3 From Berne to Frankfurt to Jena: Failed Projects and Fresh Starts

第3章 “從伯爾尼到法蘭克福再到耶拿時(shí)期：失敗的計(jì)劃和新的開始”(2)

Hegel gladly accepted the position and left Berne as soon as he could.

? ? 黑格爾樂(lè)意接受這個(gè)職位并盡快離開了伯爾尼毁习。

Christianity, Modernity, and Hegel’s Bernese Kantianism

基督教串述、現(xiàn)代性和黑格爾伯爾尼時(shí)期的康德主義

Although Hegel himself was crushingly disappointed with his activities in Berne, his time there was not completely wasted. Notwithstanding that he was failing in terms of his own aspirations, in terms of where he was eventually headed he had been laying some crucial groundwork. He had begun an intense study of Kant, Fichte, and Schelling - although with some chagrin he admitted to Schelling that “you cannot expect observations from me on your writing. In this matter I am but an apprentice”^^ - which was to pay off a few years later. In his few writings in Berne, he at first continued the line of thought that he had begun in his “Tubingen Essay,” continuing to employ the distinction between objective and subjective religion, all the while spicing it up with some of his new readings and new reflections. The fragments of his work from this period show that his Enlightenment background (as tempered by his admiration for Rousseau) continued to play a role in this thought. For example, on the one hand, he claimed that any division of society into “estates” {Stdnde) is a danger to freedom, since it fragments the whole — a theme that had also been voiced in an essay written during his period at the Stuttgart Gymnasium^ in which he drew on his youthful readings of Johann Herder and the “popular philosopher” Christian Garve to explicate the difference between ancient and modern literature.He also began to echo Edward Gibbon in his discussions of how the introduction of Christianity had undermined the Roman empire; Gibbon’s irony coupled with his passionate attachment to his subject obviously made a big impression on Hegel - indeed, he was to adopt some of Gibbon’s manner in his own masterpiece, the Phenomenology of Spirit. On the other hand, he praised the individuality of Socrates and compared Jesus unfavorably to Socrates; Socrates, he says, “l(fā)eft behind no Masonic signs, no mandate to proclaim his name.? ... He did not, in order to bring people to perfect goodness, outline some detour by way of him . . . dispensing with mediators, he led the individual only into himself.”^"* He revived the idea found in the “Tubingen Essay” of transforming an “objective” religion into a “subjective” religion, except that now he ascribed this task to the state, noting that somehow the state must do this while preserving freedom for the individual conscience.(Exactly how the state was to do this, he did not say.)

? ? 雖然黑格爾本人對(duì)他在伯爾尼的活動(dòng)極度失望肚豺，但他在那里的時(shí)間沒有被完全浪費(fèi)返顺。盡管他未能根據(jù)自己的志向做事领曼，但他在自己致力于從事的事業(yè)方面骚灸，還是打下了某種至關(guān)重要的基礎(chǔ)辅甥。他已經(jīng)著手對(duì)康德洗做、費(fèi)希特和謝林進(jìn)行廣泛的研究——盡管他有些愧謙地向謝林承認(rèn)“你不能期待我對(duì)你的著作作出評(píng)論。在這件事上我只是個(gè)學(xué)徒”——這個(gè)學(xué)徒必將在幾年后取得成功址芯。在他伯爾尼時(shí)期少量作品中灾茁，他起初繼續(xù)秉持他在“圖賓根論文”中開出的思路、繼續(xù)使用主觀宗教與客觀宗教這一區(qū)分谷炸，始終以他的某些新解讀和新反思來(lái)為這一區(qū)分加工潤(rùn)色北专。他這個(gè)階段札記表明他的啟蒙運(yùn)動(dòng)背景（作為他對(duì)盧梭的欽佩所調(diào)和的東西）繼續(xù)在上述思考中發(fā)揮重要作用。舉例來(lái)說(shuō)旬陡，一方面拓颓，他聲稱任何把社會(huì)分成“等級(jí)”（Stdnde）的做法都是對(duì)自由的威脅，因?yàn)檫@樣的做法打破了整體——一個(gè)同樣早在他斯圖加特高級(jí)中學(xué)階段撰寫的文章中就已被提出的論題描孟，在那篇文章中驶睦，他把他青年時(shí)期對(duì)約翰·赫爾德和“通俗哲學(xué)家”克里斯蒂安·加爾弗的解讀，用來(lái)解釋古代文學(xué)與現(xiàn)代文學(xué)的區(qū)別画拾。他同樣也著手在探討基督教的傳入怎么削弱了羅馬帝國(guó)時(shí)重復(fù)愛德華·吉本的觀點(diǎn)啥繁；吉本的諷刺連同他對(duì)他的問(wèn)題表現(xiàn)出的熱情明顯地給黑格爾留下了深刻的印象——更確切地說(shuō)，他必將在他自己的杰作《精神現(xiàn)象學(xué)》中采用吉本的某些方式青抛。另一方面旗闽，他贊揚(yáng)蘇格拉底的個(gè)性且不贊成把耶穌與蘇格拉底相比；蘇格拉底蜜另，他說(shuō)适室，“沒有留下共濟(jì)會(huì)標(biāo)志，沒有命令人們?nèi)樗韫灥隆麤]有举瑰，為了把人們引向至善捣辆，從而通過(guò)他自己來(lái)勾勒出標(biāo)種迂回曲折的道路……在摒棄了調(diào)解者后，他只是使他自己具有個(gè)性此迅∑耄”他重拾那見于“圖賓根論文”把“客觀的”宗教變成“主觀的”宗教這一想法旧巾，只是眼下他把這個(gè)任務(wù)歸于國(guó)家，他強(qiáng)調(diào)指出不管怎么樣忍些，國(guó)家在保護(hù)個(gè)人良知的自由時(shí)必須這樣做鲁猩。（國(guó)家恰恰怎么必將這樣做，他沒有說(shuō)出具體理由罢坝。）

In making these kinds of claims, however, he once again found himself in a bind of his own making: On the one hand, he wanted to call for some way of overcoming the fragmentation of modern life and establishing some form of community without at the same time violating individual liberty of conscience; on the other, he wanted to praise the reliance on individual insight and understanding taught by Socrates without letting such self-reliant individuals go on to fragment themselves from the social whole and from each other. In his Berne fragments, just as in his “Tubingen Essay,” he still had found no concrete way to bring these kinds of conflicting claims together, to unite his ideas of a unified, unfragmented “beautiful” social whole with the idea of the preservation of the rights and practices of the individual conscience. He seemed to realize that his prescriptions ended up being only moralistic calls for “something better” without any real possibility of their being realized. And as a Wiirttemberger, he of course certainly knew the pitfalls of having a “state” simply mandate a particular religion; Duke Carl Eugen would have gladly mandated Catholicism for his subjects, if only he could have gotten away with it.

? ? 然而廓握，在提出這些種類的主張時(shí)，他再度發(fā)覺解鈴還須系鈴人：一方面嘁酿，他想倡導(dǎo)一種用以克服現(xiàn)代生活的斷裂和建立一種形式社區(qū)的方法而同時(shí)又不侵犯?jìng)€(gè)人的良知自由隙券；另一方面，他想贊揚(yáng)依賴由蘇格拉底教導(dǎo)的個(gè)體洞察力和理解力而同時(shí)又不讓這種依靠自己的個(gè)體繼續(xù)割斷他們自己與社會(huì)整體的聯(lián)系和他們彼此間的聯(lián)系闹司。在他的伯爾尼時(shí)期札記中娱仔，正像在他的“圖賓根論文”中一樣，他仍然沒有發(fā)現(xiàn)任何具體的方法可使這些種類的自相矛盾的主張融為一體游桩，可使他關(guān)于一個(gè)統(tǒng)一的非碎片化的“優(yōu)美的”社會(huì)整體這類想法與保護(hù)個(gè)體良知的權(quán)利和實(shí)點(diǎn)這一想法結(jié)合起來(lái)拟枚。他看來(lái)好像意識(shí)到他的一系列濟(jì)世良方最終僅僅道德主義式地倡導(dǎo)“樹立一種更好的東西”而根本不可能真正地使它們得以實(shí)現(xiàn)。而且作為一個(gè)符騰堡人众弓，他當(dāng)然肯定曉得讓“國(guó)家”簡(jiǎn)單地授權(quán)一種特殊的宗教是非常危險(xiǎn)的；卡爾·歐根公爵大概很樂(lè)意把臣民委托給天主教隔箍，但愿他可以僥幸成功谓娃。

Most significant for Hegel’s development during his Bernese period was his growing concern with what it would mean, as he had put it to Schelling, to “complete” the Kantian philosophy. Indeed, his fragments and his more developed pieces from that time bear witness to his early forays into Fichte’s writings and, more importantly, to the growing influence of Kant on his thought. In Berne, his more explicitly Rousseauian commitments began to fade as the more overtly Kantian elements came more and more to the fore, and Aristotle’s notion that the good man finds happiness in what virtue requires started to become linked with Hegel’s increasingly Kantian stance in ethics. By the very end of his stay in Berne, Hegel was beginning to redescribe everything in terms of the basic notions of Kantian ethical theory. Although there were strains of Fichte in some of the fragments from that period - his friend Schelling was clearly going in the direction of Fichtean thought at this time, and Hegel was not immune to it — it was Kantian language that began to overtake Hegel’s earlier ways of formulating things. For example, in one of the fragments from the Berne period, we find Hegel claiming, like a good Kantian, that “the effect of religion is to strengthen, by means of the idea of God as moral lawgiver, ethical life’s motives and to enhance the satisfaction we derive from performing what our practical reason demands, specifically with regard to the ultimate end that reason posits: The highest good.”^*^

? ? 對(duì)于黑格爾在伯爾尼時(shí)期思想發(fā)展最有意義的是他逐漸關(guān)注“完成”康德哲學(xué)通常意味著什么，像他那時(shí)已向謝林提出的一樣蜒滩。更確切地說(shuō)滨达，他那時(shí)的札記和他較為詳細(xì)地闡發(fā)的段落證明他早年涉獵了費(fèi)希特的作品，更重要的是俯艰，證明他的思想日益受到康德的影響捡遍。在伯爾尼時(shí)期，他的更加明晰的盧梭主義的承諾逐漸消失竹握，其時(shí)康德哲學(xué)的要素越來(lái)越居于顯要的地位画株。亞里士多德關(guān)于君子能夠找到美德所要求的快樂(lè)這一見解同樣也開始變得與黑格爾倫理學(xué)上日益趨向康德哲學(xué)立場(chǎng)相聯(lián)系。到快要離開伯爾尼時(shí)啦辐，黑格爾在著手根據(jù)康德倫理學(xué)理論的基本概念來(lái)重新描述每個(gè)倫理問(wèn)題谓传。雖然那個(gè)階段的一些札記帶有費(fèi)希特思想的色彩——他的友人謝林當(dāng)時(shí)顯然在沿著費(fèi)希特思想方向繼續(xù)前進(jìn)，黑格爾不能不受費(fèi)希特思想的影響——但正是康德的用語(yǔ)逐漸替代黑格爾早期詳細(xì)論述事物的方法芹关。舉例來(lái)說(shuō)续挟，在伯爾尼時(shí)期一段札記中，我們發(fā)覺黑格爾主張侥衬，像一個(gè)虔誠(chéng)的康德哲學(xué)信徒一樣诗祸，“宗教的影響必定靠上帝作為道德立法者或倫理生活動(dòng)機(jī)這一概念而變強(qiáng)跑芳，并必定提高我們從實(shí)現(xiàn)我們的實(shí)踐理性要求的東西中所獲得的滿意度、特別是提高我們從在理性設(shè)定的終極目的方面所獲得的滿意度：最高的善直颅〔└觯”

Hegel also began to enlist Kant in his battle against Tubingen orthodoxy. In a letter, he dismissively asked Schelling, “How are things otherwise in Tubingen? ... In truth, nowhere is the old system so faithfully propagated as there.”” Taking the Tubingen theologians as his target, he even went so far in his Berne period as to write an entire “Life of Jesus” (unpublished in his lifetime) in which Jesus’ life and teachings were redescribed so as to fit more or less the ideas articulated by Kant in his Religion within the Limits of Pure Reason Alone. In the “Life of Jesus,” Jesus emerged not as the natural/supernatural deliverer of a divine revelation (as Hegel’s theology professor at Tubingen, Gottlob Storr, had tried to demonstrate) but instead as one of the foremost exponents of Kant’s “religion of morality.”

? ? 黑格爾同樣還在著手與圖賓根正統(tǒng)觀念的戰(zhàn)斗中支持康德哲學(xué)。在一封信中际乘，他輕蔑地追問(wèn)謝林坡倔，“有些事情怎么在圖賓根就變了樣？說(shuō)實(shí)話脖含，在那里舊體系晨?jī)阂舱也坏街覍?shí)的擁躉罪塔。”由于把圖賓根神學(xué)家們當(dāng)作他的靶子看待养葵，他甚至在伯爾尼時(shí)期思想上走得如此之遠(yuǎn)征堪，以至于他寫出了一部完整的《耶穌傳》（該傳在他生前未發(fā)表）。在《耶穌傳》中耶穌的生活和學(xué)說(shuō)被作了重新描述关拒，以便或多或少與康德在《單純理性限度內(nèi)的宗教》中系統(tǒng)闡述的觀點(diǎn)相適應(yīng)佃蚜。在《耶穌傳》中，耶穌不復(fù)以神啟示的自然或超自然的拯救者面目出現(xiàn)（像黑格爾的圖賓根神學(xué)教授戈特洛布·施托爾嘗試去證明的一樣）着绊，反而是以康德的“道德宗教”中最重要的闡釋者之一面目出現(xiàn)谐算。

Hegel did not, however, make himself over into a fully orthodox Kantian. For him the question continued to be: If Christianity is to be made into a “people’s religion” (a “subjective” religion), and if that is to be identified with a quasi-Kantian understanding of the “kingdom of God and the “invisible church” — that is, if it is to be fully reinter- preted in light of the code words used by Schelling, Hegel, and Holderlin at the Seminary in Tubingen - then it must be given a purely moral interpretation that is also compatible with Hegel’s, Holderlin’s, and Schelling’s admiration for the idealized ancient Greeks as models for what a renewed social order would look like. Thus, Hegel attempted to fuse Kant’s idea of a “religion of morality” with his own critique of the fragmentation of modern life inspired by his youthful readings of Garve, Herder, and Rousseau, and out of this he hoped to produce a “popular philosophy” that would bring about, as he had put it to Schelling, the “revolution in Germany” that would follow from the “application” of Kant’s philosophy.-^*

? ? 可是黑格爾并沒有使自己變成一個(gè)完全正統(tǒng)的康德哲學(xué)信徒。對(duì)于他來(lái)說(shuō)問(wèn)題仍然是：如果基督教必將被弄成“人民宗教”（“主觀”宗教）归露，如果這必將被認(rèn)為等同于對(duì)“上帝王國(guó)”和“看不見的教堂”的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)康德式解讀——也即如果它必將被按照謝林洲脂、黑格爾、荷爾德林在圖賓根神學(xué)院時(shí)期所使用的暗語(yǔ)進(jìn)行全面重新闡釋——那么它就必須被賦予一種純道德上的闡釋而且這種闡釋也要與下列的東西相一致：黑格爾剧包、荷爾德林恐锦、謝林所欽佩的作為榜樣的理想化的古希臘人，一種脫胎換骨的社會(huì)秩序通辰海看起來(lái)所像的東西一铅。因此，黑格爾嘗試著把康德的“道德宗教”概念與他自己因受他年輕時(shí)解讀加爾弗堕油、赫爾德和盧梭作品的啟發(fā)而對(duì)現(xiàn)代生活碎片化的批判融為一體潘飘，由于這樣，他希望創(chuàng)造一種“通俗哲學(xué)”掉缺，“通俗哲學(xué)”將導(dǎo)致福也，像他向謝林論述的，一場(chǎng)將緊隨康德哲學(xué)的“應(yīng)用”而來(lái)的“德國(guó)革命”攀圈。

Indeed, at this point, Hegel was still quite explicit about his desire to be such a “popular” philosopher, noting to Schelling that the special features of Kantian and Fichtean ideas were not things he thought needed to be worked out in such a “popular presentation”; it was important for intellectuals to understand the fine points of the postKantian movement, but it was not important to make them part of the “popular philosophy”: “An esoteric philosophy will, to be sure, always remain, and the idea of God as the absolute ‘F will be part of it. . . .? The philosophers are proving the dignity of man. The people will learn to feel it.”*’ In seeing his future in this way, Hegel was also quite obviously planning to carve out new ground for himself: The “popular philosophers” had until then mostly contented themselves with reproducing, reworking, and applying British (and particularly Scottish) ideas; Hegel, on the other hand, was looking to make himself into a “popular philosopher” who was going to apply Kantian ideas in light of the British ideas he had picked up along the way."^"

? ? 更確切地說(shuō)暴凑，在這一點(diǎn)上，黑格爾仍然十分明顯地渴望做這樣一名“通俗”哲學(xué)家赘来，并向謝林強(qiáng)調(diào)指出康德哲學(xué)思想和費(fèi)希特哲學(xué)思想的特征不是某種在他看來(lái)需要被以這樣一種“通俗表象”來(lái)理解的東西现喳；黑格爾這一看法對(duì)于知識(shí)界解讀后康德哲學(xué)運(yùn)動(dòng)的細(xì)微觀點(diǎn)是非常重要的凯傲，但是使細(xì)微的觀點(diǎn)構(gòu)成“通俗哲學(xué)”一部分就不那么重要了：“無(wú)疑問(wèn)，一種秘傳的哲學(xué)終究總是保持不變的嗦篱，而且作為絕對(duì)‘自我’的上帝這一概念將構(gòu)成這種秘傳哲學(xué)的一部分……有些哲學(xué)家在證明人類的尊嚴(yán)冰单。人們應(yīng)該學(xué)會(huì)感覺到人類的尊嚴(yán)【拇伲”在以這種方式展望未來(lái)時(shí)诫欠，黑格爾同樣也非常明確地去籌劃為他自已開辟出一片新的天地：“通俗哲學(xué)家”目標(biāo)到那時(shí)為止還主要是滿足于再造、重寫和應(yīng)用大不列顛的（特別是蘇格蘭的）思想浴栽；另一方面荒叼，黑格爾期待使他自己變成一名“通俗哲學(xué)家”，這名“通俗哲學(xué)家”將要根據(jù)被他半路學(xué)得的大不列顛思想來(lái)運(yùn)用康德哲學(xué)思想典鸡。

Indeed, the “completion” of Kantian philosophy at this point meant for Hegel only the application of Kantian philosophy in a “popular” way, the construction of a more or less Kantian conception of what would be a genuinely practical stimulus to action. In commenting on his study of the philosophical movement from Kant to Schelling (and on his relative ignorance of the ways in which post-Kantians like Karl Leonhard Reinhold were developing the critical philosophy), he remarked that the more recent attempts to get to the bottom of Kant’s theory (Reinhold’s and Fichte’s) were, for him, only “speculations, rather than being of great applicability to universally usable concepts, [which] seem of more direct significance mainly to theoretical reason alone.”"^’ Hegel’s ideas on “subjective” religion and a “people’s religion” were all constructed in light of what he thought at the time was necessary to transform Kantianism into something more practical, more applicable, something that could be expressed in the kind of essay written by a Popularphilosoph. However, despite Hegel’s quantitative productivity during this period (judging from the amount of manuscript material he produced), he never thought any of it worth publishing, and he never wrote to anyone (not to Schelling, not to Hdlderlin) to ask for help or advice about getting his works into print. (The exception is the pamphlet by J.-J. Cart.) Hegel was clearly dissatisfied with what he had produced. Despite the task he had set for himself of becoming a “popular philosopher,” a man of letters, despite the fact that he had produced quite a bit of work along those lines during this time, and despite the likelihood that publication would have advanced his self-chosen career as a man of letters, he simply put those manuscripts in the drawer.

? ? 更確切地說(shuō)被廓，康德哲學(xué)的“完成”在這方面意味著對(duì)于黑格爾來(lái)說(shuō)僅僅以“通俗的”方式運(yùn)用康德哲學(xué)，意味著建構(gòu)一個(gè)或多或少康德哲學(xué)關(guān)于應(yīng)該成為對(duì)行為的真正實(shí)際激勵(lì)東西的構(gòu)想萝玷。在解釋他對(duì)從康德到謝林的哲學(xué)運(yùn)動(dòng)的研究（和他相對(duì)忽視了像卡爾·萊昂哈德·賴因霍爾德一樣的后康德哲學(xué)家借以闡發(fā)批判哲學(xué)方法）的時(shí)候嫁乘，他評(píng)論說(shuō)近來(lái)有些學(xué)者試圖對(duì)康德理論（賴因霍爾德理論和費(fèi)希特理論）進(jìn)行刨根問(wèn)底，這種嘗試對(duì)于他來(lái)說(shuō)僅僅是“沉思而非對(duì)普遍可用概念的了不起的應(yīng)用球碉，[這些沉思]看來(lái)好像主要對(duì)單純的理論理性具有更直接的意義蜓斧。”黑格爾關(guān)于“主觀”宗教和“人民宗教”概念的建構(gòu)睁冬，完全依據(jù)的是他當(dāng)時(shí)認(rèn)為把康德哲學(xué)變成更實(shí)用更可應(yīng)用的東西所必需的東西法精，它就是某種可能被通俗哲學(xué)家揣寫的這樣論文表達(dá)的東西。不過(guò)痴突，盡管黑格爾在這個(gè)時(shí)期極其多產(chǎn)（根據(jù)他所撰寫的手稿數(shù)量判斷），他始終認(rèn)為其中沒有任何東西值得發(fā)表狼荞，他也從未給任何人寫信（沒有給謝林寫信沒有給荷爾德林寫信）請(qǐng)求幫助或出主意使他的作品得以發(fā)表辽装。（關(guān)于J·卡特的這本小冊(cè)子是個(gè)例外。）黑格爾顯然對(duì)他所撰寫的東西感到不滿意相味。盡管他為自己提出了做“通俗哲學(xué)家”做文人這一任務(wù)拾积，盡管事實(shí)上他在這個(gè)時(shí)期按照這些思路做了大量工作，盡管出版這些東西理應(yīng)可能促使他主動(dòng)選擇做作家丰涉，他干脆還是把這批手稿束之高閣拓巧。

While at Berne, Hegel also wrote an ambitious book-length manuscript, which he clearly expanded and altered after having arrived in Frankfurt, and even worked on somewhat after arriving in Jena at the turn of the century; he never found it satisfactory, however, and it was only published long after his death, under the title “The Positivity of the Christian Religion.” In it, Hegel tried to synthesize the basic influences on his thought at the time. For example, he brought Gibbon’s account of the decline of the Roman empire and the role Christianity played in it to bear on Kant’s reconstruction of Christian religion as the “religion of morality,” as religion “within the limits of reason alone,” and tried to show how these two accounts could be reconciled in an examination of the nature of the “positivity” of the Christian religion.? Hegel used the term “positivity” in a sense derived from jurisprudence: “Positive” law is that law which is in force in a particular legal and political community. In Hegel’s own time, “positive” law had come to be contrasted with what was then called “natural law.” “Natural law” had a much wider meaning than it does nowadays; it was the doctrine of the normative foundations of law in general, not just the normative foundations of law as lying in the “natural” order. For Hegel, positive religion - which is analogous to what he had been calling in his earlier efforts “objective religion” - is any religion and its associated doctrines whose normative force depends on their being the established religion of a people. Christianity was a positive religion in this sense, since both Catholics and Protestants had clear ideas about what counted as doctrine, who could take the Eucharist, who could not, and so on. Positivity, thus, in law and in religion, is that which relies only on the dictates of authority instead of on those dictates that come from “thinking for oneself’ (which, according to Kant, is the very definition of Enlightenment itself). Any positive religion, so it seems, must therefore be at odds with the demands of reason, of “thinking for oneself” Reviving some arguments from his manuscript “The Life of Jesus,” Hegel argued that Jesus never intended to institute a positive religion, at least in the sense of a religion that was to claim humanity’s allegiance by reference only to Jesus’ own authority. Instead, Jesus set out to create a religion of morality that would restore freedom to a world that had lost it, in which people would embrace virtue because they would impose it on themselves.

? ? 在伯爾尼的時(shí)候，黑格爾還寫有一部雄心勃勃的長(zhǎng)篇手稿一死，這部手稿顯然被他到達(dá)法蘭克福后作了擴(kuò)充和改動(dòng)肛度，甚至被他在世紀(jì)之交到達(dá)耶拿后還在以某種方式撰寫；然而投慈，他始終認(rèn)為這部手稿不盡如人意承耿，它只是在他去世后很長(zhǎng)時(shí)間才被人以《基督教的實(shí)定性》為題發(fā)表冠骄。在這部手稿中，黑格爾力圖綜合一下當(dāng)時(shí)對(duì)他的思考產(chǎn)生基本影響的東西加袋。舉例來(lái)說(shuō)凛辣，他把吉本關(guān)于羅馬帝國(guó)衰微和基督教在羅馬帝國(guó)扮演角色的釋述，與康德把基督教重建成為“道德宗教”重建成“單純理性限度內(nèi)的”宗教聯(lián)系起來(lái)职烧，并努力表明上述兩種描述怎么可以被在對(duì)基督教“實(shí)定性”本質(zhì)的考察過(guò)程中達(dá)成一致扁誓。黑格爾借用了從一種源于法學(xué)意義上說(shuō)“實(shí)定性”這一術(shù)語(yǔ)：“實(shí)定”法就是一種在特殊法定共同體和政治共同體中實(shí)施的法律。在黑格爾自己的時(shí)代蚀之，“實(shí)定”法逐漸與后來(lái)被稱作“自然法”的東西形成對(duì)比蝗敢。“自然法”較之今天的用法具有寬泛得多的意義恬总；它一般是表示法律的規(guī)范基礎(chǔ)的學(xué)說(shuō)前普，不止表示那倚重“自然”秩序的法律規(guī)范的基礎(chǔ)。對(duì)于黑格爾來(lái)說(shuō)壹堰，實(shí)定宗教——作為類似于被他在早期成果中始終稱作的“客觀宗教”的實(shí)定宗教——代表任何宗教及其相關(guān)學(xué)說(shuō)拭卿，它的規(guī)范力量取歐于與宗教相關(guān)學(xué)說(shuō)被確立為人民宗教〖溃基督教就是從上述意義上說(shuō)的實(shí)定宗教峻厚，因?yàn)樘熘鹘探掏胶托陆探掏綄?duì)什么被算作教義、誰(shuí)可以獲得圣餐谆焊、誰(shuí)不可以獲得圣餐等等都有著明確的看法惠桃。法律和宗教中實(shí)定性因此代表僅僅依賴于權(quán)威的需求的實(shí)定性，而不依賴來(lái)自于“獨(dú)立思考”的命令（這按照康德的說(shuō)法是對(duì)啟蒙運(yùn)動(dòng)本身特有的界定）辖试。因此可以說(shuō)辜王，任何實(shí)定性宗教都必然是與理性的要求或“獨(dú)立思考”的要求相抵觸的。由于他的《耶穌傳》手稿復(fù)又引起了一些爭(zhēng)論罐孝，黑格爾堅(jiān)稱耶穌從來(lái)無(wú)意去建立一種實(shí)定性宗教呐馆，至少?gòu)囊环N宗教意義上說(shuō)耶穌從來(lái)無(wú)意去創(chuàng)立實(shí)定的宗教，這種宗教旨在主張人類的忠誠(chéng)僅僅涉及耶穌自己的權(quán)威莲兢。恰恰相反汹来，耶穌著手創(chuàng)立道德的宗教，道德宗教應(yīng)該使喪失自由的世界恢復(fù)自由改艇，在復(fù)得自由的世界收班，人們之所以總是張開雙臂擁抱美德是因?yàn)樗麄儜?yīng)該把美德強(qiáng)加于他們自己。

The themes of freedom and the self-imposition of the law - both of them involving striking bits of Kantian language - reoccur throughout the essay.'*^ In his ethical theory, Kant had argued that the only thing that was unconditionally good in itself was a good will, which, in Kant’s well-known characterization, would if even “by its utmost effort it still accomplishes nothing . . . still shine like a jewel for its own sake as something which has full value in itself”"*^ Whereas the other great influence on Hegel, Aristotle, had argued that the only thing that was unconditionally good, that was a final end of an agent’s deliberations that is, that which rational human agents ultimately cared about it for its own sake - was Eudaimonia, happiness in terms of flourishing, prospering, and getting along well in a virtuous life, Kant argued that this unconditional good and final end had to be the free will itself Since no agent could be indifferent to freedom as a final end, as a requirement of practical reason no agent could therefore be indifferent to what was a priori required for the agent’s freedom. Kant argued that the a priori requirements of full freedom demanded that the agent determine his will according to principles that he had fully and freely adopted for himself, that is, that he act only on those principles that he has autonomously imposed on himself; and to make such self-impositions, the agent is required to determine his will only according to principles that abstract away from all contingencies that might determine his will (such as any contingent desires or needs he might just happen to have) and determine his will instead according to principles that answer to that element within him that is authoritative for him.

? ? 自由與法律自我強(qiáng)加——二者明顯牽涉少許康德哲學(xué)用語(yǔ)——這兩個(gè)話題復(fù)又成為貫穿于《基督教的實(shí)定性》這本論著中的一根紅線谒兄，在他的倫理學(xué)理論中摔桦，康德早已堅(jiān)稱那本質(zhì)上作為無(wú)條件的善的唯一東西就是善良意志。善良意志承疲，借用康德有名的描繪酣溃，應(yīng)該縱使“善良通過(guò)極大努力仍然一事無(wú)成……仍然會(huì)像寶石出于它自己的緣故作為一種本質(zhì)上具有充分價(jià)值的東西一樣閃閃發(fā)光”瘦穆，盡管另一個(gè)對(duì)黑格爾產(chǎn)生過(guò)很大影響的人物亞里士多德論證道，唯一作為無(wú)條件善的東西赊豌，作為行動(dòng)者深思熟慮的終極目的的東西——也即理性的行動(dòng)者出于善自己的緣故最終關(guān)注的東西——一是Exdaizonzid扛或，不斷增加的、源源不斷的和在德行生活中和共處的快樂(lè)碘饼。但是康德卻堅(jiān)稱這無(wú)條件的善和終極目的必然是自由意志本身熙兔。因?yàn)榉彩切袆?dòng)者都不可能對(duì)自由作為終極目的漠不關(guān)心，都不可能對(duì)自由作為實(shí)踐理性的要求漠不關(guān)心艾恼，所以凡是行動(dòng)者都不可能對(duì)什么是行動(dòng)者自由先天要求的東西漠不關(guān)心住涉。康德論證道钠绍，充分自由的先天要求要求行動(dòng)者應(yīng)該依據(jù)某些原理來(lái)確定他的意志舆声，這些原理早已被行動(dòng)者為了他自已而充分地自由地采納，也就是說(shuō)柳爽，要求行動(dòng)者僅僅按照某些被他自發(fā)地強(qiáng)加于他自己的原理安身立命媳握；為作出這樣的自我強(qiáng)加，行動(dòng)者常常被要求僅僅按照從所有可能確定他意志的偶然性事物（諸如任何可能恰恰被他碰巧具有的偶然欲望或需求）中抽象出來(lái)的原理來(lái)確定他的意志磷脯，而不是根據(jù)對(duì)作為他權(quán)威的他心中要素作出回答的原理來(lái)確定他的意志蛾找。

Since Kant holds that that which is authoritative for us is “selfdetermining reason” - reason that accepts no standards other than those which it can vindicate for itself, that survive the kind of self-critique that reason continually practices on itself - the only principles that can count as self-imposed are those that would hold for any rational being.? The principle of principles, therefore, for practical reason is the categorical (unconditional) imperative, that the agent determine his will according to principles that he could at the same time and always determine as “universal law,” as the kinds of principles which any other rational agent would also elect to determine his will.'*^ Of course, what is striking about Kant’s doctrine — and would have been particularly striking to Hegel at this stage in his life — is that Kant might have seemed, at least at first glance, to have resolved the problems Hegel had bumped up against in the “Tubingen Essay,” namely, how to reconcile a demand for full unconditional freedom and individual liberty of conscience with the demands of a community having a unified moral voice.? At this point in his development, Hegel took Kant to have shown how each individual, relying only on his own reason, would in his own conscience reach the same conclusions as all other rational individuals, and how thus a Kantian moral community would not morally be at odds with itself. A fully Kantian moral community would thus be an “invisible church,” constituting itself as a “philosophical sect” in which each individual member, in Hegel’s words, “adopts no duties except the ones imposed on himself”'*''

? ? 因?yàn)榭档轮鲝堊鳛閷?duì)我們來(lái)說(shuō)權(quán)威的東西是“能自主的理性”——理性只接受某些能夠被它自為地證明是正確的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)而且這些標(biāo)準(zhǔn)使某種繼續(xù)被理性利用它自身實(shí)踐著的自我批判得以存在——只有那些能夠被算作自我強(qiáng)加的原理才是應(yīng)該為任何理性之人所堅(jiān)持的原理。所以赵誓、實(shí)踐理性原理之原理是絕對(duì)的（無(wú)條件的）命令打毛，絕對(duì)命令意味著行動(dòng)者應(yīng)該確定他的意志，行動(dòng)者這樣做時(shí)依據(jù)的原理同時(shí)且總是可以被他確定為“普遍規(guī)律”俩功，確定為這樣的一種也應(yīng)該被任何其他理性行動(dòng)者選作確定他的意志的原理幻枉。誠(chéng)然，康德學(xué)說(shuō)給人留下深刻印象的東西——大概給處于人生這個(gè)階段的黑格爾留下了特別深刻影響的東西——就是康德可能看來(lái)好像解決了那些被黑格爾在“圖賓根論文”中竭力解決的問(wèn)題诡蜓，可能至少乍看起來(lái)解決了那些問(wèn)題熬甫，也即怎樣使要求完全無(wú)條件的自由與個(gè)人良知的自由和要求共同體具有統(tǒng)一的道德愿望一致起來(lái)。在他闡發(fā)的這個(gè)方面万牺，黑格爾把康德看作已經(jīng)闡明每個(gè)個(gè)體，僅僅依賴于他自己理性的個(gè)體洽腺，怎樣應(yīng)該出于他自己的良知得出和所有其他理性個(gè)體相同的結(jié)論脚粟，一個(gè)康德式的道德共同體因此如何不應(yīng)該在道德上和它自己相抵觸。一個(gè)徹底地康德式的道德共同體因而應(yīng)該成為“看不見的教堂”蘸朋，“看不見的教堂”把自己建成“哲學(xué)學(xué)派”核无，在“哲學(xué)學(xué)派”中，用黑格爾的話說(shuō)藕坯，除非有些人把責(zé)任強(qiáng)加給每個(gè)作為個(gè)體的成員团南，否則每個(gè)作為個(gè)體的成員都“享有放任自流的態(tài)度”噪沙。

In the “Positivity” essay as in the “Life of Jesus,” Hegel took Jesus to have been preaching a doctrine that fit those Kantian prescriptions.? However, he also took the corruption of the Jewish people (a theme that he seems to have taken from Chapter 15 of Gibbon’s Decline and Fall oj the Roman Empire) to have made it impossible for them to have received such a message.'*’ The Jews, on Hegel’s understanding at this time, had transformed their religion into one of base servility to law and made it thereby into a religion from which all elements of personal freedom had been extirpated. Because Jesus’ own disciples were corrupted by the Jewish adherence to the divine law, even they found it impossible to accept Jesus’ teachings for what they were — teachings that called on them to attain “truth and freedom by their own exer- tions” and thereby to lead a life of virtue"^** - and they therefore ended up proclaiming that they accepted Jesus’ teachings not by virtue of their insight into their truth but by virtue of Jesus’ own personal authority, by virtue of his having said them. The contrast with the followers of Socrates, who had been taught to think for themselves, could not be greater: as Hegel put it, the “followers of Jesus . . . had no political interest like that which a citizen of a free republic takes in his native land; their whole interest was confined to the person of Jesus,” whereas the followers of Socrates “l(fā)oved Socrates because of his virtue and philosophy, not virtue and philosophy because of him.

? ? 在《基督教的實(shí)定性》這篇論著中像在《耶穌傳》中一樣，黑格爾認(rèn)為耶穌始終在宣講適合康德哲學(xué)那些律令的學(xué)說(shuō)吐根。然而他同樣也認(rèn)為猶太人腐化墮落（一個(gè)看來(lái)好像已經(jīng)被他從吉本《羅馬帝國(guó)衰亡史》第15章中選取的主題）已經(jīng)使他們不可能得到這樣一個(gè)信息正歼。猶太人，根據(jù)黑格爾當(dāng)時(shí)的理解拷橘，把他們的宗教基本上變成法律的奴顏婢膝的宗教局义，由此使他們的宗教成為一種徹底摧毀所有個(gè)人自由要素的宗教。因?yàn)橐d自己的門徒被猶太人信奉神律弄得有傷風(fēng)化冗疮，甚至他們也發(fā)覺不可能接受耶穌關(guān)于他們所是的東西的教導(dǎo)——耶穌教導(dǎo)號(hào)召他們“憑借他們自己的努力來(lái)獲得真理和自由”并由此過(guò)著德行生活——他們因此最終宣稱他們接受耶穌的教導(dǎo)萄唇，這樣做借助的不是他們對(duì)他們的真相洞若觀火而借助的是耶穌自己的個(gè)人權(quán)威，借助的是他已經(jīng)對(duì)他們說(shuō)的東西术幔。與蘇格拉底的追隨者被教會(huì)獨(dú)立思考相比的差別不可能大到哪里去：像黑格爾指出的另萤，“耶穌的追隨者……對(duì)政治毫無(wú)興趣，正像自由共和國(guó)公民對(duì)故土毫無(wú)興趣一樣诅挑；他們的全部興趣只限于耶穌其人”四敞，盡管蘇格拉底追隨者“因蘇格拉底的美德和哲學(xué)而熱愛蘇格拉底而非因蘇格拉底而熱愛美德和哲學(xué)”。

The contrast Hegel draws is thus between Jesus, who is portrayed as a ethical-religious Kantian hero, who only wanted people to be free and to develop their own powers to impose the moral law on themselves (and thereby to become virtuous in a Kantian sense), and the founders of Christianity (the disciples, the early church fathers), who are portrayed as corrupting Jesus’ teachings and setting up Christianity as a positive religion, one whose teachings are based on authority rather than on free reason. Jesus’ own teachings are not “positive,” they are not meant to substitute a new authoritarian system for the old authoritarian system. Nonetheless, to get his teachings heard, Jesus had to confer some authority upon his own person, for, given the corrupted conditions of the time, “to propose to appeal to reason alone would have meant the same thing as preaching to fish.”^” And thus the movement was set in motion toward “positivity.”

? ? 黑格爾作出的因此是耶穌（耶穌常常被描繪成宗教倫理上康德哲學(xué)式的英雄揍障，耶穌只想要人們擁有自由和只想要使他們自己能夠把道德律強(qiáng)加給他們自身目养，由此只想要使他們成為康德意義上具有德性的人）與基督教創(chuàng)始人（耶穌門徒或早期教父）之間的對(duì)比，基督教創(chuàng)始人被描繪成他們敗壞了耶穌教義和把基督教建成實(shí)定性的宗教毒嫡，實(shí)定性宗教教義奠基于權(quán)威而非奠基于自由的理性癌蚁。耶穌自己的那些教義不是“實(shí)定性的”，它們并不被說(shuō)成用新的權(quán)威體系取代舊的權(quán)威體系兜畸。尚不止于此努释，為讓他的教義有人聽信，耶穌不得不賦予他自己這個(gè)人某些權(quán)威咬摇。原因在于伐蒂，考慮到那個(gè)時(shí)代有傷風(fēng)化狀況，“單純提出訴諸理性大概意味著等同向魚宣講教義”肛鹏。故而這個(gè)運(yùn)動(dòng)被使得走向“實(shí)定性”逸邦。

Hegel, interestingly, does not speak of the early Christians as betraying Jesus’ teachings; instead he attributes the corruption to the context in which those teachings appeared. The Greek and Roman republics were free in the sense that “Greeks and Romans obeyed laws laid down by themselves”; each citizen found the free republic itself to be “the final end of his world,” and their religions supported this freedom.^' With the collapse of Greek and Roman freedom, Greek and Roman religion also disintegrated, and what had previously been a motivating force for the better in citizens’ lives vanished. The loss of such a good left people with nothing to inspire them except the cold ideals of protecting property and the fear of death. In this context, Christianity, which promised eternal life to those who slavishly followed its dictates, stepped into the void left by the disappearance of the Greek and Roman divinities.

? ? 黑格爾，很有趣地在扰，并沒有提及早期基督教教徒違背耶穌的教義缕减；相反他把腐化墮落歸咎于那些教義見之于的語(yǔ)境。希臘共和國(guó)和羅馬共和國(guó)從“希臘人和羅馬人遵守由他們自已親手制定的法律”意義上說(shuō)是自由的芒珠；每個(gè)公民都發(fā)覺自由共和國(guó)本身是“他的世界的終極目的”桥狡，他們的宗教支持這種自由。“隨著希臘人自由和羅馬人自由的坍塌裹芝，希臘人和羅馬人宗教也隨之土崩瓦解部逮，早先已成為一種追求更好的市民生活的動(dòng)力不復(fù)存在了。這樣一個(gè)好東西的喪失絲毫沒有起到激勵(lì)他們的作用嫂易，留給他們的只是保護(hù)財(cái)產(chǎn)的冰冷的理想和對(duì)死亡的恐懼兄朋。在這種語(yǔ)境上，基督教炬搭，承諾使那些相目服從它命令的人們變得永垂不朽的基督教蜈漓，消除了因希臘人和羅馬人神只消失而留下的空虛。

The followers of Jesus and the early Christians thus were almost unwittingly led to establish Christianity as a positive religion, although in its early stages even they could not even have been aware of the commitments they were undertaking. They were a small sect, whose members joined voluntarily (and thus “imposed” the rules of the sect on themselves), and they were able thus to be a society of friends in the Aristotelian sense.But as they grew in size and influence, the “positivity” of their views became all the more apparent. As they took over the state and the realm of positive law, their religion itself became all the more “positive” in character. They eventually eliminated freedom of thought, and their positive commands to their members to feel certain ways resulted in an unspiritual society of hypocrites and self-deceived people who had lost all sense of freedom and beauty.

? ? 耶穌追隨者和早期基督教教徒因而幾乎不知不覺地神差鬼使般把基督教建成實(shí)定性宗教宫盔，盡管在基督教早期階段甚至就連他們自己也完全不可能意識(shí)到他們所作出的奉獻(xiàn)融虽。他們形成很小的派別，派別成員自覺自愿加入（成員因而“把“該派的規(guī)章“強(qiáng)加“于他們自身）灼芭，他們因此能夠組成亞里士多德哲學(xué)意義上的友人社團(tuán)有额。“但是隨著該派成員逐漸增多和日益有影響彼绷，他們看法中的“實(shí)定性”變得更加明顯巍佑。當(dāng)他們主宰國(guó)家和實(shí)定法王國(guó)的時(shí)候，他們的宗教自身變得更具有“實(shí)定性”品格寄悯∮┧ィ基督教很多派別最終摒棄了思想自由，它們積極地要求它們的成員去感受某些方式，這樣的要求導(dǎo)致塵世偽君子社團(tuán)的面世和那些自欺欺人的早已喪失全部自由感和美感的人們大行其道。

Unlike Gibbon, however, Hegel was not content to attribute the rise of Christianity simply to a series of contingent, heterogeneous social factors. Hegel’s interest in the Kantian ideas of freedom and therefore of the self-imposition of the moral law lead him to offer a hypothesis that went far beyond the bounds of Gibbon’s Enlightenment historiography. Hegel noted in relation to Christianity’s having supplanted the great pagan religions of antiquity that “great revolutions which strike the eye at a glance must have been preceded by a still and secret revolution in the spirit of the age, a revolution not visible to every eye, especially imperceptible to contemporaries, and as hard to discern as to describe in words. . . . The supplanting of a native and immemorial religion by a foreign one is a revolution which occurs in the spiritual realm itself, and it is thus of a kind whose causes must be found all the more directly in the spirit of the times.”” The “secret revolution” of which Hegel spoke made reference to his Tubingen concerns: the collapse of ancient freedom and the possibility of a revolution-reformation in modern life that would restore the spirit of Greek freedom and lead to moral and spiritual renewal. Christianity became a positive religion in spite o/Jesus’ teaching because the “spirit of the times” in Jesus’ day and immediately thereafter had lost the ideal of freedom; what actually separated the followers of Jesus from the followers of Socrates was Greek social and religious life, which had prevented the Greeks (in Hegel’s eyes) from having any positive religion. Accusations of heresy in Greek life were, after all, virtually nonexistent; the Greeks did not seem so intent in their religious practices on propounding doctrine against which one could measure one’s “true” religiosity.

? ? 然而凌节，和吉本不一樣，黑格爾并不滿足于把基督教興起簡(jiǎn)單地歸結(jié)于一系列偶然的異質(zhì)的社會(huì)因素椿争。黑格爾對(duì)康德自由思想感興趣且因此對(duì)康德道德律自我強(qiáng)加思想非常感興趣，這就致使他提出了一個(gè)遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超出吉本的啟蒙運(yùn)動(dòng)史學(xué)著作范圍的假設(shè)熟嫩。黑格爾在關(guān)于基督教取代了大量古代異教這個(gè)問(wèn)題上強(qiáng)調(diào)指出秦踪，“那些乍一看就使人留下深刻印象的大革命想必后于一種平靜和秘密的時(shí)代精神革命，想必后于一種并非每個(gè)人都能看到的革命掸茅，特別是不被當(dāng)代人察覺到的革命椅邓，這樣的大革命像很難用詞語(yǔ)描述一樣幾乎是難以覺察的……本土的古老宗教被外國(guó)宗教取代，這是一場(chǎng)發(fā)生在精神王國(guó)自身的革命昧狮，這場(chǎng)革命的原因因而想必更加直接地見于時(shí)代精神景馁。”那被黑格爾提到的“秘密革命”涉及他在圖賓根時(shí)期關(guān)注的東西：古代自由的坍塌和革命性地重塑現(xiàn)代生活的可能性將會(huì)恢復(fù)希臘人自由精神和致使人們道德重生和精神重生陵且。撇開耶穌教義裁僧，基督教變成實(shí)定的宗教，因?yàn)橐d時(shí)代的“時(shí)代精神”和緊隨其后的“時(shí)代精神”喪失了自由的理想慕购；實(shí)際上把耶穌追隨者和蘇格拉底追隨者分開的是希臘人的社會(huì)生活和宗教生活聊疲，希臘人的生活使（黑格爾眼中的）希臘人不復(fù)具有任何實(shí)定的宗教。畢竟希臘人生活中實(shí)質(zhì)上并不存在對(duì)異端的指控沪悲；希臘人看來(lái)好像并不一心根據(jù)他們的宗教習(xí)俗提出教義以反對(duì)可以判斷人們“真”宗教的東西获洲。

Despite Hegel’s own description of himself as wanting to “apply” Kant’s thought, in the “Positivity” essay he was also clearly trying to develop it in light of his own interests. In “What Is Enlightenment?”, Kant had called for an end to mankind’s “self-incurred tutelage.”^'* In the “Positivity” essay, Hegel took this a step further, explaining this self-imposed tutelage as having come about because of the loss of Greek and Roman freedom, and attributing the transformation of Christianity into a positive religion to that loss; Hegel “applied” Kant’s notion of freedom as self-legislation to history to explain how Christianity became a “positive religion.” Echoing Kant’s essay, Hegel noted that “every day anyone can see examples of how far men can renounce their own native powers and freedom, how they can submit to a perpetual tutelage with such willingness that their attachment to the fetters they place on reason is all the greater the heavier these fetters are. In addition to recommending a virtue religion, Jesus was also bound continually to bring himself, the teacher of this religion, into play; he had to demand faith in his person, a faith which his virtue religion required only for its opposition to the positive doctrines.

? ? 盡管黑格爾自己把他自已描述成想“運(yùn)用”康德的思想，在《基督教的實(shí)定性》這篇論著中他還是明顯地努力根據(jù)他自己興趣來(lái)闡發(fā)康德的思想殿如。早在《什么是啟蒙運(yùn)動(dòng)贡珊？》中，康德就已在倡導(dǎo)人類“自己招致守護(hù)”的目的涉馁。在《宗教的實(shí)定性》這篇論著中门岔，黑格爾在這一點(diǎn)上走得更遠(yuǎn)，把自己招致守護(hù)出現(xiàn)的原因解釋成在于希臘人和羅馬人自由的喪失烤送，并把基督教變成實(shí)定宗教歸因于希臘人和羅馬人自由的喪失寒随；黑格爾把康德關(guān)于作為自我立法的自由概念“應(yīng)用于”歷史以解釋基督教怎么變成“實(shí)定的宗教”。在重復(fù)康德論著中觀點(diǎn)時(shí)帮坚，黑格爾強(qiáng)調(diào)指出“每天任何人都能看到一些事例妻往，它們是人們?cè)鯓痈蟪潭壬蠏仐壦麄冏约号c生俱來(lái)的權(quán)力和自由、他們?cè)鯓忧鼜挠趲в邢铝械倪@種意愿的永久守護(hù)：他們作為他們給理性帶上的鐐銬的附屬品意味著這些鐐銬將變得更加巨大更加沉重试和。除了舉薦德性宗教之外讯泣，耶穌同樣也不斷地必然發(fā)揮他自己作為德性宗教導(dǎo)師的作用；他不得不要求人們信仰他這個(gè)人阅悍，這樣的信仰是他的德性宗教僅僅出于它與實(shí)定教義分庭抗禮所需要的好渠。”

The unspoken but clear implication of the essay is that the question of whether Christianity could therefore cease to be a positive religion and become again a “religion of freedom” was necessarily connected with the issue of whether the French Revolution would succeed in restoring freedom and spirituality to modern life. But, oddly enough, the question of whether Christianity actually could be this new “religion of freedom” was left unanswered in the essay, and the reason seems to be that Hegel simply had not made up his mind on the issue. He suspected that Christianity might simply be inadequate to the role of a “religion of freedom.” At one point he noted that its imagery does not lend itself to the kind of “poetic adaptation” that is capable of “refining our people,” because the images of “positive” Christianity have been so inculcated in people’s minds in such a “positive” manner that they “carry a sense of uneasiness running counter to that enjoyment of beauty which arises from the free play of our mental powers.”^* (The notion of beauty as arising from the “free play of our mental powers” is, of course, an indirect reference to Kant’s notion in his Critique of Judgment that beauty results from the sensuous embodiment of our spontaneity, that in enjoying beauty, we are really enjoying the spontaneous free play of our mental powers.) If because of its cultural and historical baggage, “positive” Christianity is incapable of being beautiful, then it is incapable of motivating people to be free, and, if that is true, “positive” Christianity simply cannot satisfy the demands of modern European life.

? ? 這篇論著未言明而顯然暗含的問(wèn)題是基督教因此是否可能不復(fù)成為實(shí)定宗教和是否可能再度成為“自由宗教”這個(gè)問(wèn)題必然是與法國(guó)大革命是否將會(huì)成功地還現(xiàn)代生活以自由和精神性這個(gè)問(wèn)題密切相關(guān)的溉箕』耷剑可是，十分奇怪地肴茄，基督教實(shí)際上是否可能成為新的“自由宗教”這個(gè)問(wèn)題在這篇論著中并未作出回答晌畅，原因看來(lái)好像是黑格爾根本沒有決定解決這個(gè)問(wèn)題。他懷疑基督教可能根本不勝任扮演“自由宗教”這個(gè)角色寡痰。在這個(gè)關(guān)鍵問(wèn)題上抗楔，他強(qiáng)調(diào)指出它的表象沒有使它自身成為一種“能夠渾化我們國(guó)民”的“詩(shī)化的適應(yīng)”，因?yàn)椤皩?shí)定”基督教的表象已經(jīng)被以這樣一種“實(shí)定”方式如此反復(fù)灌輸進(jìn)人們的腦子里拦坠，以至于他們“產(chǎn)生與美的享受背道而馳的焦慮不安感连躏，這樣的感覺源自對(duì)我們智力的自由應(yīng)用≌瓯酰”（作為源自“自由地應(yīng)用我們智力”的美這個(gè)概念當(dāng)然間接地涉及康德《判斷力批判》中的概念入热，這個(gè)概念大意是美源自我們自發(fā)性的感性體現(xiàn)拍棕，在享受美時(shí)，我們確實(shí)在享受我們自發(fā)而自由地應(yīng)用我們的智力勺良。）如果绰播，由于“實(shí)定”宗教的文化和歷史包袱，“實(shí)定”基督教不能夠成為優(yōu)美的宗教尚困，那么它就不能夠促使人們?nèi)?zhēng)取自由蠢箩，如果說(shuō)上述假設(shè)成立的話，“實(shí)定”基督教就根本無(wú)法滿足現(xiàn)代歐洲人的生活要求事甜。

At that point in his development, though, Hegel could not bring himself to conclude authoritatively that Christianity could not satisfy such demands. However, the lack of a definitive answer to that crucial question was, as Hegel surely came to see, fatal for the “Positivity” essay, and without an answer to that question, the “application” of Kant had not really succeeded, for the basic practical question remained unanswered.

? ? 盡管這樣谬泌，在他闡發(fā)這個(gè)關(guān)鍵問(wèn)題時(shí)，黑格爾不可能讓他自己以權(quán)威姿態(tài)斷定基督教不可能滿足這樣的要求逻谦。然而掌实，這個(gè)至關(guān)重要的問(wèn)題缺乏確定的答案，像黑格爾想必逐漸看出的邦马，這樣的缺乏是《基督教的實(shí)定性》這篇論著的致命傷潮峦，而假如這個(gè)問(wèn)題沒有答案，對(duì)康德哲學(xué)的“應(yīng)用”就不會(huì)早就真正地取得了成功勇婴，因?yàn)檫@個(gè)基本的實(shí)際問(wèn)題仍然沒有得到回答忱嘹。

Even worse for Hegel’s point of view, the answer that was coming from France, as it were, was not encouraging: In 1793, the revolutionaries had officially “abolished” Christianity and replaced it with Robespierre’s “cult of reason,” something that was as silly as it was uninspiring. Indeed, Christianity of any sort did not seem to be playing a critical role in the development of revolutionary events. The “Positivity” essay thus ended without really coming to grips with the very problems that had inspired it.

? ? 甚至對(duì)于黑格爾的觀點(diǎn)更為糟糕的是，可以說(shuō)這個(gè)可能來(lái)自于法國(guó)的答案并不是令人鼓舞的：早在1793年耕渴，法國(guó)一系列革命就已正式“廢除了”基督教拘悦，取代基督教的是羅伯斯比爾的“理性神拜”，它像無(wú)啟發(fā)性東西一樣的荒謬可笑橱脸。更確切地說(shuō)础米，任何種類的基督教看來(lái)好像都沒有在革命事件發(fā)展過(guò)程中發(fā)揮關(guān)鍵的作用√硭撸《基督教的實(shí)定性》這篇論著因而最終沒有真正地認(rèn)真解決激起“理性崇拜”的特有問(wèn)題屁桑。

Hegel was almost without doubt discouraged by his attempts at “popular philosophy.” He had written much, but none of it he deemed suitable to see the light of day. His position seemed, furthermore, to be more syncretic than synthetic: He was pasting together bits and pieces of Kantian practical philosophy, his theological training at Tubingen, and his interest in what he took to be the problems and promises of the Revolution, and the result was a whole that not only looked cobbled together but also failed to provide crucial answers for the basic problems it was written to address. Hegel’s attempt to “complete” the Kantian philosophy by applying it to the problems of a “people’s religion” thus seemed to be coming to a dead end.

? ? 黑格爾幾乎無(wú)疑對(duì)他在“通俗哲學(xué)”方面作出的嘗試感到心灰意冷。他確實(shí)寫了不少東西栏赴，但是其中沒有一件東西被他認(rèn)為適合于拿出去見世面蘑斧。此外就是，他的立場(chǎng)看來(lái)好像傾向于調(diào)和而非綜合：他在把康德實(shí)跋哲學(xué)中零零散散的東西须眷、他在圖賓根時(shí)的神學(xué)訓(xùn)練竖瘾、他對(duì)被他認(rèn)為的成為法國(guó)大革命問(wèn)題和承諾的興趣這三個(gè)方面內(nèi)容精合在一起，這三方面內(nèi)容結(jié)果形成的整體不僅看似被草草拼湊起來(lái)而且未能為講演中被記下的有關(guān)整體的基本問(wèn)題提供關(guān)鍵答案花颗。黑格爾試圖憑借把康德哲學(xué)應(yīng)用于“人民宗教”問(wèn)題進(jìn)而“使”康德哲學(xué)“臻于完美”捕传，這樣的嘗試因此看來(lái)好像將要走進(jìn)死胡同。

It was, in part, the failure of his efforts to “apply” Kant to practical life that eventually would lead him to question even more fundamentally just what the completion of Kantian philosophy would imply. At first, however, the failure of his efforts simply left him depressed and at odds with himself; but he had reason to be hopeful: He was escaping Berne for the more cosmopolitan community of Frankfurt, apparently to work for a more congenial family and for a reunion with his close friend Holderlin.

從特定程度上說(shuō)扩劝，是他努力把康德“應(yīng)用”于實(shí)際生活的失敗庸论，最終致使他對(duì)使康德哲學(xué)臻于完美恰恰應(yīng)該暗示的何種更為基本的東西產(chǎn)生懷疑职辅。然而，起初由于他的努力以失敗告終而簡(jiǎn)直令他十分沮喪和不知所措聂示；但是他有理由抱有希望：他將逃離伯爾尼去世界化大都市法蘭克福罐农，顯然是為更為和諧的家庭而工作，為跟他摯友荷爾德林的重聚而工作催什。

Stopover in Stuttgart: Flirtation and Politics

在斯圖加特的短暫逗留：調(diào)情與政治學(xué)

At the end of the year of 1796, Hegel set off from Berne to Frankfurt.? He had to get permission from the Konsistorium (the church authorities) in Wiirttemberg to take his position as Hofmeister with the Gogel family, since he still technically owed them service as a pastor. However, because there were many other young men who actually wanted the few church positions that were available, and who were obviously better suited for them than Hegel (who was in any event hardly the darling of the theological faculty at Tubingen), his permission to go to Frankfurt seemed a sure bet. Playing the odds, Hegel began his service with the Gogel family at the beginning of January, although his official permission from the Konsistorium to do so was not granted until January 10, 1797.

? ? 在1796年底，黑格爾從伯爾尼啟程前往法蘭克福宰睡。他必須得到符騰堡Komsistorixmr（教會(huì)當(dāng)局）的許可才能擔(dān)任戈格爾家家庭教師蒲凶，因?yàn)樗缮先匀粵]有完成教會(huì)當(dāng)局牧師服務(wù)。然而拆内，因?yàn)橛泻芏嗥渌贻p人實(shí)際上想獲得教會(huì)提供的少量職位旋圆，而且他們明顯比黑格爾更適合這類職位（黑格爾無(wú)論如何幾乎不是圖賓根神學(xué)院的寵兒），所以他將被獲準(zhǔn)去法蘭克隔锘校看來(lái)好像沒有什么懸念灵巧。幸運(yùn)的是，黑格爾一月初就開始在戈格爾家服務(wù)抹沪，盡管教會(huì)當(dāng)局直到1797年1月10日才正式批準(zhǔn)他在戈格爾家當(dāng)家庭教師刻肄。

On the way home, Hegel stopped off to visit his family in Stuttgart for a few weeks. Even with the brighter prospects of Frankfurt ahead of him, his sister remembered him as sad and withdrawn. After all, although he was moving to a better city, and would be in the company of Holderlin once more, he was simply trading one Hofmeister position for another. He was not, for example, going on to edit a journal or even to write for one, nor was he going to a university to assume a position as a salaried intellectual. However, as things turned out, two things during his stay in Stuttgart helped him to recover himself and get his feet planted again: he became involved with the growing revolutionary movements in his home state of Wiirttemberg, and he became involved in a flirtation with a young woman by the name of Nanette Endel, who was living at the time with his sister and father.

? ? 在去戈格爾家路上，黑格爾為看望當(dāng)時(shí)在斯圖加特家人的中途逗留了幾個(gè)星期融欧。甚至當(dāng)法蘭克福更為光明的前景展現(xiàn)在他面前的時(shí)候敏弃，他的妹妹不會(huì)忘記他仍然表現(xiàn)出郁郁寡歡。畢竟噪馏，盡管他將移居一個(gè)更好的城市麦到，盡管他大概會(huì)復(fù)又同荷爾德林交往、他卻只不過(guò)是利用家庭教師這個(gè)職位作為跳板欠肾。舉例來(lái)說(shuō)瓶颠，他不打算去當(dāng)編輯甚或成為雜志撰稿人，他也不打算去大學(xué)做擔(dān)任拿薪水的知識(shí)分子職位刺桃。然而粹淋，像有些事情證明的，在他小住斯圖加特期間有兩件事助他煥發(fā)青春和再度站穩(wěn)腳跟：他卷入他家鄉(xiāng)符騰堡州正在興起的革命運(yùn)動(dòng)瑟慈、他同樣也卷入與芳名納內(nèi)特·恩德爾這位年輕貌美女郎的調(diào)情廓啊，這位女郎當(dāng)時(shí)跟他妹妹和父親住在一起。

Nanette Endel was apparently a friend of Hegel’s sister, Christiane.? She later became a milliner, and she was probably engaged in training to become a milliner while she was living and working at the Hegel household to earn her keep and to pay for her training. Nanette Endel was five years younger than Hegel and a devout Catholic. Although Hegel arrived at Stuttgart feeling quite low, it seems clear that he and Nanette became good friends rather quickly. The two teased each other quite a lot and carried on an extended flirtation (much to the consternation of Hegel’s sister, whom Hegel jokingly characterized in a letter to Nanette Endel as the “privy councilor” who had accused Nanette of being a bit “roguish” in her relations with him).” Hegel, whose own distaste for Catholicism was to last for the greater portion of his life, no doubt at first reacted strongly to Nanette Endel’s devout adherence to it. However, Nanette Endel was good-spirited enough to joust with Hegel on these matters. She teased him about his dour nature and his Protestant high-mindedness, gently poking fun at his self-important, self-appointed task of becoming an “educator of the people” and establishing a “people’s religion.” She teased him by calling him Saint Alexis, a Christian saint from the year 400, who fled on the day of his wedding and renounced all his worldly possessions in order to live the life of a monk. He teased her by calling her Sister Jacqueline, a reference to Jacqueline Arnauld, the abbess of the Jansenist cloister of Port Royal.? It seems that she at least tried, however good-naturedly and maybe even half-heartedly, to get Hegel to consider becoming a Catholic or at least going to Mass or undertaking some Catholic practices; he in turn tried to get her to convert to Protestantism.

? ? 納內(nèi)特·恩德爾看似是黑格爾妹妹克里斯蒂亞娜的好友封豪。她后來(lái)成了一名禮帽設(shè)計(jì)師谴轮，她很可能在訓(xùn)練自己做禮帽設(shè)計(jì)師，其時(shí)她住在黑格爾家并為黑格爾家做家務(wù)以掙錢維持生活和繳納培訓(xùn)費(fèi)吹埠。納內(nèi)特·恩德爾比黑格爾年輕5歲第步，是個(gè)虔誠(chéng)的天主教教徒疮装。盡管黑格爾到達(dá)斯圖加特時(shí)情緒非常低落，但是他和納內(nèi)特看似顯然閃電般地成了知己粘都，她被黑格爾致納內(nèi)特·恩德爾信中開玩笑地描述成是“私人顧問(wèn)”廓推，她早就責(zé)備納內(nèi)特在與黑格爾關(guān)系方面有點(diǎn)“耍流氓”。黑格爾翩隧、他自己對(duì)天主教的厭惡可能持續(xù)了他大半生樊展，無(wú)疑起初對(duì)納內(nèi)特·恩德爾虔誠(chéng)信奉天主教作出強(qiáng)烈的反應(yīng)。不過(guò)納內(nèi)特·恩德爾有著足夠精力在這些事上與黑格爾展開爭(zhēng)辯堆生。她取笑他秉性執(zhí)拗和他作為新教徒的高傲心氣专缠，委婉地嘲弄他自我持重自我指定將來(lái)當(dāng)“人民教育家”和創(chuàng)立“人民宗教”的任務(wù)。她借助把他稱作圣亞歷克西斯而戲弄他淑仆，圣亞歷克西斯是400年前一名基督教圣徒涝婉。他在婚禮那天逃走和放棄了所有世俗家產(chǎn)以便出家修行。他靠把她稱作修女杰奎琳來(lái)取笑她蔗怠，修女杰奎琳與杰奎琳·阿瑙爾德這位羅亞爾港詹森派修道院院長(zhǎng)有染墩弯。看來(lái)好像她至少試圖寞射，不管她生性多么善良甚或多么楊花水性渔工，想使黑格爾考慮做天主教徒或至少去做彌撒或從事某些天主教活動(dòng)；他反而力圖使她皈依新教桥温。