“我說(shuō)了督禽，我的原告幾乎沒(méi)講一句真話颠黎，或者干脆說(shuō)另锋，一句真話都沒(méi)講，而從我嘴里你們聽(tīng)到的將全部是真話狭归，先生們夭坪，我可以向你們保證，這不是因?yàn)槲視?huì)像他們那樣流利地使用語(yǔ)言和精心修飾詞句过椎。不室梅，你們聽(tīng)到的話將是直截了當(dāng)、脫口而出的疚宇，充滿著正義的自信亡鼠，我不想要你們中間有人會(huì)對(duì)我的話另作他想』壹担”

“直截了當(dāng)拆宛、脫口而出的，充滿正義的自信”是什么意思呢讼撒？Benjamin Jowett的英譯本是這樣的:for I am confident in the justice of my cause (Or, I am certain
that I am right in taking this course.)
G.M.A.Grube的英譯本是這樣的:for I put my trust in the justice of what I say
大概就是 因?yàn)槲宜f(shuō)的都是正義的吧浑厚。這是什么意思呢股耽？我沒(méi)明白，也不知道問(wèn)題在哪兒钳幅。后來(lái)找到了本《反諷地捍衛(wèi)蘇格拉底》物蝙，它把我的問(wèn)題都說(shuō)出來(lái)了，還做了細(xì)致的回答:作者把這個(gè)問(wèn)題總結(jié)“The peoblem of truthfullness”:
By “the things I say,” does he mean the things he will say in the courtroom, the things he usually says (30b6–7,cf.Gorgias 490e9–11, 509a4–7), or perhaps even everything he has ever said (cf. 37b2–3)? Does “just” mean in accordance with the law or in accordance with natural justice (Crito51b8–c1)? Is a man who says just things necessarily one who does just things (cf. 32e2–4 with 31e4–32a3)? And if not in general, what about in the special case of a defendant who pleads innocent? Moreover, whyisn’t Socrates certain that the things he says are just? And if it is because he lacks knowledge of justice (cf. 20b4–c3), what’s the ground of his trust that the things he says are just? Important as these questions are,however, they are secondary matters. The most mysterious thing of all is that Socrates does not spell out the connection betwewn saying things that are just and a willingness to tell the whole truth in a haphazad manner.
“我所說(shuō)的事情”敢艰，他是指他將要在法庭上所說(shuō)的诬乞，還是他通常所說(shuō)的，或者甚至是他過(guò)去說(shuō)過(guò)的所有的事情钠导？“正義”是法律意義上的正義還是自然正義震嫉？一個(gè)人所說(shuō)是正義的，他的行為就必然是正義的嗎牡属？如果不一定是票堵，那么一個(gè)在某案件上聲稱自己是清白的被告呢？而且逮栅，蘇格拉底是怎么確定他所說(shuō)的都是正義的呢悴势？如果他缺乏關(guān)于正義的知識(shí)，他憑什么保證他所說(shuō)的是正義的呢措伐？這些雖然也是重要的問(wèn)題特纤，然而它們都是次要的，最難以理解的是侥加，蘇格拉底并沒(méi)有說(shuō)明所言是正義的與愿意直截了當(dāng) 脫口而出地說(shuō)出事實(shí)這兩者有什么聯(lián)系捧存。

嗯，對(duì)官硝，就是這樣矗蕊。
接著《反諷地捍衛(wèi)蘇格拉底》的作者又說(shuō)道：
But perhaps Socrates does not need to spell this out. What he has in mind may be a simple thought that has occurred to every decent listener (and reader): a man who has done nothing wrong has nothingto hide. As long as he tells the whole truth, things will go well for him. If he is on trial, his innocence – that is, the justice of what he says (cf. 18a4–5) – will shine forth, ensuring his acquittal. Now, isn’t this what we all want to believe about justice? Don’t we think that a just man shouldn’t have to be sneaky? Even if he is a simple man,as long as he is truly good, we not only hope, but commonly expect,that things will work out for him in the end.In fact, according toordinary decent opinion, simplicity and justice are closely linked: wedoubt the justice of liars and schemers (cf. 17d3 with Republic 360e6–361a4 and 361b5–8). Justice does not seem to need the support ofsuch “cleverness.” It can stand on its own.
不過(guò)也許蘇格拉底并不需要清楚地說(shuō)出這兩者之間的關(guān)系。他腦子里有個(gè)簡(jiǎn)單的想法氢架，每個(gè)decent listener也會(huì)有這樣的想法：一個(gè)沒(méi)干壞事的人沒(méi)什么需要隱藏的傻咖。只要他把所有的實(shí)情說(shuō)出，問(wèn)題就都解決了岖研。如果他在受審卿操，他的清白——也就是蘇格拉底所說(shuō)的正義——將會(huì)shine forth,會(huì)保證他被判無(wú)罪。這不正是我們?cè)敢庀嘈诺恼x嗎孙援？我們不都認(rèn)為一個(gè)正義的人不該使詭計(jì)嗎害淤？即使他是一個(gè)天真幼稚的人，只要他真的是個(gè)好人拓售，我們不僅希望而且通常預(yù)計(jì)最后事情都會(huì)迎刃而解窥摄。事實(shí)上，按照慣常的想法础淤，天真率直和正義是密切聯(lián)系的：我們會(huì)懷疑騙子和陰謀家是否正義崭放。正義似乎不需要類似“聰明”的支撐哨苛，它自己就能站穩(wěn)腳。
What might be called Socrates’ faith in the power ofvirtue is asserted repeatedly in the dialogue, often in more explicit andextreme terms than here (cf. 30b2–4, 30c6–d1, 41c8–d2). This faith has inspired the deepest admiration in some of the dialogue’s readers.But doesn’t it also make him look very naive? It seems to con?rm Callicles’ charge in the Gorgias that the philosopher is a fool who knows nothing about the affairs of men and so is unable to protect himself. After all, Socrates’ innocence does not shine forth, at least not to the satisfaction of the jury, which votes to condemn him.
我們可以稱之為蘇格拉底對(duì)美德力量的信念在這篇對(duì)話中一再被申明币砂，通常以比這更直率的極端的terms.這種信念激起了一些讀者深深的崇敬之情建峭。但是，這不會(huì)使他看起來(lái)很幼稚嗎决摧？好像這恰恰證實(shí)了《高爾吉亞篇》中Callicles所說(shuō)的哲學(xué)家是不知人事的傻子亿蒸，也不能保護(hù)自己。畢竟掌桩，蘇格拉底的清白沒(méi)有shine forth,至少在投票要判他有罪的陪審團(tuán)面前是這樣边锁。

He will speak the whole truth haphazardly, he implies, because he believes the jury will recognize the justice of what he says. But he also gives us at least tworeasons to doubt that he believes this. First, he says that his accusershave spoken so persuasively that they have almost convinced Socrates himself that he is guilty (17a1–3).That is, the justice (or injustice) of what a speaker says does not necessarily shine forth. Won’t Socrates have to speak cleverly and persuasively, then, to counteract the extraor-dinary persuasiveness of his accusers? Will it be enough to speak “at random”?Second, at the end of the prooemium Socrates says that the virtue of an orator (including a defendant) is to speak the truth,while that of a judge or juror is to apply his mind to whether what the speaker says is just. These virtues complement each other; if defendantand juror exercise their proper virtue, there is some reason for con?-dence in the verdict. But as Socrates will soon make clear, the juror slack their proper virtue: most are prejudiced against him and have, in fact, been slandering him for many years (18b4–19a2, 19d5–7, 28a6–8). Isn’t clever and persuasive speech needed, then, to counteract theirdeep-seated prejudice? Will speaking at random do the trick?
他說(shuō)他將haphazardly (隨意無(wú)目的)地說(shuō)出全部的truth, 因?yàn)榕銓張F(tuán)將會(huì)明白他所說(shuō)的都是正義的。但是他也至少給了我們兩點(diǎn)理由懷疑他是否真的這么認(rèn)為波岛。第一砚蓬，他說(shuō)他的被告說(shuō)得那么persuasively,以至于他都快要被他們說(shuō)服而認(rèn)為自己有罪了。難道蘇格拉底不需要說(shuō)得persuasively 和cleverly一點(diǎn)嗎盆色？?jī)H僅是“speak at random”夠嗎？第二祟剔，在prooemium（大概是前言之類的吧）的最后隔躲，蘇格拉底說(shuō)一個(gè)演說(shuō)家（包括被告）的美德（virtue）就是說(shuō)出真相，而法官和陪審團(tuán)的美德就是用智力判斷他們所言是否是正義的(just)物延。如果被告和陪審團(tuán)都實(shí)踐他們應(yīng)有的美德宣旱，那么是有理由對(duì)判決有信心。但是叛薯，蘇格拉底很快就闡明浑吟，陪審團(tuán)缺乏他們應(yīng)有的美德：他們中的大部分人對(duì)他有偏見(jiàn)，而且誹謗(slander)了他多年耗溜。為了對(duì)抗根深蒂固的偏見(jiàn)组力，難道不需要一個(gè)clever和persuasiv的演講嗎？“speaking at radom”能成功（Do The trick）嗎抖拴？

Socrates’ reason for telling the whole truth haphazardly is that he counts on the jury to recognize the justice of what he says. Yet he alsomakes it very clear that this cannot be counted on. The implication isthat he will not tell the whole truth haphazardly. But what will he do?Perhaps he will tell the whole truth cleverly and persuasively; but hedoes not tell the whole truth about how he will speak or why. Perhapsthen, in keeping with the virtue of an orator, he will tell, not indeedthe whole truth, but only the truth, scrupulously avoiding any lies(cf. 17b7–8 with 18a5–6 and Symposium 198d3–7). But in saying thathe will tell the whole truth haphazardly, he has already lied – and liedcleverly, for it was necessary to disarm the suspicion of the jurors atthe outset. However, this means that he also lied in saying that hisaccusers lied in calling him a clever speaker. And he lied in saying thatthey would immediately be refuted by him in deed. And he lied, I willargue, when he said that the virtue of an orator is to speak the truth.And this by no means exhausts the list of clever lies in Socrates’ briefaccount of his simple truthfulness.
蘇格拉底能hphazardly說(shuō)出全部真相他靠的是陪審團(tuán)能意識(shí)到他所說(shuō)都是正義的燎字。然而他也很清楚地表明這是靠不住的。言下之意就是他不會(huì)hapharzardly地說(shuō)出全部真相阿宅。那他會(huì)怎么做呢候衍？或許他會(huì)cleverly和persuasively地說(shuō)出所有真相；但是他不會(huì)說(shuō)出他怎么說(shuō)和為什么這么說(shuō)的真相洒放◎嚷梗或許為了保有一個(gè)orator應(yīng)有的美德，他說(shuō)的不是全部真相往湿，而僅僅是真相妖异，小心謹(jǐn)慎地避免謊話惋戏。但是當(dāng)他說(shuō)他將haphazardly地說(shuō)出全部真相的時(shí)候，他已經(jīng)說(shuō)謊了随闺，而且說(shuō)謊說(shuō)得很高明日川，因?yàn)閺囊婚_(kāi)始就打消陪審團(tuán)的懷疑是必要的。而這也就是說(shuō)當(dāng)他說(shuō)他的被告說(shuō)他是clever speaker是謊言時(shí)矩乐，他在說(shuō)謊龄句。他說(shuō)他們很快就會(huì)被他駁斥，他也在說(shuō)謊散罕。我敢說(shuō)分歇，他說(shuō)一個(gè)orator的美德就是講真話，他還是在說(shuō)謊欧漱。

In the prooemium, Socrates presents the problem of truthfulness in the guise of a claim to speak truthfully. Or, more precisely, he presentsthe problem of the relation between truth and justice in the guise of a claim that he will speak truthfully because what he says is just. If accusers never told persuasive lies and jurors were never prejudiced, or rather, if justice had the power to overcome these and other obstacles to a fair trial, an innocent defendant could speak the whole truth at random and count on being acquitted. As it is, however, he may have to tell clever lies for the sake of justice itself – that is, to keep aninnocent man from suffering an undeserved penalty (cf. 37b2–5 andCrito 54b8–c1). Thinking through the prooemium is the?rst step in thereader’s education. Some would call it the?rst step in his “corruption.”
如果正義能克服障礙到達(dá)公正的審判职抡，那么被告就可以不假思索地說(shuō)出全部真相而被判無(wú)罪。但事實(shí)上并非如此误甚，所以蘇格拉底不得不為了正義本身而說(shuō)謊缚甩。

Notice, however, that Socrates does not utter, much less argue for,the “corrupt” conclusion that justice may require lying. Instead, hemakes an unquestionably decent assertion that can serve as a start-ing point for the listener’s own re?ection. By emphatically connectingjustice and truthfulness in a context that reveals the connection asproblematic, he even encourages the listener to re?ect. The listener,however, must think out the problem for himself. He must ?nd hisown way to the unstated thoughts behind Socrates’ puzzling words.In doing so, he may make those thoughts his own more easily than ifSocrates had been too frank. (Frankness would have led some listeners to recoil and others to try to adopt Socrates’ conclusions prematurely,without adequate understanding.) As we will see, Socrates’ statementsin the prooemium illustrate his characteristic way of teaching. They also illustrate his defensive rhetoric.In the prooemium, the orators tands in for the philosopher, and the danger that an orator may face in speaking truthfully to a jury is the ?rst sign of the tension, or potential for con?ict, between the philosopher and the city.
然而，蘇格拉底并沒(méi)有直接說(shuō)出這個(gè)corrupt的結(jié)論: 正義需要謊言窑邦。取而代之的是擅威，他說(shuō)了一個(gè)合理的沒(méi)問(wèn)題的assertion（他將不假思索地說(shuō)出所有真相），這給聽(tīng)眾自己思考的一個(gè)起點(diǎn)冈钦。通過(guò)強(qiáng)調(diào)justice和正義的關(guān)系郊丛，他激勵(lì)聽(tīng)眾去思考。聽(tīng)眾必須自己發(fā)現(xiàn)問(wèn)題瞧筛。這是蘇格拉底teaching的特點(diǎn)厉熟。在prooemium里，orators代表了哲學(xué)家较幌，而orators在陪審團(tuán)面前說(shuō)出全部真相而面臨的危險(xiǎn)是哲學(xué)家和城邦之間關(guān)系緊張或者說(shuō)潛在沖突的一個(gè)重要信號(hào)(sign)揍瑟。

As we proceed through the Apology, the roots of this tension willbecome clearer. For now, I offer a few preliminary considerations. The law makes pronouncements about many things, including, in the case of Athenian law, the gods. By and large citizens take these pronounce-ments as their guide to justice. But these pronouncements are never altogether sound or true – in part because those who make the law are not completely wise (cf. Minos 314c–e; Statesman 298c–d); in part because even laws made by the wise would have to bow, in both their provisions and justi?cations, to the imperfect wisdom of the ruled, or,to say almost the same thing, because even laws made by the wise would have to include “noble lies” that render them acceptable to the unwise or conceal their unavoidable defects (Republic 414b–415d); inpart because laws are general rules that are not equally well suited to allthe situations they cover (Statesman 294a–295a); and in part because laws claim to be just, that is, good for all, but in some, and perhapsmany, situations covered by law there is no common good: what ben-e?ts one party harms another (consider Apology 19a2–3 together with Cleitophon 410b1–3). Hence, speaking the truth, or raising questionsthat are part of the search for truth, will at some point mean contradict-ing the pronouncements of the law (cf. Apology 24d9–e1; Euthyphro6a–b. Cf. Laws 624a, 628d–e, and 630d–e with 634d–635b). It willinvolve saying things that the city regards as unjust; it will look likecorruption or impiety (Statesman 296c, 299b–c). And this, of course,applies to things said outside the courtroom as well as within it. Forthese and other reasons a sensible man will not speak the whole truthindiscriminately in public (cf. Euthyphro 3d6–9). Whatever the virtueof an orator may be, it is not simply speaking the truth.
法律會(huì)公告(pronouncements)很多東西包括這個(gè)案子中的“神”。大部分的公民以這些pronouncements作為判斷正義的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)绅络。但是這些pronouncements從來(lái)都不是完善的也不是完全真實(shí)的月培，這一方面是因?yàn)橹贫ㄟ@些pronouncements的人不是真正有智慧的，即使法律由有智慧的人制定恩急，它也不得不bow to in both their provisions and justi?cations, to the imperfect wisdom of the ruled, or,to say almost the same thing(這句不知道怎么解)杉畜，即使法律由有智慧的人制定，它也不得不包含高貴的謊言（noble lies）以使它更好地為unwise的人接受衷恭，或者以掩蓋它不可避免的缺陷此叠；另一方面是因?yàn)榉陕暦Q是正義的，對(duì)所有人都是好的随珠，但是在一些情況下灭袁，也許是在很多情況下猬错，沒(méi)有common good: 當(dāng)一部分人受益時(shí)另一部人就會(huì)受損。因此茸歧，說(shuō)真話或者提出問(wèn)題是探索真相的一部分倦炒，也會(huì)在某種程度上與法律聲明的pronouncements發(fā)生沖突。說(shuō)真話可能會(huì)說(shuō)出一些城邦認(rèn)為不正義的東西软瞎，顯得不敬逢唤。在法庭之外說(shuō)的真話當(dāng)然也是如此。不管一個(gè)orator的美德是什莫涤浇，它肯定不會(huì)是簡(jiǎn)簡(jiǎn)單單地說(shuō)出真相鳖藕。

后來(lái)我發(fā)現(xiàn)我看的這個(gè)版本是王曉朝譯的，后來(lái)我又找來(lái)了王太慶譯的這段話來(lái)看看：
“他們說(shuō)的話里沒(méi)有一點(diǎn)真東西只锭，你們可以聽(tīng)得出著恩，我說(shuō)的只有實(shí)話，沒(méi)有別的蜻展『硖埽皇天在上，雅典公民們纵顾，我的話不像他們那樣字斟句酌裹驰，也沒(méi)有經(jīng)過(guò)仔細(xì)安排，只是*信口說(shuō)出片挂，不加選擇，因?yàn)槲蚁嘈盼艺f(shuō)的是正理贞盯，你們別指望有別的什么意思音念。”
如果用“正理”躏敢，我覺(jué)得我不會(huì)有什么疑問(wèn)闷愤，但是用“正義”就真是讓人費(fèi)解啊。不過(guò)英譯本也是用的just和justice這樣的詞 件余，確實(shí)是正義的意識(shí)啊讥脐，只能說(shuō)什么是正義本身就太讓人費(fèi)解了啊啼器！