Economic theory?posited?that a developed country like the United States would adjust to import competition by moving workers into more advanced industries that competed successfully in global markets. In the real world of American workers exposed to the rush of imports after China erupted onto world markets, the adjustment didn’t happen.
從經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)理論角度來(lái)講，像美國(guó)這樣的發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家是可以應(yīng)對(duì)進(jìn)口競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的秽澳。只要將工人轉(zhuǎn)移到更高端的產(chǎn)業(yè)中俭缓，而且這些產(chǎn)業(yè)得是在全球市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)中脫穎而出的叠纹。但實(shí)際情況是，當(dāng)中國(guó)在國(guó)際市場(chǎng)中異軍突起眨层，美國(guó)工人面臨大量涌進(jìn)的中國(guó)商品時(shí)蜒秤，卻并沒(méi)能成功幸免膝擂。
If mediocre job prospects and low wages didn’t stop American families from consuming, it was because the American financial system was flush with Chinese cash and willing to lend, financing their homes and refinancing them to buy the furniture. But that?equilibrium?didn’t end well either, did it?
并不樂(lè)觀的就業(yè)前景和低廉的薪資并沒(méi)有打消美國(guó)家庭的購(gòu)買熱情，那是因?yàn)槊绹?guó)金融體系充斥著人民幣鸳慈，并且美國(guó)愿意將這筆資金出借給公民饱溢，資助他們購(gòu)房，當(dāng)他們需要買家具的時(shí)候走芋，美國(guó)政府會(huì)再次伸出援助之手绩郎。但是這樣的平衡似乎并沒(méi)有帶來(lái)想要的結(jié)果。
What it left was a lot of betrayed anger floating around among many Americans on the wrong end of these dynamics. “By not following the law, the administration sent a political signal that the U.S. wouldn’t stand up to Chinese cheating,” said Edward Alden, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. “As we can see now, that hurt in terms of maintaining political support for open trade.”
剩下的似乎只是縈繞在大量美國(guó)人心中的憤怒翁逞，他們感到了背叛的滋味肋杖，覺(jué)得自己處在經(jīng)濟(jì)運(yùn)行模式不公的一端。美國(guó)外交關(guān)系協(xié)會(huì)的高級(jí)研究員愛(ài)德華·艾爾登（Edward Alden）說(shuō)：美國(guó)不會(huì)遵守這樣的規(guī)則挖函，以此行政部門發(fā)出了一個(gè)政治信號(hào)状植，表明美國(guó)不會(huì)任由中國(guó)的作弊行為。就我們目前看到的是怨喘，這樣的做法也不利于為公平交易持續(xù)輸送政治支持津畸。
If there was a winner from this dynamic, it was Mr. Trump.
如果當(dāng)下的經(jīng)濟(jì)動(dòng)態(tài)還能有一個(gè)受益方的話，那這個(gè)贏家就是特朗普必怜。
Will Mr. Trump really go after China? In addition to an expected executive order to?retaliate?against the dumping of Chinese steel, he has promised more. He could?tinker?with the definitions of “material” and “significant” trade surpluses to justify a manipulation charge.
特朗普真的會(huì)找中國(guó)算賬嗎肉拓？特朗普已經(jīng)籌劃了一項(xiàng)用于還擊中國(guó)鋼鐵傾銷的行政命令。除此之外梳庆，他還可以對(duì)所謂“材料”暖途、“重大的”貿(mào)易順差的定義做些改動(dòng)卑惜，這樣就可以指控中國(guó)操控了。
And yet a charge of manipulation would add irony upon irony. “It would be incredibly ironic not to have named China a manipulator when it was manipulating, and name it when it is not,” Mr. Setser told me. And Mr. Trump would be retaliating against the economic dynamic that handed him the presidency.
但是對(duì)中國(guó)進(jìn)行操控的指控似乎只是讓原本就很諷刺的情形變得更加諷刺丧肴。Setser先生告訴我残揉，“如果中國(guó)真的在背后操縱，那沒(méi)有指控它就顯得尤其諷刺芋浮。如果中國(guó)沒(méi)有操縱抱环，卻指出中國(guó)是操縱國(guó)，那將會(huì)同樣諷刺纸巷≌虿荩”特朗普將要打擊的經(jīng)濟(jì)動(dòng)態(tài)正是當(dāng)初將他送上總統(tǒng)寶座的那個(gè)。
.0000?????O
郝???O
