此文為筆者的上篇文章《謬誤 Fallacies （一）》的續(xù)譯

循環(huán)論證（circular argument）：和 回避問題?一樣

? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? “你可以相信WARP新聞势告，

? ??????????????????因?yàn)樗麄兛偸窃趶V播里說 ‘我們只說實(shí)話’奴艾，

? ??????????????????所以他們說的一定也是實(shí)話”

現(xiàn)實(shí)中的循環(huán)論證通常是在繞一個(gè)大圈子蛉鹿，雖然辯論者希望他們到正確的結(jié)論，但是他們總是回到他們開始的地方匆笤。

（評(píng)：感覺像是自圓其說，沒有事實(shí)能夠支撐論點(diǎn)）

復(fù)雜問題（complex question）： 提出一個(gè)讓別人不能同意或者不同意的問題谱邪，因?yàn)榛卮疬@樣的問題會(huì)讓他們陷入你的設(shè)的前提陷阱炮捧。一個(gè)簡單的例子：

? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?“你是不是和以前一樣以自我為中心？”

不論是回答是或者不是都會(huì)導(dǎo)致你同意自己以前是以自我為中心這個(gè)觀點(diǎn)惦银。還有一個(gè)更加細(xì)微的例子：

? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?“你會(huì)非常善良地把心愛的書捐出去嗎咆课？”

如果說“不”，那么不管真正的不捐書的原因是什么扯俱，都會(huì)給人一種負(fù)罪感

如果說“是”书蚪，那么就會(huì)給人一種非常高尚的感覺

所以說，你要是想要人捐助蘸吓，直接說就行了善炫，別整這些花里胡哨的。

（評(píng)：不論說是或者不是都會(huì)陷入的前提陷阱库继，實(shí)際上是做了一個(gè)跟問題本身無關(guān)的聯(lián)系）

否定前提(denying the antecedent）： 一個(gè)推導(dǎo)形式的錯(cuò)誤

? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? “如果p箩艺，則q

? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 沒有p

? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 所以沒有q”

請(qǐng)記住窜醉，表述“如果p則q，”艺谆，p叫做“前提”榨惰，q叫做”結(jié)論“。否定前提（p）静汤，會(huì)產(chǎn)生一個(gè)不同并且無效的形式琅催。即使前提是正確的，仍然不能保證會(huì)得到正確的結(jié)論虫给。例如：

? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? “當(dāng)路結(jié)冰的時(shí)候藤抡，郵件會(huì)晚點(diǎn)

? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 現(xiàn)在路上沒有結(jié)冰，

? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 所以抹估，郵件不會(huì)晚點(diǎn)”

盡管郵件會(huì)因?yàn)槁飞辖Y(jié)冰而晚點(diǎn)缠黍，但是同樣也會(huì)因?yàn)槠渌蛲睃c(diǎn)。這個(gè)結(jié)論同樣忽略了其他可能性药蜻。

（評(píng)：這個(gè)例子當(dāng)中兩個(gè)條件都是正確的瓷式，但是還是得到了錯(cuò)誤的結(jié)論，俗話說“想當(dāng)然”）

偷換概念（equivocation） ：? ?在論證的過程中把一個(gè)術(shù)語的意思變成另外一個(gè)意思

? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? “男人和女人在生理和心理上是不平等的语泽。所以性別是不“平等”的贸典，所以，男女在法律上也應(yīng)當(dāng)不平等”

在前提和結(jié)論之間偷換了“平等”的概念踱卵。當(dāng)提到生理和心理上的“平等”指的是“完全相同的”廊驼。然而法律層面上的平等，并不是指“生理和心理的相同”惋砂，而是“享有同樣的權(quán)利和機(jī)會(huì)”蔬充。所以把上面這句話按照正確的理解重新復(fù)述一遍：

? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ”男人和女人在心理上不是完全相同的，所以班利，男人和女人不應(yīng)該享有同樣的權(quán)利和機(jī)會(huì)“饥漫。

當(dāng)偷換概念的把戲被拆穿之后，很顯然前提并不能得到結(jié)論罗标。同樣也沒有任何什么事實(shí)能夠表明生理和心理上的不同會(huì)導(dǎo)致獲得不同的權(quán)利和機(jī)會(huì)庸队。

Original：

circular argument: same as begging the question.

? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? “You can count on WARP News for the facts, because they constantly say on

????????????????????the air that “we just give you the facts,” so that must be a fact too!”

Real-life circular arguments often follow a bigger circle, but they all

eventually end up starting in the same place they want to end.

complex question: posing a question in such a way that people cannot agree

or disagree with you without committing themselves to some other claim you

wish to promote. A simple example: “Are you still as selfcentered as you

used to be?” Answering either “yes” or “no” commits you to agreeing that

you used to be self-centered. A more subtle example: “Will you follow your

conscience instead of your pocketbook and donate to the cause?” Saying

“no,” regardless of their real reasons for not donating, makes people feel

guilty. Saying “yes,” regardless of their real reasons for donating, makes

them noble. If you want a donation, just ask for it.

denying the antecedent: a deductive mistake of the form

? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?“ If p then q.

????????????????????Not-p.

????????????????????Therefore, not-q.”

Remember that, in the statement “If p then q,” p is called the “antecedent”

and q the “consequent.” The second premise of a modus tollens—a valid

form—denies the consequent, q (go back to Rule 23 and check). Denying the

antecedent (p), though, yields quite a different—and invalid— form. A true

conclusion is not guaranteed even if the premises are true. For example:

When the roads are icy, the mail is late.

The roads are not icy.

Therefore, the mail is not late.

Although the mail would be late if the roads were icy, it may be late for other

reasons too. This argument overlooks alternatives.

equivocation: sliding from one meaning of a term to another in the middle of

an argument.

Women and men are physically and emotionally different. The sexes are not

“equal,” then, and therefore the law should not pretend that we are.

Between premise and conclusion this argument shifts the meaning of the term

“equal.” The sexes are not physically and emotionally “equal” in the sense in

which “equal” means simply “identical.” Equality before the law, however,

does not mean “physically and emotionally identical” but “entitled to the

same rights and opportunities.” Rephrased with the two different senses of

“equal” made clear, the argument goes:

Women and men are not physically and emotionally identical. Therefore,

women and men are not entitled to the same rights and opportunities.

Once the equivocation is removed, it is clear that the argument’s conclusion

is neither supported by nor even related to the premise. No reason is offered

to show that physical and emotional differences imply different rights and

opportunities.