bào)告討論了中國(guó)經(jīng)購(gòu)買力平價(jià)調(diào)整后的國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值(GDP)位居全球第一的影響。
But any observers that are at all skeptical about the relationship between the Chinese economy and its reported GDP must dismiss the PPP-adjustment as almost complete nonsense. (I don’t mean that the PPP-adjusted data is less accurate for China than it is for other countries: I mean, quiteliterally, that it is almost complete nonsense). Any ratio based on reported GDP figures can only be comparably meaningful for China to the extent that China’s reported GDP numbers have the same relationship to the underlying economy—or to whatever GDP is thought to mean—as corresponding numbers in other countries do. But surely few observers still believe that.
但任何對(duì)中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)與其公布的國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值(GDP)之間關(guān)系持懷疑態(tài)度的觀察人士敛助，都必須將購(gòu)買力平價(jià)的調(diào)整視為胡扯粗卜。（我的意思不是說(shuō)，經(jīng)購(gòu)買力平價(jià)調(diào)整后的數(shù)據(jù)對(duì)中國(guó)的準(zhǔn)確性不如對(duì)其他國(guó)家纳击。我的意思是续扔，毫不夸張地說(shuō)，這幾乎完全是無(wú)稽之談）焕数。任何基于中國(guó)官方報(bào)告的GDP數(shù)據(jù)的比率纱昧，只有在中國(guó)公布的GDP數(shù)據(jù)與經(jīng)濟(jì)有著相同關(guān)系的情況下——或者，只有在中國(guó)的GDP的內(nèi)涵與其他國(guó)家一致時(shí)——這一比率對(duì)中國(guó)才具有同等意義堡赔。但很明顯砌些，很少有人相信這一點(diǎn)。
The point is that if there has been a divergence between China’s reported GDP figures and the country’s underlying economy, there are at least three completely different ways that this discrepancy can manifest itself. Observers too often confuse the three, however. For example, I have said many times that I believe that if China’s GDP were to be expressed ina way that is comparable with that of other countries, it would be growing at less than half the current reported growth rate.
關(guān)鍵是，如果中國(guó)公布的GDP數(shù)據(jù)與經(jīng)濟(jì)（真實(shí)表現(xiàn)）存在差異存璃，那么這種差異至少可以通過(guò)三種完全不同的方式自發(fā)地表現(xiàn)出來(lái)仑荐。然而，觀察家們常匙荻混淆這三者粘招。例如，我已經(jīng)說(shuō)過(guò)很多次偎球，我相信洒扎，如果中國(guó)的GDP以一種與其他國(guó)家相同的方式來(lái)核算，它的增長(zhǎng)率將不到目前報(bào)告的增長(zhǎng)率的一半衰絮。
A lot of people interpret this to mean that I think Beijing is falsifying the data, but I don’t mean that at all. In my mind, the biggest problem is that China’sreported GDP is an input into the economic system, not a measured output.To make China’s GDP figures comparable to those of other countries, the input numbers would have to be adjusted with some relevant output, such as the amountof bad debt that should be (but isn’t) written down in a given time period. Ifthis amount were subtracted from China’s nominal GDP growth rate, the resulting adjusted growth rate probably would be a lot closer to what economists think ofas GDP than the country’s actual reported GDP data is.
很多人認(rèn)為袍冷，我在暗示北京在偽造數(shù)據(jù)，我并不是這個(gè)意思猫牡。在我看來(lái)胡诗，最大的問(wèn)題是，中國(guó)公布的GDP是對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)體系的投入淌友，而不是應(yīng)該衡量的產(chǎn)出煌恢。為了使中國(guó)的GDP數(shù)據(jù)與其他國(guó)家的GDP數(shù)據(jù)可比，中國(guó)的GDP必須要依據(jù)相關(guān)產(chǎn)出的數(shù)據(jù)做相應(yīng)的調(diào)整震庭，比如在給定的時(shí)間段內(nèi)應(yīng)當(dāng)(但沒(méi)有)減記的壞賬數(shù)額瑰抵。如果從中國(guó)名義GDP增長(zhǎng)率中減去這一數(shù)字，那么調(diào)整后的增長(zhǎng)率可能會(huì)比中國(guó)實(shí)際公布的GDP數(shù)據(jù)更接近經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家們所認(rèn)為的GDP器联。
感謝復(fù)旦王永欽教授推薦二汛，王老師還推薦此文：《China‘s Slowdown：More There than Meets the Eye》（https://cfe.econ.jhu.edu/chinas-slowdown-meets-eye/）
