I came into this period with the biases I had picked up from my experiences and the people around me. In 1966, asset prices reflected investors’ optimism about the future. But between 1967 and 1979, bad economic surprises led to big and unexpected price declines. Not just the economy and the markets but social sentiment deteriorated as well. Living through that taught me that while almost everyone expects the future to be a slightly modified version of the present, it is usually very different. But I didn’t know that in 1967. Certain that stocks would eventually rebound, I kept buying them, even as the market fell and I lost money until I figured out what was going wrong and how to deal with it. I gradually learned that prices reflect people’s expectations, so they go up when actual results are better than expected and they go down when they are worse than expected. And most people tend to be biased by their recent experiences.

我是帶著我所經(jīng)歷的糟糕的人和事回憶這段時(shí)間的。1966年余佃，資產(chǎn)價(jià)格充分反映了投資者對(duì)于未來的樂觀預(yù)期啤握。但是1967-1979年間掰茶，糟糕的經(jīng)濟(jì)意外的帶來了一場(chǎng)巨大的怖现，不期而遇的價(jià)格崩潰。不僅僅是經(jīng)濟(jì)和市場(chǎng)苇羡，連帶社會(huì)風(fēng)氣也開始惡化形导。這段時(shí)期的生活教會(huì)我雖然人們總是期盼未來會(huì)比今天更好，但是通常都恰恰相反砌些。但在1967年我并不明白這一點(diǎn)瞧毙，我任然確信股市會(huì)反彈，我持續(xù)的買進(jìn)股票寄症，資產(chǎn)宙彪，甚至當(dāng)市場(chǎng)開始下跌，我不停在損失金錢直到直到我能清晰的分辨出什么是錯(cuò)的有巧，以及怎樣對(duì)付他释漆。我逐漸明白價(jià)格反映了人們的期望，所以價(jià)格會(huì)上升當(dāng)實(shí)際表現(xiàn)比人們期盼的更好時(shí)篮迎，當(dāng)比預(yù)期壞時(shí)價(jià)格下跌男图。而人們總是根據(jù)近期的經(jīng)驗(yàn)來做出決定。

That fall, I started? at a local college, C. W. Post. I got in on probation because of my C average? in high school. But unlike high school, I loved college because I could learn? about things that interested me, not because I had to, so I got great grades.? I also loved living away from home and having independence.

1967年秋天甜橱，我在當(dāng)?shù)氐囊凰髮W(xué)長(zhǎng)島大學(xué)（私立學(xué)校）c.w post開始了學(xué)習(xí)逊笆，我高中以平均c的成績(jī)通過了考驗(yàn)，不像高中岂傲，我愛大學(xué)因?yàn)槲铱梢詫W(xué)習(xí)那些我感興趣的東西难裆，而不是我被迫學(xué)習(xí)，所以我取得了非常幫的成績(jī)镊掖，我離家租房住乃戈，喜歡自己一個(gè)人，自由自在獨(dú)立的感覺亩进。

Learning to meditate? helped too. When the Beatles visited India in 1968 to study Transcendental? Meditation at the ashram of Maharishi Mahesh Yogi, I was curious to learn it,? so I did. I loved it. Meditation has benefited me hugely throughout my life? because it produces a calm open-mindedness that allows me to think more? clearly and creatively.I majored in finance in college because of my love for? the markets and because that major had no foreign language requirement—so it? allowed me to learn what I was interested in, both inside and outside class.? I learned a lot about commodity futures from a very interesting classmate, aVietnamveteranquite a bit? older than me. Commodities were attractive because they could be traded with? very low margin requirements, meaning I could leverage the limited amount of money I? had to invest. If I could make winning decisions, which I planned to do, I? could borrow more to make more. Stock, bond, andcurrency futuresdidn’t exist back then.? Commodity futures were strictly real commodities like corn, oybeans, cattle,? and hogs. So those were the markets I started to trade and learn about.

1968年披頭士訪問印度症虑，并在阿什拉姆的瑜伽圣地學(xué)習(xí)深度禪定冥想，我迫不及待的去學(xué)習(xí)冥想归薛，并且通過深度的冥想得到很多幫助谍憔。

冥想讓我受益良多，我的整個(gè)生命因?yàn)樗兊弥t遜主籍、開放习贫、放空自己的頭腦這樣使我可以更清晰更創(chuàng)造性的思考。我在大學(xué)主修經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)崇猫，因?yàn)槲业呐d趣在市場(chǎng)也因?yàn)檫@門學(xué)科不需要學(xué)習(xí)外國(guó)語言---所以我可以自由學(xué)習(xí)我感興趣的沈条，課內(nèi)課外我從一位非常有趣的同學(xué)那里學(xué)習(xí)掌握了大量的關(guān)于商品趨勢(shì)的知識(shí)。

一位約戰(zhàn)退役老兵比我僅大一點(diǎn)诅炉，商品非常吸引我蜡歹，因?yàn)樯唐纺芤苑浅５偷倪呺H需求進(jìn)行交易屋厘。這意味著我可以杠桿驅(qū)動(dòng)限量的錢進(jìn)行投資。假如我能做出穩(wěn)贏的決定我計(jì)劃的月而，那么我就可以買進(jìn)越來越多汗洒。股票，證券父款，貨幣期貨仿佛對(duì)我來說并不存在溢谤。商品期貨被嚴(yán)格的限定在真實(shí)的商品比如谷物，大豆憨攒，家畜世杀，豬等。以上都是我在商品市場(chǎng)開始嘗試交易和學(xué)習(xí)的東東肝集。

My college years? coincided with the era of free love, mind-expanding drug experimentation, and? rejection of traditional authority. Living through it had a lasting effect on? me and many other members of my generation. For example, it deeply impacted? Steve Jobs, whom I came to empathize with and admire. Like me, he took up? meditation and wasn’t interested in being taught as much as he loved visualizing? and building out amazing new things. The times we lived in taught us both to? question established ways of doing things—an attitude he demonstrated? superbly in Apple’s iconic “1984” and “Here’s to the Crazy Ones,” which were ad? campaigns that spoke to me.

我的大學(xué)生涯恰逢美國(guó)處于自由戀愛瞻坝，心靈測(cè)試藥物實(shí)驗(yàn)，反對(duì)傳統(tǒng)權(quán)威的時(shí)代杏瞻。經(jīng)過那個(gè)時(shí)代的人比如我和屬于我的那代人都有一種持續(xù)的時(shí)代影響所刀。舉例，深刻影響了史蒂夫喬布斯捞挥，我感同身受和尊敬的人浮创。像我一樣，他接受禪修冥想砌函，對(duì)于大學(xué)教的東西不感興趣斩披，熱衷創(chuàng)建令人驚奇的新事物。我們所處的時(shí)代教會(huì)我們質(zhì)疑那些已經(jīng)建立的成規(guī)舊俗—一種用于建立偉大蘋果公司的象征標(biāo)志的“1984”和“向瘋狂的人致敬”-對(duì)我來說都是廣告胸嘴。

For the country as a? whole, those were difficult years. As the draft expanded and the numbers of? young men coming home in body bags soared, the Vietnam War split the country.? There was a lottery based on birthdates to determine the order of those who? would be drafted. I remember listening to the lottery on the radio while? playing pool with my friends. It was estimated that the first 160 or so? birthdays called would be drafted, though they read off all 366 dates. My? birthday was forty-eighth.

對(duì)于整個(gè)國(guó)家而言雏掠，60-70年代都是非常困難的時(shí)候。債臺(tái)高筑劣像，犧牲于越戰(zhàn)的年輕人被裝在裹尸袋里送回來，越戰(zhàn)撕裂了整個(gè)國(guó)家摧玫。曾經(jīng)有一種彩票基于生日決定中獎(jiǎng)順序耳奕。我記得我常常邊和朋友們玩撞球邊收聽彩票的廣播。估計(jì)前160左右的播報(bào)生日可能中獎(jiǎng)诬像，我的生日排在第48位屋群。

I wasn’t smart? enough to be afraid of going to war because I naively thought nothing bad? could happen to me, but I didn’t want to go because I was charging forward? with my life and to put it on hold for two years seemed like an eternity. My? dad, though, was adamantly against the war and hell-bent against me going,? even though he had believed in and fought in the prior two wars. He had me? examined by a doctor who discovered I hadhypoglycemia, which gave me anexemption. When I look? back on that, I see that I got out of serving on a technicality—that my dad? was essentially helping me dodge thedraft—which now gives me mixed feelings. I feel? guilty I didn’t do my part, relieved I didn’t experience the harmful? consequences so many others suffered from the war, and appreciative of my dad? for the love behind his effort to protect me. I have no idea what I’d do if I? were faced with the same situation today.

我不夠聰明也害怕參軍去戰(zhàn)場(chǎng)，我天真的以為壞事情不會(huì)發(fā)生在我身上坏挠，我想自己掌握自己的生活芍躏，參軍兩年似乎是一場(chǎng)無窮盡的事情。我父親降狠，一個(gè)老兵卻堅(jiān)定的反對(duì)這場(chǎng)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)对竣，并堅(jiān)決反對(duì)我參軍庇楞，即使他堅(jiān)信和參加了上兩次戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)。我讓我做了檢查并發(fā)現(xiàn)我得了低血糖否纬，就這樣我有了一次豁免權(quán)吕晌。每當(dāng)我回想這事，我明白父親幫我我技術(shù)性的躲避了征兵和服役临燃。當(dāng)然這件事也帶給我一種復(fù)雜的感覺睛驳，一種內(nèi)疚感我沒有盡自己的責(zé)任。當(dāng)然也使我免于遭受戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)帶來的一系列有害的傷害膜廊，感謝父親為愛而保護(hù)我所做出的的努力乏沸。如果今天我遇到同樣的情況我任然不知道怎么面對(duì)。

As America’s? politics and economy deteriorated, the country’s mood became depressed. TheTet Offensivein? January 19681seemed? to convey the U.S. was losing the war; that same year Lyndon Johnson decided? not to run for a second term and Richard Nixon was elected, beginning an even? more difficult era. At the same time, France’s president Charles de Gaulle? wasturning in his ?country’s dollars for goldbecause he was concerned the U.S. was printing? money to finance its spending. Watching the news and the market move? together, I began to see the whole picture and understand the cause-effect? relationship between the two.Around 1970 or 1971,? I noticed gold was starting totick upin world markets. Until then, like most people, I? hadn’t paid much attention tocurrency ratesbecause the currency system had been stable? throughout my lifetime. But as currency events increasingly appeared in the? news, they caught my attention. I learned that other currencies were fixed? against the dollar, that the dollar was fixed against gold, that Americans? weren’t allowed to own gold (though I wasn’t sure why), and that other? central banks could convert their paper dollars into gold, which was how they? were assured that they wouldn’t be hurt if the U.S. printed too many dollars.? I heard our government officials pooh-pooh the worries about the dollar and? the excitement about gold, assuring us that the dollar was sound and that? gold was just an archaic metal.Speculatorswere behind the rising gold prices, they said, and? they would get burned once things settled down. Back then, I still assumed? that government officials were honest.

隨著美國(guó)政治和經(jīng)濟(jì)的雙重惡化爪瓜，整個(gè)國(guó)家的風(fēng)氣都變壞了蹬跃。1968年1月的春季攻勢(shì)似乎要帶著美國(guó)走向失敗钥勋；童年林登約翰遜總統(tǒng)決定不參加第二次總統(tǒng)選舉炬转，理查德尼克松當(dāng)選，開啟了一場(chǎng)更困難的時(shí)代算灸。同時(shí)法國(guó)總統(tǒng)戴高樂用黃金替代美金扼劈，因?yàn)樗麚?dān)心美國(guó)印發(fā)貨幣用于自己的開銷》坡浚看到這段新聞和市場(chǎng)的反應(yīng)一致荐吵，我開始明白整個(gè)局面并了解關(guān)于兩者的因果關(guān)系。1970-71年間赊瞬，我注意到黃金價(jià)格在世界市場(chǎng)開始上揚(yáng)先煎。直到此時(shí)，像絕大多數(shù)人一樣巧涧，我沒過多的留意匯率因?yàn)樨泿畔到y(tǒng)自我整個(gè)生涯都很穩(wěn)定薯蝎。但是當(dāng)貨幣時(shí)間逐漸在新聞中開始增加報(bào)道時(shí)，引起了我的注意谤绳。我了解到其他貨幣與美金是緊密關(guān)聯(lián)的占锯，而美元與黃金是緊密關(guān)聯(lián)的，美國(guó)不被允許擁有的黃金（我不確定為什么）缩筛，其他國(guó)家的中央銀行可以將他們的紙質(zhì)美元兌換成黃金消略，這樣就能保證如果美國(guó)印發(fā)超量的美元，而他們自己不會(huì)受到傷害瞎抛。聽聞美國(guó)的政府機(jī)構(gòu)非常蔑視對(duì)美元的擔(dān)憂和對(duì)于黃金的興奮艺演。并向我們保證美元是堅(jiān)挺的，而黃金只是一種古老的金屬罷了。投機(jī)玩家隱藏在金價(jià)上升之后胎撤，投機(jī)者說過晓殊，他們會(huì)被燒焦的一旦局勢(shì)穩(wěn)定下來。在那時(shí)哩照，我依舊假設(shè)政府機(jī)構(gòu)是誠(chéng)實(shí)的挺物。

In the spring of? 1971, I graduated college with a nearly perfect grade point average, which? got me into Harvard Business School. The summer before I started at HBS, I got? a job as a clerk on the floor of the New York Stock Exchange. By midsummer,? the dollar problem began to reach a breaking point. There were reports that? Europeans wouldn’t accept dollars from American tourists. The global monetary? system was in the process of breaking down, but that wasn’t clear to me quite? yet.

1971年春，我以接近完美的學(xué)分成績(jī)從大學(xué)畢業(yè)飘弧，就是這樣我進(jìn)入哈佛了商學(xué)院识藤。在hbs學(xué)習(xí)前的夏天，我得到了一份在紐約證券交易所第一層做職員的工作次伶。夏季中期痴昧，美元問題達(dá)到一個(gè)零界點(diǎn)。據(jù)報(bào)道歐洲拒絕接受美國(guó)旅游者的美元冠王。全球的金融系統(tǒng)處于崩潰的途中赶撰，只是我當(dāng)時(shí)還不太明了。

Then, on Sunday,? August 15, 1971, President Nixon went on television to announce that the U.S.? wouldrenegeon? its promise to allow dollars to be turned in for gold, which led the dollar? to plummet. Since government officials had promised not to devalue the? dollar, I listened with amazement as he spoke. Instead of addressing the? fundamental problems behind the pressure on the dollar, he continued to blame? speculators, crafting his words to make it sound like he was moving to? support the dollar while his actions were doing just the opposite. “Floating? it,” as Nixon was doing, and then letting it sink like a stone, looked a lot? like a lie to me. Over the decades since, I’ve repeatedly seen policymakers? deliver such assurances immediately before currency devaluations, so I? learned not to believe government policymakers when they assure you that they? won’t let a currency devaluation happen. The more strongly they make those? assurances, the more desperate the situation probably is, so the more likely? it is that a devaluation will take place.

接著在1971年8月15日周日柱彻，尼克松總統(tǒng)在電視上發(fā)表了公開演說：美國(guó)將拒絕就美元兌換黃金做出承諾豪娜，這將使美元直線下跌。既然政府機(jī)構(gòu)已經(jīng)保證了不會(huì)使美元貶值哟楷，我在聆聽的時(shí)候目瞪口呆瘤载。沒有定位美元壓力背后的基本問題，尼克松總統(tǒng)還在繼續(xù)譴責(zé)投機(jī)者卖擅，措辭巧妙的讓民眾相信他在持續(xù)支持美元鸣奔，而他的所作所為恰恰相反〕徒祝“讓她浮起來”隨著尼克松的動(dòng)作挎狸，然后讓美元像石頭一樣下沉，在我看來像一個(gè)大謊言断楷。過了幾十年锨匆，我已經(jīng)多次看到?jīng)Q策者們?cè)谪泿刨H值時(shí)立刻傳遞那樣的保證。所以我學(xué)到不要相信政府的決策者當(dāng)他們向你保證他們不會(huì)任由貨幣貶值發(fā)生冬筒。他們?cè)绞潜ＷC统刮，情況可能越糟糕，所以更可能的情況是貨幣貶值正在發(fā)生账千。

As I listened to? Nixon speak, I wondered what those developments meant. Money as we’d known? it—a claim check to get gold—no longer existed. That couldn’t be good. It? seemed clear to me that the era of promise that Kennedy had personified was? unraveling. Monday morning I? walked onto the floor of the exchange expecting pandemonium. There was? pandemonium all right, but not the sort I expected: Instead of falling, the? stock market jumped about 4 percent, a significant daily gain.

當(dāng)我傾聽尼克松講話的時(shí)候，我很好奇那些情況發(fā)展意味著什么暗膜。金錢就像我們已知的那樣匀奏，一個(gè)得到確認(rèn)的支票可以獲得黃金—不再是了。那不可好学搜。對(duì)我來說仿佛肯尼迪總統(tǒng)人格化的承諾的時(shí)代消散了娃善。周一早上我步行走進(jìn)交易所一層預(yù)料之中的喧鬧论衍。已經(jīng)整晚都在吵鬧了，但不是我期望的那種：沒有下跌聚磺，股票上揚(yáng)了4%坯台，一個(gè)意味聲長(zhǎng)的日收益。

To try to understand? what was happening, I spent the rest of that summer studying past currency? devaluations. I learned that everything that was going on—the currency? breaking its link to gold and devaluing, the stock market soaring in? response—had happened before, and that logical cause-effect relationships? made those developments inevitable. My failure to anticipate this, I? realized, was due to my being surprised by something that hadn’t happened in? my lifetime, though it had happened many times before. The message that? reality was conveying to me was “You better make sense of what happened to? other people in other times and other places because if you don’t you won’t? know if these things can happen to you and, if they do, you won’t know how to? deal with them.”

為了試著搞明白發(fā)生了什么瘫寝，那個(gè)夏天剩下的時(shí)間我都在研究過去的貨幣貶值蜒蕾。我掌握了與之相關(guān)的每件事---貨幣與黃金的鏈接斷開與貶值，股票市場(chǎng)隨之上揚(yáng)—在此之前已經(jīng)發(fā)生的事情焕阿，導(dǎo)致這一切不可避免發(fā)生的因果關(guān)系的邏輯咪啡。我預(yù)測(cè)失敗的原因，我理解暮屡，歸因于我的在我生命中還沒有發(fā)生的那些能引起我吃驚的事情撤摸。盡管以前已經(jīng)發(fā)生過多次了。現(xiàn)實(shí)傳遞給我的信息是“你最好弄明白其他人在其他時(shí)間和其他地方發(fā)生了什么褒纲，如果沒有准夷，你不會(huì)知道那些事情是否會(huì)發(fā)生在你身上，如果發(fā)生在你身上莺掠，你不會(huì)知道如何處理”衫嵌。

Enrolling at Harvard Business School that fall, I was excited about meeting the extraordinarily intelligent people from all over the planet who would be my classmates. And high as my expectations were, the experience was even better. I lived with people from all over the world and we partied together in an exciting, eclectic environment. There was no teacher in front of a blackboard telling us what to remember and no tests to see whether we remembered it. Instead we were given actual case studies to read and analyze. Then we gathered in groups to thrash out what we would do if we were in the shoes of the people in those situations. This was my kind of school!?

1971年秋天在哈佛商學(xué)院登記后，我很興奮因?yàn)槲覍⒑蛠泶巳澜绲淖吭絻?yōu)秀的人做同學(xué)汁蝶。我的期望也是如此渐扮，事實(shí)經(jīng)驗(yàn)比預(yù)想的更好。我和來自世界各地的人住在一起掖棉，處于一種興奮墓律、折中的氣氛當(dāng)中。沒有老師教導(dǎo)我們什么該記住幔亥，沒有測(cè)驗(yàn)檢驗(yàn)我們是否記住了耻讽。相反我們都有實(shí)際的案例用于分析和閱讀。我們被分成小組反復(fù)演練如果我們處于那樣的情況下如何處理帕棉。這就是我中意的那種學(xué)校针肥。

你好 ：我是007-4478 李小軍，以上是我個(gè)人的翻譯香伴，可能不會(huì)太準(zhǔn)確慰枕，但我盡量保證不會(huì)離原文太遠(yuǎn)，因?yàn)槲乙苍趯W(xué)習(xí)其中的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)知識(shí)和原則即纲，我不喜歡我偏離了正確的東西具帮。

第二節(jié)太長(zhǎng)了所以我分段來翻譯，并注解，請(qǐng)?jiān)彙?/p>

本段描述了作者從1967-1972年間的事情蜂厅，主要是長(zhǎng)島大學(xué)和哈佛商學(xué)院的學(xué)習(xí)經(jīng)歷和一部分假期的實(shí)習(xí)工作經(jīng)歷匪凡。顯然作者對(duì)這段回憶不是很開心，除了上學(xué)的時(shí)光掘猿，所以我在下面會(huì)分開講病游。

顯然在這段工作時(shí)間是不會(huì)愉快的，因?yàn)槊绹?guó)正陷入越戰(zhàn)泥潭稠通，連續(xù)對(duì)外作戰(zhàn)衬衬，造成美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)和社會(huì)水平持續(xù)下降，自由戀愛采记，毒品佣耐，濫交，反戰(zhàn)唧龄，反傳統(tǒng)等風(fēng)靡一時(shí)兼砖。股市，證券既棺，期貨都不好讽挟，作者在此期間簡(jiǎn)單講述了他經(jīng)歷的事情，很有趣丸冕，但讓人印象深刻耽梅，比如金本位，比如美元超發(fā)胖烛，比如貨幣貶值眼姐，比如nifty 50, 就如今天的500標(biāo)準(zhǔn)普爾指數(shù)一樣；比如尼克松總統(tǒng)的謊言佩番，政客們往往指鹿為馬众旗，黑白顛倒。

上學(xué)的時(shí)光是美好的趟畏，無論東西贡歧。作者在大學(xué)享受了無憂無慮的自由時(shí)光，和來自全世界的最好赋秀，最優(yōu)秀的人一起討論利朵、學(xué)習(xí)、進(jìn)步猎莲，不亦樂乎绍弟。同時(shí)他了解了商品期貨。當(dāng)然作為優(yōu)秀生他獲得了美林證券的實(shí)習(xí)生機(jī)會(huì)著洼，并選擇了冷門的商品期貨晌柬。經(jīng)歷了石油危機(jī)和美元貶值和超發(fā)姥份。

哦！作者的年齡到了應(yīng)該參軍年碘，保家衛(wèi)國(guó)的時(shí)候了，可作者的父親展鸡，一個(gè)二戰(zhàn)和韓戰(zhàn)的老兵卻出乎意料的反對(duì)他參加屿衅，并通過各種手段成功避免了服役。偉大的父親對(duì)嗎莹弊？否則我們可能會(huì)少一個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)大師涤久，當(dāng)然作者的命運(yùn)可能會(huì)完全不同。在戰(zhàn)場(chǎng)上丟了小命也不一定的忍弛。

作者提到了披頭士和喬布斯還有瑜伽响迂。很多成功人士都深受瑜伽的影響，還都很推崇瑜伽细疚，那么我們還有什么理由不接受那蔗彤？原則第一條：就是從比你優(yōu)秀的人那里直接拿來并接受他的原則。還提到了著名的 “1984”和“致敬那些瘋狂的人”兩則廣告疯兼，推薦給廣告人看看然遏，其中“1984”我早就看過了，可能當(dāng)時(shí)很精彩 吧彪，現(xiàn)在看有點(diǎn)不過爾爾的感覺待侵。

好了到重頭戲了，也是我很感興趣的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的知識(shí)環(huán)節(jié)了姨裸。

作者在描述中夾雜了大量的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)常識(shí)和術(shù)語秧倾，其中引起我注意的是以下：

currency rates 貨幣匯率

Speculators 投機(jī)者 索羅斯是不是投機(jī)者？

currency devaluations 貨幣貶值

gold standard ?金本位傀缩。

Stocks 資本

brokerage 掮客 （中間人那先，經(jīng)濟(jì)，古代中國(guó)有種行業(yè)叫 牙人扑毡，大家可以百度）胃榕；

oil shock- 石油危機(jī)

stock market took a dive--股市跳水

hypoglycemia 低血糖

exemption 豁免權(quán)

dominoes 多米諾骨牌

debt-financed ?債務(wù)融資

easy-credit--放松信貸 擴(kuò)大信用。

defaulted--違約

我來試著串一串作者故事中的一條隱線：美元自第二次世界大戰(zhàn)后獲得全球貨幣霸主地位后瞄摊，開始超發(fā)貨幣勋又，并放松信貸，就是鼓勵(lì)大家貸款换帜，貸款利率低楔壤，政策優(yōu)惠，鼓勵(lì)消費(fèi)惯驼，支出蹲嚣。但是美元是和黃金掛鉤的递瑰，而其他貨幣是和美元掛鉤的，美元超發(fā)隙畜，而黃金不變抖部，所以美元貶值，但為了彌補(bǔ)因超發(fā)帶來的債務(wù)危機(jī)议惰，只能用公共債務(wù)形式來償還慎颗，美元貶值而用紙幣還債，進(jìn)一步超發(fā)美元言询，連帶全球國(guó)家接盤美國(guó)的債務(wù)俯萎。這就是目前美國(guó)每年的巨額國(guó)債，但是美國(guó)并不擔(dān)心运杭，只要美元堅(jiān)挺就行夫啊。所以本書無意間道出了美元如今的情況，美國(guó)不斷通過政治辆憔、軍事手段確保美元的霸主地位撇眯，但各國(guó)有對(duì)策，通過兌換黃金躁愿，減持美元叛本，把黃金拉回本國(guó)來減少風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。當(dāng)然最主要是保護(hù)本國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)彤钟，而中國(guó)的人民幣是美元最警惕的来候，因?yàn)槊涝?dāng)年就是打壓英鎊而上位的，他當(dāng)然不會(huì)允許故事重演逸雹。

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