Note：英文水平一般群凶，且只邊閱讀邊翻譯，因?yàn)闀r(shí)間關(guān)系沒(méi)有修飾文字别伏。出現(xiàn)錯(cuò)誤請(qǐng)務(wù)必指出，如果貼出一大段知識(shí)點(diǎn)和建議忧额，必有回報(bào)厘肮！
“Think it possible that you may be mistaken.”——Quaker Advices and Queries
（這句翻了好久沒(méi)有翻出心儀的句子）
IN OCTOBER 2008, Wendelin Wiedeking, Porsche’s chief executive, announced an imminent takeover of VW. Hedge funds that had bet on VW’s share price falling were confounded. Tearful fund managers confronted huge losses. Yet within six months, Porsche was almost bankrupt. In a humiliating reversal, VW turned the tables on the predatory Porsche, which lost its independence – when it had seemed to come within an ace of success. Porsche was ruined by overconfidence. Yet why was Porsche so sure? What made it believe that it could dominate a company 82 times its size?
2008年10月，法拉第CEOWendelin Wiedeking宣布提前接管大眾睦番。Hedge基金預(yù)測(cè)大眾的股價(jià)將大跌类茂。基金經(jīng)理們?cè)庥隽藨K重的損失。但是在6個(gè)月內(nèi)巩检，法拉第幾乎瀕臨破產(chǎn)恬涧。在這個(gè)恥辱性的逆轉(zhuǎn)中，大眾面對(duì)法拉第的掠奪性攻擊成功反敗為勝碴巾，法拉第在貌似快成功的情況下幾乎失去了自主權(quán)溯捆。法拉第被自己的自負(fù)所摧毀。那為什么法拉第那么確定自己可以打敗大眾呢厦瓢？是什么讓法拉第相信自己可以控制比自己體量大82倍的大眾呢提揍？
Calamity loves overconfidence. This chapter explores what causes overconfidence and how it can lead to calamity. The starting point is that most managers are confident to begin with. Repeated success makes them even more confident and therefore more prone to behaving recklessly – though without realising it. Business is a game of skill and luck. The important thing is not to depend too much on luck.
自負(fù)伴隨著災(zāi)難。這章將探討引起過(guò)度自信的原因和其如何導(dǎo)致災(zāi)難的煮仇。在項(xiàng)目開(kāi)始的時(shí)候劳跃，大多數(shù)的管理者都會(huì)表現(xiàn)的充滿自信。重復(fù)的成功讓他們信心爆棚浙垫，因此讓他們表現(xiàn)出更加魯莽的行為傾向——但是他們并沒(méi)有意識(shí)到刨仑。商業(yè)活動(dòng)是一場(chǎng)技術(shù)與運(yùn)氣的博弈，成功的關(guān)鍵是不要過(guò)分依賴運(yùn)氣夹姥。
1.Illusions of control 控制的錯(cuò)覺(jué)
In 1980, Shelly Taylor, a psychologist, published a controversial book entitled Positive Illusions. Taylor’s theme (supported by substantial research evidence) is that most people are out of touch with reality most of the time. For instance, whereas depression is popularly regarded as seeing things as worse than they are, Taylor argues that depression is seeing things as they are.
在1980年杉武，心理學(xué)家Shelly Taylor發(fā)表了一本引發(fā)爭(zhēng)議的書(shū)叫做‘Positive Illusions（積極幻想）’。Taylor的觀點(diǎn)是大多數(shù)人在大多數(shù)時(shí)候無(wú)法觸碰到現(xiàn)實(shí)辙售。比如說(shuō)轻抱，人們普遍認(rèn)為抑郁癥是患者看到了更糟糕的事情，但Taylor認(rèn)為抑郁癥是患者看到了事物本身（這里有點(diǎn)禪意暗┎俊）祈搜。
Psychologists call it the illusion of control, a reference to our innate tendency as human beings to overestimate our ability to achieve outcomes, even those that are obviously due to chance. For instance, would you prefer to choose a lottery ticket or accept a ticket from the shopkeeper? (Assume that the shopkeeper is honest.) Logically, it makes no difference to the probability of winning. Yet you may prefer to choose the ticket – why?
心理學(xué)家把這叫做錯(cuò)覺(jué)，有研究表明這是人之為人天生的心理傾向：高估我們成功的能力士八，但這成功往往是由于機(jī)遇容燕。比如說(shuō)，你更想讓老板幫你選一張彩票號(hào)碼還是自己親自選擇婚度？從統(tǒng)計(jì)學(xué)來(lái)說(shuō)蘸秘，這兩種情況贏得獎(jiǎng)金的概率是一樣的，但你往往會(huì)自己選擇彩票號(hào)碼陕见。這是為什么呢秘血？
Research into gambling behaviour has shown that players often behave as if they can control chance events. For instance, they shake the cup hard if they need high numbers on the dice and softly if they need low numbers. Then there is the daily “to do” list. Those who compile such lists typically overestimate what they can achieve in a day. Yet that does not stop them from compiling yet another list – as if they never learn. Overconfidence may also encourage frequent trading in stockmarkets. That is, frequent traders may assume that their stock selections will be so successful that transaction costs will prove immaterial.
博弈行為的研究表明玩家通常表現(xiàn)出他們似乎掌控著全局味抖。比如說(shuō)评甜，當(dāng)玩家們想擲到一個(gè)大數(shù)時(shí)就會(huì)使勁搖著杯子，但如果想要一個(gè)小數(shù)時(shí)就會(huì)輕輕搖杯子仔涩。當(dāng)我們?cè)趯?xiě)每日待辦事項(xiàng)清單時(shí)忍坷， 我們總是過(guò)高估計(jì)一天能完成的任務(wù)量。但是我們?cè)俅螌?xiě)任務(wù)清單時(shí)，依然這樣做佩研，就好像從來(lái)不知道一樣柑肴。在股票市場(chǎng)，過(guò)分自信也會(huì)增加交易頻率旬薯。股民們會(huì)對(duì)所持有的股票充滿信心而頻繁交易卻不在乎交易陳本晰骑。
Our innate tendency to overestimate our abilities means we often see ourselves as superior to other people. We also view ourselves more positively than others see us. We often overstate the value of our own contributions, while undervaluing contributions made by other people. For instance, in 1923 two Canadian scientists, Frederick Banting and James Macleod, won the Nobel Prize in medicine for the discovery of insulin. Banting claimed that Macleod had been more of a hindrance than a help while Macleod omitted Banting’s name from all the speeches describing the research leading up to the discovery. Similarly, in group work, most people remember their own contributions rather than those made by other members of the group. Negotiators often underestimate the bargaining power of their opponents and overestimate the likelihood that their final offer will be accepted.
這種天生高估自己能力的傾向意味著我們總是把自己看得比別人更厲害。我們看待自己總是比別人看我們更樂(lè)觀绊序。我們通乘队撸夸大我們所做出成績(jī)的價(jià)值，同時(shí)低估別人的成就骤公。比如說(shuō)抚官，1923年，因?yàn)榘l(fā)現(xiàn)了胰島素阶捆，加拿大兩位科學(xué)家Frederick Banting和James Macleod獲得了諾貝爾醫(yī)學(xué)獎(jiǎng)凌节。當(dāng)Macleod在做關(guān)于胰島素研究的演講總是省略掉Banting的名字時(shí)，Banting就聲稱 Macleod其實(shí)是更多阻礙而非促進(jìn)發(fā)現(xiàn)胰島素洒试。在團(tuán)隊(duì)工作中也相似倍奢，大多數(shù)的人總是更在意自己的功勞而不是別人。談判代表總是低估對(duì)手討價(jià)還價(jià)的能力和高估對(duì)手最終接受自己報(bào)價(jià)的可能性垒棋。
Research has shown that most people value themselves too highly. The result may be that they price themselves (or their firms) out of the market. The chief executive of a multinational company says:
We needed a piece of research done. Firms in the US and Australia wanted around $20 million for the job. A firm in India said they would do it if we re-kitted their laboratories – $3 million – and they had all the infrastructure and staff in place to support the research – same as the US and Australia.
研究表明大多數(shù)人都會(huì)高估自己娱挨。這樣的結(jié)果可能會(huì)導(dǎo)致他們脫離市場(chǎng)高估自己的價(jià)值。一位跨過(guò)公司的CEO說(shuō)：同樣是進(jìn)行一項(xiàng)研究捕犬，美國(guó)和澳大利亞的公司評(píng)估需要2000萬(wàn)美元跷坝，但印度的公司卻只報(bào)價(jià)300萬(wàn)美元，并且提供和美澳一樣的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施和技術(shù)人員碉碉。
Lesson: be humble. 教訓(xùn)：謙虛點(diǎn)
Overconfidence breeds complacency. When NASA first launched the Apollo moon-landing expeditions in the 1960s, it was so afraid of failure that engineers had to prove that every launch was safe before it could go ahead. As the technology became routine, the system developed a false confidence in itself. Safety standards were lowered. That meant rockets would be launched unless engineers could prove that it was unsafe to do so. The consequences of NASA’s complacency were graphically demonstrated when the spaceship Challenger exploded on take-off killing all on board – before a television audience of millions. Similarly, as memories of Three Mile Island and Chernobyl receded, attitudes towards nuclear energy relaxed. Then in 2011 an earthquake struck Japan followed by a tsunami. Reactors melted down releasing high levels of radioactivity into the atmosphere and the ocean. The disaster also exposed systemic weaknesses, including poor location of the reactors, poor accident preparation, poor emergency response and weak regulation. It was the old story. We forget that a history of no accidents does not mean something is safe.
過(guò)度自信喂養(yǎng)自滿柴钻。當(dāng)NASA第一次打算在70年代發(fā)布阿波羅登月計(jì)劃時(shí)，因?yàn)榉浅?dān)心失敗垢粮，每次發(fā)射前都會(huì)讓工程師保證安全性贴届。但當(dāng)這些變成例行公事時(shí)，整個(gè)系統(tǒng)演化出錯(cuò)誤的自信蜡吧。安全標(biāo)準(zhǔn)被過(guò)低設(shè)置毫蚓，這意味著除非工程師證明發(fā)射存在安全隱患，火箭就會(huì)正常發(fā)射昔善。NASA自滿的結(jié)果就是在上百萬(wàn)電視觀眾面前元潘，宇宙飛船Challenger的發(fā)射失敗，所有宇航員都殉難了君仆。相似的翩概，三里島和切爾諾貝利事件讓人們改變了對(duì)和能源的態(tài)度牲距。之后，2011年的福島核泄漏事件發(fā)生钥庇，反應(yīng)堆泄露的放射性物質(zhì)污染了大氣和海洋牍鞠。災(zāi)難總是暴露系統(tǒng)的弱點(diǎn)，比如糟糕的反應(yīng)堆的選址评姨、突發(fā)事件預(yù)案难述、緊急反應(yīng)能力和程序。這是個(gè)古老的故事吐句，我們忘記歷史上的災(zāi)難但這并不意味著所有的一切都是安全的龄广。
Toyota’s leaders inflicted huge damage upon the company by refusing to recall vehicles with potentially lethal accelerator pedals. Toyota had known about the “sticky accelerator pedal” problem for months (possibly years) before reports began appearing in the news in late 2009, but acted only when forced to do so by mounting public pressure. The company was finally galvanised into action following worldwide dissemination of a recording of the last words of a passenger in a hired Lexus that allegedly sped out of control.
豐田的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人拒絕召回存在加速踏板問(wèn)題的車輛，因?yàn)檫@對(duì)公司會(huì)造成巨大損失蕴侧。在2009年底新聞報(bào)道出現(xiàn)之前择同，豐田就已經(jīng)知道了“粘性油門(mén)踏板”問(wèn)題，但是卻在公眾輿論的壓力下才開(kāi)始宣布召回有問(wèn)題車輛净宵。一段雷克薩斯雇員的行車記錄在全球范圍內(nèi)傳播敲才，最終導(dǎo)致豐田公司對(duì)于這次事件的完全失控。
In a 911 emergency call made just before the car crashed, Chris Lastrella is heard saying, “We’re in a Lexus . . . and we’re going north on 125 and our accelerator is stuck . . . we’re in trouble . . . there’s no brakes . . . we’re approaching the intersection . . . hold on . . . hold on and pray . . . pray.”2 Lastrella was killed in the crash along with the driver of the car and two other passengers. Part of Toyota’s problem may have been that it simply could not believe that its cars could be less than perfect. 豐田的問(wèn)題是過(guò)分相信自己的汽車沒(méi)有安全風(fēng)險(xiǎn)择葡。
2.The confidence trap 自信陷阱
Nothing succeeds like success, according to the proverb. Yet repeated success can destroy us. This is because, if we are consistently successful, we expect to succeed. Just as people who experience early wins in games of chance tend to raise their bets, repeated success can tempt us to take bigger and bigger risks because we feel invulnerable.
正如諺語(yǔ)所說(shuō)紧武，成功不易。但是把成功掛在嘴邊會(huì)毀了我們敏储。這是因?yàn)槿绻覀円恢背晒ψ栊牵覀兙蜁?huì)期待成功。在賭博中已添，一開(kāi)始體驗(yàn)了贏錢(qián)的感覺(jué)會(huì)提高我們的賭注妥箕。一直成功會(huì)讓我們感覺(jué)無(wú)懈可擊，導(dǎo)致風(fēng)險(xiǎn)越來(lái)越大更舞。
Barings almost came to grief 100 years before it was destroyed by Nick Leeson’s activities in the early 1990s. During the 1880s Barings was flying high as evidenced by the runaway success of the Guinness flotation of 1886, when investors, desperate to acquire shares, resorted to wrapping their application forms round stones and hurling them through Barings’ windows. Barings then determined upon an even bolder venture, namely a waterworks project in Argentina. This time Lord Revelstoke, Barings’ senior partner, decided that underwriting was superfluous. The issue failed. Barings was left holding the shares. The firm had to be rescued by the government because of the systemic threat. The partners lost everything. Lord Revelstoke’s mistake was dispensing with underwriting. That decision made the venture much more risky. Lord Revelstoke took the decision because he assumed that the Guinness success would be repeated. Such was his overconfidence that it never occurred to him that it might not be.
Modern firms are by no means immune from the overconfidence trap. In 2007, Vodafone triumphantly launched a $10.9 billion expansion into India by acquiring a 66% stake in Hutchinson Essar, renamed Vodafone Essar. Vodafone expected to acquire a substantial share of India’s growing market for mobile telephony. Yet within three years, it was forced to write down the value of its Indian business by 25%. This embarrassing reversal happened because whereas most countries have three or four network operators, India has 15. An overly confident Vodafone failed adequately to consider the implications of this basic statistic. (The venture has since prospered despite the inauspicious start.)
現(xiàn)代公司也不可能逃脫過(guò)度自信陷阱畦幢。（2007年沃達(dá)豐在印度的投資失敗案例。）
Similarly, Porsche’s status as the most profitable carmaker in the world may have gone to its directors’ heads. Success also boosts our self-esteem. High self-esteem may also explain (but not excuse) unethical behaviour. That is, executives with high self-esteem may believe that they are incapable of acting unethically. （保時(shí)捷的例子）成功助長(zhǎng)狂妄自大缆蝉。很多違法職業(yè)道德的行為可以用狂妄自大來(lái)解釋宇葱。因?yàn)樽源蟮母吖軅儚墓亲永锞拖嘈潘麄兊男袨椴皇遣坏赖碌摹?/p>
