Hypersonic boom?

高超音速發(fā)展?

?? Long range, gliding missiles that fly at more than five times the speed of sound are coming??遠(yuǎn)程滑翔導(dǎo)彈正以超五倍音速的速度“飛來”

?? “‘Once the rockets are up, who cares where they come down?/ That’s not my department!’ says?Wernher von Braun.”Tom Lehrer’s satirical?ditty?on the Nazi-turned-American rocketeer was faithful to the essence of early missile development, whose principal challenge was hoisting the weapons into the sky. Gravity did most of the rest. The first warheads capable of steering on descent did not arrive until the 1980s. Even they were limited in how much they could move around, making it pretty easy to predict their target area.?

? ? “‘一旦火箭升空，誰會在意它們落在哪里? / 那不是我的事徽级！’沃納·馮·布勞恩說哥纫。”湯姆·萊勒(Tom Lehrer)對這位納粹出身的美國火箭專家的諷刺小調(diào)峦朗，如實(shí)反映了早期導(dǎo)彈研發(fā)的要義——其主要挑戰(zhàn)是將武器升上天空荣月，剩下的大部分都決定于重力作用。直到20世紀(jì)80年代，第一批能夠在下降過程中加以操縱的彈頭才問世日矫。此前，它們的活動范圍甚至也受到限制绑榴，這使得預(yù)測它們的目標(biāo)區(qū)域變得相當(dāng)容易哪轿。

?? A new generation of hypersonic missiles is changing all that. Some might be capable of gliding across continents at great speed, their target unpredictable until seconds before impact. Russia claims to have a hypersonic glider on the?cusp?of deployment; others are redoubling their efforts. Many are likely to start entering service in the 2020s. All this opens up new military possibilities—and problems.?

? ? 新一代高超音速導(dǎo)彈正在改變這一切。有的導(dǎo)彈有可能以極快的速度滑過大陸翔怎，其目標(biāo)在撞擊前幾秒鐘是無法預(yù)知的窃诉。俄羅斯聲稱即將部署一枚高超音速滑翔導(dǎo)彈；有的國家則在加倍努力。許多導(dǎo)彈可能到21世紀(jì)20年代開始服役褐奴。所有這些都帶來了新的軍事可能性按脚，也會引發(fā)諸多問題。

? ? ? Missiles that travel at speeds greater than Mach 5 (five times the speed of sound, or about 1.5km per second), have existed for some time. Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) re-enter the atmosphere at up to 8km per second. What is different about the hypersonic weapons in the pipeline is that they are designed to sustain such speeds over long distances, manoeuvre as they do so and, in some cases, hit targets with pinpoint accuracy.?

? ? 速度超過5馬赫(音速的5倍敦冬，約每秒1.5公里)的導(dǎo)彈已經(jīng)存在一段時間了辅搬。洲際彈道導(dǎo)彈(ICBMS)以每秒8公里的速度重新進(jìn)入大氣層。彈道高超音速武器的不同之處在于脖旱，其設(shè)計目的是長距離保持這樣的速度堪遂，同時可以進(jìn)行操控，在某些情況下萌庆，還能精確命中目標(biāo)溶褪。

? ? “Manoeuvrable missiles travelling at many times the speed of sound barely leave time for considered human responses,” warned Heiko Maas, Germany’s foreign minister, in March. Such weapons may also elude today’s arms-control agreements, which were written for an earlier generation of weapons.?

? ? 德國外交部長海科·馬斯(Heiko Maas)今年3月警告稱：“以多倍音速飛行的可操縱導(dǎo)彈讓人幾乎沒有時間去深思熟慮践险≡陈瑁”這類武器也可能規(guī)避當(dāng)今軍備控制協(xié)議，因?yàn)檫@些協(xié)議是針對上一代武器制定的巍虫。

? ? There are two basic designs: cruise missiles and gliders. Hypersonic cruise missiles are essentially faster versions of existing ones but powered by very different jet engines. Gliders are pricier and harder to build, but can travel faster and farther, and so are receiving more attention. Like ICBMs and von Braun’s V-2s, they are lofted into? space and fall to earth unpowered. But unlike the old-fashioned projectiles, they do not follow a predictable, parabolic arc through the sky. Instead, a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) detaches from the rocket while it is still ascending and either skips along the upper atmosphere or, having re-entered, glides through it for hundreds or thousands of kilometres.?

? ? 基本設(shè)計包括兩類：巡航導(dǎo)彈與滑翔導(dǎo)彈彭则。高超音速巡航導(dǎo)彈本質(zhì)上是現(xiàn)有導(dǎo)彈的更快版本，但由非常不同的噴氣發(fā)動機(jī)提供動力占遥「┒叮滑翔導(dǎo)彈造價更高、制造難度更大瓦胎，但飛行速度更快芬萍、距離更遠(yuǎn)，因此正受到越來越多的關(guān)注搔啊。就像洲際彈道導(dǎo)彈和馮·布勞恩的V2火箭一樣柬祠，它們被送入太空，在沒有動力的情況下墜落到地球坯癣。但與老式發(fā)射物不同的是瓶盛，它們在空中并不沿著可預(yù)知的弧形拋物線運(yùn)動最欠。相反示罗，高超音速滑翔飛行器(HGV)在火箭仍在上升時脫離火箭，要么沿高層大氣躍進(jìn)芝硬，要么在重新進(jìn)入大氣層后滑翔數(shù)百或數(shù)千公里蚜点。

? ? Such gliders have several advantages. Ballistic missiles are less agile and tend not to be very accurate. A Minuteman III ICBM, the backbone of America’s nuclear arsenal, has a “circular error probable” of roughly 120m, meaning only half the missiles fired are expected to land within 120m of the impact point. That is fine for nuclear bombs but useless for hitting a ship or runway. Today’s cruise missiles, on the other hand, are very accurate—one could be sent through a window—but much slower. HGVs combine the speed of ballistic missiles with the manoeuvrability and accuracy of cruise missiles. “You can fly, you can shape your trajectory, you can turn,” says Will Roper, the US Air Force acquisitions chief.?

? ? 這種滑翔機(jī)有幾個優(yōu)點(diǎn)。彈道導(dǎo)彈不太靈活拌阴，而且往往不是很精確绍绘。“民兵3”洲際彈道導(dǎo)彈是美國核武庫的支柱，其“圓概率誤差”約為120米陪拘，也就是說導(dǎo)彈發(fā)射后只有一半預(yù)計會落在距彈著點(diǎn)120米以內(nèi)厂镇。這對于核彈來說算好的了，但要是打擊一艘船或者一條跑道就沒用了左刽。另一方面捺信，現(xiàn)今的巡航導(dǎo)彈非常精確——可以通過一扇窗戶發(fā)射——但速度要慢得多。HGV融合了彈道導(dǎo)彈的速度與巡航導(dǎo)彈的機(jī)動性和精確性欠痴。美國空軍首席采購官威爾?羅珀(Will Roper)表示：“你能飛迄靠，你能改變軌跡，你能轉(zhuǎn)彎喇辽≌浦浚”

? ? The key is their trajectory. An unpowered ICBM warhead spends most of its time in the vacuum of space where it cannot duck or dive, but HGVs spend 80% of their time below 100km, allowing them to manoeuvre for most of their flight. They can also dodge ground-based radar for longer by hiding behind the?curvature?of the Earth. Whereas American ICBMs must fly over Russia to hit China—which could lead to dangerous misunderstandings—gliders could take more circuitous routes, avoiding missile defences and leaving adversaries uncertain of the target.

? ? 運(yùn)行軌跡是關(guān)鍵。一枚無動力洲際彈道導(dǎo)彈彈頭的大部分時間都在真空中運(yùn)動菩咨，無法閃避或俯沖吠式，但HGV80%的時間都在100公里以下，這使得它們在飛行大部分過程中具有機(jī)動性抽米。它們還可以利用地球曲度將自己隱藏起來奇徒，從而避開地面雷達(dá)更長時間。美國洲際彈道導(dǎo)彈必須飛越俄羅斯才能擊中中國——這可能造成危險的誤解——而滑翔導(dǎo)彈可以采取更迂回的路線缨硝，避開導(dǎo)彈防御系統(tǒng)摩钙，讓對手無法確定目標(biāo)。

? ? Hypersonic gliders are almost a century in the making. The first rocket-boosted glider flew in Germany in 1928. During the second world war, German engineers tried to extend the range of von Braun’s V-2 by having it glide. After the war, America and the Soviet Union pilfered German rocketry, leading to a series of technological leaps. Alpha Draco, an American HGV, was tested to hypersonic speeds in the 1950s and hypersonic gliding was refined by the space race: the space shuttle was a hypersonic glider, in its way.?

? ? 高超音速滑翔導(dǎo)彈的研制已歷時近一個世紀(jì)查辩。1928年胖笛，第一枚火箭助推滑翔導(dǎo)彈在德國飛行。二戰(zhàn)期間宜岛，德國工程師試圖通過讓馮·布勞恩的V-2火箭滑翔來增加其射程长踊。戰(zhàn)后，美國和蘇聯(lián)盜用德國的火箭技術(shù)萍倡，引領(lǐng)了一系列的技術(shù)飛躍身弊。阿爾法·德拉科(Alpha Draco)是美國的一種HGV，在上世紀(jì)50年代接受了高超音速速度的測試列敲，后來在太空競賽中其高超音速滑翔功能又得以改進(jìn)：航天飛機(jī)在某種程度上是一種高超音速滑翔機(jī)阱佛。

? ? War at Mach 5?

? ? 5馬赫速度的戰(zhàn)爭

? ? Why, then, have hypersonic missiles taken so long to arrive? Extended hypersonic flight presents?fiendish?scientific and engineering challenges. The lift-to-drag ratio of the space shuttle at hypersonic speeds is around one, notes James Acton of the Carnegie Endowment, a think-tank; an advanced glider would require over twice that. Higher lift-to-drag ratios require sharp leading edges, which, combined with extreme velocities, can generate surface temperatures up to 2,000℃. That can erode a glider’s protective coating, fry its electronics and bend it out of shape. America’s test of one prototype in 2011 failed when the skin blistered and peeled off. The resulting shockwaves overwhelmed control systems in less than two seconds.?

? ? 那么，高超音速導(dǎo)彈的發(fā)展之路為何如此漫長呢戴而？延長高超音速航程面臨極為復(fù)雜的科技和工程難題凑术。智庫卡內(nèi)基基金會的詹姆斯·阿克頓（James Acton）指出，航天飛機(jī)在高超音速下的升阻比約為1所意；一架先進(jìn)的滑翔機(jī)則需要兩倍以上淮逊。升阻比增高催首，滑翔機(jī)前緣就需要十分鋒利，再加上極快的速度泄鹏，可以產(chǎn)生高達(dá)2000℃的表面溫度郎任。這會腐蝕滑翔機(jī)的保護(hù)層，燒壞電子設(shè)備备籽，使其變形涝滴。2011年，美國對一款原型機(jī)的測試無功而返胶台，因?yàn)樗耐鈿ぎa(chǎn)生氣泡并最終脫落歼疮，由此產(chǎn)生的沖擊波在不到兩秒鐘的時間里就摧毀了控制系統(tǒng)。

? ? The only thing that seems to work, says an expert at an arms company that is developing gliders, is to cover the vehicle in cork. But that is vaporised in minutes or less, so does not work for long-range missiles. Dissipating heat as quickly as it is built up is “daunting” and “perhaps impossible” above Mach 10, he says.?

? ? 一家正在開發(fā)滑翔導(dǎo)彈的武器公司的專家說诈唬，唯一可行的辦法是用栓皮覆蓋飛行器韩脏。但這在幾分鐘或更短的時間內(nèi)就會蒸發(fā)掉，因此不適用于遠(yuǎn)程導(dǎo)彈铸磅。他說赡矢，速度超過10馬赫時，要想迅速散熱阅仔，“讓人望而卻步”吹散，而且“估計是不可能的”。

? ? Great speeds also break up molecules in the atmosphere, creating a field of charged particles (or “plasma”) around the glider, which disrupts GPS and other signals required for guiding the missile to its target. Researchers “still don’t completely understand the physics of hypersonic flight”, wrote Ivett Leyva of America’s Air Force Office of Scientific Research in a 2017 paper.?

? ? 高速飛行還會分解大氣中的分子八酒，在滑翔導(dǎo)彈周圍形成一個帶電粒子(或“等離子體”)場空民，從而干擾GPS和其他引導(dǎo)導(dǎo)彈到達(dá)目標(biāo)所需的信號。美國空軍科學(xué)研究辦公室的伊維特·萊瓦(Ivett Leyva)在2017年的一篇論文中寫道羞迷，研究人員“仍然不完全理解高超音速飛行的物理原理”界轩。

? ? The big powers have all made some progress in surmounting these challenges. Thomas Bussing, who heads missile development for Raytheon, an arms company, says there has been a “step change” over the past decade, thanks to advances in computational fluid dynamics, new materials and electronic and guidance systems. America, which set aside $2.6bn for hypersonic weapons in the Pentagon’s 2020 budget, is probably farthest ahead. It tested a wedge-shaped glider in 2010 and 2011, a more successful cone-shaped design in 2011, 2014 and 2017 (the Alternate Re-entry System) and is working on tactical systems that use smaller, cheaper rockets and could be launched from ships and aircraft.?

? ? 大國在應(yīng)對這些挑戰(zhàn)方面都取得了一些進(jìn)展。托馬斯·巴辛(Thomas Bussing)是雷神武器公司導(dǎo)彈研發(fā)部門的負(fù)責(zé)人衔瓮，他說浊猾，由于計算流體動力學(xué)、新材料热鞍、電子和制導(dǎo)系統(tǒng)的發(fā)展葫慎，在過去的十年里已經(jīng)發(fā)生了“階躍變化”。美國在五角大樓2020年預(yù)算中為高超音速武器安排了26億美元薇宠，可能遙遙領(lǐng)先偷办。該公司在2010年和2011年測試了一種楔形滑翔導(dǎo)彈，在2011年昼接、2014年和2017年測試了一種更成功的錐形滑翔導(dǎo)彈(交替式再入系統(tǒng))爽篷，目前正在研發(fā)一套戰(zhàn)術(shù)系統(tǒng)，所用的火箭更小也更便宜慢睡，而且可以從艦船和飛機(jī)上發(fā)射逐工。

? ? Russia has been working on hypersonics for decades, haltingly. Its flagship Avangard glider was flaunted publicly by President Vladimir Putin in March 2018 and tested to greatfanfarein December, after which it was declared ready for service this year—somewhat implausibly, say experts. Pavel Podvig of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research points out that very few of the glider’s tests were successful and that the programme was nearly shut down four years ago.?

? ? 幾十年來，俄羅斯在高超音速研究方面一直步履蹣跚漂辐。2018年3月泪喊，俄羅斯總統(tǒng)弗拉基米爾·普京(Vladimir Putin) 公開炫耀了其旗艦級滑翔導(dǎo)彈——“先鋒(Avangard)”，并在12月進(jìn)行了大張旗鼓的測試髓涯，之后宣布該導(dǎo)彈擬于今年服役——專家認(rèn)為袒啼，這有點(diǎn)令人難以置信。聯(lián)合國裁軍研究所的帕維爾·波德維格 (Pavel Podvig) 指出纬纪，滑翔導(dǎo)彈的試驗(yàn)很少取得成功蚓再，而且四年前該項(xiàng)目就差點(diǎn)被關(guān)停了。

? ? China has tested its own DF-ZF HGV at least nine times since 2014. Almost nothing is publicly known about its nimbleness or accuracy. Australia, India, France and Japan are all chasing the pack. “We have lost our technical advantage in hypersonics,” warned General Paul Selva, America’s highest-ranking air-force officer in January. China has built two to three times as many hypersonics-related facilities as America, including the world’s fastest wind tunnel for testing, and pumped out the most public research on the technology (716 publications in 2017, compared with 207 from America and 76 from Russia).?

? ? 自2014年以來包各，中國已經(jīng)至少9次測試了自己的DF-ZF高超音速滑翔飛行器摘仅。公眾對其靈活性和準(zhǔn)確性幾乎一無所知。澳大利亞问畅、印度娃属、法國和日本都在“跟跑”。今年1月护姆，美國空軍最高級官員保羅·塞爾瓦(Paul Selva矾端，譯注：美國參謀長聯(lián)席會議副主席、美國空軍上將暨美國國防部二號人物)將軍警告說：“我們已經(jīng)失去了超音速上的技術(shù)優(yōu)勢卵皂≈让”中國建造的高超音速相關(guān)設(shè)施是美國的兩到三倍，其中包括世界上最快的風(fēng)洞測試灯变，并對該技術(shù)進(jìn)行了公開面最廣的研究(2017年發(fā)表716篇論文豺旬，相比之下，美國發(fā)表207篇柒凉，俄羅斯發(fā)表76篇)族阅。

? ? Even so, Mr Acton suggests that the Chinese programme is probably less advanced than America’s. For one thing, America is testing its gliders over significantly longer ranges than China is. It is also solving a different, harder, problem. America wants the ability to deliver conventional warheads over continental distances. It is because ICBMs are not accurate enough for this that it wants HGVS. Russia and China are keener on nuclear-tipped ones, partly because they fear their existing nukes might one day be stopped by improvements in America’s missile-defence shield. Their own gliders need not be so precise.?

? ? 盡管如此，阿克頓先生認(rèn)為中國的項(xiàng)目可能不如美國的先進(jìn)膝捞。首先坦刀，美國正在比中國更遠(yuǎn)的射程上測試滑翔導(dǎo)彈，并且在解決一個不同的蔬咬、更難的問題鲤遥。美國希望有能力在洲際范圍內(nèi)運(yùn)載常規(guī)彈頭。由于洲際彈道導(dǎo)彈在這方面不夠精確林艘，因此需要用HGV盖奈。俄羅斯和中國更熱衷于擁有帶有核彈頭的滑翔導(dǎo)彈，部分是因?yàn)樗麄儞?dān)心他們現(xiàn)有的核武器有一天會遭到改進(jìn)后的美國導(dǎo)彈防御系統(tǒng)攔截狐援。他們自己的滑翔導(dǎo)彈不需要特別精確钢坦。

? ? Douglas Barrie, an expert at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a think-tank, forecasts that hypersonic gliders are likely to start entering service in the early 2020s. The result might be twitchier decision-makers and a more frenzied battlefield.?

? ? 智庫國際戰(zhàn)略研究所(International Institute for Strategic Studies)專家道格拉斯·巴里(Douglas Barrie)預(yù)測究孕，高超音速滑翔導(dǎo)彈可能在本世紀(jì)20年代初開始服役。其結(jié)果可能是爹凹，決策者更加緊張厨诸，戰(zhàn)場更加瘋狂。

? ? Area defences, which guard broad swathes of territory like continental America, rely on shooting down missiles mid-course and on a straightforward trajectory. Gliders do not go as high and are less predictable, hence Mr Putin’s boast that the Avangard is “invulnerable to interception” (some reckon that interceptors placed in space might have a shot as super-hot gliders should stand out to infra-red sensors).?

? ? 區(qū)域防御系統(tǒng)(area defences)守衛(wèi)著廣袤領(lǐng)土禾酱，比如美國大陸微酬，它依靠的是在中途擊落導(dǎo)彈和一條明確的軌道〔眨滑翔導(dǎo)彈飛得沒那么高颗管，也不那么容易預(yù)測，因此普京夸口說“先鋒”是“不會被攔截的”(一些人認(rèn)為滓走，放置在太空的攔截器可能有機(jī)會擊中它垦江，因?yàn)槌瑹峄鑼?dǎo)彈應(yīng)該會在紅外線傳感器面前“現(xiàn)出原形”)。

? ? Point defences, which guard individual sites against shorter-range missiles, might have more luck. Gliders must slow down as they approach their targets. Systems like America’s?THAAD?have a proven ability to shoot down ballistic missiles, which close in more quickly.?

? ? 點(diǎn)防御系統(tǒng)(point defences)可以保護(hù)單個地點(diǎn)免受短程導(dǎo)彈的攻擊闲坎，或許運(yùn)氣更好疫粥。滑翔導(dǎo)彈在接近目標(biāo)時必須減速腰懂。美國薩德之類的系統(tǒng)已經(jīng)被證明有能力擊落彈道導(dǎo)彈梗逮，這種導(dǎo)彈接近目標(biāo)時速度更快。

? ? “The world has changed dramatically,” says Mr Bussing. “These systems are very, very difficult to counter and fundamentally give the holder a tremendous advantage over the states that don’t have them. The sense of urgency to develop ways to counter them is an?imperative.”?

?? “世界飛速變化绣溜，”巴辛說慷彤，“這些系統(tǒng)非常、非常難以對付怖喻，從根本上說底哗，擁有這些系統(tǒng)的國家因此會比沒有的國家有著巨大的優(yōu)勢。當(dāng)務(wù)之急就是要有一種緊迫感锚沸，努力找到對付它們的方法跋选。”

? ? One American military official suggests that humans will have to hand ever more control to defences that are already semi-autonomous: “There will be no time at all for a man in the loop.” The uncertain payload of gliders is another problem. If targets could not tell the difference between conventional and nuclear gliders, or feared that conventional ones, through accuracy and kinetic energy alone, could threaten important targets, they might choose to launch their own nuclear forces to avoid losing them.?

? ? 一位美國軍方官員表示哗蜈，人類將不得不把更多的控制權(quán)交給已經(jīng)處于半自治狀態(tài)的防御系統(tǒng)：“一個人根本沒有時間參與其中前标。” 還有一個問題是滑翔導(dǎo)彈的有效載荷不確定距潘。如果目標(biāo)不能分辨出常規(guī)滑翔導(dǎo)彈和核滑翔導(dǎo)彈的區(qū)別炼列，或者擔(dān)心常規(guī)滑翔導(dǎo)彈僅通過精度和動能就可對重要目標(biāo)構(gòu)成威脅，他們可能會選擇發(fā)射自己的核力量音比，以避免失去它們俭尖。

? ? There are also wider implications for arms control. The impending collapse of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which barred America and Russia from possessing land-based missiles of 500km-5,500km ranges, clears the way for both countries to develop and deploy new ground-launched hypersonic missiles. A separate treaty, New START, caps the number of longer-range weapons, but is up for renewal in 2021 and looking shaky. When it was negotiated in 2010, America and Russia implicitly agreed that gliders would not be covered. Former officials say that was a mistake.?

? ? 軍備控制還有更廣泛的含義。正面臨瓦解的《中程核力量條約》(INF)禁止美國和俄羅斯擁有500公里至5500公里射程的陸基導(dǎo)彈，為兩國開發(fā)和部署新的地面發(fā)射高超音速導(dǎo)彈掃清了道路稽犁。另一份名為《新削減戰(zhàn)略武器條約》(New START)的條約為遠(yuǎn)程武器的數(shù)量設(shè)定了上限焰望，但該條約到2021年就將失效，而且看起來并不可靠缭付。2010年談判時柿估，美國和俄羅斯含糊其辭地同意該條約不包括滑翔導(dǎo)彈循未。前官員稱這是一個錯誤陷猫。

? ? Germany convened an arms-control conference in Berlin on March 15th to kick- start a discussion on taming the risks posed by futuristic weapons, including hypersonic missiles, through diplomacy. Mr Maas called for an “international missiles dialogue” to discuss the challenge.?

? ? 3月15日，德國在柏林召開了一場軍備控制會議的妖，開始討論通過外交手段遏制包括高超音速導(dǎo)彈在內(nèi)的未來武器帶來的風(fēng)險绣檬。馬斯呼吁開展“國際導(dǎo)彈對話”來商討這一挑戰(zhàn)。

? ? The UN’s disarmament office has proposed that rivals could swap information on test flights and take other confidence-building measures. Corentin Brustlein of IFRI, a French think-tank, suggests capping glider numbers. Yet America and Russia are?enmeshed?in worsening disputes over today’s weapons, let alone tomorrow’s, and China shows little interest in tying its hands. Gliders are likely to enjoy a fair geopolitical wind.?

? ? 聯(lián)合國裁軍辦公室提議嫂粟，競爭對手可以交換試飛信息娇未，并采取其他建立信任的措施。法國智庫IFRI（法國國際關(guān)系研究所）的科朗坦·布拉斯特萊恩(Corentin Brustlein)建議限制滑翔導(dǎo)彈的數(shù)量星虹。然而零抬，對于現(xiàn)在的武器，美國和俄羅斯之間的爭端已經(jīng)日益惡化宽涌，更不用說未來的武器了平夜，而且中國也基本沒有流露出要“收手”的意思⌒读粒滑翔導(dǎo)彈可能會乘著一股公平的“地緣政治風(fēng)”飛翔忽妒。

（陳繼龍譯自《經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)人》雜志2019年4月6日刊）