這是最近翻譯BM的一篇文章卡辰，文章中有句話霹疫，讓我印象深刻：

I feel it is important that people realize that everything in life has design?tradeoffs and the secret is to make the best tradeoffs. In order to make the?best tradeoffs you must look at the entire picture.

世間萬物的存在都是在做權(quán)衡的考量拱绑，關(guān)鍵在于做出最好的權(quán)衡。為了做出最好的權(quán)衡必須縱觀全局更米。這句話幾乎是整個文章的靈魂欺栗。無論是pow，pos征峦，dpos都各有利弊迟几，而每種共同體區(qū)塊鏈的也都是在不斷的利弊權(quán)衡考量中接受市場的檢驗。

以下是文章翻譯栏笆，希望對你有用类腮。

In Defense of Consortium Blockchains為共同體區(qū)塊鏈的辯護

Every so often someone decides towrite an article attacking Delegated Proof of Stake (DPOS) on some basis. Themost resent example is @anonymint's article claiming DPOS can't internet-scale總有人時不時的發(fā)文抨擊授權(quán)股權(quán)證明機制，最讓氣憤的是@anonymint's蛉加，聲稱DPOS不具有網(wǎng)絡(luò)效應(yīng)蚜枢。

Before I go on to addressAnonymint's claims, I feel it is important that people realize that everythingin life has design tradeoffs and the secret is to make the best tradeoffs. Inorder to make the best tradeoffs you must look at the entire picture. Youcannot attack an idea in a vacuum, everything must be compared to somethingelse. Furthermore, if comparisons are to be made they should be againstaccurate descriptions of working alternatives and not against theoreticalalternatives for which there is no known nor proven implementation.在回應(yīng)Anonymint's之前，我認為有一點很重要：世間萬物的存在都是在做權(quán)衡的考量针饥，關(guān)鍵在于做出最好的權(quán)衡厂抽。為了做出最好的權(quán)衡必須縱觀全局。千萬不要憑空攻擊某個想法丁眼，因為某個東西只有和其他東西比較后筷凤，才知道孰優(yōu)孰劣。即便做比較，也得和已經(jīng)切實可行的方案對比藐守，而不是和那些沒有被實證的理論對比挪丢。

Consortium

Blockchains vs Proof of Work共同體區(qū)塊鏈vs 工作量證明機制

In his blog, @anonymint claims that"permissioned" blockchains such as Tendermint and DPOS createoverlords. The claim is that overlording "whales" can extract higherand higher rents. This claim cannot exist in a vacuum, but must be compared toalternatives of which Proof of Work is presented. What we know is that FiatWhales control the majority of the hash power and that they hold the networkransom for fees. They use their control over block production to profit at theexpense of everyone else. ?Anonymint在博客里講道，“被授權(quán)”的區(qū)塊鏈卢厂，如Tendermint共識協(xié)議和DPOS創(chuàng)建了巨無霸乾蓬。聲稱這些“巨無霸”能獲得越來越高的回報∩骱悖可不能就這樣憑空職責(zé)DPOS任内，一定要和現(xiàn)存的切實可用的區(qū)塊鏈形態(tài)，如POW做比較巧号。Fiat Whales因為掌控著大部分的哈希算力族奢，可以收取網(wǎng)絡(luò)交易費。他們利用對區(qū)塊鏈生產(chǎn)的掌控丹鸿，從其他人那里獲取利潤越走。

The claim is that Proof of Work is

"Open Entry"; however, to believe that one must ignore economic?barriers to entry. For example, no one can enter the proof of work game unless?they can mine profitably. Mining profitably means economies of scale and?ultimately alternative revenue streams derived from the political power the?miners possess.有人說，POW是可以“自由進入”的;但卻忽視了進入門檻靠欢。比如廊敌，如果挖礦不能獲利，那么就沒有人能參與POW门怪。挖礦有利可圖意味著它會形成具一定經(jīng)濟規(guī)模的產(chǎn)業(yè)骡澈，最終導(dǎo)致政治勢力的加入，影響了礦工挖礦掷空。

Many governments in the world cantrivially make mining unprofitable for all free market actors. They can do thiswill relatively little capital cost because all mining profits or losses arebased upon the margins. Since governments are not concerned about directeconomic profit and can realize gains by defending their monopoly, all proof ofwork systems will be dominated by our current fiat overlords who use their fiatprinting presses to subsidize and control cooperative miners.許多國家政府都可以輕而易舉地的肋殴，用低成本讓所有參與自由市場競爭的挖礦者無利可圖，因為所有的挖礦利潤或挖礦損失都是邊際利潤坦弟。政府不用考慮直接經(jīng)濟利潤护锤，只要維護壟斷地位就可以獲益，因而所有的POW系統(tǒng)都將由“巨無霸”主導(dǎo)酿傍，巨無霸獎勵了那些愿意合作的礦工的同時也控制了他們烙懦。

Furthermore, no minority can create theirown smaller consensus system without risk of abuse by the mining powers thatbe. All one needs to do is look at the mining attacks between BTC and BCH tosee how this unfolds.此外，只要濫用礦力赤炒，就會導(dǎo)致共識無法達成氯析。只要看一下BTC和BHC之間的挖礦互擊，就知道是怎么回事了莺褒。

What we can conclude from this is thatmining is a dead-end, winner takes all, system. Once economies of scaleoptimize a mining algorithm that algorithm cannot be used by any minority whichis at odds with the mining powers.由此掩缓，可以得出的結(jié)論：挖礦終將是行不通的，最終會導(dǎo)致贏者通吃遵岩，一旦一種算法通過規(guī)模效應(yīng)被放大你辣，那他就無法被任何少數(shù)派利用，因為這種礦力與少數(shù)派的礦力是不相符的。

Liveliness and the 1/3+ attack存活和1/3+攻擊

One of the criticisms levied by?@anonymint is：colluding malevolent 33% of the stake canpermanently and irreparably shutdown the blockchain@anonymint有一條評論是這樣講的：只要惡意勾結(jié)掌握33%的股權(quán)绢记，就能永遠關(guān)閉區(qū)塊鏈。

This statement is an example of one ofmany misunderstandings of existing DPOS systems, such as Steem. DPOS as it wasoriginally designed for BitShares uses the longest-chain rule. Because DPOSlimits the frequency a block producer can produce, the chain with the mostparticipation will eventually become the longest chain.這是對現(xiàn)存的DPOS典型的誤解正卧，比如Steem蠢熄。DPOS最初是為BitShares設(shè)計，使用的是最長鏈法則炉旷。因為DPOS限制了一個區(qū)塊生產(chǎn)的頻率签孔，因此那條最常用的鏈最終會成為最長的鏈。

This means that stake holders can voteout malicious actors even if 51% are malicious, so long as their exists atleast 1 honest producers willing to accurately tally an election on atemporarily minority fork. The "bad fork" will start out at 2/3speed, and the honest fork will be operating at 1/3 speed. Once an electionoccurs on the 1/3 network it will gain speed to 3/3 and eventually overtake the"bad guys".這意味著窘行，即便有51% 的人是惡意的饥追，比特股持有者仍然可以把惡意行為者踢出去，這個鏈是如此之長罐盔，只要有1個誠實的生產(chǎn)者但绕，就能在一條臨時分叉出去的區(qū)塊鏈上進行投票選舉。這條“惡意分叉區(qū)塊鏈”以2/3的速度繼續(xù)運作惶看，誠實的分叉區(qū)塊鏈以1/3的速度運作捏顺。一旦某個區(qū)塊鏈在以1/3的速度完成投票，它將會提速至3/3纬黎，最終超過那些“惡意區(qū)塊鏈”幅骄。

This is still the underlying "ruleof DPOS" on STEEM and BitShares and everything else is simply establishinga high probability of irreversibility.這仍然是STEEM和BitShares的底層“DPOS規(guī)則”,其他的僅僅建立了一個最大可能的不可逆過程。

Importance of Minimizing Finality Latency挖礦延遲的重要性

Bitcoin never reaches finality andwithout timely finality inter-blockchain communication is not practical.Imagine all consensus systems as a substitute for digital signatures. Nowimagine if every time a user signed a transaction it took 1 hour for 99.9%certainty (6 blocks) and the transaction was never truly final.比特幣永遠都不會達到最終狀態(tài)本今，但是如果沒有及時地進入最終狀態(tài)拆座，就不能完成區(qū)塊鏈內(nèi)部通信。你可以把所有的共識系統(tǒng)想象成數(shù)字簽名的替代物冠息。想象挪凑，一個用戶簽一份交易，需要花1小時的時間來（6個區(qū)塊）99.9%的確認是否交易成功铐达，用這樣的速度和確認概率岖赋，那么這筆交易就永遠不會真正的完成。

At some point society needs to make adecision to either accept the signature and "transfer the money" orreject the signature and not transfer it. If the signature is eventuallyinvalidated then the money shouldn't be transferred; however, if the producthas shipped or the "exchange made", then it isn't possible to fairlyunwind the transfer.有時候瓮孙，社會需要決定唐断，要么接受簽名“轉(zhuǎn)移資金”，要么拒絕簽名杭抠，不轉(zhuǎn)移資金脸甘。如果簽名最終是無效的，那么這筆賬款就不應(yīng)該轉(zhuǎn)移偏灿；然而丹诀，如果交易已經(jīng)發(fā)生了或者“交易已完成”，那么這筆交易記錄就不太可能被撤銷。

We need to accept things as final even ifthere is some potential they could be wrong or be fraudulent because higherlevel processes cannot advance until lower level processes are final. The costfinality approaches infinity as the certainty demand approaches 100%. At somepoint, the cost of additional certainty is greater than the loss if it turnsout to be fraudulent.即便可能有些潛在的錯誤铆遭，但我們還是得認為交易已經(jīng)達到了最終狀態(tài)硝桩，因為只有低級的進程實行完成，高級的進程才能發(fā)展枚荣。如果要達到100%的確認碗脊，最終的花費會無限增加。某些程度上橄妆，如果最終證明它是錯的衙伶，那么確定的成本比丟棄它的成本更大。

Because finality is critical forinter-blockchain communication and inter-blockchain communication isfundamental to ultimate internet-scale solutions, we can conclude that statingnothing is ever final is not an acceptable solution. Furthermore, latency infinality dramatically impacts inter-blockchain communication for real worldapplications. If we must have finality, then we should have it as quickly aspossible.由于最終狀態(tài)對區(qū)塊鏈內(nèi)部通信至關(guān)重要害碾，而區(qū)塊鏈內(nèi)部通信對拓展網(wǎng)絡(luò)規(guī)模又至關(guān)重要矢劲，因此，我們可以得出結(jié)論：不能沒有最終狀態(tài)慌随。此外芬沉，在真實的應(yīng)用場景中，潛在最終狀態(tài)對區(qū)塊鏈內(nèi)部通信影響非常大阁猜。如果我們必須得有最終狀態(tài)花嘶，那還是越快越好。

Bitcoin accepts 6 blocks as"final" which means that 5 mining pools vote on which transactionsare final. Even if miners could switch pools in the event that a pool wascorrupt, they are unable to identify the corruption or switch within the 1 hourwindow of finality. This is even without considering the potential corruptionat the hash-power distribution level.比特幣以6個區(qū)塊作為“最終狀態(tài)”蹦漠，表明5個礦池來投票選出哪些交易達到“最終”狀態(tài)椭员。即便礦池中有腐敗行為時，礦工可以交換礦池笛园，但無法在1小時的之內(nèi)分辨出腐敗或做出轉(zhuǎn)換隘击。這還沒有考慮哈希算力分布級別時潛在的腐敗。

If we are going to rely on 5 miningpools, then we might as well let them sign off on things in seconds rather thanwaiting an hour or more. The resulting security will be the same, but thelatency will be dramatically reduced.如果我們繼續(xù)依靠5個礦池研铆，我們也可以讓它們在幾秒鐘內(nèi)進行簽名埋同，而不是等到一小時后。這兩者的安全性時一樣的棵红，但是大大降低延遲的概率凶赁。

Conclusion結(jié)論

?Perfecting any single dimension of a problemwill come at the expense of the whole and reduce overall volume (value). Theoptimum solution will maximize the volume by carefully observing the 80/20rule: 80% of the benefits (value) are achieved by 20% of the effort (cost).Furthermore, no system exists in a vacuum and therefore all security analysisthat ignores the larger environment is incomplete and likely misleading.完善問題的任何一個維度，都會增加成本支出逆甜。最好的解決方式是認真權(quán)衡二八法則虱肄，實現(xiàn)價值最大化：80%的收益由20%的努力決定。并且交煞，沒有一個系統(tǒng)是憑空產(chǎn)生的咏窿，因此忽視了大環(huán)境的安全分析是不完備的，都具有誤導(dǎo)性素征。

Security must always consider the use ofphysical threats, the use of short selling to invert POS incentives, and thepotential for alternative income streams.安全性必須得經(jīng)臣叮考慮物理性能上的不足萝挤，做空POS激勵，以及其他收入來源的潛力根欧。