復(fù)利的力量

冰河時(shí)代帶給我們的重要啟示是，創(chuàng)造巨大的成果并不需要巨大的力量施掏。 如果事物具有復(fù)利效應(yīng)——即一點(diǎn)點(diǎn)的增長(zhǎng)能為未來的增長(zhǎng)提供動(dòng)力——那么一個(gè)小小的起點(diǎn)也能帶來超乎想象的結(jié)果帖烘，這些結(jié)果看似有悖常理亮曹。

它們可能如此違背常理，以至于你會(huì)低估可能取得的成就秘症、增長(zhǎng)的來源以及它所能帶來的影響照卦。 財(cái)富增長(zhǎng)亦是如此。 市面上有超過2000本書探討沃倫·巴菲特是如何積累財(cái)富的乡摹。其中很多都很不錯(cuò)役耕。但很少有書充分關(guān)注到一個(gè)最簡(jiǎn)單的事實(shí)：巴菲特的財(cái)富并非僅僅源于他是一名優(yōu)秀的投資者，更在于他從孩童時(shí)期起就是一名優(yōu)秀的投資者聪廉。 我寫這段話時(shí)瞬痘，沃倫·巴菲特的凈資產(chǎn)為845億美元故慈。其中，842億美元是他50歲之后積累的框全。815億美元是他在65歲左右符合領(lǐng)取社會(huì)保障金條件之后獲得的察绷。 沃倫·巴菲特是一位杰出的投資者。但如果你將他的所有成功都?xì)w功于投資敏銳度竣况，那就忽略了一個(gè)關(guān)鍵因素克婶。他成功的真正關(guān)鍵在于筒严，他作為一名杰出的投資者已經(jīng)有75年之久丹泉。如果他30歲才開始投資，60歲就退休鸭蛙，那幾乎沒人會(huì)聽說過他摹恨。我們來做個(gè)小小的思想實(shí)驗(yàn)。 巴菲特10歲時(shí)就開始認(rèn)真投資娶视。到他30歲時(shí)晒哄，他的凈資產(chǎn)達(dá)到了100萬美元，按通貨膨脹調(diào)整后相當(dāng)于930萬美元肪获。 要是他和普通人一樣寝凌，十幾歲和二十幾歲時(shí)去探索世界、尋找自己的熱愛孝赫，到30歲時(shí)较木，他的凈資產(chǎn)假設(shè)只有2.5萬美元呢？ 假設(shè)他仍然能夠獲得他實(shí)際取得的那種驚人的年投資回報(bào)率（每年22%）青柄，但60歲就停止投資伐债，退休去打高爾夫球、陪孫子孫女致开。 那么粗略估算一下峰锁，他如今的凈資產(chǎn)會(huì)是多少呢？ 不會(huì)是845億美元双戳。 而是1190萬美元虹蒋。 比他實(shí)際的凈資產(chǎn)少了99.9%。 實(shí)際上飒货，沃倫·巴菲特所有的財(cái)務(wù)成功都與他在青少年時(shí)期打下的財(cái)務(wù)基礎(chǔ)以及他在老年時(shí)期持續(xù)的投資有關(guān)魄衅。 他的技能是投資，但他的秘訣是時(shí)間膏斤。 這就是復(fù)利的力量徐绑。 換個(gè)角度想。巴菲特是有史以來最富有的投資者莫辨。但他實(shí)際上并非最厲害的——至少?gòu)哪昃貓?bào)率來看并非如此傲茄。 對(duì)沖基金文藝復(fù)興科技公司的掌門人吉姆·西蒙斯自1988年以來毅访，資金的復(fù)利回報(bào)率達(dá)到了每年66%。無人能及這一紀(jì)錄盘榨。如我們所知喻粹，巴菲特的年均復(fù)利回報(bào)率約為22%，只有西蒙斯的三分之一草巡。 我寫這段話時(shí)守呜，西蒙斯的凈資產(chǎn)為210億美元。盡管考慮到我們討論的這些數(shù)字山憨，這么說聽起來很荒謬查乒，但他的財(cái)富比巴菲特少了75%。 如果西蒙斯是更優(yōu)秀的投資者郁竟，為什么會(huì)有這樣的差距呢玛迄？ 因?yàn)槲髅伤怪钡?0歲才在投資領(lǐng)域嶄露頭角。他進(jìn)行復(fù)利投資的時(shí)間還不到巴菲特的一半棚亩。如果吉姆·西蒙斯能像巴菲特積累財(cái)富的70年那樣蓖议，以66%的年回報(bào)率進(jìn)行投資，他的身家將達(dá)到——請(qǐng)屏住呼吸——63億億9000萬億781萬億7800億7480160000美元讥蟆。 這些數(shù)字大得離譜勒虾、不切實(shí)際。關(guān)鍵在于瘸彤，對(duì)增長(zhǎng)率假設(shè)的看似微小的改變修然，就能導(dǎo)致極其夸張、不切實(shí)際的數(shù)字钧栖。所以當(dāng)我們研究某件事為何變得如此強(qiáng)大——比如冰河時(shí)代為何形成低零，或者沃倫·巴菲特為何如此富有——我們往往會(huì)忽略成功的關(guān)鍵驅(qū)動(dòng)因素。 我聽過很多人說拯杠，他們第一次看到復(fù)利計(jì)算表——或者讀到那些關(guān)于20多歲開始儲(chǔ)蓄和30多歲開始儲(chǔ)蓄相比掏婶，退休時(shí)能多攢多少錢的故事——改變了他們的人生。但可能并非如此潭陪。這些故事很可能只是讓他們感到驚訝雄妥，因?yàn)榻Y(jié)果從直覺上看似乎不合理。線性思維遠(yuǎn)比指數(shù)思維更符合直覺依溯。如果我讓你在腦子里計(jì)算8 + 8 + 8 + 8 + 8 + 8 + 8 + 8 + 8老厌，你幾秒就能算出來（答案是72）。但如果我讓你計(jì)算8×8×8×8×8×8×8×8×8黎炉，你可能就會(huì)頭疼不已（答案是134217728）枝秤。 20世紀(jì)50年代，IBM制造出了3.5兆字節(jié)的硬盤慷嗜。到了60年代淀弹，硬盤容量達(dá)到了幾十兆字節(jié)丹壕。70年代，IBM的溫徹斯特硬盤容量為70兆字節(jié)薇溃。此后菌赖，硬盤尺寸呈指數(shù)級(jí)縮小，而存儲(chǔ)容量不斷增大沐序。20世紀(jì)90年代初琉用，普通個(gè)人電腦的硬盤容量為200 - 500兆字節(jié)。 然后……砰策幼！情況發(fā)生了爆炸式的變化邑时。 1999年——蘋果的iMac配備了6千兆字節(jié)的硬盤。 2003年——Power Mac的硬盤容量達(dá)到120千兆字節(jié)垄惧。 2006年——新款iMac的硬盤容量為250千兆字節(jié)刁愿。 2011年——第一款4太字節(jié)的硬盤問世。 2017年——出現(xiàn)了60太字節(jié)的硬盤到逊。 2019年——100太字節(jié)的硬盤誕生。 把這些數(shù)據(jù)匯總一下：從1950年到1990年滤钱，硬盤容量增加了296兆字節(jié)觉壶。從1990年到現(xiàn)在，硬盤容量增加了1億兆字節(jié)件缸。 如果你在20世紀(jì)50年代是個(gè)科技樂觀主義者铜靶，你可能會(huì)預(yù)測(cè)實(shí)際存儲(chǔ)容量會(huì)增大1000倍。如果你野心更大他炊，可能會(huì)預(yù)測(cè)增大10000倍争剿。但很少有人會(huì)說“在我有生之年增大3000萬倍”。但這確實(shí)發(fā)生了痊末。 復(fù)利的反直覺特性讓即使最聰明的人也會(huì)忽視它的力量蚕苇。2004年，比爾·蓋茨批評(píng)新款Gmail凿叠，質(zhì)疑為什么有人需要1千兆字節(jié)的存儲(chǔ)空間涩笤。作家史蒂文·利維寫道：“盡管他對(duì)前沿技術(shù)了如指掌，但他的思維仍停留在舊的存儲(chǔ)觀念中盒件，認(rèn)為存儲(chǔ)是一種必須節(jié)省使用的資源蹬碧。”你永遠(yuǎn)無法習(xí)慣事物增長(zhǎng)的速度炒刁。 這里的危險(xiǎn)在于恩沽，當(dāng)復(fù)利不那么直觀時(shí)，我們往往會(huì)忽略它的潛力翔始，轉(zhuǎn)而尋求其他解決問題的方法罗心。這并非因?yàn)槲覀兿氲锰嗥酰且驗(yàn)槲覀兒苌偻Ｏ聛硭伎紡?fù)利的潛力。 在那2000本剖析巴菲特成功之道的書中协屡，沒有一本的書名是《這家伙持續(xù)投資了75年》俏脊。但我們知道，這才是他大部分成功的關(guān)鍵肤晓。只是這個(gè)數(shù)學(xué)原理很難理解爷贫，因?yàn)樗环现庇X。 市面上有關(guān)于經(jīng)濟(jì)周期补憾、交易策略和行業(yè)投資的書籍漫萄。但最強(qiáng)大、最重要的書應(yīng)該叫做《閉嘴盈匾，等待》腾务。它只有一頁(yè)，上面是一張經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的長(zhǎng)期圖表削饵。 實(shí)際的啟示是岩瘦，復(fù)利的反直覺特性可能是導(dǎo)致大多數(shù)令人失望的交易、糟糕的策略以及看似成功實(shí)則不然的投資嘗試的原因窿撬。 你不能責(zé)怪人們?nèi)σ愿啊獰o論是在學(xué)習(xí)還是行動(dòng)上——試圖獲得最高的投資回報(bào)率启昧。從直覺上看，這似乎是致富的最佳途徑劈伴。 但好的投資不一定意味著追求最高的回報(bào)率密末，因?yàn)樽罡叩幕貓?bào)率往往是一次性的，難以復(fù)制跛璧。好的投資是追求相當(dāng)不錯(cuò)的回報(bào)率严里，并且能夠長(zhǎng)期堅(jiān)持、持續(xù)獲得追城。只有這樣刹碾，復(fù)利才能發(fā)揮出巨大的威力。 反之漓柑，獲得無法持續(xù)的高額回報(bào)會(huì)導(dǎo)致一些悲劇性的故事教硫。我們需要在下一章中講述這些故事殖卑。

big takeaway from ice ages is that you don’t need tremendous force to create tremendous results. If something compounds—if a little growth serves as the fuel for future growth—a small starting base can lead to results so extraordinary they seem to defy logic.

It can be so logicdefying that you underestimate what’s possible, where growth comes from, and what it can lead to. And so it is with money. More than 2,000 books are dedicated to how Warren Buffett built his fortune. Many of them are wonderful. But few pay enough attention to the simplest fact: Buffett’s fortune isn’t due to just being a good investor, but being a good investor since he was literally a child. As I write this Warren Buffett’s net worth is $84.5 billion. Of that, $84.2 billion was accumulated after his 50th birthday. $81.5 billion came after he qualified for Social Security, in his mid-60s. Warren Buffett is a phenomenal investor. But you miss a key point if you attach all of his success to investing acumen. The real key to his success is that he’s been a phenomenal investor for three quarters of a century. Had he started investing in his 30s and retired in his 60s, few people would have ever heard of him. Consider a little thought experiment. Buffett began serious investing when he was 10 years old. By the time he was 30 he had a net worth of $1 million, or $9.3 million adjusted for inflation.1? What if he was a more normal person, spending his teens and 20s exploring the world and finding his passion, and by age 30 his net worth was, say, $25,000? And let’s say he still went on to earn the extraordinary annual investment returns he’s been able to generate (22% annually), but quit investing and retired at age 60 to play golf and spend time with his grandkids. What would a rough estimate of his net worth be today? Not $84.5 billion. $11.9 million. 99.9% less than his actual net worth. Effectively all of Warren Buffett’s financial success can be tied to the financial base he built in his pubescent years and the longevity he maintained in his geriatric years. His skill is investing, but his secret is time. That’s how compounding works. Think of this another way. Buffett is the richest investor of all time. But he’s not actually the greatest—at least not when measured by average annual returns. Jim Simons, head of the hedge fund Renaissance Technologies, has compounded money at 66% annually since 1988. No one comes close to this record. As we just saw, Buffett has compounded at roughly 22% annually, a third as much. Simons’ net worth, as I write, is $21 billion. He is—and I know how ridiculous this sounds given the numbers we’re dealing with—75% less rich than Buffett. Why the difference, if Simons is such a better investor? Because Simons did not find his investment stride until he was 50 years old. He’s had less than half as many years to compound as Buffett. If James Simons had earned his 66% annual returns for the 70-year span Buffett has built his wealth he would be worth—please hold your breath—sixtythree quintillion nine hundred quadrillion seven hundred eighty-one trillion seven hundred eighty billion seven hundred forty-eight million one hundred sixty thousand dollars. These are ridiculous, impractical numbers. The point is that what seem like small changes in growth assumptions can lead to ridiculous, impractical numbers. And so when we are studying why something got to become as powerful as it has —why an ice age formed, or why Warren Buffett is so rich— we often overlook the key drivers of success. I have heard many people say the first time they saw a compound interest table—or one of those stories about how much more you’d have for retirement if you began saving in your 20s versus your 30s—changed their life. But it probably didn’t. What it likely did was surprise them, because the results intuitively didn’t seem right. Linear thinking is so much more intuitive than exponential thinking. If I ask you to calculate 8+8+8+8+8+8+8+8+8 in your head, you can do it in a few seconds (it’s 72). If I ask you to calculate 8×8×8×8×8×8×8×8×8, your head will explode (it’s 134,217,728). IBM made a 3.5 megabyte hard drive in the 1950s. By the 1960s things were moving into a few dozen megabytes. By the 1970s, IBM’s Winchester drive held 70 megabytes. Then drives got exponentially smaller in size with more storage. A typical PC in the early 1990s held 200–500 megabytes. And then … wham. Things exploded. 1999—Apple’s iMac comes with a 6 gigabyte hard drive. 2003—120 gigs on the Power Mac. 2006—250 gigs on the new iMac. 2011—first 4 terabyte hard drive. 2017—60 terabyte hard drives. 2019—100 terabyte hard drives. Put that all together: From 1950 to 1990 we gained 296 megabytes. From 1990 through today we gained 100 million megabytes. If you were a technology optimist in the 1950s you may have predicted that practical storage would become 1,000 times larger. Maybe 10,000 times larger, if you were swinging for the fences. Few would have said “30 million times larger within my lifetime.” But that’s what happened. The counterintuitive nature of compounding leads even the smartest of us to overlook its power. In 2004 Bill Gates criticized the new Gmail, wondering why anyone would need a gigabyte of storage. Author Steven Levy wrote, “Despite his currency with cutting-edge technologies, his mentality was anchored in the old paradigm of storage being a commodity that must be conserved.” You never get accustomed to how quickly things can grow. The danger here is that when compounding isn’t intuitive we often ignore its potential and focus on solving problems through other means. Not because we’re overthinking, but because we rarely stop to consider compounding potential. None of the 2,000 books picking apart Buffett’s success are titled This Guy Has Been Investing Consistently for ThreeQuarters of a Century. But we know that’s the key to the majority of his success. It’s just hard to wrap your head around that math because it’s not intuitive. There are books on economic cycles, trading strategies, and sector bets. But the most powerful and important book should be called Shut Up And Wait. It’s just one page with a long-term chart of economic growth. The practical takeaway is that the counterintuitiveness of compounding may be responsible for the majority of disappointing trades, bad strategies, and successful investing attempts. You can’t blame people for devoting all their effort—effort in what they learn and what they do—to trying to earn the highest investment returns. It intuitively seems like the best way to get rich. But good investing isn’t necessarily about earning the highest returns, because the highest returns tend to be one?off hits that can’t be repeated. It’s about earning pretty good returns that you can stick with and which can be repeated for the longest period of time. That’s when compounding runs wild. The opposite of this—earning huge returns that can’t be held onto—leads to some tragic stories. We’ll need the next chapter to tell them

沒有什么是免費(fèi)的

everything has a price, and the key to a lot of things with money is just figuring out what that price is and being willing to pay it. The problem is that the price of a lot of things is not obvious until you’ve experienced them firsthand, when the bill is overdue. 沒有什么是免費(fèi)的 只有經(jīng)歷才能了解代價(jià)

General Electric was the largest company in the world in 2004, worth a third of a trillion dollars. It had either been first or second each year for the previous decade, capitalism’s shining example of corporate aristocracy. Then everything fell to pieces. The 2008 financial crisis sent GE’s financing division—which supplied more than half the company’s profits—into chaos. It was eventually sold for scrap. Subsequent bets in oil and energy were disasters, resulting in billions in writeoffs. GE stock fell from $40 in 2007 to $7 by 2018. Blame placed on CEO Jeff Immelt—who ran the company since 2001—was immediate and harsh. He was criticized for his leadership, his acquisitions, cutting the dividend, laying off workers and—of course—the plunging stock price. Rightly so: those rewarded with dynastic wealth when times are good hold the burden of responsibility when the tide goes out. He stepped down in 2017. But Immelt said something insightful on his way out. Responding to critics who said his actions were wrong and what he should have done was obvious, Immelt told his successor,“Every job looks easy when you’re not the one doing it.”? 每個(gè)工作都是看起來更容易

Every job looks easy when you’re not the one doing it because the challenges faced by someone in the arena are often invisible to those in the crowd. Dealing with the conflicting demands of sprawling bloat, short-term investors, regulators, unions, and entrenched bureaucracy is not only hard to do, but it’s hard to even recognize the severity of the problems until you’re the one dealing with them.Immelt’s successor, who lasted 14 months, learned this as well. Most things are harder in practice than they are in theory. Sometimes this is because we’re overconfident. More often it’s because we’re not good at identifying what the price of success is, which prevents us from being able to pay it.

翻譯Same with investing, where volatility is almost always a fee, not a fine. Market returns are never free and never will be. They demand you pay a price, like any other product. You’re not forced to pay this fee, just like you’re not forced to go to Disneyland. You can go to the local county fair where tickets might be $10, or stay home for free. You might still have a good time. But you’ll usually get what you pay for. Same with markets. The volatility/uncertainty fee—the price of returns—is the cost of admission to get returns greater than low-fee parks like cash and bonds. The trick is convincing yourself that the market’s fee is worth it. That’s the only way to properly deal with volatility and uncertainty—not just putting up with it, but realizing that it’s an admission fee worth paying. There’s no guarantee that it will be. Sometimes it rains at Disneyland. But if you view the admission fee as a fine, you’ll never enjoy the magic.Find the price, then pay it

市場(chǎng)不會(huì)免費(fèi) 不會(huì)投機(jī)取巧

和大多數(shù)產(chǎn)品一樣帖蔓，回報(bào)越高，代價(jià)越大炼杖。2002 年至 2018 年锋玲，網(wǎng)飛（Netflix）股票回報(bào)率超過 35000%景用，但其股價(jià)在 94% 的時(shí)間里都低于此前的歷史最高點(diǎn)。1995 年至 2018 年，怪物飲料（Monster Beverage）回報(bào)率高達(dá) 319000%—— 堪稱史上最高回報(bào)率之一 —— 但在此期間伞插，其股價(jià) 95% 的時(shí)間都低于此前高點(diǎn)割粮。

接下來是關(guān)鍵部分。就像買車媚污，你有幾個(gè)選擇：你可以付出這個(gè)代價(jià)舀瓢，接受波動(dòng)與起伏；或者你可以找一種不確定性較小耗美、回報(bào)也較低的資產(chǎn)京髓，類似一輛二手車；又或者你可以嘗試類似偷車的做法：試圖獲取回報(bào)商架，同時(shí)避開隨之而來的波動(dòng)堰怨。

在投資領(lǐng)域，很多人選擇了第三種蛇摸。他們就像偷車賊 —— 盡管本意不壞且平時(shí)遵紀(jì)守法 —— 琢磨出各種技巧和策略备图，想不付出代價(jià)就獲得回報(bào)。他們頻繁買賣赶袄。試圖在下次經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退前賣出揽涮，在下次繁榮前買入。大多數(shù)稍有經(jīng)驗(yàn)的投資者都知道弃鸦，波動(dòng)真實(shí)且常見绞吁。然后，許多人就邁出了看似順理成章的下一步：試圖避開波動(dòng)唬格。

但是，財(cái)富之神可不待見那些想不勞而獲的人颜说。有些偷車賊可能會(huì)逃脫懲罰购岗，但更多的會(huì)被抓住并受到懲處。

投資也是如此门粪。