Basel 1

為什么要制定Basel1？

背景：1988年之前銀行監(jiān)管混亂。

為了

1.To strength the soundness and stability of the international banking system;

2. To diminish existing sources of competitive inequality among international banks

1.加強(qiáng)國際銀行體系的健康穩(wěn)定实胸。

2.消除國際銀行之間競爭不平等的現(xiàn)有根源

摘自Balthazar,L., 2006.From Basel 1 to Basel 3: The integration of state of the art risk modelling in banking regulation. Springer.

In the early 1980s, the onset of the Latin American debt crisis heightened concerns that the capital ratios of the main international banks were deteriorating at a time of growing international risks. The world needs a unified banking regulatory system to remove a source of competitive inequality arising from differences in national requirements.

并且在1980年代初闷煤，拉丁美洲債務(wù)危機(jī)的爆發(fā)加劇了國際風(fēng)險，主要國際銀行的資本率正在惡化鲤拿。世界范圍內(nèi)需要一個統(tǒng)一的銀行監(jiān)管體系來消除因國家資本要求不同而產(chǎn)生競爭不平等的根源假褪。

1974年，巴塞爾銀行監(jiān)管委員會成立生音，1988年巴塞爾協(xié)議1來臨窒升。

Basel 1的內(nèi)容是什么饱须？

針對"internationally-active", G10-incorporated banks，

Since 1 January 1993, all G10 incorporated, internationally-active banks have been obliged to observe a minimum risk asset ratio (RAR) of 8% to cover credit risk.

自1993年1月1日起譬挚，所有10國集團(tuán)注冊的、在國際上活躍的銀行都必須遵守8%的最低風(fēng)險資產(chǎn)比率(RAR)盐须，以覆蓋信貸風(fēng)險漆腌。

Since 1 January 1998, the same banks have been obliged to accommodate market risk alongside credit risk under a revised RAR methodology but using the same floor of 8%.

自1998年1月1日起闷尿，根據(jù)修訂后的RAR方法，同一家銀行有義務(wù)同時承擔(dān)市場風(fēng)險和信貸風(fēng)險晓勇，但使用相同的8%下限。

Subject to supervisory approval, banks may use internal models (i.e. VaRs) to calculate their market risk capital charges.

經(jīng)監(jiān)管部門批準(zhǔn)绰筛，銀行可以使用內(nèi)部模型(即VaRs)計算其市場風(fēng)險資本費(fèi)用。

Basel 1 的意義與缺陷

意義：Basel 1 created a worldwide benchmark for banking regulations. Designed originally for internationally active banks of the G10 countries, it is now the basis of the inspiration for banking regulations in more than 100 countries and is often imposed on national banks as well. international banks are now facing a uniform set of rules, which avoids them having to discuss with each national regulator what the correct capital level should be for conducting the same business in many different countries. Additionally, banks of different countries competing on the same markets have equivalent regulatory capital requirements. That is clearly an improvement in comparison with the situation before 1988.

The introduction of different risk-weights for different assets' classes, although not reflecting completely the true risks of banks' credit portfolios, is a clear improvement on the previous regulatory ratios that were used in some countries - such as equity: assets or equity: deposits ratios.

Has the Basel 1 Accord succeeded in making the banking sector a safer place??A lot of research has been carried out on the subject (see, for instance, Jackson, 1999), but the answer is still unclear.?The capital ratios of most banks indeed increased at the beginning of the 1990s (the capital ratios of the large G10 banks went from an average of 9.3 percent in 1988 to 11.2 percent in 1996), and bank failures diminished (for instance, yearly failures of FDIC-insured banks in the US wen tfrom 280 in 1988 to fewer than 10 a year between 1995 and 2000).

巴塞爾協(xié)議1為銀行監(jiān)管設(shè)立了一個全球基準(zhǔn)。最初是為10國集團(tuán)(G10)的國際活躍銀行設(shè)計的骏庸，如今已成為100多個國家銀行業(yè)監(jiān)管的靈感來源具被，并經(jīng)常被強(qiáng)加于本國銀行。國際銀行目前正面臨一套統(tǒng)一的規(guī)則七咧，這使它們不必與各國監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)討論在許多不同國家開展同一業(yè)務(wù)的正確資本金水平艾栋。此外蛉顽，在同一市場上競爭的不同國家的銀行具有相同的監(jiān)管資本要求。與1988年以前的情況相比悼粮，這顯然是一個改善矮锈。

針對不同資產(chǎn)類別引入不同的風(fēng)險權(quán)重，雖然不能完全反映銀行信貸組合的真實風(fēng)險债朵，但與一些國家以前采用的監(jiān)管比率(例如股本:資產(chǎn)或股本:存款比率)相比瀑凝，這是一個明顯的進(jìn)步粤咪。

巴塞爾協(xié)議1是否成功地使銀行業(yè)成為一個更安全的地方?關(guān)于這一主題已經(jīng)進(jìn)行了大量的研究(例如，Jackson, 1999)宪塔，但是答案仍然不清楚囊拜。大多數(shù)銀行的資本充足率的確增加了1990年代初(G10大型銀行的資本比率從1988年的平均9.3%到1996年的11.2%),和銀行倒閉減少每年的失敗(例如,fdic擔(dān)保銀行在美國從280到1988年的不到10之間的1995年和2000年)冠跷。

缺陷：

1. The agreement is not legally binding, undermining its effectiveness.

2. The geographical coverage achieved is limited, undermining the stability of' the international banking system.

3. The use of a flawed methodology in the credit risk assessment process

4. The use of'"inexact" (in an actuarial sense) risk weights and conversion. factors in the weighting system

5. Induces a misallocation of capital resources within the banking industry.

6. Induces a misallocation of capital resources between the bank and non-bank sectors of the economy.

7. Induces distortion in banks' pricing and other business decisions.

[if !supportLists]8.??????[endif]Leads to a misallocation of resources due to the induced balance sheet restructuring by banks.

9. May breed complacency. [Strict adherence to the guidelines by all internationally-active banks would still not guarantee their solvency nor the stability of the international financial system.]

10. Not enough done to level the playing field for international banks.

11. Risks contributing to global and/or regional"credit crunches".

12. May induce perverse and potentially destabilising responses on the part of banks.

1.該協(xié)議沒有法律約束力蜜托，削弱了其效力。

2.覆蓋的地理范圍有限幔托，破壞了“國際銀行體系”的穩(wěn)定柑司。

3.在信用風(fēng)險評估過程中使用有缺陷的方法

4.使用“不精確”(精算意義上的)風(fēng)險權(quán)重和換算锅劝。權(quán)重系統(tǒng)中的因子

5.導(dǎo)致銀行業(yè)內(nèi)部資本資源配置不當(dāng)故爵。

6.導(dǎo)致銀行和非銀行經(jīng)濟(jì)部門之間的資本資源配置不當(dāng)隅津。

7.導(dǎo)致銀行定價和其他業(yè)務(wù)決策的扭曲伦仍。

8.導(dǎo)致銀行資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表重組導(dǎo)致資源配置不當(dāng)很洋。

9.可能滋生自滿情緒。(所有從事國際業(yè)務(wù)的銀行嚴(yán)格遵守這些指導(dǎo)原則谓苟，仍不能保證它們的償付能力涝焙，也不能保證國際金融體系的穩(wěn)定孕暇。)

10.在為國際銀行提供公平競爭環(huán)境方面做得還不夠妖滔。

11.造成全球和/或地區(qū)“信貸緊縮”的風(fēng)險。

12.可能導(dǎo)致銀行做出反常且可能破壞穩(wěn)定的反應(yīng)近迁。

Perhaps the most serious are:

1.the use of a flawed risk assessment methodology（使用有缺陷的風(fēng)險評估方法）

2.the induced distortions and misallocation of resources（造成資源扭曲和分配不當(dāng)）

3.the perverse, and potentially destabilising, bank responses that may be induced (the most worrying forms of balance sheetengineering–nowtermed“regulatory capital arbitrage” –are“cherrypicking”and securitisation)（可能引發(fā)的反常且可能破壞穩(wěn)定的銀行反應(yīng)(最令人擔(dān)憂的資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表工程形式——現(xiàn)在被稱為“監(jiān)管性資本套利”——是“櫻桃采摘”和證券化)）.

Basel 2

1999年因為Basel 1的種種不足，2被提案并且一直在修正歧譬，直至2007年得到實施瑰步。

為什么要制定Basel2？

因為銀行業(yè)需要一個更復(fù)雜的框架，2針對1的缺陷進(jìn)行了一系列改進(jìn)贩汉。

目的是

????????????? to continue to promote safety and soundness in the financial system

????????????? to continue to enhance competitive equality

????????????? to adopt a more comprehensive approach to addressing risks

????????????? to continue to focus on internationally-active banks, although the new framework’s underlying principles should be suitable for application to banks of varying levels of complexity and sophistication

特別的题翻，

1. improve the way regulatory capital requirements reflect underlying risks（改善監(jiān)管資本要求反映潛在風(fēng)險的方式）

2. better address the financial innovation that has occurred in recent years（更好地應(yīng)對近年來出現(xiàn)的金融創(chuàng)新）;

3. recognise and promote improvements in bank risk management and control（認(rèn)識及推動銀行風(fēng)險管理及控制的改善）

4. adopt a more comprehensive approach to addressing risks（采取更加全面的辦法應(yīng)對風(fēng)險）。

? Basel 2的內(nèi)容是什么熄赡？

三大支柱齿税。

The three "pillars":

? minimum regulatory capital requirements

巴2對于信用風(fēng)險資本金采用了新的計算方式凌箕，這一方式體現(xiàn)對手的信用風(fēng)險。計算方法分為【標(biāo)準(zhǔn)法他托，內(nèi)部評級基礎(chǔ)法赏参，內(nèi)部評級高級法】標(biāo)準(zhǔn)法和巴1差不多沿盅，只不過風(fēng)險權(quán)重更加細(xì)分了腰涧。內(nèi)部評級法是監(jiān)管人員將資本金建立在VaR基礎(chǔ)上，這里的VaR是一年展望期99.9置信度疗锐。巴2還增加了操作風(fēng)險資本金费彼。

? supervisory review of an institution’s capital adequacy

and internal assessment process

巴2要求加強(qiáng)監(jiān)督審查箍铲。各國監(jiān)管部門對于利率風(fēng)險，信用風(fēng)險关划，操作風(fēng)險特別注意贮折。監(jiān)管部門管理過程透明可靠春畔。

? greater market discipline

鼓勵銀行信息披露力度

After the publication of CP1, two further sets of proposals emerged – “CP2” and “CP3” – following consultation with the banking industry and other interested parties and “quantitative impact assessments” (“QISs”).

《巴塞爾資本協(xié)議》征求意見稿CP1、CP2和CP3分別于1999年6月臼疫、2001年l月和2003年4月相繼頒布扣孟，并將于2007年1月l日正式實施凤价。

CP2, CP3是對CP1的完善和擴(kuò)充利诺。

Basel 2 的影響

Positive impact

1.Would increase stability of the internationalised banking system.

This would result from: the attempts made to minimise the"perverse" incentives facing banks; the focus on other? bank risks; the new obligations placed onsupervisors to engage in "prompt corrective action" and to imposebank-specific capital charges that closely reflect the risk exposures actuallyassumed; the consolidation of parent holding companies; the linking of thebenefits to be derived, in the form of reduced risk weightings (i.e. below 100%), by highly-rated banks to their supervisors' adoption of the BaselCommittee's "Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision"; theencouragement given, via wider supervisory recognition, to the development ofrisk mitigation techniques; the reduction of the bias in favour of short-terminterbank lending, the introduction of a higher (i.e. 150%) risk weight forlowly-rated (i.e. below "B-") borrowers; the abolition of the 50% capon the risk-weighting of derivative exposures; the incentives provided to allborrowers (bar some of those currently unrated) to seek higher credit ratings;the demand for greater information disclosure; and the new requirement forsupervisors to take? explicit account ofan individual bank's relative importance in national and international marketsand potential to trigger systemic instability.

增強(qiáng)國際化銀行體系的穩(wěn)定性慢逾。

這將源于:試圖將銀行面臨的“反常”激勵降至最低;關(guān)注其他銀行風(fēng)險;監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)承擔(dān)的新義務(wù)是“迅速采取糾正行動”口注，并對與實際承擔(dān)的風(fēng)險風(fēng)險密切相關(guān)的銀行特定資本收取費(fèi)用;母公司控股公司的合并;將高評級銀行以降低風(fēng)險權(quán)重(即低于100%)的形式獲得的利益與其監(jiān)管者采納巴塞爾委員會“有效銀行監(jiān)管的核心原則”聯(lián)系起來;透過更廣泛的監(jiān)督認(rèn)可寝志，鼓勵發(fā)展減低風(fēng)險的技術(shù);減少對短期銀行間貸款的偏好策添，為評級較低(即低于“B-”)的借款人引入較高(即150%)的風(fēng)險權(quán)重;取消對衍生品風(fēng)險權(quán)重的50%上限;向所有借款者(除一些目前未評級的借款者外)提供的尋求更高信用評級的激勵措施;要求更大程度的信息披露;新規(guī)定要求監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)明確考慮單個銀行在國內(nèi)和國際市場上的相對重要性唯竹，以及引發(fā)系統(tǒng)性不穩(wěn)定的可能性摩窃。

2.Would increase economic efficiency.

This would result from: the use of external credit ratings,which take account of, inter alia, the characteristics of? the obligor, to determine risk weights;possible supervisory recognition of internal credit ratings and portfoliocredit risk models, which would align regulatory capital requirements moreclosely with the internal allocation of economic capital; the removal of thebias in favour of loans to OECD countries and OECD banks; the reduction·in thebias in favour of short-term (i.e. for less than 365 days) interbank lending; theremoval of the bias in favour of off-balance-sheet? (rather than on-balance-sheet) exposures viaabolition of the 50% cap on the risk weighting of derivative exposures; theremoval of the bias in favour of commitments of up to one year; theintroduction of a 150% risk weight for lowly-rated borrowers; the linking ofthe benefits gained by highly-rated sovereign borrowers (from reduced riskweights, i.e. below 100%) to the country's compliance with the IMF's"Special Data- Dissemination Standards"; the attempts to block theuse of securitisation as a means of circumventing capital requirements throughthe risk-weighting of securitisation tranches; the incentives created for allborrowers (other than some of those currently unrated) to seek improved ratings;the encouragement given to the continued development of sophisticated riskmanagement techniques and their closer integration with capital allocationprocedures; the enhanced information disclosure requirements, which will leadto improved market transparency and greater market discipline.

提高經(jīng)濟(jì)效率猾愿。

這將是由于:利用外部信用評級蒂秘，除其他外淘太，考慮到債務(wù)人的特點(diǎn)，以確定風(fēng)險權(quán)重;可能對內(nèi)部信用評級和投資組合信用風(fēng)險模型進(jìn)行監(jiān)管認(rèn)可赌莺，使監(jiān)管資本要求與經(jīng)濟(jì)資本的內(nèi)部配置更緊密地一致;消除有利于向經(jīng)合發(fā)組織國家和各經(jīng)合發(fā)組織銀行提供貸款的偏見;·有利于短期(即少于365天)銀行間貸款的偏好下降;通過取消衍生品風(fēng)險權(quán)重的50%上限松嘶，消除偏向表外(而非表內(nèi))風(fēng)險敞口的偏見;消除對至多一年的承諾的偏見;為低評級借款人引入150%的風(fēng)險權(quán)重;將高評級主權(quán)借款人所獲得的好處(從風(fēng)險權(quán)重降低到低于100%)與該國是否遵守IMF的“特殊數(shù)據(jù)——傳播標(biāo)準(zhǔn)”聯(lián)系起來;試圖阻止利用證券化作為一種手段翠订，通過證券化部分的風(fēng)險權(quán)重規(guī)避資本要求;鼓勵所有借款人(目前未評級的一些借款人除外)尋求改善評級;鼓勵繼續(xù)發(fā)展復(fù)雜的風(fēng)險管理技術(shù)，并使其與資本分配程序更密切地結(jié)合;加強(qiáng)資訊披露的規(guī)定官撼，將有助提高市場透明度和加強(qiáng)市場紀(jì)律傲绣。

3.Would contribute, on balance, to a further levelling of the regulatory playing field.

This would result from: the enforced geographical spread of prompt corrective action and the application of bank-specific capital charges; convergence in information disclosure standards and supervisory practices; removal of the bias resulting from OECD membership/incorporation.

總的來說斜筐，有助于進(jìn)一步提高監(jiān)管領(lǐng)域水平蛀缝。

這將是由于:強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行迅速糾正行動的地域分布和適用銀行特定的資本費(fèi)用;信息披露標(biāo)準(zhǔn)與監(jiān)管實踐的趨同;消除經(jīng)濟(jì)合作與發(fā)展組織成員/合并所造成的偏見屈梁。

Concerns

[if !supportLists]1.????????[endif]the retention of the flawed standardised riskassessment methodology which ignores risk correlations (even though a morerisk-sensitive framework, embracing external credit assessments, was applied)

保留有缺陷的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)化風(fēng)險評估方法，這種方法忽視了風(fēng)險相關(guān)性(盡管采用了一種更敏感的框架煞抬，包括外部信用評估)

[if !supportLists]2.????????[endif]persisting disagreement over the risk assessment of certain credits (many viewed the treatment of residential property loans and commercial lending as lenient, as subsequently proved to be the case) and the use of VaR models for regulatory purposes

對某些信貸的風(fēng)險評估(許多人認(rèn)為對住宅物業(yè)貸款和商業(yè)貸款的處理過于寬松革答，這一點(diǎn)后來被證明是正確的)和為監(jiān)管目的而使用VaR模型的問題上曙强，一直存在分歧碟嘴。

[if !supportLists]3.????????[endif]the failure to address, satisfactorily, thepro-cyclical impact of the reform package, which risked amplifying businesscycles (although bankers were later asked to assess the riskiness of the loansover the full economic cycle under a Pillar 2 requirement that demands“meaningfully conservative credit risk stress testing” by banks adopting theIRB approaches)

未能確定的娜扇、圓滿的順周期性影響改革方案,這可能會放大經(jīng)濟(jì)周期(盡管銀行家們后來被要求評估貸款風(fēng)險在一個完整的經(jīng)濟(jì)周期下支柱2要求“有意義的保守的信用風(fēng)險壓力測試”的要求銀行采用IRB的方法)

[if !supportLists]4.????????[endif]given the continuing doubts about the current“state of the art” in credit risk modelling and the lack of historical data on loan defaults, the real risks to “safety and soundness” if banks are given, prematurely, supervisory recognition of their IRB approaches and, further down the round, their portfolio credit risk models (there is a real possibility that, in some jurisdictions, the banks will be able to “browbeat” their supervisors into granting supervisory recognition of their models in circumstances where a more cautious approach would be advisable)

鑒于持續(xù)質(zhì)疑當(dāng)前的“先進(jìn)的”信用風(fēng)險建模和貸款違約缺乏歷史數(shù)據(jù),真正的“安全與穩(wěn)健”如果銀行風(fēng)險,過早,監(jiān)督IRB的識別方法,進(jìn)一步降低,投資組合信用風(fēng)險模型(這是一個真正的可能性,在某些司法轄區(qū),銀行將能夠“脅迫”它們的監(jiān)管者，讓他們在更謹(jǐn)慎的做法更為可取的情況下玉掸，認(rèn)可自己的監(jiān)管模式)

[if !supportLists]5.????????[endif]the scale of the supervisory burden that would be faced in all jurisdictions, but especially in developing countries, which risks undermining the effectiveness of the proposals

所有司法管轄區(qū)登疗，特別是發(fā)展中國家辐益，將面臨的監(jiān)管負(fù)擔(dān)之大，可能會削弱建議的效力认罩。

[if !supportLists]6.????????[endif]the scale of the compliance burden to be borneby the banking industry alongside the "capping" of some of the short-term benefits (especially in the US)

銀行業(yè)在“封頂”部分短期利益(尤其是在美國)的同時垦垂，還要承擔(dān)多大的合規(guī)負(fù)擔(dān)

[if !supportLists]7.????????[endif]continuing doubts about the wisdom of embracingexternal credit assessments within the assessment régime (for some, thesafeguards designed to ensure the public interest prevails in instances whereexternal credit assessments are embraced did not go far enough;? while others continued to question theaccuracy of the credit assessment ratings produced by the rating agencies, thesubsequent rating of structured products duly proving their point)

繼續(xù)懷疑在評估制度內(nèi)接受外部信用評估是否明智(對一些人來說劫拗，在接受外部信用評估的情況下矾克，旨在確保公眾利益的保障措施不夠充分;其他人士則繼續(xù)質(zhì)疑評級機(jī)構(gòu)所作出的信貸評等的準(zhǔn)確性胁附，而其后對結(jié)構(gòu)性產(chǎn)品的評級則充分證明他們的觀點(diǎn))

[if !supportLists]8.????????[endif]concerns that, in connection with the credit calibration process, the correct balance had not been struck between, on the one hand, encouraging the take-up of the IRB approaches and, on the other, ensuring "safety and soundness"

關(guān)切在信貸校正過程中，一方面鼓勵采用內(nèi)部評級辦法州袒，另一方面確崩煽蓿“安全和穩(wěn)妥”菇存，兩者之間沒有取得正確的平衡

[if !supportLists]9.????????[endif]the Committee’s determination to treatoperational risk under Pillar 1 rather than Pillar 2

委員會決定根據(jù)第一支柱而非第二支柱處理業(yè)務(wù)風(fēng)險

[if !supportLists]10.???? [endif]thefear that, given the dramatic increase in the scope for national discretion,the quest for a level regulatory playing field would be seriously undermined,an objective already threatened by the variability in the quality of nationalsupervision (to allay such fears, the Basle Committee set up the ‘AccordImplementation Group’ to try to ensure a high degree of consistency inimplementation)

擔(dān)心,鑒于國民自由裁量權(quán)范圍的大幅增加,追求公平監(jiān)管競爭環(huán)境將嚴(yán)重削弱,客觀的可變性已經(jīng)威脅到國家質(zhì)量監(jiān)督(減輕這種擔(dān)憂,巴塞爾委員會設(shè)置的協(xié)議實現(xiàn)集團(tuán)試圖確保高度的一致性實現(xiàn))

[if !supportLists]11.???? [endif]fearsabout possible short-term adverse consequences for countries’ banking systems and economies

擔(dān)心對各國銀行系統(tǒng)和經(jīng)濟(jì)可能造成的短期不利后果

[if !supportLists]12.???? [endif]theCommittee’s determination to secure the endorsement of its proposals by all G10countries, which led to unfortunate compromises on principle, which risked undermining both the spirit and the impact of the reform package

委員會決定確保所有10國集團(tuán)國家批準(zhǔn)其建議，這導(dǎo)致了不幸的原則性妥協(xié)畦徘，這有可能破壞改革一攬子計劃的精神和影響

Basel 3

In April 2008, the Basel Committee announced plans to strengthen the resilience of the international banking system in the light of the fallout from the sub-prime crisis.

危機(jī)中暴露的制度缺陷

1.the inadequate levels of capital generally held by banks（銀行普遍持有的資本金不足）

2.the failure of VaR models to estimate true levels of market risk（VaR模型未能估計市場風(fēng)險的真實水平）

3.the failure to capture major on- and off-balance sheet risks, as well as some derivative-related exposures（未能捕捉到資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表內(nèi)外的重大風(fēng)險，以及一些衍生品相關(guān)風(fēng)險）

4.the failure to prevent excessive credit growth in the run-up to the crisis as a result of banks’excessive leverage（在危機(jī)爆發(fā)前溶握，由于銀行杠桿率過高睡榆，未能阻止信貸過度增長）

5.the extent to which banks had arbitraged between the trading book and banking book（銀行在交易賬簿和銀行賬簿之間進(jìn)行套利的程度）

6.the scale of the induced growth in the“shadow” banking system, which led to unsustainable reintermediation during the crisis（引發(fā)“影子”銀行體系增長的規(guī)模袍榆，在危機(jī)期間導(dǎo)致了不可持續(xù)的再中介）

7.the failure to satisfactorily address systemic risk in thesystem（未能令人滿意地處理系統(tǒng)內(nèi)的系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險）;

8.the failure to appreciably reduce the degree of pro-cyclicality in the regulatory framework（未能顯著降低監(jiān)管框架內(nèi)的順周期性程度）;

9.the unavailability of certain kinds of hybrid instruments to absorb losses during the crisis（某些混合工具在危機(jī)期間無法吸收損失）;

10.the folly of ignoring liquidity risks within the regulatory framework（在監(jiān)管框架內(nèi)忽視流動性風(fēng)險的愚蠢行為）;

11.continuing weaknesses in banks’risk management processes (Pillar 2)（銀行風(fēng)險管理過程中的持續(xù)弱點(diǎn)(支柱2)）

12.inadequate and inconsistent disclosure of risk exposures and regulatory capital (Pillar 3)（風(fēng)險暴露和監(jiān)管資本的披露不充分和不一致(支柱3)

It planned to do

1.boosting capital cushions（提高資本緩沖）

2.creating robust liquidity buffers（建立穩(wěn)健的流動性緩沖）

3.strengthening risk management and supervision (through further Pillar 2 guidance)（加強(qiáng)風(fēng)險管理和監(jiān)督(通過進(jìn)一步的第二支柱指導(dǎo))）

4.enhancing market discipline through increased transparency（通過提高透明度加強(qiáng)市場紀(jì)律）

Basel 3的內(nèi)容

new capital requirements:

Minimum common equity capital ratio requirement to be increased from the current 2%

level (before the application of strict regulatory adjustments) to 4.5% (after

the application of stricter adjustments) by 1 January 2015.

最低普通資本充足率從2%提高到4.5%宿崭。

Minimum Tier 1 capital ratio requirement, which includes common equity and other

qualifying capital instruments based on stricter criteria, to be increased from

the current level of 4% to 6% by 1 January 2015.

一級資本充足率最低要求從4%提高到6%葡兑。

A new“conservation buffer”, to be built up outside periods of stress and designed to ensure that banks maintain a buffer of capital that can be used to absorb losses during periods of financial and economic stress– rather than to be used to pay discretionary bonuses and dividends or buy back shares – to be introduced in 2016.? By 1 January 2019, it must amount to 2.5% of risk-weighted assets, to be met from common equity(after deductions).? This will raise the effective minimum common equity ratio requirement to 7% by that date.

建立“資本緩沖”區(qū)去吸收損失赞草。

A new “countercyclical buffer”, within a range of 0% to 2.5% of risk-weighted assets, may also be introduced, at national discretion.?

引入新的“反周期緩沖”厨疙，風(fēng)險加權(quán)資產(chǎn)在0%-2.5%之間。

The overall minimum total ratio requirement?to remain at its current level of 8% until the end of 2015, after which it will gradually increase to reach 10.5% by 1 January 2019 as a result of the phasing in of the capital conservation buffer.

資本充足率提高到10.5%岖沛。

New liquidity requirement:

After an observation period beginning in 2011, a new“l(fā)iquidity coverage ratio” (LCR) requirement to?be introduced on 1 January 2015 (full compliance was later delayed until 2019).

流動覆蓋率

And, after an observation period beginning in 2012, a new“net stable funding ratio” (NSFR) requirement?to be introduced on1 January 2018.

凈穩(wěn)定資金比率

Future outlook of the Basle Accord

1.For the vast majority of the world’s banks, however,little changed, either because they were not internationally-active, or because they were not sophisticated enough to move beyond the standardised approach, or because they were incorporated outside the G10/EU and their policymakers decided against immediate adoption（然而婴削，對于全球絕大多數(shù)銀行而言唉俗，幾乎沒有什么變化配椭，要么是因為它們在國際上不夠活躍股缸，要么是因為它們不夠成熟，無法超越標(biāo)準(zhǔn)化方法瘾境，要么是因為它們是在10國集團(tuán)/歐盟之外成立的迷守，而它們的政策制定者決定不立即采用這種方法）

2.Moreover, and notwithstanding the implementation of Basel IIIand Basel IV reforms, there must be a doubt about the Capital Accord’s future, especially with respect to the revamped (yet again!) Pillar 1 requirements,which banks always seem to successfully‘game’.（此外，盡管實施了《巴塞爾協(xié)議III》和《巴塞爾協(xié)議IV》的改革凯力，但人們肯定對《資本協(xié)議》的未來心存疑慮礼华，尤其是在修訂后的(又一次!)支柱1的要求卓嫂，銀行似乎總是成功地“游戲”）

Summary and Conclusion

[if !supportLists]1.??????[endif]The Basle Committee is to be congratulated for moving, albeit belatedly, to address some of the long-standing flaws inherent in the original Capital Accord.

委員會的行動解決了一些最初資本中一些長期存在的固有缺陷晨雳。

[if !supportLists]2.??????[endif]Similarly, by responding in such a positive fashion to some of the criticisms levelled at it during the various rounds of consultation, the definitive version of Basel was, on balance, likely to prove more cost-effective than the packages proposed under CP1, CP2 and CP3.

最終成本的巴塞爾協(xié)議草案相比于CP1、CP2和CP3下提出的一攬子方案更具成本效益血久。

[if !supportLists]3.??????[endif]This did not mean, however, that the agreed reform package was without fault; a number of potentially-serious concerns remained, which duly became apparent during the global banking crisis of 2007-09.

一攬子計劃依然有缺陷氧吐，并且在07-09年全球銀行業(yè)危機(jī)期間暴露出來末盔。

[if !supportLists]4.??????[endif]Moreover, the Committee might have done more to promote the wider use of market discipline as an integral part of bank prudential regulation and supervision.

委員會可以促進(jìn)更廣泛地使用市場紀(jì)律陨舱。

[if !supportLists]5.??????[endif]Notwithstanding these on-going concerns – BaselIII is widely condemned as doing “too little too late” - and the fact that relatively-few banks around the world will actually be required to comply with either Basel 3 or its successor Basel IV, much of value has come out of the Basel process.

Basel 3被譴責(zé)做得太少游盲。

a) the cause of sound risk management within the banking industry has been furthered

推進(jìn)銀行業(yè)風(fēng)險管理健康發(fā)展

b) bank supervisors around the world will be pressured into adopting accepted“best practices” sooner rather than later

世界各地的銀行監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)將面臨壓力，要求它們盡早采用公認(rèn)的“最佳做法”

c) the Pillar 3 requirements for enhanced information disclosure have stimulated discussion of the potential benefits of market discipline, restoration of which is sorely needed in the wake of the recent global financial crisis

加強(qiáng)信息披露的第三大支柱要求谜慌，引發(fā)了對市場紀(jì)律潛在好處的討論欣范。在最近的全球金融危機(jī)之后，恢復(fù)市場紀(jì)律是非常必要的杖刷。

[if !supportLists]6.??????[endif]It is to be hoped that these developments can be taken forward under any future evolution of the Basel Accord

希望能夠有推進(jìn)驳癌。