巴菲特這個夾敘夾議的故事2014年2月28日發(fā)表在致股東信中，標(biāo)題為《關(guān)于投資的一些思考》动羽。

同年3月17日包帚，本文以《巴菲特年度信：你能從我的不動產(chǎn)投資中學(xué)到什么？》為題运吓，刊發(fā)在《財富》雜志上渴邦。關(guān)于退休金的部分當(dāng)時被刪掉了疯趟，這是完整版本，被刪減部分在文末三段几莽。

讀完大概需要6分鐘迅办，分為七部分，以下小標(biāo)題系編者加注章蚣。

1、故事一：買農(nóng)場
2姨夹、故事二：買商業(yè)地產(chǎn)
3纤垂、投資基本原則
4、買農(nóng)場地產(chǎn)和買股票有什么區(qū)別
5磷账、我和查理的想法
6峭沦、以前不這樣，我的改變
7逃糟、別依賴退休金

Some Thoughts About Investing

Investment is most intelligent when it ismost businesslike.

——The Intelligent Investor by Benjamin Graham

關(guān)于投資的一些想法

如果像做生意那樣投資吼鱼，就是明智的〈卵剩——本杰明·格雷厄姆《聰明的投資者》

It is fitting to have a Ben Graham quote open this discussion because I owe so much of what I know about investing to him. I will talk more about Ben a bit later, and I will even sooner talk about common stocks. But let me first tell you about two small non-stock investments that I made long ago. Though neither changed my net worth by much, they are instructive.? ?

我懂投資歸功于Ben（本杰明·格雷厄姆）菇肃，所以引用他的話做開場白非常合適。我會講下股票取募，然后再講Ben琐谤。不過開始之前，我先講講很久之前我做過的兩個小的非股票投資玩敏。盡管這兩個投資沒有讓我的財富發(fā)生巨大變化斗忌，但這兩個故事能把投資原理說清楚。

故事一：買農(nóng)場

This tale begins in Nebraska. From 1973 to 1981, the Midwest experienced an explosion in farm prices, caused by a widespread belief that runaway inflation was coming and fueled by the lending policies of small rural banks. Then the bubble burst, bringing price declines of 50% or more that devastated both leveraged farmers and their lenders. Five times as many Iowa and Nebraska banks failed in that bubble’s aftermath than in our recent Great Recession.? ? ? ?

這個故事始于內(nèi)布拉斯加州旺聚。從1973到1981年织阳，中西部的農(nóng)產(chǎn)品價格崩盤，這是由于人們普遍認為失控的通貨膨脹即將到來砰粹，小型農(nóng)村銀行的貸款政策也在推波助瀾唧躲。隨后泡沫破裂，價格下跌50%甚至更多伸眶，重創(chuàng)了借貸的農(nóng)民和借給他們錢的銀行惊窖。這次泡沫的后果，導(dǎo)致愛荷華和內(nèi)布拉斯加銀行倒閉的數(shù)量厘贼，成為1937年大蕭條時期的五倍界酒。

In 1986, I purchased a 400-acre farm, located 50 miles north of Omaha, from the FDIC. It cost me $280,000, considerably less than what a failed bank had lent against the farm a few years earlier. I knew nothing about operating a farm. But I have a son who loves farming and I learned from him both how many bushels of corn and soybeans the farm would produce and what the operating expenses would be. From these estimates, I calculated the normalized return from the farm to then be about 10%. I also thought it was likely that productivity would improve over time and that crop prices would move higher as well. Both expectations proved out.

1986年，我花28萬美元從聯(lián)邦存款保險公司買了一個400英畝的農(nóng)場嘴秸，位于奧馬哈以北50英里毁欣。這個價格比幾年前一家破產(chǎn)銀行以這個農(nóng)場為抵押的貸款金額還要低得多庇谆。我對經(jīng)營農(nóng)場一無所知。但我兒子熱愛農(nóng)業(yè)凭疮，我從他那里學(xué)到了這個農(nóng)場可以生產(chǎn)多少玉米和大豆饭耳，以及運營成本是多少。根據(jù)這些估算执解，我計算出農(nóng)場在那時的正衬ぃ回報率約為10%。我還認為衰腌，隨著時間的推移新蟆，生產(chǎn)率可能會提高，同時農(nóng)作物價格也會上漲右蕊。事實證明琼稻，這兩個預(yù)期都對。

I needed no unusual knowledge or intelligence to conclude that the investment had no downside and potentially had substantial upside. There would, of course, be the occasional bad crop and prices would sometimes disappoint. But so what? There would be some unusually good years as well, and I would never be under any pressure to sell the property. Now, 28 years later, the farm has tripled its earnings and is worth five times or more what I paid. I still know nothing about farming and recently made just my second visit to the farm.?

我不需要什么特別的知識或智慧就能得出結(jié)論饶囚，這項投資虧不了帕翻，而且可能賺到不少錢。當(dāng)然萝风，偶爾會有壞收成嘀掸，農(nóng)作物價格有時不及預(yù)期。但那又怎樣闹丐？也會有一些特別棒的好年景横殴，我沒有任何壓力會導(dǎo)致我不得不賣掉這個農(nóng)場。現(xiàn)在28年過去了卿拴，農(nóng)場的收入翻了三倍衫仑，價值是我當(dāng)初支付的5倍甚至更多。而我對種莊稼仍然一無所知堕花，最近才第二次去農(nóng)場文狱。

故事二：買商業(yè)地產(chǎn)

In 1993, I made another small investment. Larry Silverstein, Salomon’s landlord when I was the company’s CEO, told me about a New York retail property adjacent to NYU that the Resolution Trust Corp. was selling. Again, a bubble had popped – this one involving commercial real estate – and the RTC had been created to dispose of the assets of failed savings institutions whose optimistic lending practices had fueled the folly.?

1993年，我做了另一筆小投資缘挽。Larry是所羅門公司的房東瞄崇，當(dāng)時我是所羅門公司的CEO，他告訴我壕曼，紐約的一處商業(yè)地產(chǎn)毗鄰紐約大學(xué)苏研，RTC公司正在出售這處地產(chǎn)。和上個故事一樣腮郊，也是泡沫破滅崩盤摹蘑，這次是商業(yè)地產(chǎn)。銀行過于樂觀寬松的貸款助長了愚蠢行為轧飞。RTC的成立就是為了處置這些破產(chǎn)銀行的資產(chǎn)衅鹿，

Here, too, the analysis was simple. As had been the case with the farm, the unleveraged current yield from the property was about 10%. But the property had been undermanaged by the RTC, and its income would increase when several vacant stores were leased. Even more important, the largest tenant – who occupied around 20% of the project’s space – was paying rent of about $5 per foot, whereas other tenants averaged $70. The expiration of this bargain lease in nine years was certain to provide a major boost to earnings. The property’s location was also superb: NYU wasn’t going anywhere.?

這里的分析也很簡單撒踪。和前面講過的農(nóng)場情況一樣，不用借貸全資收購這處地產(chǎn)的話大渤，當(dāng)時的出租收益率約為10%制妄。RTC無暇管理這處地產(chǎn)，有幾個商店閑置泵三，如果租出去的話收入將會增加耕捞。更重要的是，最大的租戶占了這個項目大約20%的空間切黔，而支付的租金約為每英尺5美元砸脊，而其他租戶的平均租金為70美元。這份廉價租約將在9年后到期纬霞，這肯定會大幅提高收益。這處地產(chǎn)的位置也很棒：紐約大學(xué)就在這兒驱显。

I joined a small group, including Larry and my friend Fred Rose, that purchased the parcel. Fred was an experienced, high-grade real estate investor who, with his family, would manage the property. And manage it they did. As old leases expired, earnings tripled. Annual distributions now exceed 35% of our original equity investment. Moreover, our original mortgage was refinanced in 1996 and again in 1999, moves that allowed several special distributions totaling more than 150% of what we had invested. I’ve yet to view the property.

我和Larry還有我的朋友Fred一起買下來這個商業(yè)地產(chǎn)诗芜。Fred是一個經(jīng)驗豐富的高級房地產(chǎn)投資者，他和他的家族將管理這處商業(yè)地產(chǎn)埃疫。隨著舊租約到期伏恐，他們成功地把這部分租金收入提高為之前的三倍。現(xiàn)在每年的分紅比我們原始投資的35%還要多栓霜。此外翠桦，我們最初的抵押貸款先后在1996年和1999年進行了兩次再融資，這使得幾次特別分紅加起來就超過了我們當(dāng)初投資總額的1.5倍胳蛮。到現(xiàn)在我還沒看過那處地產(chǎn)销凑。

Income from both the farm and the NYU real estate will probably increase in the decades to come. Though the gains won’t be dramatic, the two investments will be solid and satisfactory holdings for my lifetime and, subsequently, for my children and grandchildren.

未來幾十年，我買的農(nóng)場和紐約大學(xué)那處地產(chǎn)的收入大概率會增加仅炊。雖然收益不是那么驚人斗幼，但這兩項投資將是我一生中堅實而令人滿意的資產(chǎn)，對我的兒孫也是如此抚垄。

投資的基本原則

I tell these tales to illustrate certain fundamentals of investing:?

我講這些故事是為了說明投資的基本原則:

■?You don’t need to be an expert in order to achieve satisfactory investment returns. But if you aren’t, you must recognize your limitations and follow a course certain to work reasonably well. Keep things simple and don’t swing for the fences. When promised quick profits, respond with a quick “no.”?

你不需要成為專家就能獲得令人滿意的投資回報蜕窿。但你必須認識到你的局限性，并遵循行之有效的方法呆馁。保持事情簡單桐经，不要賭。當(dāng)有人拉你賺快錢的時候浙滤，立馬回絕阴挣。

■ Focus on the future productivity of the asset you are considering. If you don’t feel comfortable making a rough estimate of the asset’s future earnings, just forget it and move on. No one has the ability to evaluate every investment possibility. But omniscience isn’t necessary; you only need to understand the actions you undertake.?

買資產(chǎn)的話，要關(guān)注未來產(chǎn)出效益瓷叫。如果你對粗略估算未來收益感到一絲不踏實屯吊，那就放棄送巡，別干。沒人能評估每一種投資的可行性盒卸。只需要懂你在做的事情骗爆，不需要啥都懂。

■ If you instead focus on the prospective price change of a contemplated purchase, you are speculating. There is nothing improper about that. I know, however, that I am unable to speculate successfully, and I am skeptical of those who claim sustained success at doing so. Half of all coin-flippers will win their first toss; none of those winners has an expectation of profit if he continues to play the game. And the fact that a given asset has appreciated in the recent past is never a reason to buy it.?

如果你轉(zhuǎn)而關(guān)注目標(biāo)的預(yù)期價格變化蔽介，你就是在投機摘投。這無可厚非。但我知道我沒有投機的本事虹蓄，我也不相信有人能持續(xù)成功投機犀呼。有一半拋硬幣賭博的人第一輪會贏；他們一直賭下去的話薇组，沒人能贏錢外臂。某項資產(chǎn)最近漲了這件事，從來都不是購買它的理由律胀。

■ With my two small investments, I thought only of what the properties would produce and cared not at all about their daily valuations. Games are won by players who focus on the playing field – not by those whose eyes are glued to the scoreboard. If you can enjoy Saturdays and Sundays without looking at stock prices, give it a try on weekdays.?

在我這兩筆小額投資中宋光，我只考慮這些資產(chǎn)會產(chǎn)出什么，根本不關(guān)心它們每天的價格炭菌。賽場獲勝的一定是專注于比賽的運動員罪佳，而不是那些眼睛盯著記分牌的人。如果你可以享受周末不看股價的日子黑低，試試工作日也別看赘艳。

■ Forming macro opinions or listening to the macro or market predictions of others is a waste of time. Indeed, it is dangerous because it may blur your vision of the facts that are truly important. (When I hear TV commentators glibly opine on what the market will do next, I am reminded of Mickey Mantle’s scathing comment: “You don’t know how easy this game is until you get into that broadcasting booth.”)??

判斷宏觀經(jīng)濟，或聽別人對宏觀經(jīng)濟看法克握、市場預(yù)測啥的蕾管，純屬浪費時間。實際上這很危險玛荞，因為這些內(nèi)容可能會模糊你的視野娇掏，而忽視了真正重要的事。(當(dāng)我聽到電視評論員滔滔不絕地談?wù)撌袌鲎邉輹r勋眯，我想起了Mickey Mantle的犀利諷刺：“直到進了廣播室婴梧，我才知道原來棒球運動這么簡單】吞＃”)
（注：Mickey Mantle是美國歷史上最偉大的棒球運動員）

■ My two purchases were made in 1986 and 1993. What the economy, interest rates, or the stock market might do in the years immediately following – 1987 and 1994 – was of no importance to me in making those investments. I can’t remember what the headlines or pundits were saying at the time. Whatever the chatter, corn would keep growing in Nebraska and students would flock to NYU.

我這兩次投資是在1986年和1993年塞蹭。在隨后的1987年和1994年，經(jīng)濟讶坯、利率被饿、股票市場的走勢對我做這兩項投資一點兒都不重要焰扳。我不記得當(dāng)時的頭條新聞或權(quán)威人士在說啥母剥。無論談?wù)撌裁矗瑑?nèi)布拉斯加州的玉米會繼續(xù)生長这刷，紐約大學(xué)會有大批學(xué)生。

有什么區(qū)別娩井？

There is one major difference between my two small investments and an investment in stocks. Stocks provide you minute-to-minute valuations for your holdings whereas I have yet to see a quotation for either my farm or the New York real estate.?

我這兩筆小額投資和股票投資有一個主要區(qū)別暇屋。股市為你的持股提供了實時報價，但我持有的農(nóng)場或紐約商業(yè)地產(chǎn)卻從未看到過什么報價洞辣。

It should be an enormous advantage for investors in stocks to have those wildly fluctuating valuations placed on their holdings – and for some investors, it is. After all, if a moody fellow with a farm bordering my property yelled out a price every day to me at which he would either buy my farm or sell me his – and those prices varied widely over short periods of time depending on his mental state – how in the world could I be other than benefited by his erratic behavior? If his daily shout-out was ridiculously low, and I had some spare cash, I would buy his farm. If the number he yelled was absurdly high, I could either sell to him or just go on farming.?

對股票投資者來說咐刨，股價大幅波動按說應(yīng)該是個巨大的優(yōu)勢。實際上扬霜，對一部分投資者來說確實如此定鸟。畢竟，如果一個與我相鄰的農(nóng)場主著瓶，這家伙情緒忽高忽低联予，每天給我出個報價，要么買我的材原，要么把他的賣給我躯泰；這些價格短期波動巨大，取決于他的情緒华糖。我怎么可能不從他古怪的行為中受益呢？如果他報價低得荒唐瘟裸，而我有一些閑錢客叉，我會買下他的農(nóng)場。如果他喊的數(shù)字高得離譜话告，我要么賣給他兼搏，要么種我的地不理他。

Owners of stocks, however, too often let the capricious and often irrational behavior of their fellow owners cause them to behave irrationally as well. Because there is so much chatter about markets, the economy, interest rates, price behavior of stocks, etc., some investors believe it is important to listen to pundits – and, worse yet, important to consider acting upon their comments.?

然而沙郭，股民經(jīng)常被其他股民的情緒和非理性行為帶動著佛呻，自己也變得不理性。因為有太多關(guān)于市場病线、經(jīng)濟吓著、利率、股價走勢的說法送挑，一些投資者認為聽取股評家的評論很重要绑莺，更糟糕是，他們認為參照股評炒股也很重要惕耕。

Those people who can sit quietly for decades when they own a farm or apartment house too often become frenetic when they are exposed to a stream of stock quotations and accompanying commentators delivering an implied message of “Don’t just sit there, do something.” For these investors, liquidity is transformed from the unqualified benefit it should be to a curse.?

股民們買了農(nóng)場或房子時可以默默的持有幾十年纺裁，而股市中股價每天波動，各種評論信息傳遞著潛臺詞：“別傻坐著，干點兒啥”欺缘，股民們往往變得狂熱栋豫。對這些投資者來說，容易變現(xiàn)這個特點谚殊，本該是無條件的好處卻變成了詛咒丧鸯。

A “flash crash” or some other extreme market fluctuation can’t hurt an investor any more than an erratic and mouthy neighbor can hurt my farm investment. Indeed, tumbling markets can be helpful to the true investor if he has cash available when prices get far out of line with values. A climate of fear is your friend when investing; a euphoric world is your enemy.

就像一個整天忽高忽低報價的鄰居不會傷害我的農(nóng)場投資一樣，股價崩盤或其他極端的市場波動不會傷害股票投資者络凿。事實上骡送，當(dāng)價格遠低于價值時，如果真正的投資者手里有閑錢絮记，市場暴跌對他有利摔踱。投資時，愁云密布的熊市是你的朋友怨愤；皆大歡喜的牛市是你的敵人派敷。

During the extraordinary financial panic that occurred late in 2008, I never gave a thought to selling my farm or New York real estate, even though a severe recession was clearly brewing. And, if I had owned 100% of a solid business with good long-term prospects, it would have been foolish for me to even consider dumping it. So why would I have sold my stocks that were small participations in wonderful businesses? True, any one of them might eventually disappoint, but as a group they were certain to do well. Could anyone really believe the earth was going to swallow up the incredible productive assets and unlimited human ingenuity existing in America??

在2008年末金融危機的大恐慌期間，盡管一場嚴重的衰退顯然正在醞釀之中撰洗，我也從未想過要賣掉我的農(nóng)場或紐約的地產(chǎn)篮愉。如果我擁有一家長期前景良好的公司100%股權(quán)，我想賣掉它就是愚蠢的差导。既然如此试躏，我為什么要賣掉我的股票呢？這些股票其實就是優(yōu)秀企業(yè)的一小部分设褐。誠然颠蕴，這些公司中的單獨某一個最終可能會令人失望，但作為一個組合整體肯定會做得很好助析。真的有人會相信這個世界會吞噬掉美國這些具備非凡生產(chǎn)力的公司犀被，和無限的人類創(chuàng)造力嗎？

我和查理的想法

When Charlie and I buy stocks –which we think of as small portions of businesses – our analysis is very similar to that which we use in buying entire businesses. We first have to decide whether we can sensibly estimate an earnings range for five years out, or more. If the answer is yes, we will buy the stock (or business) if it sells at a reasonable price in relation to the bottom boundary of our estimate. If, however, we lack the ability to estimate future earnings – which is usually the case – we simply move on to other prospects. In the 54 years we have worked together, we have never foregone an attractive purchase because of the macro or political environment, or the views of other people. In fact, these subjects never come up when we make decisions.?

查理和我認為股票是企業(yè)的一小部分外冀，我們購買股票時的分析寡键，和購買整個企業(yè)所做的分析非常相似。我們首先確定能否合理估計這家公司未來五年或更長時間的大致盈利情況雪隧。如果我們有這個評估能力西轩，那么此時股票（或整個公司）這時的價格，假如和我們估算最差情況下的盈利相比是合理的膀跌，我們就會買入遭商。然而，如果我們對這家公司未來盈利沒能力估算捅伤，我們就會放棄劫流，然后看下一家公司，這種情況經(jīng)常發(fā)生。在我們一起工作的54年里祠汇，我們從未因為宏觀經(jīng)濟或政治環(huán)境仍秤，或其他人的觀點而放棄一個有吸引力的買入機會。事實上可很，當(dāng)我們做決定時诗力，從來不討論這些話題。

It’s vital, however, that we recognize the perimeter of our “circle of competence” and stay well inside of it. Even then, we will make some mistakes, both with stocks and businesses. But they will not be the disasters that occur, for example, when a long-rising market induces purchases that are based on anticipated price behavior and a desire to be where the action is.

關(guān)鍵是要認識到我們“能力圈”的邊界我抠，并待在里面苇本。即使這樣，我們也會犯一些錯誤菜拓，不管是買股票還是收購企業(yè)瓣窄。但它們不會成為那種被牛市誘惑追高買入這種災(zāi)難性的后果。

Most investors, of course, have not made the study of business prospects a priority in their lives. If wise, they will conclude that they do not know enough about specific businesses to predict their future earning power.?

當(dāng)然纳鼎，大多數(shù)股民并沒有把對公司前景研究作為他們生活中的優(yōu)先事項俺夕。如果明智的話，大多數(shù)股民應(yīng)該得出結(jié)論：他們對那些具體公司的了解贱鄙，還不足以預(yù)測那些公司未來的盈利能力劝贸。

I have good news for these non-professionals: The typical investor doesn’t need this skill. In aggregate, American business has done wonderfully over time and will continue to do so (though, most assuredly, in unpredictable fits and starts). In the 20th Century, the Dow Jones Industrials index advanced from 66 to 11,497, paying a rising stream of dividends to boot. The 21st Century will witness further gains, almost certain to be substantial. The goal of the non-professional should not be to pick winners –neither he nor his “helpers”can do that – but should rather be to own a cross-section of businesses that in aggregate are bound to do well. A low-cost S&P 500 index fund will achieve this goal.?

對這些非專業(yè)人士，我有個好消息：通常投資者不需要這種技能逗宁。隨著時間的推移映九，美國公司作為一個整體，已經(jīng)取得了驚人的成就瞎颗，并將繼續(xù)保持下去（盡管可以肯定會斷斷續(xù)續(xù)）氯迂。在20世紀(jì)，道瓊斯工業(yè)指數(shù)從66點上漲到11,497點言缤，股息不斷增加。21世紀(jì)將見證更多的收獲禁灼，幾乎可以肯定是非彻苄可觀的收獲。非專業(yè)人士的目標(biāo)不應(yīng)是挑選贏家弄捕，他和他的“助手”（比如基金經(jīng)理僻孝、理財顧問）都做不到這一點，但擁有一個跨行業(yè)的公司組合一定會表現(xiàn)良好——一只低成本的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)普爾500指數(shù)基金將實現(xiàn)這一目標(biāo)守谓。

That’s the “what” of investing for the non-professional. The “when” is also important. The main danger is that the timid or beginning investor will enter the market at a time of extreme exuberance and then become disillusioned when paper losses occur. (Remember the late Barton Biggs’ observation: “A bull market is like sex. It feels best just before it ends.”) The antidote to that kind of mistiming is for an investor to accumulate shares over a long period and never to sell when the news is bad and stocks are well off their highs. Following those rules, the “know-nothing” investor who both diversifies and keeps his costs minimal is virtually certain to get satisfactory results. Indeed, the unsophisticated investor who is realistic about his shortcomings is likely to obtain better longterm results than the knowledgeable professional who is blind to even a single weakness.

對于非專業(yè)投資者來說穿铆，這就解決了“買什么”的問題。“什么時候買”也很重要斋荞。主要的危險是荞雏，膽小的或初學(xué)的投資者會在極度繁榮的時候進入市場，然后在賬面損失發(fā)生時大失所望。(記得已故的巴頓·比格斯說過：“牛市就像性愛凤优，在結(jié)束前感覺最好悦陋。”對于投資者來說筑辨，解決錯誤擇時的辦法是：長期買入俺驶，不斷積攢份額，當(dāng)消息不好棍辕、股票都跌得稀里嘩啦的時候暮现，千萬不要賣出。遵循這些規(guī)則楚昭，那些既分散投資又保持最低成本的小白投資者幾乎肯定獲得滿意結(jié)果栖袋。事實上，和知識淵博但對自己哪怕一個弱點都視而不見的專業(yè)投資者相比哪替，對自己缺點誠實的普通投資者能夠獲得更好的長期回報栋荸。（注：巴頓·比格斯，著名資產(chǎn)管理人凭舶，《對沖基金風(fēng)云錄》的作者晌块，曾準(zhǔn)確預(yù)測了20世紀(jì)90年代末的網(wǎng)絡(luò)泡沫。）

If “investors” frenetically bought and sold farmland to each other, neither the yields nor prices of their crops would be increased. The only consequence of such behavior would be decreases in the overall earnings realized by the farm-owning population because of the substantial costs it would incur as it sought advice and switched properties.?

如果“投資者”瘋狂地相互買賣農(nóng)田帅霜，他們的農(nóng)作物產(chǎn)量和價格都不會提高匆背。這樣干的唯一后果將是擁有農(nóng)場的人群總收入減少，因為當(dāng)他們在咨詢和買賣資產(chǎn)時會產(chǎn)生大量的成本身冀。

Nevertheless, both individuals and institutions will constantly be urged to be active by those who profit from giving advice or effecting transactions. The resulting frictional costs can be huge and, for investors in aggregate, devoid of benefit. So, ignore the chatter, keep your costs minimal, and invest in stocks as you would in a farm.?

不過钝尸，那些從提供咨詢或執(zhí)行交易中獲利的人，會不斷敦促個人和機構(gòu)活躍交易搂根。由此產(chǎn)生的摩擦成本可能是巨大的珍促，而且對總體投資者來說，毫無益處剩愧。所以別理他們猪叙，保持你的成本最低，像投資農(nóng)場一樣投資股票仁卷。

My money, I should add, is where my mouth is: What I advise here is essentially identical to certain instructions I’ve laid out in my will. One bequest provides that cash will be delivered to a trustee for my wife’s benefit. (I have to use cash for individual bequests, because all of my Berkshire shares will be fully distributed to certain philanthropic organizations over the ten years following the closing of my estate.) My advice to the trustee could not be more simple: Put 10% of the cash in short-term government bonds and 90% in a very low-cost S&P 500 index fund. (I suggest Vanguard’s.) I believe the trust’s long-term results from this policy will be superior to those attained by most investors –whether pension funds, institutions or individuals –who employ high-fee managers.?

補充說明穴翩，我的錢也是這種處理方式：我在這里給出的建議與我在遺囑中列出的做法本質(zhì)相同。給我妻子的遺產(chǎn)是現(xiàn)金锦积。（我必須用現(xiàn)金進行個人遺贈芒帕，因為在我去世十年里，我所有的伯克希爾股票將全部捐贈給慈善組織丰介。）我給受托人的建議非常簡單：10%的現(xiàn)金投資于短期政府債券背蟆，90%投資于成本非常低的標(biāo)普500指數(shù)基金鉴分。（建議買先鋒基金公司的，收費低）我相信這個投資策略獲得的長期收益淆储，會跑贏大多數(shù)投資者（無論是養(yǎng)老基金冠场、機構(gòu)還是個人）聘用高收費投資管理人的收益。

以前不這樣本砰，我的改變

And now back to Ben Graham. I learned most of the thoughts in this investment discussion from Ben’s book The Intelligent Investor, which I bought in 1949. My financial life changed with that purchase.?

現(xiàn)在回頭講Ben的故事碴裙。這篇投資想法討論的大部分內(nèi)容是我從Ben的書《聰明的投資者》中學(xué)到的，1949年買Ben的書点额，改變了我的投資生涯舔株。

Before reading Ben’s book, I had wandered around the investing landscape, devouring everything written on the subject. Much of what I read fascinated me: I tried my hand at charting and at using market indicia to predict stock movements. I sat in brokerage offices watching the tape roll by, and I listened to commentators. All of this was fun, but I couldn’t shake the feeling that I wasn’t getting anywhere.?

在讀Ben的書之前，我在投資領(lǐng)域迷茫徘徊还棱，如饑似渴地閱讀了所有關(guān)于投資的書籍载慈。其中很多內(nèi)容都讓我著迷：我試過畫圖畫線來預(yù)測股票走勢。我坐在交易大廳珍手，看著股價變化办铡，聽股評家的評論。所有這些都很有意思琳要，但就是賺不到錢寡具。

In contrast, Ben’s ideas were explained logically in elegant, easy-to-understand prose (without Greek letters or complicated formulas). For me, the key points were laid out in what later editions labeled Chapters 8 and 20. (The original 1949 edition numbered its chapters differently.) These points guide my investing decisions today.?

相比之下，Ben用大白話闡述了他的思想（沒有希臘字母或復(fù)雜的公式）稚补。對我來說童叠，投資要義在修訂版本的第8章和第20章中。（1949年的原版章節(jié)順序不同）這些要點今天仍然指導(dǎo)著我的投資決策课幕。

A couple of Interesting sidelights about the book: Later editions included a postscript describing an unnamed investment that was a bonanza for Ben. Ben made the purchase in 1948 when he was writing the first edition and – brace yourself– the mystery company was GEICO. If Ben had not recognized the special qualities of GEICO when it was still in its infancy, my future and Berkshire’s would have been far different.?

這本書有幾個趣事：修訂版有個附錄講述了一個不具名的投資厦坛，這是Ben賺大錢的一個股票。本在1948年寫第一版的時候買入了這個股票乍惊，這個神秘的公司就是GEICO保險杜秸。如果Ben在GEICO早期沒有認識到它的與眾不同，我和伯克希爾的未來可能和現(xiàn)在大不相同润绎。（注：巴菲特多次投資過GEICO保險亩歹，最后伯克希爾100%擁有GEICO）

The 1949 edition of the book also recommended a railroad stock that was then selling for $17 and earning about $10 per share. (One of the reasons I admired Ben was that he had the guts to use current examples, leaving himself open to sneers if he stumbled.) In part, that low valuation resulted from an accounting rule of the time that required the railroad to exclude from its reported earnings the substantial retained earnings of affiliates.?

該書1949年版還推薦了一只鐵路股票，當(dāng)時售價為17美元凡橱，每股收益約為10美元。（我欽佩Ben的原因之一是亭姥，他敢使用當(dāng)前的例子稼钩，而萬一錯了會被恥笑）在某種程度上，這種低估是由當(dāng)時的會計制度造成的达罗，規(guī)則要求鐵路從其報告的收益中去掉附屬公司的大量留存收益坝撑。

The recommended stock was Northern Pacific, and its most important affiliate was Chicago, Burlington and Quincy. These railroads are now important parts of BNSF (Burlington Northern Santa Fe), which is today fully owned by Berkshire. When I read the book, Northern Pacific had a market value of about $40 million. Now its successor (having added a great many properties, to be sure) earns that amount every four days.?

推薦的那只股票是北太平洋公司静秆，它最重要的附屬公司是芝加哥、伯靈頓和昆西鐵路公司巡李。這些鐵路現(xiàn)在是BNSF公司的重要部分抚笔，BNSF公司現(xiàn)在完全由伯克希爾所有。當(dāng)年我讀這本書時侨拦，北太平洋公司的市值約為4000萬美元∈獬龋現(xiàn)在，它的繼承者BNSF公司（無疑已經(jīng)增加了許多資產(chǎn)）每四天就能賺到這個數(shù)目狱从。

I can’t remember what I paid for that first copy of The Intelligent Investor. Whatever the cost, it would underscore the truth of Ben’s adage: Price is what you pay, value is what you get. Of all the investments I ever made, buying Ben’s book was the best (except for my purchase of two marriage licenses).

我不記得買第一本《聰明的投資者》花了多少錢膨蛮。無論成本多少，它都凸顯了Ben的格言千真萬確：價格是你付出的季研，價值是你得到的敞葛。買Ben的書是我做過的最好的投資（如果不算我那兩本結(jié)婚證書的話）。

別依賴退休金

Local and state financial problems are accelerating, in large part because public entities promised pensions they couldn’t afford. Citizens and public officials typically under-appreciated the gigantic financial tapeworm that was born when promises were made that conflicted with a willingness to fund them. Unfortunately, pension mathematics today remain a mystery to most Americans.

地方和國家的財政難題正在加劇与涡，很大程度上是因為政府機構(gòu)承諾了他們負擔(dān)不起的退休金惹谐。當(dāng)交養(yǎng)老保險的意愿和兌現(xiàn)退休金承諾出現(xiàn)兩難的時候，就出現(xiàn)了巨大的財政困境驼卖，公眾和政府官員通常低估了這個困境氨肌。不幸的是，對于大多數(shù)美國人來說款慨，退休金難題仍然是個未解之謎儒飒。

Investment policies, as well, play an important role in these problems. In 1975, I wrote a memo to Katharine Graham, then chairman of The Washington Post Company, about the pitfalls of pension promises and the importance of investment policy. That memo is reproduced on pages 118 - 136.?

退休金的投資策略也非常重要。1975年檩奠，我給時任華盛頓郵報公司董事長的凱瑟琳·格雷厄姆寫過一份備忘錄桩了，談到退休金機制的缺陷和投資策略的重要性。這部分內(nèi)容抄錄在本年報的118-136頁埠戳。

During the next decade, you will read a lot of news – bad news –about public pension plans. I hope my memo is helpful to you in understanding the necessity for prompt remedial action where problems exist.

接下來的十年井誉，你會讀到很多關(guān)于公眾退休金計劃的消息——壞消息。希望我的備忘錄有助于你理解這個問題整胃，并及時采取補救措施颗圣。

后記感悟：

1、對自己負責(zé)屁使，不能完全依賴退休金在岂，投資是一件必要的事。
2蛮寂、對自己誠實蔽午，不懂不做的話，投資的風(fēng)險實際上沒那么大酬蹋。