BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP, LTD. 810 KIEWIT PLAZA OMAHA 31, NEBRASKA

Our Performance in 1964

1964年我們的投資表現(xiàn)

Although we had an overall gain of $4,846,312.37 in 1964, it was not one of our better years as judged by our fundamental yardstick, the Dow-Jones Industrial Average (hereinafter called the "Dow"). The overall result for BPL was plus 27.8% compared to an overall plus 18.7% for the Dow. The overall result for limited partners was plus 22.3%. Both the advantage of 9.1 percentage points on a partnership basis and 3.6 points by the limited partners were the poorest since 1959, which was a year of roughly comparable gains for the Dow.

盡管我們?cè)?964年總體收益為484萬(wàn)6312.37美元，但是和我們一直以來(lái)的標(biāo)桿道瓊斯指數(shù)相比，成績(jī)并沒(méi)有那么亮眼藕漱。合伙企業(yè)總體收益為27.8%，同時(shí)期道指的收益為18.7%目派。有限合伙人的總體收益為22.3%酸舍。以合伙企業(yè)總體來(lái)計(jì)算相對(duì)道指的9.1%正收益和合伙人收益來(lái)計(jì)算的3.6%的相對(duì)正收益都是自1959年來(lái)最低。今年的確是道指收獲頗豐的一年鸳兽。

Nevertheless, I am not depressed. It was a strong year for the general market, and it is always tougher for us to outshine the Dow in such a year. We are certain to have years when the Dow gives us a drubbing and, in some respects, I feel rather fortunate that 1964 wasn't the year. Because of the problems that galloping markets pose for us, a Dow repeat in 1965 of 1964 results would make it most difficult for us to match its performance, let alone surpass it by a decent margin.

但我并不沮喪蹬叭。今年股票市場(chǎng)紅紅火火藕咏，對(duì)于我們來(lái)說(shuō)要超過(guò)道指就更加困難了。毫無(wú)疑問(wèn)道瓊斯指數(shù)會(huì)在某些年遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超過(guò)我們秽五，不過(guò)很幸運(yùn)1964年沒(méi)有孽查。如果今年市場(chǎng)還像1964年那樣上漲，我們1965年的結(jié)果將很難和它的表現(xiàn)相媲美坦喘，更別說(shuō)大幅超越了盲再。

To bring the record up to date, the following summarizes the year-by-year performance of the Dow, the performance of the Partnership before allocation to the general partner, and the limited partner's results:

下表是最新的year by year 和道指的收益對(duì)比，包括合伙企業(yè)總體收益（在分配之前）瓣铣，以及有限合伙人的收益：

收益對(duì)比

1. Based on yearly changes in the value of the Dow plus dividends that would have been received through ownership of the Dow during that year.
   收益計(jì)算基于每年的股價(jià)變化并考慮對(duì)應(yīng)的股利發(fā)放答朋；

2. For 1957-61 consists of combined results of all predecessor limited partnerships operating throughout the entire year after all expenses but before distributions to partners or allocations to the general partner.
   1957-1961年的數(shù)據(jù)包含了所有有限合伙人在扣除必要費(fèi)用后的收益率，但未算入分發(fā)給合伙人的資金或者給一般合伙人的分紅棠笑；

3. For 1957-61 computed on the basis of the preceding column of partnership results allowing for allocation to the general partner based upon the present partnership agreement, but before monthly withdrawals by limited partners.
   基于前表的數(shù)據(jù)且根據(jù)當(dāng)前合伙人協(xié)議扣除給一般合伙人配額的部分梦碗，但并不計(jì)算合伙人每個(gè)月從賬戶中的提款。

On a cumulative or compounded basis, the results are:

累積收益率如下：

累積收益率

Investment Companies

其他投資公司

We regularly compare our results with the two largest open-end investment companies (mutual funds) that follow a policy of being typically 95-100% invested in common stock, and the two largest diversified closed- end investment companies. These four companies, Massachusetts Investors Trust, Investors Stock Fund, Tri- Continental Corporation, and Lehman Corporation, manage about 30 billion investment company industry. My opinion is that their results roughly parallel those of the overwhelming majority of other investment advisory organizations which handle, in aggregate, vastly greater sums.

通常我們將自己的投資收益和兩家最大的開(kāi)放式基金（其資產(chǎn)95%-100%都在股票市場(chǎng)中）蓖救，和兩家最大的封閉式投資公司相比較洪规。這四家公司，Massachusetts Investors Trust, Investors Stock Fund, Tri- Continental Corp., and Lehman Corp., 總共管理了超過(guò)了45億美金的資產(chǎn)循捺，投資者達(dá)到55萬(wàn)人斩例，可以認(rèn)為是當(dāng)前300億美金投資行業(yè)的典型代表。我的觀點(diǎn)是除了總體規(guī)模差別外从橘，這四家公司應(yīng)該與絕大多數(shù)其他投資咨詢機(jī)構(gòu)的表現(xiàn)大致相當(dāng)念赶。

The purpose of this tabulation, which is shown below, is to illustrate that the Dow is no pushover as an index of investment achievement. The advisory talent managing just the four companies shown commands annual fees of over $8 million and this represents a very small fraction of the professional investment management industry. The public batting average of this highly-paid and widely respected talent indicates performance a shade below that of the Dow, an unmanaged index.

羅列這些資訊是為了證明超越道指并非易事础钠。僅僅這四家公司才華橫溢的基金經(jīng)理收的管理費(fèi)每年就將近800萬(wàn)美元，而這只是專業(yè)投資管理行業(yè)的冰山一角叉谜。這些高薪廣受尊敬的基金人才忙活出來(lái)的收益率還沒(méi)有一個(gè)被動(dòng)指數(shù)好旗吁。

年收益表

復(fù)利表

The repetition of these tables has caused partners to ask: "Why in the world does this happen to managements working with (1) bright, energetic staff people, (2) virtually unlimited resources, (3) the most extensive business contacts, and (4) literally centuries of aggregate investment experience?" (The latter qualification brings to mind the fellow who applied for a job and stated he had twenty years of experience - which was corrected by the former employer to read “one year's experience -twenty times.”)

這些重復(fù)的表格讓各位股東不禁提問(wèn)，這些投資管理機(jī)構(gòu)到底怎么了停局，雇員都是聰明絕頂精力旺盛的人阵漏，基本上無(wú)窮無(wú)盡的資源，最廣泛的業(yè)務(wù)聯(lián)系翻具，和快百年的投資積累經(jīng)驗(yàn)。（其實(shí)這些經(jīng)驗(yàn)讓我想起申請(qǐng)工作并稱他有20年經(jīng)驗(yàn)的人--前雇主將其更正為將一年的經(jīng)驗(yàn)重復(fù)了20次）

This question is of enormous importance, and you would expect it to be the subject of considerable study by investment managers and substantial investors. After all, each percentage point on 300 million per year. Curiously enough, there is practically nothing in the literature of Wall Street attracting this problem, and discussion of it is virtually absent at security analyst society meetings, conventions, seminars, etc. My opinion is that the first job of any investment management organization is to analyze its own techniques and results before pronouncing judgment on the managerial abilities and performance of the major corporate entities of the United States.

這個(gè)問(wèn)題十分重要回还，你會(huì)覺(jué)得這個(gè)問(wèn)題很值得投資經(jīng)理和大量投資者去研究裆泳。畢竟，300 億美元的每個(gè)百分點(diǎn)就是每年 3 億美元柠硕。不過(guò)奇怪的是工禾，對(duì)于這個(gè)問(wèn)題的在華爾街任何文獻(xiàn)中都沒(méi)有提及，并且在證券分析師協(xié)會(huì)會(huì)議蝗柔，研討會(huì)等也無(wú)人提及闻葵。我的觀點(diǎn)是首先是各個(gè)投資管理公司自己分析他們自己的投資方法和收益結(jié)果，然后再對(duì)美國(guó)各個(gè)實(shí)業(yè)家的管理能力吹毛求疵癣丧。

In the great majority of cases the lack of performance exceeding or even matching an unmanaged index in no way reflects lack of either intellectual capacity or integrity. I think it is much more the product of: (1) group decisions - my perhaps jaundiced view is that it is close to impossible for outstanding investment management to come from a group of any size with all parties really participating in decisions; (2) a desire to conform to the policies and (to an extent) the portfolios of other large well-regarded organizations; (3) an institutional framework whereby average is "safe" and the personal rewards for independent action are in no way commensurate with the general risk attached to such action; (4) an adherence to certain diversification practices which are irrational; and finally and importantly, (5) inertia.

大多數(shù)情況下槽畔，投資收益無(wú)法超越甚至和被動(dòng)指數(shù)持平并非智力不足或者缺乏誠(chéng)信。我認(rèn)為這更多是由于（1）集體決策--我個(gè)人有可能帶有偏見(jiàn)的觀點(diǎn)是胁编，優(yōu)秀的投資管理幾乎不可能是來(lái)自于任何規(guī)模的團(tuán)體厢钧，并且團(tuán)體中各方都參與到了決策中；（2）期望和其他大型投資管理公司投資組合一致的沖動(dòng)嬉橙；（3）在一種提倡平均至上的組織結(jié)構(gòu)中早直，特立獨(dú)行的獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)和承受的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)不相稱；（4）對(duì)于分散投資行為的不合理的執(zhí)念市框；最后也是最重要的霞扬，（5）懶。

Perhaps the above comments are unjust. Perhaps even our statistical comparisons are unjust. Both our portfolio and method of operation differ substantially from the investment companies in the table. However, I believe both our partners and their stockholders feel their managements are seeking the same goal - the maximum long- term average return on capital obtainable with the minimum risk of permanent loss consistent with a program of continuous investment in equities. Since we should have common goals, and most partners, as an alternative to their interest in BPL, would probably have their funds invested in media producing results comparable with these investment companies, I feel their performance record is meaningful in judging our own results.

也許上述的評(píng)論是不公平的枫振，甚至我們統(tǒng)計(jì)對(duì)比的數(shù)據(jù)也是不公平的喻圃。我們投資組合以及運(yùn)作方法和上表中的投資公司完全不同。但是蒋得，我相信我們的合伙人和股東都是為了同一個(gè)目標(biāo)级及，尋求長(zhǎng)期平均收益的最大化，和最小化永久損失的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)额衙。既然我們目標(biāo)一樣饮焦，而且大多數(shù)人在投資BPL之外也會(huì)將他們的資金投入到和這些投資公司收益相似的標(biāo)的中怕吴。因此把業(yè)績(jī)拿來(lái)對(duì)比一下也很有意義。

There is no question that an important service is provided to investors by investment companies, investment advisors, trust departments, etc. This service revolves around the attainment of adequate diversification, the preservation of a long-term outlook, the ease of handling investment decisions and mechanics, and most importantly, the avoidance of the patently inferior investment techniques which seem to entice some individuals. All but a few of the organizations do not specifically promise to deliver superior investment performance although it is perhaps not unreasonable for the public to draw such an inference from their advertised emphasis on professional management.

投資管理公司县踢，投資經(jīng)理人转绷，信托公司等等，他們提供的服務(wù)都很重要硼啤。這些服務(wù)圍繞充分多樣化议经，保持長(zhǎng)期投資觀點(diǎn)，簡(jiǎn)化投資決策和方法谴返，并且最重要的是防止個(gè)人濫用某些似乎吸引人但是其實(shí)拙劣的投資技術(shù)煞肾。除了少數(shù)幾個(gè)組織外，所有組織都沒(méi)有特別承諾提供卓越的投資業(yè)績(jī)嗓袱，盡管公眾從他們宣傳的對(duì)專業(yè)管理的強(qiáng)調(diào)中得出這樣的推論也許并非不合理籍救。

One thing I pledge to you as partners - just as I consider the previously stated performance comparison to be meaningful now, so will I in future years, no, matter what tale unfolds. Correspondingly, I ask that you, if you do not feel such a standard to be relevant, register such disagreement now and suggest other standards which can be applied prospectively rather than retrospectively.

作為合伙人，我向各位承諾一件事渠抹，我對(duì)投資收益對(duì)比有重大意義這個(gè)觀點(diǎn)現(xiàn)在和未來(lái)都不會(huì)改變蝙昙，無(wú)論以后發(fā)生什么。相應(yīng)地梧却，如果各位覺(jué)得這種對(duì)比毫不相關(guān)奇颠，請(qǐng)立即投票反對(duì)并且提供一個(gè)可以具有前瞻性的對(duì)比方法，而非后視鏡的方法放航。

One additional thought - I have not included a column in my table for the most widely-used investment advisor in the world - Bell management. People who watch their weight, golf scores, and fuel bills seem to shun quantitative evaluation of their investment management skills although it involves the most important client in the world - themselves. While it may be of academic interest to evaluate the management accomplishments of Massachusetts Investors Trust or Lehman Corporation, it is of enormous dollars-and-cents importance to evaluate objectively the accomplishments of the fellow who is actually handling your money - even if it’s you.

還有一個(gè)想法烈拒，我的對(duì)比表中沒(méi)有包含當(dāng)前使用最廣泛的投資顧問(wèn)--Bell management。人們關(guān)注體重三椿，高爾夫成績(jī)和燃油費(fèi)用缺菌，卻似乎回避了對(duì)他們投資管理技能的量化評(píng)估，盡管這關(guān)系到世界上最重要的客戶搜锰，他們自己伴郁。雖然評(píng)估馬薩諸塞州投資者信托基金或雷曼公司的管理成就可能具有學(xué)術(shù)意義，但客觀地評(píng)估實(shí)際處理您資金的人的成績(jī)（即使是您本人）非常重要蛋叼。

The Question of Conservatism

關(guān)于保守的問(wèn)題

In looking at the table of investment company performance, the question might be asked: “Yes, but aren't those companies run more conservatively than the Partnership?" If you asked that question of the investment company managements, they, in absolute honesty, would say they were more conservative. If you asked the first hundred security analysts you met, I am sure that a very large majority of them also would answer for the investment companies. I would disagree. I have over 90% of my net worth in BPL, and most of my family have percentages in that area, but of course, that only demonstrates the sincerity of my view - not the validity of it.

當(dāng)看到投資管理公司的表現(xiàn)之后焊傅，很自然會(huì)有人問(wèn)：”沒(méi)錯(cuò)，但是這難道不是因?yàn)橥顿Y公司的運(yùn)營(yíng)比合伙企業(yè)更加保守嗎狈涮？“ 如果你拿這個(gè)問(wèn)題問(wèn)管理公司狐胎，毫無(wú)疑問(wèn)保守是唯一的答案。如果相同的問(wèn)題去問(wèn)任何一百個(gè)股票分析師歌馍，我也相信絕大多數(shù)人也會(huì)為投資管理公司說(shuō)話握巢。不過(guò)我不同意，我的凈資產(chǎn)90%在BPL松却，而且我家人大多數(shù)都在合伙企業(yè)中有股份暴浦。不過(guò)這只能證明我的話是真誠(chéng)的溅话，并不一定是對(duì)的。

It is unquestionably true that the investment companies have their money more conventionally invested than we do. To many people conventionality is indistinguishable from conservatism. In my view, this represents erroneous thinking. Neither a conventional nor an unconventional approach, per se, is conservative.

毫無(wú)疑問(wèn)歌焦，投資公司投資資金的方式比我們更傳統(tǒng)飞几。 對(duì)許多人來(lái)說(shuō)，傳統(tǒng)與保守沒(méi)有區(qū)別独撇。 在我看來(lái)屑墨，這代表了錯(cuò)誤的想法。 無(wú)論是傳統(tǒng)的還是非常規(guī)的方法本身纷铣，都不是保守的卵史。

Truly conservative actions arise from intelligent hypotheses, correct facts and sound reasoning. These qualities may lead to conventional acts, but there have been many times when they have led to unorthodoxy. In some corner of the world they are probably still holding regular meetings of the Flat Earth Society.

真正保守的行動(dòng)源于明智的假設(shè)、正確的事實(shí)和合理的推理搜立。 這些品質(zhì)可能會(huì)導(dǎo)致傳統(tǒng)行為程腹，但也有很多時(shí)候它們會(huì)導(dǎo)致非正統(tǒng)的行為。 在世界的某個(gè)角落儒拂，可能還有某個(gè)“地球是平的”團(tuán)體在舉行定期集會(huì)。

We derive no comfort because important people, vocal people, or great numbers of people agree with us. Nor do we derive comfort if they don't. A public opinion poll is no substitute for thought. When we really sit back with a smile on our face is when we run into a situation we can understand, where the facts are ascertainable and clear, and the course of action obvious. In that case - whether other conventional or unconventional - whether others agree or disagree - we feel - we are progressing in a conservative manner.

我們不應(yīng)懈怠色鸳，因?yàn)橛泻芏嗳诉x擇相信我們社痛。反過(guò)來(lái)，如果沒(méi)人相信則更應(yīng)該努力命雀。民意測(cè)驗(yàn)并不能代替獨(dú)立思考蒜哀。除非我們處于一個(gè)能夠完全理解的環(huán)境之中，各個(gè)事實(shí)是清楚確定的吏砂，事物行動(dòng)的過(guò)程是顯而易見(jiàn)的情況下撵儿，才能真正的放松。在那種情況下狐血，不管是否墨守成規(guī)淀歇，或者其他人是否同意，都會(huì)覺(jué)得我們是在保守地進(jìn)行運(yùn)作匈织。

The above may seem highly subjective. It is. You should prefer an objective approach to the question. I do. My suggestion as to one rational way to evaluate the conservativeness of past policies is to study performance in declining markets. We have only three years of declining markets in our table and unfortunately (for purposes of this test only) they were all moderate declines. In all three of these years we achieved appreciably better investment results than any of the more conventional portfolios.

上面的描述看起來(lái)很主觀浪默。的確如此。各位應(yīng)該選擇一個(gè)客觀公正的方法缀匕。對(duì)于如何判斷投資方法是否保守纳决，我的建議是研究這個(gè)方法在下跌市場(chǎng)中的收益如何。在下表中只有三年是是下跌市場(chǎng)乡小，而且很不幸都是輕微下跌阔加。在這三年的對(duì)比中，我們的投資收益明顯要好于任何傳統(tǒng)的投資方法满钟。

Specifically, if those three years had occurred in sequence, the cumulative results would have been:

特別要指出胜榔，如果這三年是連續(xù)發(fā)生的胳喷，累積收益將會(huì)是：

收益對(duì)比

We don’t think this comparison is all important, but we do think it has some relevance. We certainly think it makes more sense than saying “We own (regardless of price) A.T. &T., General Electric, IBM and General Motors and are therefore conservative.” In any event, evaluation of the conservatism of any investment program or management (including self-management) should be based upon rational objective standards, and I suggest performance in declining markets to be at least one meaningful test.

雖然這種對(duì)比不是決定性的，但是這其中確實(shí)能說(shuō)明一些規(guī)律苗分⊙岜危總比那些說(shuō)著“我們（無(wú)論成本）有AT&T ， 通用摔癣，IBM股票奴饮，所以我們是傳統(tǒng)的投資方法“ 要來(lái)著合理。在任何情況下择浊，判斷投資方法或者投資管理的保守程度應(yīng)該基于一個(gè)相對(duì)客觀的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)戴卜。我建議把在下跌市場(chǎng)中投資組合表現(xiàn)納入對(duì)比是一個(gè)很有意義的測(cè)試方法。

The Joys of Compounding

復(fù)利的魔力

Readers of our early annual letters registered discontent at a mere recital of contemporary investment experience, but instead hungered for the intellectual stimulation that only could be provided by a depth study of investment strategy spanning the centuries. Hence, this section.
早期年度信的讀者對(duì)僅僅展示當(dāng)代的投資經(jīng)驗(yàn)已經(jīng)不滿琢岩，而是希望在深挖跨越數(shù)個(gè)世紀(jì)的投資策略上獲得知識(shí)上的激勵(lì)投剥。因此，我為大家?guī)?lái)這個(gè)章節(jié)担孔。

Our last two excursions into the mythology of financial expertise have revealed that purportedly shrewd investments by Isabella (backing the voyage of Columbus) and Francis I (original purchase of Mona Lisa) bordered on fiscal lunacy. Apologists for these parties have presented an array of sentimental trivia. Through it all, our compounding tables have not been dented by attack.

我們最近兩次對(duì)金融專業(yè)神話的探索表明江锨，據(jù)稱伊莎貝拉（支持哥倫布的航行）和弗朗西斯一世（最初購(gòu)買蒙娜麗莎）的近乎瘋狂的投資。他們支持者們卻羅列了許多無(wú)關(guān)痛癢的瑣事為其辯護(hù)糕篇。但是即便如此啄育，還是無(wú)法改變復(fù)利表的結(jié)果。

Nevertheless, one criticism has stung a bit. The charge has been made that this column has acquired a negative tone with only the financial incompetents of history receiving comment. We have been challenged to record on these pages a story of financial perspicacity which will be a bench mark of brilliance down through the ages.

然而拌消，有一條評(píng)論值得注意挑豌。有人指責(zé)我們只評(píng)論歷史上財(cái)務(wù)無(wú)能的人。讀者要求羅列一些富有財(cái)務(wù)洞察力的故事墩崩，這些故事可以成為歷史上財(cái)務(wù)輝煌的標(biāo)桿氓英。

One story stands out. This, of course, is the saga of trading acumen etched into history by the Manhattan Indians when they unloaded their island to that notorious spendthrift, Peter Minuit in 1626. My understanding is that they received 24 net. For this, Minuit received 22.3 square miles which works out to about 621,688,320 square feet. While on the basis of comparable sales, it is difficult to arrive at a precise appraisal, a 20 per square foot estimate seems reasonable giving a current land value for the island of 12,433,766,400 (12 1/2 billion). To the novice, perhaps this sounds like a decent deal. However, the Indians have only had to achieve a 6 1/2% return (The tribal mutual fund representative would have promised them this.) to obtain the last laugh on Minuit. At 6 1/2%, 24 becomes 42,105,772,800 (42 billion) in 338 years, and if they just managed to squeeze out an extra half point to get to 7%, the present value becomes $205 billion.

一個(gè)故事值得一說(shuō)。 當(dāng)然鹦筹，這銘記史冊(cè)的智慧傳奇交易是曼哈頓印第安人在 1626 年將他們的島嶼交給臭名昭著的揮霍無(wú)度的彼得·米努伊特（Peter Minuit）铝阐。我的理解是，他們收到了 24 美元的凈收入铐拐。 為此饰迹，Minuit 獲得了 22.3 平方英里的面積，約合 621,688,320 平方英尺余舶。 雖然僅僅依據(jù)現(xiàn)有的交易信息啊鸭，很難得出精確的評(píng)估，但我們可以合理估計(jì)地價(jià)為每平方英尺 20 美元匿值，那么該島目前的土地價(jià)值為 12,433,766,400 美元（12.5 億美元）赠制。 對(duì)新手來(lái)說(shuō)，這聽(tīng)起來(lái)像是一筆不錯(cuò)的交易。 然而钟些，印第安人只需要獲得 6.5% 的回報(bào)（部落共同基金代表會(huì)向他們承諾這一點(diǎn)烟号。）就可以在 Minuit 上笑到最后。 在 收益率為6.5% 時(shí)政恍，24 美元在 338 年內(nèi)變成了 42,105,772,800 美元（420 億美元）汪拥，如果他們只是設(shè)法擠出一個(gè)額外的半個(gè)點(diǎn)達(dá)到 7%，現(xiàn)值將變?yōu)?2050 億美元篙耗。

復(fù)合收益

This table indicates the financial advantages of:
這個(gè)表展示了如何獲得投資上的優(yōu)勢(shì)

1. A long life (in the erudite vocabulary of the financial sophisticate this is referred to as the Methusalah Technique)
   活得夠久
2. A high compound rate
   收益率夠高
3. A combination of both (especially recommended by this author)
   以上兩者結(jié)合

Our Goal

我們的目標(biāo)

You will note that there are no columns in the preceding table for the 27.7% average of the Partnership during its eight-year lifespan or the 22.3% average of the limited partners. Such figures are nonsensical for the long term for several reasons: (Don't worry about me "holding back" to substantiate this prophecy.)
各位會(huì)發(fā)現(xiàn)上圖中并未將合伙企業(yè)27.7% 的年化收益和22.3%的有限合伙人收益率加入對(duì)比迫筑。從長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)來(lái)看，這些數(shù)字是荒謬的宗弯，原因如下：（不要擔(dān)心我會(huì)“回避”來(lái)證實(shí)這個(gè)預(yù)言脯燃。）

1. Any significant sums compounded at such rates take on national debt proportions at alarming speed.
   任何以這樣的復(fù)利增長(zhǎng)的大筆款項(xiàng)都將以驚人的速度占有國(guó)家債務(wù)。

2. During our eight-year history a general revaluation of securities has produced average annual rates of overall gain from the whole common stock field which I believe unattainable in future decades. Over a span of 20 or 30 years, I would expect something more like 6% - 7% overall annual gain from the Dow instead of the 11.1% during our brief history. This factor alone would tend to knock 4 points or so off of our annual compounding rate. It would only take a minus 20.5% year in 1965 for the Dow to bring it down to a 7% average figure for the nine years. Such years (or worse) should definitely be expected from time to time by those holding equity investments. If a 20% or 30% drop in the market value of your equity holdings (such as BPL) is going to produce emotional or financial distress, you should simply avoid common stock type investments. In the words of the poet - Harry Truman – “If you can’t stand the heat, stay out of the kitchen. It is preferable, of course, to consider the problem before you enter the “kitchen.”
   在我們合伙企業(yè)的這八年蒙保，股票市場(chǎng)的價(jià)值重估導(dǎo)致提高了股市的平均收益率辕棚，這個(gè)現(xiàn)象我相信未來(lái)幾十年不會(huì)持續(xù)下去。以20-30年的時(shí)間跨度來(lái)看邓厕，我估計(jì)道指的年化收益將在6%-7%而非這幾年的11.1%逝嚎。僅僅這一項(xiàng)就將收益率降低了4個(gè)百分點(diǎn)。道指在 1965 年只需要負(fù)收益 20.5% 就會(huì)將其 9 年的平均收益降到 7%详恼。作為投資者懈糯，我們絕對(duì)應(yīng)該準(zhǔn)備這種（甚至更糟）情況的隨時(shí)發(fā)生。如果您持有的股票（例如 BPL）的市值下跌 20% 或 30% 會(huì)對(duì)您產(chǎn)生情緒或財(cái)務(wù)困境单雾，您應(yīng)該避免普通股類型的投資。用詩(shī)人哈里·杜魯門(mén)的話來(lái)說(shuō)——“如果你受不了高溫她紫，就不要去廚房硅堆。當(dāng)然，最好在進(jìn)入“廚房”之前考慮好贿讹。

3. We do not consider it possible on an extended basis to maintain the 16.6 percentage point advantage over the Dow of the Partnership or the 11.2 percentage point edge enjoyed by the limited partners. We have had eight consecutive years in which our pool of money has out-performed the Dow, although the profit allocation arrangement left the limited partners short of Dow results in one of those years. We are certain to have years (note the plural) when the Partnership results fall short of the Dow despite considerable gnashing of teeth by the general partner (I hope not too much by the limited partners). When that happens our average margin of superiority will drop sharply. I might say that I also think we will continue to have some years of very decent margins in our favor. However, to date we have benefited by the fact that we have not had a really mediocre (or worse) year included in our average, and this obviously cannot be expected to be a permanent experience.
   我們認(rèn)為不可能長(zhǎng)期保持對(duì)合伙企業(yè)道瓊斯指數(shù) 16.6 個(gè)百分點(diǎn)的優(yōu)勢(shì)或有限合伙人享有的 11.2 個(gè)百分點(diǎn)的優(yōu)勢(shì)渐逃。 我們連續(xù)八年的資金池表現(xiàn)優(yōu)于道瓊斯指數(shù)，盡管利潤(rùn)分配安排使有限合伙人在其中一年未能達(dá)到道瓊斯指數(shù)的業(yè)績(jī)民褂。 盡管普通合伙人（我希望有限合伙人不要太多）咬牙切齒茄菊，但我們肯定會(huì)有幾年（注意復(fù)數(shù)）合伙企業(yè)的結(jié)果低于道瓊斯指數(shù)。 當(dāng)這種情況發(fā)生時(shí)赊堪，我們的平均優(yōu)勢(shì)幅度將急劇下降面殖。 我可能會(huì)說(shuō)，我也認(rèn)為我們將繼續(xù)擁有對(duì)我們有利的幾年非晨蘖可觀的利潤(rùn)脊僚。 然而，這都是因?yàn)槠駷橹刮覀兪芤嬗谶@樣一個(gè)事實(shí)遵绰，即我們從未經(jīng)歷過(guò)收益水平真正平平無(wú)奇（或更糟）辽幌，顯然不可能永遠(yuǎn)這樣增淹。

So what can we expect to achieve? Of course, anything I might say is largely guesswork, and my own investment philosophy has developed around the theory that prophecy reveals far more of the frailties of the prophet than it reveals of the future.

那么我們可以期望實(shí)現(xiàn)什么？ 當(dāng)然乌企，我可能說(shuō)的任何事情在很大程度上都是猜測(cè)虑润，而我自己的投資哲學(xué)是圍繞這樣一種理論發(fā)展起來(lái)的，即預(yù)言揭示的先知的弱點(diǎn)遠(yuǎn)比它揭示的未來(lái)要多加酵。

Nevertheless, you, as partners, are entitled to know my expectations, tenuous as they may be. I am hopeful that our longer term experience will unfold along the following basis:

盡管如此拳喻，作為合作伙伴，你們有權(quán)了解我的期望虽画，盡管它們可能很微不足道舞蔽。 我希望我們的長(zhǎng)期經(jīng)驗(yàn)將在以下基礎(chǔ)上展開(kāi)：

1. An overall gain from the Dow (including dividends, of course) averaging in the area of 7% per annum, exhibiting customarily wide amplitudes in achieving this average -- say, on the order or minus 40% to plus 50% at the extremes with the majority of years in the minus 10% to plus 20% range;
   道瓊斯指數(shù)的整體收益（當(dāng)然包括股息）平均在每年增長(zhǎng) 7% 的范圍內(nèi)，在達(dá)到這個(gè)平均水平時(shí)表現(xiàn)出慣常的震蕩——比如說(shuō)码撰，大約大多數(shù)年份處于負(fù) 10% 至正 20% 范圍內(nèi)并伴有負(fù) 40% 到正 50% 之間的極端情況渗柿；

2. An average advantage of ten percentage points per annum for BPL before allocation to the general partner - again with large amplitudes in the margin from perhaps 10 percentage points worse than the Dow in a bad year to 25 percentage points better when everything clicks;
   在分配給普通合伙人之前，BPL 平均每年有 10 個(gè)百分點(diǎn)的優(yōu)勢(shì)——同樣脖岛，利潤(rùn)率震蕩的幅度也很大朵栖，從糟糕的一年可能比道瓊斯指數(shù)差 10 個(gè)百分點(diǎn)，當(dāng)一切順利時(shí)柴梆，比道瓊斯指數(shù)好 25 個(gè)百分點(diǎn)陨溅；

3. The product of these two assumptions gives an average of 17% to BPL or about 14% to limited partners. This figure would vary enormously from year to year; the final amplitudes, of course, depending, on the interplay of the extremes hypothesized in (1) and (2).
   這兩個(gè)假設(shè)的乘積平均給 BPL 17% 或給有限合伙人約 14%。 這個(gè)數(shù)字每年都會(huì)有很大的不同绍在； 當(dāng)然门扇，最終幅度取決于（1）和（2）中假設(shè)的極值的相互作用。

I would like to emphasize that the above is conjecture, perhaps heavily influenced by self-interest, ego, etc. Anyone with a sense of financial history knows this sort of guesswork is subject to enormous error. It might better be left out of this letter, but it is a question frequently and legitimately asked by partners. Long-range expectable return is the primary consideration of all of us belonging to BPL, and it is reasonable that I should be put on record, foolish as that may later make me appear. My rather puritanical view is that any investment manager, whether operating as broker, investment counselor, trust department, Investment Company, etc., should be willing to state unequivocally what he is going to attempt to accomplish and how he proposes to measure the extent to which he gets the job done.

我要強(qiáng)調(diào)的是偿渡，以上是猜想臼寄，可能受自身利益、自我等因素的影響很大溜宽。任何對(duì)金融歷史有了解的人都知道吉拳，這種猜測(cè)的誤差很大。 在這封信中最好不要提及它适揉，但這個(gè)問(wèn)題合作伙伴經(jīng)常提及留攒，并且他們有權(quán)知道我的答案。遠(yuǎn)期預(yù)期收益是我們所有屬于BPL的人的首要考慮嫉嘀，這應(yīng)該被記錄在案炼邀，因?yàn)殡y免我以后會(huì)做什么蠢事。我清教徒似的觀點(diǎn)是剪侮，任何投資經(jīng)理汤善，無(wú)論是作為經(jīng)紀(jì)人、投資顧問(wèn)、信托部門(mén)红淡、投資公司等不狮，都應(yīng)該愿意明確說(shuō)明他將試圖完成什么以及建議如何衡量他完成了這些。

Our Method of Operation

我們的運(yùn)營(yíng)方法

In past annual letters I have always utilized three categories to describe investment operations we conduct. I now feel that a four-category division is more appropriate. Partially, the addition of a new section - "Generals Relatively Undervalued" - reflects my further consideration of essential differences that have always existed to a small extent with our "Generals" group. Partially, it reflects the growing importance of what once was a very small sub-category but is now a much more significant part of our total portfolio. This increasing importance has been accompanied by excellent results to date justifying significant time and effort devoted to finding additional opportunities in this area. Finally, it partially reflects the development and implementation of a new and somewhat unique investment technique designed to improve the expectancy and consistency of operations in this category. Therefore, our four present categories are:

在過(guò)去的年度信件中在旱，我總是使用三個(gè)類別來(lái)描述我們進(jìn)行的投資業(yè)務(wù)摇零。 我現(xiàn)在覺(jué)得四類劃分比較合適。 增加了一個(gè)新的分類——“相對(duì)被低估的股票”——反映了我對(duì)與股票分類中一直存在的本質(zhì)差異的進(jìn)一步考慮桶蝎。 在某種程度上驻仅，它反映了曾經(jīng)是一個(gè)非常小的子類別但現(xiàn)在已成為我們總投資組合中更重要的一部分并且其重要性日益增加。
這種日益增長(zhǎng)的重要性伴隨著迄今為止的出色收益登渣，使得投入大量時(shí)間和精力在該領(lǐng)域?qū)ふ腋鄼C(jī)會(huì)是非常合理的噪服。 最后，它部分反映了一種新的胜茧、有些獨(dú)特的投資技術(shù)的開(kāi)發(fā)粘优，旨在提高該類別業(yè)務(wù)的預(yù)期和一致性。 因此呻顽，我們目前的四個(gè)類別是：

1. “Generals -Private Owner Basis” - a category of generally undervalued stocks, determined by quantitative standards, but with considerable attention also paid to the qualitative factor. There is often little or nothing to indicate immediate market improvement. The issues lack glamour or market sponsorship. Their main qualification is a bargain price; that is, an overall valuation of the enterprise substantially below what careful analysis indicates its value to a private owner to be. Again, let me emphasize that while the quantitative comes first and is essential, the qualitative is important. We like good management - we like a decent industry - we like a certain amount of “ferment” in a previously dormant management or stockholder group. But, we demand value.
   "股票 - 基于私有的目的" - 一類通常意義上的低估股票雹顺，通過(guò)一些定量的方法篩選而出，不過(guò)仍然要經(jīng)過(guò)定性分析廊遍。這類股票通常短期內(nèi)很難有股價(jià)提升嬉愧。問(wèn)題在于這些股票缺乏魅力或市場(chǎng)贊助。 他們的主要優(yōu)點(diǎn)是便宜的價(jià)格喉前； 也就是說(shuō)没酣，企業(yè)的總體估值大大低于仔細(xì)分析表明其對(duì)私人所有者的價(jià)值。 讓我再次強(qiáng)調(diào)卵迂，雖然定量是第一位的并且是必不可少的裕便，但定性是重要的。 我們喜歡良好的管理——我們喜歡一個(gè)體面的行業(yè)——我們喜歡在以前休眠的管理層或股東群體中進(jìn)行一定程度的“發(fā)酵”狭握。 但是，我們要求價(jià)值疯溺。
   Many times in this category we have the desirable "two strings to our bow" situation where we should either achieve appreciation of market prices from external factors or from the acquisition of a controlling position in a business at a bargain price. While the former happens in the overwhelming majority of cases, the latter represents an insurance policy most investment operations don't have. We have continued to enlarge the positions in the three companies described in our 1964 midyear report where we are the largest stockholder. All three companies are increasing their fundamental value at a very satisfactory rate, and we are completely passive in two situations and active only on a very minor scale in the third. It is unlikely that we will ever take a really active part in policy-making in any of these three companies, but we stand ready if needed.
   很多時(shí)候论颅，在這個(gè)類別中，我們有理想的互為補(bǔ)充的方案囱嫩，要么通過(guò)外部因素實(shí)現(xiàn)市場(chǎng)價(jià)格的升值恃疯，要么通過(guò)以低廉的價(jià)格獲得企業(yè)的控制權(quán)。 雖然前者發(fā)生在絕大多數(shù)情況下墨闲，但后者代表了大多數(shù)投資業(yè)務(wù)所沒(méi)有的保險(xiǎn)策略今妄。 我們繼續(xù)擴(kuò)大我們?cè)?1964 年年中報(bào)告中描述的三家公司的頭寸，成為最大的股東。 這三個(gè)公司都在以非常令人滿意的速度增加它們的基本價(jià)值盾鳞，我們?cè)趦煞N情況下完全被動(dòng)犬性，在第三家公司只有稍微參與管理。 我們不太可能真正積極參與這三家公司中的任何一家的政策制定腾仅，但如果需要乒裆，我們隨時(shí)準(zhǔn)備就緒。

2. "Generals -Relatively Undervalued" - this category consists of securities selling at prices relatively cheap compared to securities of the same general quality. We demand substantial discrepancies from current valuation standards, but (usually because of large size) do not feel value to a private owner to be a meaningful concept. It is important in this category, of course, that apples be compared to apples - and not to oranges, and we work hard at achieving that end. In the great majority of cases we simply do not know enough about the industry or company to come to sensible judgments -in that situation we pass.
   “股票 - 相對(duì)低估” - 此類別是一些股價(jià)要相對(duì)低于同類別的股票推励。我們要求這類股票的估值和標(biāo)準(zhǔn)有巨大的利差鹤耍，但是（通常是因?yàn)楣疽?guī)模）將這家公司私有化卻不是一個(gè)合理的選擇。在這個(gè)類別中验辞，這點(diǎn)很重要稿黄。因?yàn)槲覀兣οＭ茉谙嗤悇e中進(jìn)行對(duì)比。而在絕大多數(shù)情況下跌造，我們對(duì)行業(yè)或者公司的了解不足從而無(wú)法作出明確的判斷 --- 這種情況下杆怕，我們就略過(guò)這家公司。
   As mentioned earlier, this new category has been growing and has produced very satisfactory results. We have recently begun to implement a technique, which gives promise of very substantially reducing the risk from an overall change in valuation standards; e.g. I we buy something at 12 times earnings when comparable or poorer quality companies sell at 20 times earnings, but then a major revaluation takes place so the latter only sell at 10 times.
   如前所述鼻听，這項(xiàng)新的類別資金總量正在增長(zhǎng)财著，而且產(chǎn)生了很好的收益。我們最近開(kāi)始實(shí)施一項(xiàng)技術(shù)撑碴，該技術(shù)有望大大降低估值標(biāo)準(zhǔn)整體變化帶來(lái)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)撑教；例如當(dāng)某個(gè)可對(duì)比的業(yè)績(jī)較差的公司股價(jià)為20倍市盈率時(shí)，我們以此為參考在PE為12的時(shí)候購(gòu)買了另一家公司醉拓，但是由于市場(chǎng)發(fā)生重大的重估伟姐，對(duì)標(biāo)公司的市盈率為10了，那么我們就“買貴了”亿卤。
   This risk has always bothered us enormously because of the helpless position in which we could be left compared to the "Generals -Private Owner" or "Workouts" types. With this risk diminished, we think this category has a promising future.
   這種風(fēng)險(xiǎn)一直困擾著我們愤兵，因?yàn)榕c“股票-私有化”或“套利”類型相比，我們可能處于被動(dòng)的境地排吴。 但隨著這種風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的降低秆乳，我們認(rèn)為這個(gè)類別有一個(gè)充滿希望的未來(lái)。

3. "Workouts" - these are the securities with a timetable. They arise from corporate activity - sell-outs, mergers, reorganizations, spin-offs, etc. In this category we are not talking about rumors or "inside information" pertaining to such developments, but to publicly announced activities of this sort. We wait until we can read it in the paper. The risk pertains not primarily to general market behavior (although that is sometimes tied in to a degree), but instead to something upsetting the applecart so that the expected development does not materialize. Such killjoys could include anti-trust or other negative government action, stockholder disapproval, withholding of tax rulings, etc. The gross profits in many workouts appear quite small. It's a little like looking for parking meters with some time left on them. However, the predictability coupled with a short holding period produces quite decent average annual rates of return after allowance for the occasional substantial loss. This category produces more steady absolute profits from year to year than generals do. In years of market decline it should usually pile up a big edge for us; during bull markets it will probably be a drag on performance. On a long-term basis, I expect the workouts to achieve the same sort of margin over the Dow attained by generals.
   ”套利“ - 這些是有時(shí)間操作表的股票钻哩。它們來(lái)自公司活動(dòng)——出售屹堰、合并、重組街氢、分拆等扯键。在這一類別中，我們不是在談?wù)撆c此類發(fā)展有關(guān)的謠言或“內(nèi)幕消息”珊肃，而是公開(kāi)宣布的活動(dòng)荣刑。我們等到可以在報(bào)紙上看到消息后再行動(dòng)馅笙。風(fēng)險(xiǎn)并不主要來(lái)自于一般市場(chǎng)（盡管有時(shí)在一定程度上與此相關(guān)），而是有些行為讓政府不滿意厉亏，從而讓該商業(yè)活動(dòng)無(wú)法實(shí)現(xiàn)董习。這樣的掃興的緣由可能包括反壟斷或者其他政府反對(duì)的行為，股東不贊成叶堆，或者稅務(wù)問(wèn)題等等阱飘。大多數(shù)的套利純利潤(rùn)很少。這有點(diǎn)像找那種還剩一點(diǎn)時(shí)間的停車計(jì)時(shí)器虱颗。然而沥匈，由于這種套利的收益可以預(yù)測(cè)并且周轉(zhuǎn)時(shí)間短，在將偶爾的重大損失計(jì)算入內(nèi)后忘渔，其平均年回報(bào)率仍然不錯(cuò)高帖。而且他要比股票的收益更加穩(wěn)定。從長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)來(lái)看畦粮，我希望套利類別可以達(dá)到和股票投資一樣高于道指的收益雳灵。

4. "Controls" - these are rarities, but when they occur they are likely to be of significant size. Unless we start off with the purchase of a sizable block of stock, controls develop from the general - private owner category. They result from situations where a cheap security does nothing pricewise for such an extended period of time that we are able to buy a significant percentage of the company's stock. At that point we are probably in a position to assume a degree of or perhaps complete control of the company's activities. Whether we become active or remain relatively passive at this point depends upon our assessment of the company's future and the managements capabilities.
   “控股公司” - 這類非常罕見(jiàn)欣簇，但是發(fā)生時(shí)产园，資金規(guī)模都很大侣姆。除非我們一開(kāi)始就大量購(gòu)入股票，否則控股公司都是從股票-私有化的類別衍生出來(lái)的儒将。他們是由以下情況產(chǎn)生的：在相當(dāng)長(zhǎng)的一段時(shí)間低廉的股價(jià)毫無(wú)起色從而導(dǎo)致我們持續(xù)購(gòu)入了公司相當(dāng)大比例的股份吏祸。到那時(shí)，我們可能在處于可以一定程度或者完全控制公司活動(dòng)的地位钩蚊。至于我們是主動(dòng)參與還是做個(gè)默不作聲的股東贡翘，取決于我們對(duì)公司未來(lái)和管理層能力的評(píng)估。

We do not want to get active merely for the sake of being active. Everything else being equal, I would much rather let others do the work. However, when an active role is necessary to optimize the employment of capital, you can be sure we will not be standing in the wings.

我們不想僅僅為了活躍而活躍砰逻。 在其他條件相同的情況下鸣驱，我寧愿讓其他人做這項(xiàng)工作。 但是蝠咆，當(dāng)需要發(fā)揮積極作用來(lái)優(yōu)化資本使用時(shí)踊东，您可以肯定我們不會(huì)袖手旁觀。

Active or passive, in a control situation there should be a built-in profit. The sine qua non of this operation is an attractive purchase price. Once control is achieved, the value of our investment is determined by the value of the enterprise, not the oftentimes irrationalities of the market place.

主動(dòng)還是被動(dòng)刚操，這是處于控股股東地位的一個(gè)潛在優(yōu)勢(shì)闸翅。此操作的必要條件是具有吸引力的購(gòu)買價(jià)格。 一旦實(shí)現(xiàn)控制赡茸，我們投資的價(jià)值就取決于企業(yè)的價(jià)值缎脾，而不是市場(chǎng)的不合理性祝闻。

Any of the three situations where we are now the largest stockholders mentioned under Generals - Private Owner could, by virtue of the two-way stretch they possess, turn into controls. That would suit us fine, but it also suits us if they advance in the market to a price more in line with intrinsic value enabling us to sell them, thereby completing a successful generals - private owner operation.

在股權(quán)-私有化類別中提到三家公司的任意一家都可以雙向延伸占卧。有可能轉(zhuǎn)變成控股公司的類別遗菠，這非常適合我們。但如果它們?cè)谑袌?chǎng)上推進(jìn)到更符合內(nèi)在價(jià)值的價(jià)格华蜒，使我們能夠出售它們辙纬，從而完成一個(gè)成功的股權(quán)-私有化類別的運(yùn)作也不錯(cuò)。

Investment results in the control category have to be measured on the basis of at least several years. Proper buying takes time. If needed, strengthening management, redirecting the utilization of capital, perhaps effecting a satisfactory sale or merger, etc., are also all factors that make this a business to be measured in years rather than months. For this reason, in controls, we are looking for wide margins of profit -if it appears at all close, we quitclaim.

最終會(huì)發(fā)展成控股類別的投資都必須至少幾年的時(shí)間叭喜。合理的價(jià)格購(gòu)入需要時(shí)間贺拣。如果需要，加強(qiáng)管理捂蕴、調(diào)整資金使用方向譬涡、可能還會(huì)涉及多方滿意的出售或合并等，也是使這項(xiàng)業(yè)務(wù)以年而不是月來(lái)衡量的所有因素啥辨。因此我們?cè)诖祟惖牟僮餍枰薮蟮睦麧?rùn)空間涡匀，如果這不滿足，我們會(huì)放棄溉知。

Controls in the buying stage move largely in sympathy with the Dow. In the later stages their behavior is geared more to that of workouts.

在買入階段其和道指的行為相似陨瘩。不過(guò)在后期的行為更像是套利。

You might be interested to know that the buyers of our former control situation, Dempster Mill Manufacturing, seem to be doing very well with it. This fulfills our expectation and is a source of satisfaction. An investment operation that depends on the ultimate buyer making a bum deal (in Wall Street they call this the "Bigger Fool Theory") is tenuous indeed. How much more satisfactory it is to buy at really bargain prices so that only an average disposition brings pleasant results.

各位也許會(huì)對(duì)我們之前的控股公司的買家感興趣级乍。Dempster Mill Manufacturing似乎做的很好舌劳。這很符合我們的期望。任意的一項(xiàng)投資都是依賴于最終買家做冤大頭實(shí)在是不靠譜（華爾街那幫人叫做博傻游戲）玫荣。以真正便宜的價(jià)格購(gòu)買然后在合理的價(jià)格賣出才是穩(wěn)健而且令人愉快的甚淡。

As I have mentioned in the past, the division of our portfolio among categories is largely determined by the accident of availability. Therefore, in any given year the mix between generals, workouts, or controls is largely a matter of chance, and this fickle factor will have a great deal to do with our performance relative to the Dow. This is one of many reasons why single year's performance is of minor importance and good or bad, should never be taken too seriously.

正如我之前提到的，我們投資組合中各個(gè)類別的分配很大程度取決于市場(chǎng)上有多少合適的標(biāo)的崇决。因此材诽，在任意年份，股票恒傻，套利或者控股公司的分配是隨機(jī)的脸侥，而他們的分布對(duì)于我們和道指收益的對(duì)比又緊密相關(guān)。這也就說(shuō)明了為什么不用太在意一年的收益率盈厘。

To give an example of just how important the accident of division between these categories is, let me cite the example of the past three years. Using an entirely different method of calculation than that used to measure the performance of BPL in entirety, whereby the average monthly investment at market value by category is utilized, borrowed money and office operating expenses excluded, etc., (this gives the most accurate basis for intergroup comparisons but does not reflect overall BPL results) the generals (both present categories combined), workouts, and the Dow, shape up as follows:

為了佐證各個(gè)類別分類的隨機(jī)性睁枕，我把過(guò)去三年的收益率給大家列舉一下。這里我們使用了一個(gè)完全不同的統(tǒng)計(jì)方式沸手，即使用按類別計(jì)算平均每月投資標(biāo)的的市場(chǎng)價(jià)值外遇，不包括借入資金和辦公室運(yùn)營(yíng)費(fèi)用等。（這可以最準(zhǔn)確地表現(xiàn)公司內(nèi)部各個(gè)類別的投資收益契吉，但不代表BPL總體收益）股票跳仿，套利和道指的收益對(duì)比如下：

收益對(duì)比

Obviously the workouts (along with controls) saved the day in 1962, and if we had been light in this category that year, our final result would have been much poorer, although still quite respectable considering market conditions during the year. We could just as well have had a much smaller percentage of our portfolio in workouts that year; availability decided it, not any notion on my part as to what the market was going to do. Therefore, it is important to realize that in 1962 we were just plain lucky regarding mix of categories.

很明顯套利（包括控股投資）在1962年拯救了我們，如果該類別在那一年占比很小我們的總體收益將會(huì)很難看捐晶，雖然要比當(dāng)年總體市場(chǎng)的表現(xiàn)要好很多菲语。那一年我們投資組合中套利的比例本可以少很多妄辩，但是這取決于是否有合適的標(biāo)的而非我去預(yù)測(cè)市場(chǎng)。因此山上，重要的是要認(rèn)識(shí)到眼耀，在 1962 年，我們有合適的投資類別組合完全是靠運(yùn)氣佩憾。

In 1963 we had one sensational workout which greatly influenced results, and generals gave a good account of themselves, resulting in a banner year. If workouts had been normal, (say, more like 1962) we would have looked much poorer compared to the Dow. Here it wasn't our mix that did much for us, but rather excellent situations.

在1963年我們完成了一筆極成功的套利運(yùn)作哮伟，極大地提升了收益，而股票投資也表現(xiàn)不俗妄帘。如果套利收益表現(xiàn)平平（像1962年那樣）楞黄，我們的評(píng)價(jià)收益率相較于道指來(lái)說(shuō)就差強(qiáng)人意了。這一年并不是說(shuō)多樣性投資類別對(duì)我們有多大幫助抡驼，僅僅是碰上一筆好的交易了谅辣。

Finally, in 1964 workouts were a big drag on performance. This would be normal in any event during a big plus year for the Dow such as 1964, but they were even a greater drag than expected because of mediocre experience. In retrospect it would have been pleasant to have been entirely in generals, but we don’t play the game in retrospect.

最后，1964年套利的收益大大地拖累了總體收益婶恼。在道指大漲的1964年什么事情發(fā)生都有可能桑阶，但是由于經(jīng)驗(yàn)不足，整體收益遜于預(yù)期勾邦◎悸迹回想起來(lái)如果我們?nèi)珘涸诠善笔袌?chǎng)的收益將會(huì)非常可觀眷篇，但是我們不會(huì)生活在如果里萎河。

I hope the preceding table drives home the point that results in a given year are subject to many variables - some regarding which we have little control or insight. We consider all categories to be good businesses and we are very happy we have several to rely on rather than just one. It makes for more discrimination within each category and reduces the chance we will be put completely out of operation by the elimination of opportunities in a single category.

我希望前面的表格能說(shuō)明這一點(diǎn)，即給定年份的收益受許多變量的影響——其中一些我們幾乎無(wú)法控制或洞察蕉饼。 我們認(rèn)為所有類別都是好的業(yè)務(wù)虐杯，很高興我們多個(gè)可以依賴的收益來(lái)源，而不僅僅是一個(gè)昧港。 各個(gè)類別互相補(bǔ)充這樣就不會(huì)因?yàn)槟撤N類別的失敗導(dǎo)致我們整體收益堪憂擎椰。

Taxes

稅務(wù)

We have had a chorus of groans this year regarding partners' tax liabilities. Of course, we also might have had a few if the tax sheet had gone out blank.

今年我們收到了合作伙伴納稅義務(wù)的齊聲抱怨。當(dāng)然创肥，我么的確應(yīng)該有一些稅要交达舒。

More investment sins are probably committed by otherwise quite intelligent people because of "tax considerations" than from any other cause.

往往一些非常聰明的人都會(huì)出于稅收考慮而做出很多投資失誤。

What is one really trying to do in the investment world? Not pay the least taxes, although that may be a factor to be considered in achieving the end. Means and end should not be confused, however, and the end is to come away with the largest after-tax rate of compound. Quite obviously if two courses of action promise equal rates of pre-tax compound and one involves incurring taxes and the other doesn't the latter course is superior. However, we find this is rarely the case.

我們做投資真正想做的是什么叹侄？ 不是繳納最少的稅款巩搏，盡管這可能是實(shí)現(xiàn)目標(biāo)時(shí)要考慮的一個(gè)因素。 然而趾代，手段和目的不應(yīng)該混淆贯底，目的是要得到最大的稅后復(fù)合率。 很明顯撒强，如果兩種行動(dòng)方案承諾稅前復(fù)合率相等禽捆，一種涉及產(chǎn)生稅款糯俗，另一種則不，后一種方案更優(yōu)越睦擂。 然而，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)這種情況很少見(jiàn)杖玲。

It is extremely improbable that 20 stocks selected from, say, 3000 choices are going to prove to be the optimum portfolio both now and a year from now at the entirely different prices (both for the selections and the alternatives) prevailing at that later date. If our objective is to produce the maximum after-tax compound rate, we simply have to own the most attractive securities obtainable at current prices, And, with 3,000 rather rapidly shifting variables, this must mean change (hopefully “tax-generating” change).

在總共3000支股票市場(chǎng)中選擇20只股票顿仇，并且希望他們?cè)诋?dāng)年以及未來(lái)幾年在不同價(jià)格上面保持超額回報(bào)是不可能的。我們的目的是產(chǎn)生最大的稅后復(fù)合收益摆马，因此我們需要當(dāng)前價(jià)格最具吸引力的證券臼闻。而且另外3000只股票是隨時(shí)浮動(dòng)的變量，這也意味著我們也要跟著變化囤采。

It is obvious that the performance of a stock last year or last month is no reason, per se, to either own it or to not own it now. It is obvious that an inability to "get even" in a security that has declined is of no importance. It is obvious that the inner warm glow that results from having held a winner last year is of no importance in making a decision as to whether it belongs in an optimum portfolio this year.

很明顯述呐，我們不會(huì)根據(jù)股票去年或者上個(gè)月的表現(xiàn)來(lái)決定是否持有。下跌的股票帶來(lái)的心理不平毫不重要蕉毯，而看著去年盈利的股票所帶來(lái)的滿足感也不是繼續(xù)持有的理由乓搬。

If gains are involved, changing portfolios involves paying taxes. Except in very unusual cases (I will readily admit there are some cases), the amount of the tax is of minor importance if the difference in expectable performance is significant. I have never been able to understand why the tax comes as such a body blow to many people since the rate on long-term capital gain is lower than on most lines of endeavor (tax policy indicates digging ditches is regarded as socially less desirable than shuffling stock certificates).

如果有盈利，那么換股就要交稅代虾。除非有極特殊的情況（我會(huì)欣然承認(rèn)有一些情況）进肯，如果預(yù)期業(yè)績(jī)的差異很大，那么稅收金額就無(wú)關(guān)緊要了棉磨。我一直無(wú)法理解為什么稅收對(duì)許多人來(lái)說(shuō)是一個(gè)如此沉重的打擊江掩，因?yàn)殚L(zhǎng)期資本收益的比率低于大多數(shù)收益來(lái)源（根據(jù)稅收政策表明買賣股票僅僅比挖溝更受歡迎一點(diǎn)）。

I have a large percentage of pragmatists in the audience so I had better get off that idealistic kick. There are only three ways to avoid ultimately paying the tax: (1) die with the asset - and that's a little too ultimate for me even the zealots would have to view this "cure" with mixed emotions; (2) give the asset away - you certainly don't pay any taxes this way, but of course you don't pay for any groceries, rent, etc., either; and (3) lose back the gain if your mouth waters at this tax-saver, I have to admire you -you certainly have the courage of your convictions.

我的聽(tīng)眾中有很大比例的實(shí)用主義者乘瓤，所以我最好擺脫那種理想主義的幻想环形。只有三種方法可以避免最終繳納稅款：（1）與資產(chǎn)一起死 - 這對(duì)我來(lái)說(shuō)有點(diǎn)過(guò)于極端，即使是狂熱分子也不得不以復(fù)雜的情緒看待這種“解藥”衙傀； (2) 放棄資產(chǎn)——你當(dāng)然不用這種方式繳納任何稅款抬吟，當(dāng)然你也不用支付任何雜貨、租金等统抬； （3）如果你只想著節(jié)稅的話拗军，就放棄收益，不過(guò)我不得不佩服你——你實(shí)在太忠于自己的信念了蓄喇。

So it is going to continue to be the policy of BPL to try to maximize investment gains, not minimize taxes. We will do our level best to create the maximum revenue for the Treasury -at the lowest rates the rules will allow.

因此发侵，BPL 的政策將繼續(xù)是試圖最大化投資收益，而不是最小化稅收妆偏。 我們將盡最大努力為財(cái)富創(chuàng)造最大收益——以規(guī)則允許的最低利率刃鳄。

An interesting sidelight on this whole business of taxes, vis-à-vis investment management, has appeared in the last few years. This has arisen through the creation of so-called "swap funds" which are investment companies created by the exchange of the investment company's shares for general market securities held by potential investors. The dominant sales argument has been the deferment (deferment, when pronounced by an enthusiastic salesman, sometimes comes very close phonetically to elimination) of capital gains taxes while trading a single security for a diversified portfolio. The tax will only finally be paid when the swap fund's shares are redeemed. For the lucky ones, it will be avoided entirely when any of those delightful alternatives mentioned two paragraphs earlier eventuates.

過(guò)去幾年出現(xiàn)了關(guān)于整個(gè)稅收業(yè)務(wù)相對(duì)于投資管理的一個(gè)有趣的現(xiàn)象。 這是通過(guò)創(chuàng)建所謂的“交換基金”而產(chǎn)生的钱骂，這些基金是通過(guò)將投資公司的股票交換為潛在投資者持有的一般市場(chǎng)證券而創(chuàng)建的投資公司叔锐。 主要的銷售論點(diǎn)是資本利得稅的延期（延期挪鹏，這個(gè)字眼銷售員在提及時(shí)，激動(dòng)的都失聲了）愉烙，同時(shí)交易單一證券同時(shí)實(shí)現(xiàn)了多元化的投資組合讨盒。 只有當(dāng)互換基金的股份被贖回時(shí)，才會(huì)最終支付稅款步责。如果夠幸運(yùn)返顺，之前提到的那幾個(gè)完全免稅的選項(xiàng)他有可能會(huì)碰上一個(gè)。

The reasoning implicit in the swapee's action is rather interesting. He obviously doesn't really want to hold what he is holding or he wouldn't jump at the chance to swap it (and pay a fairly healthy commission - usually up to $100,000) for a grab-bag of similar hot potatoes held by other tax-numbed investors. In all fairness, I should point out that after all offerees have submitted their securities for exchange and had a chance to review the proposed portfolio they have a chance to back out but I understand a relatively small proportion do so.

產(chǎn)生這種交換的初衷實(shí)在有趣蔓肯。顯然股票持有者不愿意繼續(xù)持有或者他不愿放棄和別人交換類似股票的機(jī)會(huì)（特別是還要收取很大一筆最高達(dá)10萬(wàn)刀手續(xù)費(fèi)）遂鹊。但說(shuō)句公道話，每個(gè)交易的參與方都有機(jī)會(huì)審核交易中涉及的股票并及時(shí)推出蔗包，雖然幾乎沒(méi)人這么做秉扑。

There have been twelve such funds (that I know of) established since origination of the idea in 1960, and several more are currently in the works. The idea is not without appeal since sales totaled well over 250,000 to $700,000 per year), but because of the low tax basis inherited from the contributors of securities, virtually his every move creates capital gains tax liabilities. And, of course, he knows that if he incurs such liabilities, he is doing so for people who are probably quite sensitive to taxes or they wouldn't own shares in the swap fund in the first place.

自 1960 年提出這一想法以來(lái)，（據(jù)我所知）已經(jīng)建立了 12 個(gè)這樣的基金调限，目前還有幾個(gè)正在籌建中舟陆。 這個(gè)想法并非沒(méi)有吸引力，因?yàn)殇N售額總計(jì)超過(guò) 6 億美元耻矮。 所有基金都保留了一名投資經(jīng)理吨娜，他們通常向其支付資產(chǎn)價(jià)值的 0.5% 作為報(bào)酬。而這些基金經(jīng)理卻面臨一個(gè)有趣的問(wèn)題淘钟，報(bào)酬是為了讓其好好的管理基金（在五個(gè)最大的基金中宦赠，這個(gè)費(fèi)用目前每年從 250,000 美元到 700,000 美元不等），但是由于從基金認(rèn)購(gòu)人那里繼承的低稅基米母，他的每一次操作都會(huì)產(chǎn)生資本利得稅勾扭。而且他還知道，這些資本利得稅的對(duì)象是那些本來(lái)就對(duì)稅務(wù)敏感的客戶铁瞒，或者他們一開(kāi)始就不該認(rèn)購(gòu)這種交換基金妙色。

I am putting all of this a bit strongly, and I am sure there are some cases where a swap fund may be the best answer to an individual's combined tax and investment problems. Nevertheless, I feel they offer a very interesting test-tube to measure the ability of some of the most respected investment advisors when they are trying to manage money without paying (significant) taxes.

雖然以上的看法有點(diǎn)偏激，但我相信在某些情況下慧耍，互換基金可能是解決個(gè)人稅收和投資問(wèn)題的最佳答案身辨。 盡管如此，我覺(jué)得他們提供了一個(gè)非常有趣的實(shí)驗(yàn)環(huán)境來(lái)衡量一些最受尊敬的投資顧問(wèn)在不繳納（大量）稅款的情況下管理資金的能力芍碧。

The three largest swap funds were all organized in 1961, and combined have assets now of about $300 million. One of these, Diversification Fund, reports on a fiscal year basis which makes extraction of relevant data quite difficult for calendar year comparisons. The other two, Federal Street Fund and Westminster Fund (respectively first and third largest in the group) are managed by investment advisors who oversee at least 2 billion of institutional money.

三個(gè)最大的互換基金都是在 1961 年成立的煌珊，現(xiàn)在總資產(chǎn)約為 3 億美元。 其中之一泌豆，多元化基金定庵，以財(cái)政年度為基礎(chǔ)進(jìn)行報(bào)告，這使得提取相關(guān)數(shù)據(jù)以進(jìn)行日歷年比較非常困難。 另外兩個(gè)蔬浙，聯(lián)邦街基金和威斯敏斯特基金（分別是該集團(tuán)的第一和第三大基金）由手下至少 20 億美元機(jī)構(gòu)資金的投資顧問(wèn)管理猪落。

Here's how they shape up for all full years of existence:
以下是他們成立以來(lái)年化收益：

收益

This is strictly the management record. No allowance has been made for the commission in entering and any taxes paid by the fund on behalf of the shareholders have been added back to performance.

這是個(gè)嚴(yán)謹(jǐn)?shù)墓芾碛涗洠瑳](méi)有算入任何津貼或者基金代表股東支付的稅款的費(fèi)用畴博。

Anyone for taxes?

對(duì)于稅收還有問(wèn)題嗎笨忌？

Miscellaneous

雜項(xiàng)

In the December 21st issue of AUTOMOTIVE NEWS it was reported that Ford Motor Co. plans to spend $700 million in 1965 to add 6,742,000 square feet to its facilities throughout the world. Buffett Partnership, Ltd., never far behind, plans to add 227 1/4 square feet to its facilities in the spring of 1965.

在 12 月 21 日的《汽車新聞》中報(bào)道說(shuō)，福特汽車公司計(jì)劃在 1965 年斥資 7 億美元在全球范圍內(nèi)增加 6,742,000 平方英尺的設(shè)施俱病。巴菲特合伙有限公司官疲，也不甘落后，計(jì)劃在 1965 年春天為其設(shè)施增加 227 1/4 平方英尺庶艾。

Our growth in net assets from 100) on May 5, 1956 when the first predecessor limited partnership.(Buffett Associates, Ltd. ) was organized, to $26,074,000 on 1/1/65 creates the need for an occasional reorganization in internal routine. Therefore, roughly contemporaneously with the bold move from 682 to 909 1?4 square feet, a highly capable is going to join our organization with responsibility for the administrative (and certain other) functions. This move will particularly serve to free up more of Bill Scott's time for security analysis which is his forte. I’ll have more to report on this in the midyear letter.

我們的凈資產(chǎn)從 1956 年 5 月 5 日第一個(gè)前身有限合伙公司（Buffett Associates, Ltd.）成立時(shí)的 105,100 美元（猜猜誰(shuí)投入的100 美元）增長(zhǎng)到 65 年 1 月 1 日的 26,074,000 美元，因此我們需要對(duì)內(nèi)部程序進(jìn)行偶爾的重組擎勘。因此咱揍，在進(jìn)行 682 到 909 1?4 平方英尺的大膽擴(kuò)建的同時(shí)，一個(gè)有能力的人將加入我們的組織棚饵，負(fù)責(zé)行政（和某些其他）職能煤裙。這一舉措將特別有助于騰出比爾斯科特更多的時(shí)間進(jìn)行安全分析，這是他的專長(zhǎng)噪漾。我將在年中信中對(duì)此進(jìn)行更多報(bào)告硼砰。

Bill (who continues to do a terrific job) and his wife have an investment in the Partnership of 298,749, a very large majority of their net worth. Our new associate (his name is being withheld until his present employer has replaced him), along with his wife and children, has made an important investment in the Partnership. Susie and I presently have an interest of 3,406,700 in BPL which represents virtually our entire net worth, with the exception of our continued holding of Mid-Continent Tab Card Co., a local company into which I bought in 1960 when it had less than 10 stockholders. Additionally, my relatives, consisting of three children, mother , two sisters, two brothers-in-law, father-in-Law, four aunts, four cousins and six nieces and nephews, have interests in BPL, directly or indirectly, totaling $1,942,592. So we all continue to eat home cooking.

比爾（總是能出色的完成使命）和他的妻子在合伙企業(yè)中投資了 298,749 美元，占他們凈資產(chǎn)的很大一部分欣硼。我們的新合伙人（他的名字不便透露直到在他現(xiàn)雇主真正找到替代者）题翰，連同他的妻子和孩子，對(duì)合伙企業(yè)進(jìn)行了重要的投資诈胜。 Susie 和我目前在 BPL 中擁有 3,406,700 美元的權(quán)益豹障，這幾乎代表了我們的全部?jī)糍Y產(chǎn)，除了我們繼續(xù)持有 Mid-Continent Tab Card Co.焦匈，這是我在 1960 年購(gòu)買的當(dāng)?shù)毓狙?dāng)時(shí)它只有不到 10個(gè)股東。此外缓熟，我的親戚累魔，包括三個(gè)孩子、母親够滑、兩個(gè)姐妹垦写、兩個(gè)姐夫、岳父彰触、四個(gè)阿姨梯澜、四個(gè)堂兄弟和六個(gè)侄女和侄子，直接或間接在 BPL 擁有權(quán)益，總計(jì) 1,942,592 美元晚伙。

Finally -and most sincerely -let me thank you partners who cooperate magnificently in getting things to us promptly and properly and thereby maximize the time we can spend working where we should be -by the cash register. I am extremely fortunate in being able to spend the great majority of my time thinking about where our money should be invested, rather than getting bogged down in the minutiae that seems to overwhelm so many business entities. We have an organizational structure which makes this efficiency a possibility, and more importantly, we have a group of partners that make it a reality. For this, I am most appreciative and we are all wealthier.

最后 - 也是最誠(chéng)摯的 - 讓我感謝合作伙伴吮龄，他們?cè)诩皶r(shí)、妥善地為我們提供幫助方面進(jìn)行了出色的合作咆疗，從而最大限度地利用寶貴的時(shí)間放在工作上漓帚。 我非常幸運(yùn)能夠?qū)⒋蟛糠謺r(shí)間都花在思考我們的錢應(yīng)該投資在哪里，而不是陷入似乎壓倒這么多商業(yè)實(shí)體的細(xì)枝末節(jié)午磁。 我們的組織結(jié)構(gòu)使這種效率成為可能尝抖，更重要的是，我們有一群合作伙伴使之成為現(xiàn)實(shí)迅皇。 對(duì)于這一點(diǎn)昧辽，我最感激，我們都將更富有登颓。

Cordially, Warren E. Buffett