Our Performance in 1963

1963年度投資表現(xiàn)

1963 was a good year. It was not a good year because we had an overall gain of $3,637,167 or 38.7% on our beginning net assets, pleasant as that experience may be to the pragmatists in our group. Rather it was a good year because our performance was substantially better than that of our fundamental yardstick --the Dow-Jones Industrial Average (hereinafter called the “Dow”). If we had been down 20% and the Dow had been down 30%, this letter would still have begun “1963 was a good year.” Regardless of whether we are plus or minus in a particular year, if we can maintain a satisfactory edge on the Dow over an extended period of time, our long term results will be satisfactory -- financially as well as philosophically.

1963年表現(xiàn)不錯(cuò)。我們說它好并不是因?yàn)槟甑资找孢_(dá)到363.7萬美元或者較年初增長(zhǎng)了38.7%，對(duì)于實(shí)用主義者來說，這些數(shù)字的確是令人愉悅的染突。然而，我們的好是因?yàn)楸憩F(xiàn)遠(yuǎn)超年度標(biāo)桿--道瓊斯工業(yè)指數(shù)啃匿。如果我們今年市值縮水20%同時(shí)期道指縮水30%迫淹，那么信依然會(huì)是以“表現(xiàn)不錯(cuò)”來開頭炭菌。任何特定一年的收益無論正負(fù)览效，只要我們能夠保持和道指的相對(duì)優(yōu)勢(shì)却舀，我們長(zhǎng)期的收益絕不會(huì)差.

To bring the record up to date, the following summarizes the year-by-year performance of the Dow, the performance of the Partnership before allocation to the general partner, and the limited partners' results for all full years of BPL's and predecessor partnerships' activities:

更新一下數(shù)據(jù)虫几，下表總結(jié)了道指年化收益以及合伙企業(yè)在給一般合伙人分紅前和分紅后的總體收益率：

收益對(duì)比

(1) Based on yearly changes in the value of the Dow plus dividends that would have been received through ownership of the Dow during that year.

1. 收益計(jì)算基于每年的股價(jià)變化并考慮對(duì)應(yīng)的股利發(fā)放；

(2) For 1957-61 consists of combined results of all predecessor limited partnerships operating throughout the entire year after all expenses but before distributions to partners or allocations to the general partner.

2. 1957-1961年的數(shù)據(jù)包含了所有有限合伙人在扣除必要費(fèi)用后的收益率挽拔，但未算入分發(fā)給合伙人的資金或者給一般合伙人的分紅辆脸；

(3) For 1957-61 computed on the basis of the preceding column of partnership results allowing for allocation to the general partner based upon the present partnership agreement.

3. 基于前表的數(shù)據(jù)且根據(jù)當(dāng)前合伙人協(xié)議扣除給一般合伙人配額的部分。

One wag among the limited partners has suggested I add a fourth column showing the results of the general partner --let's just say he, too, has an edge on the Dow.

一位愛開玩笑的有限合伙人提議我應(yīng)該增加第四欄把一般合伙人的收益也羅列一下螃诅。

The following table shows the cumulative or compounded results based on the preceding table:

下表展示的是復(fù)合收益率

復(fù)合收益率

In a more serious vein, I would like to emphasize that, in my judgment; our 17.7 margin over the Dow shown above is unattainable over any long period of time. A ten percentage point advantage would be a very satisfactory accomplishment and even a much more modest edge would produce impressive gains as will be touched upon later. This view (and it has to be guesswork -- informed or otherwise) carries with it the corollary that we must expect prolonged periods of much narrower margins over the Dow as well as at least occasional years when our record will be inferior (perhaps substantially so) to the Dow.

依據(jù)我的判斷啡氢，我們這種能夠超越道指17.7%的表現(xiàn)是無法長(zhǎng)期維持的。超越10個(gè)點(diǎn)足以讓人滿意术裸，即便是更少的優(yōu)勢(shì)也能產(chǎn)生令人驚艷的收益倘是。這種觀點(diǎn)（它必須是猜測(cè)——知情或以其他方式）伴隨著的必然結(jié)果，即我們必須預(yù)期超越道瓊斯指數(shù)的利潤(rùn)率長(zhǎng)期來看會(huì)變窄穗椅，并且至少偶爾會(huì)有幾年我們的記錄比道瓊斯指數(shù)更差（有可能遠(yuǎn)不如道指）辨绊。

Investment Companies

其他投資公司

We regularly compare our results with the two largest open-end investment companies (mutual funds) that follow a policy of being, typically, 95 -100% invested in common stocks, and the two largest diversified closed- end investment companies. These four companies, Massachusetts Investors Trust, Investors Stock Fund, Tri- Continental Corp. and Lehman Corp. manage about 25 billion investment company industry. My opinion is that their results roughly parallel those of the vast majority or other investment advisory organizations which handle, in aggregate, vastly greater sums.

我們通常會(huì)把投資收益和兩家最大的開放式投資公司（95%-100%的資產(chǎn)都投資于股票市場(chǎng)）奶栖，和兩家封閉式投資公司做比較匹表。這四家公司分別是Massachusetts Investors Trust, Investors Stock Fund, Tri- Continental Corp. 和 Lehman Corp. 總計(jì)管理了大約40億美元的資產(chǎn)，并能很好地代表當(dāng)前總資產(chǎn)為250億美元的投資信托產(chǎn)業(yè)宣鄙。我的觀點(diǎn)是他們的投資表現(xiàn)應(yīng)該與其他投資公司一致

The purpose or this tabulation, which is shown below, is to illustrate that the Dow is no pushover as an index or investment achievement. The advisory talent managing just the four companies shown commands' annual fees of over $7 million, and this represents a very small fraction of the industry. The public batting average of this highly-paid talent indicates they achieved results slightly less favorable than the Dow.

羅列下表的目的是為了告訴大家道瓊斯指數(shù)并不是一個(gè)容易超越的指標(biāo)袍镀。這四家公司聰明絕頂?shù)耐顿Y顧問每年的咨詢費(fèi)高達(dá)700萬美元，這也只是整個(gè)行業(yè)的冰山一角冻晤。這些高薪人才的投資表現(xiàn)也只能略遜于道指苇羡。

Both our portfolio and method of operation differ substantially from the investment companies in the table. However, most partners, as an alternative to their interest in the Partnership would probably have their funds invested in media producing results comparable with investment companies, and I, therefore, feel they offer a meaningful standard of performance.

我們的投資組合或是運(yùn)作方式都和這些投資公司大相徑庭。但是鼻弧，大多數(shù)合伙人處于投資多樣性的考慮會(huì)把他們的一部分資金投資于媒體遴選出的投資公司设江，我認(rèn)為他們是個(gè)很不錯(cuò)的對(duì)比標(biāo)尺。

年化收益

復(fù)合收益

The Dow, of course, is an unmanaged index, and it may seem strange to the reader to contemplate the high priests of Wall Street striving vainly to surpass or even equal it. However, this is demonstrably the case. Moreover, such a failure cannot be rationalized by the assumption that the investment companies et al are handling themselves in a more conservative manner than the Dow. As the table above indicates, and as more extensive studies bear out, the behavior of common stock portfolio managed by this group, on average, have declined in concert with the Dow. By such a test of behavior in declining markets, our own methods of operation have proven to be considerably more conservative than the common stock component of the investment company or investment advisor group. While this has been true in the past, there obviously can be no guarantees about the future.

道瓊斯指數(shù)攘轩，一個(gè)顯然無人管理的指數(shù)到底緣何讓各位華爾街的精英們費(fèi)勁心思也無法超過甚至收益與之相近叉存。即便原因不止，結(jié)果也是顯而易見的度帮。此外歼捏，這種失敗并不能歸咎于投資公司使用了比道瓊斯指數(shù)更加保守的投資策略。上表體現(xiàn)出在熊市笨篷，各個(gè)投資公司的收益和道指一樣下跌瞳秽，程度更甚。在熊市下跌程度的測(cè)試可以體現(xiàn)出我們的投資策略是要比道指和其他投資公司更加保守率翅。不過這只代表過去练俐，未來可是未知的。

The above may seem like rather strong medicine, but it is offered as a factual presentation and in no way as criticism. Within their institutional framework and handling the many billions of dollars involved, the results achieved are the only ones attainable. To behave unconventionally within this framework is extremely difficult. Therefore, the collective record of such investment media is necessarily tied to the record of corporate America. Their merits, except in the unusual case, do not lie in superior results or greater resistance to decline in value. Rather, I feel they earn their keep by the ease of handling, the freedom from decision making and the automatic diversification they provide, plus, perhaps most important, the insulation afforded from temptation to practice patently inferior techniques which seem to entice so many world-be investors.

以上的結(jié)論似乎令人吃驚但也毫無爭(zhēng)辯的事實(shí)冕臭。在我看來那些管理著巨量資金的龐大投資機(jī)構(gòu)腺晾，這種收益率似乎已經(jīng)是最好的結(jié)果了瓢棒。在他們公司的框架下要做什么出格的事情是十分困難的。因此媒體所展示的各種投資公司組合實(shí)際上適合美國(guó)整體公司的情況緊密聯(lián)系的丘喻。除非是特殊情況脯宿，他們的價(jià)值不是在于超額收益或者抗通脹。在我看來泉粉，他們的價(jià)值體現(xiàn)在為大眾提供了一個(gè)方便连霉，自由的，多樣化的投資途徑嗡靡，并提供有效阻止了一些投資新手來股票市場(chǎng)試水跺撼。

The Joys of Compounding

復(fù)利的魔力

Now to the pulse-quickening portion of our essay. Last year, in order to drive home the point on compounding, I took a pot shot at Queen Isabella and her financial advisors. You will remember they were euchred into such an obviously low-compound situation as the discovery of a new hemisphere.

言歸正傳，去年為了更形象地展示復(fù)利的魔力讨彼，我拿伊麗莎白女王和她經(jīng)濟(jì)顧問舉例歉井。各位應(yīng)該還記得他們?cè)诎l(fā)現(xiàn)新大陸至今整體的復(fù)合收益率是有多低。

Since the whole subject of compounding has such a crass ring to it, I will attempt to introduce a little class into this discussion by turning to the art world. Francis I of France paid 4,000 ecus in 1540 for Leonardo da Vinci’s Mona Lisa. On the off chance that a few of you have not kept track of the fluctuations of the ecu 4,000 converted out to about $20,000.

關(guān)于復(fù)利的討論是如此粗俗哈误，那么我們就來談?wù)勊囆g(shù)界的事吧哩至。1540 年，法國(guó)的弗朗西斯一世為達(dá)芬奇的蒙娜麗莎支付了 4,000 埃庫(kù)蜜自。 有些人大概沒有注意到當(dāng)時(shí) 4,000 埃庫(kù)相當(dāng)于大約 20,000 美元菩貌。

If Francis had kept his feet on the ground and he (and his trustees) had been able to find a 6% after-tax investment, the estate now would be worth something over 1,000,000,000,000,000.00. That's $1 quadrillion or over 3,000 times the present national debt, all from 6%. I trust this will end all discussion in our household about any purchase or paintings qualifying as an investment.

如果弗朗西斯一世留住這部分錢，然后找個(gè)稅后有6%收益的投資項(xiàng)目重荠，那么到現(xiàn)在的收益應(yīng)該是有 $1,000,000,000,000,000.00箭阶。這將近是有當(dāng)前美國(guó)國(guó)債的3000倍的資金，還僅僅是只有6%的收益率戈鲁。我相信這個(gè)統(tǒng)計(jì)應(yīng)該能夠終結(jié)投資藝術(shù)品是否是個(gè)好的投資的爭(zhēng)論了仇参。

However, as I pointed out last year, there are other morals to be drawn here. One is the wisdom of living a long time. The other impressive factor is the swing produced by relatively small changes in the rate of compound.

然而，正如我去年所指出的那樣婆殿，這其中還有一些其他的事情需要注意诈乒。第一就是要活的夠長(zhǎng)；另一個(gè)關(guān)鍵點(diǎn)就是收益率的些許波動(dòng)對(duì)最終結(jié)果的影響鸣皂。

Below are shown the gains from $100,000 compounded at various rates:

下面就是10萬美刀在不同復(fù)合收益率下的結(jié)果：

不同收益率對(duì)比

It is obvious that a variation of merely a few percentage points has an enormous effect on the success of a compounding (investment) program. It is also obvious that this effect mushrooms as the period lengthens. If, over a meaningful period of time, Buffett Partnership can achieve an edge of even a modest number of percentage points over the major investment media, its function will be fulfilled.

很明顯收益率些許的變化對(duì)復(fù)合收益率的結(jié)果將天差地別抓谴。而且隨著時(shí)間的增長(zhǎng)，這種影響將會(huì)越來越大寞缝。如果巴菲特合伙公司在長(zhǎng)期能夠保持合理的超越主流投資公司的收益癌压，這個(gè)效果將會(huì)顯現(xiàn)出來。

Some of you may be downcast because I have not included in the above table the rate of 22.3% mentioned on page 3. This rate, of course, is before income taxes which are paid directly by you --not the Partnership. Even excluding this factor, such a calculation would only prove the absurdity of the idea of compounding at very high rates -- even with initially modest sums. My opinion is that the Dow is quite unlikely to compound for any important length of time at the rate it has during the past seven years and, as mentioned earlier, I believe our margin over the Dow cannot be maintained at its level to date. The product of these assumptions would be a materially lower average rate of compound for BPL in the future than the rate achieved to date. Injecting a minus 30% year (which is going to happen from time to time) into our tabulation of actual results to date, with, say, a corresponding minus 40% for the Dow brings both the figures on the Dow and BPL more in line with longer range possibilities. As the compounding table above suggests, such a lowered rate can still provide highly satisfactory long term investment results.

也許有些人會(huì)因?yàn)槲覜]有將第三頁提到的22.3%的收益率算一遍感到失望荆陆。這個(gè)收益率是稅前金額滩届。即便不考慮稅務(wù)因素，計(jì)算出的結(jié)果只能證明以很高的比率（收益率）來計(jì)算復(fù)利是荒謬的被啼，即便初始金額不高帜消。我的想法是道瓊斯指數(shù)不會(huì)像過去七年那樣有如此高的收益率棠枉，我們的合伙企業(yè)也很難維持相對(duì)道指這樣的超額收益。以上的假設(shè)意味著將來BPL的復(fù)合收益率將會(huì)低于當(dāng)前所取得的結(jié)果泡挺。如果將30%的回撤（其實(shí)會(huì)時(shí)不時(shí)地發(fā)生）考慮進(jìn)去辈讶，道指相應(yīng)地有40%的回撤，這會(huì)使合伙公司的道指的收益預(yù)期更加符合實(shí)際娄猫。即便如此贱除，低復(fù)合收益率仍然能帶來可喜的收益。

Our Method of Operation

我們的運(yùn)營(yíng)方法

At this point I always develop literary schizophrenia. On the one hand, I know that we have in the audience a number of partners to whom details of our business are interesting. We also have a number to whom this whole thing is Greek and who undoubtedly wish I would quit writing and get back to work.

寫到這里我就有點(diǎn)分裂了媳溺，一方面有的觀眾對(duì)我們的運(yùn)作很感興趣月幌，也有一部分合伙人希望我少說多做。

To placate both camps, I am just going to sketch briefly our three categories at this point and those who are interested in getting their doctorate can refer to the appendix for extended treatment of examples.

為了兼顧各方悬蔽，在正文中我將對(duì)三個(gè)類別的投資簡(jiǎn)要概述扯躺，對(duì)細(xì)節(jié)感興趣的讀者請(qǐng)參閱附錄。

Our three investment categories are not differentiated by their expected profitability over an extended period of time. We are hopeful that they will each, over a ten or fifteen year period, produce something like the ten percentage point margin over the Dow that is our goal. However, in a given year they will have violently different behavior characteristics, depending primarily on the type of year it turns out to be for the stock market generally. Briefly this is how they shape up:

這三類投資并非根據(jù)對(duì)其的預(yù)期收益率來分類蝎困。我們的目標(biāo)是它們?cè)?0-15年的時(shí)間里都能完成超過道指10%的收益录语。同時(shí)在任意一年各自的收益率都有所不同，很大程度上取決于當(dāng)年整體股票市場(chǎng)的情況难衰。下面就是他們分類方法：

“Generals” - A category of generally undervalued stocks, determined primarily by quantitative standards, but with considerable attention also paid to the qualitative factor. There is often little or nothing to indicate immediate market improvement. The issues lack glamour or market sponsorship. Their main qualification is a bargain price; that is, an overall valuation on the enterprise substantially below what careful analysis indicates its value to a private owner to be. Again let me emphasize that while the quantitative comes first and is essential, the qualitative is important. We like good management - we like a decent industry - we like a certain amount of “ferment” in a previously dormant management or stockholder group. But we demand value. The general group behaves very much in sympathy with the Dow and will turn in a big minus result during a year of substantial decline by the Dow. Contrary wise, it should be the star performer in a strongly advancing market. Over the years we expect it, of course, to achieve a satisfactory margin over the Dow.

"股票投資" -- 這類投資主要是很多被低估的股票钦无，主要是依據(jù)定量的研究逗栽，不過同時(shí)也會(huì)很注重定性分析盖袭。往往這些股票沒有漲的跡象。同時(shí)也是被市場(chǎng)忽略的股票彼宠。他們的主要優(yōu)勢(shì)在于便宜的股價(jià)鳄虱，即當(dāng)前股價(jià)所代表的市值是遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)小于公司內(nèi)在價(jià)值的。但是請(qǐng)各位牢記凭峡，盡管定量分析很關(guān)鍵拙已，定性分析也十分重要。我們喜歡好的管理層摧冀，不錯(cuò)的行業(yè)倍踪，也喜歡在目前近乎休眠的管理層或者股東中有些活躍分子。但是其中的價(jià)值是我們最關(guān)注的索昂。這部分股票投資的收益曲線和道指十分相似建车，在熊市的時(shí)候他們的收益也會(huì)很差。相反的椒惨，在大牛市里他們一定獨(dú)領(lǐng)風(fēng)騷缤至。不過長(zhǎng)期我們一定希望這部分投資會(huì)領(lǐng)先道指。

“Workouts” - These are the securities with a timetable. They arise from corporate activity - sell-outs, mergers, reorganizations, spin-offs, etc. In this category we are not talking about rumors or "inside information" pertaining to such developments, but to publicly announced activities of this sort. We wait until we can read it in the paper. The risk pertains not primarily to general market behavior (although that is sometimes tied in to a degree), but instead to something upsetting the applecart so that the expected development does not materialize. Such killjoys could include anti-trust or other negative government action, stockholder disapproval, withholding of tax rulings, etc. The gross profits in many workouts appear quite small. A friend refers to this as getting the last nickel after the other fellow has made the first ninety-five cents. However, the predictability coupled with a short holding period produces quite decent annual rates of return. This category produces more steady absolute profits from year to year than generals do. In years of market decline, it piles up a big edge for us; during bull markets, it is a drag on performance. On a long term basis, I expect it to achieve the same sort of margin over the Dow attained by generals.

“套利投資” -- 這些股票的投資是按照時(shí)間表來操作的康谆。他們起源于一系列公司層面的操作：出售领斥、合并嫉到、重組、分拆等等月洛。這類投資并不依賴于那種小道消息何恶，而是根據(jù)公開發(fā)布的信息。我們等到可以在公開資料上看到這些消息后再出手嚼黔。這類投資的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)不在于市場(chǎng)行為（盡管有時(shí)市場(chǎng)的反應(yīng)會(huì)有一定影響）导而，相反往往是政策原因讓這些案子最終擱淺。此類叫停原因可能包括反壟斷或其他負(fù)面政府行為隔崎、股東反對(duì)今艺、扣繳稅收裁決等。大多數(shù)套利投資的利潤(rùn)看起來都很少爵卒。一個(gè)朋友如此形容套利操作：在別人拿走95%利潤(rùn)后虚缎，去努力拿那最后5%。不過钓株，套利的確定性和短期效應(yīng)可以讓年化收益也很可觀实牡。這類投資可以比第一類股票投資提供更加穩(wěn)定的年化收益率。在熊市期間轴合，它撐起是我們收益的主要來源创坞；但在牛市中，卻會(huì)對(duì)投資表現(xiàn)有所拖累受葛。長(zhǎng)期來看题涨，我希望這類投資能收益能和股票類投資收益率持平。

“Controls” - These are rarities, but when they occur they are likely to be of significant size. Unless we start off with the purchase of a sizable block or stock, controls develop from the general category. They result from situations where a cheap security does nothing price-wise for such an extended period of time that we are able to buy a significant percentage of the company's stock. At that point we are probably in a position to assume some degree of, or perhaps complete, control of the company's activities; whether we become active or remain relatively passive at this point depends upon our assessment of the company’s future and the management's capabilities. The general we have been buying the most aggressively in recent months possesses excellent management following policies that appear to make very good sense to us. If our continued buying puts us in a controlling position at some point in the future, we will probably remain very passive regarding the operation or this business.

“控股公司“ -- 這類投資不多总滩，但是每筆投資都會(huì)占用大量資金纲堵。一半我們是從購(gòu)買部分股權(quán)開始，控股公司往往是從股票投資類別轉(zhuǎn)化過來闰渔。往往是這些低廉便宜的股票價(jià)格長(zhǎng)期維持低位席函，最終我們能夠在這個(gè)價(jià)位把公司股票大部分都收入囊中。待到那時(shí)冈涧，我們就處于能夠左右或者完全控制公司運(yùn)營(yíng)的位置茂附，那么我們是否積極參與公司管理或者依然保持沉默取決于我們對(duì)這家公司未來和當(dāng)前管理層的評(píng)估。我們這幾個(gè)月大舉購(gòu)入的公司管理層十分優(yōu)秀督弓。如果我們對(duì)這家公司持續(xù)買入营曼，不久將來我們就會(huì)達(dá)到控制的比例。但是很可能我們對(duì)這家公司的運(yùn)營(yíng)不會(huì)干預(yù)咽筋。

We do not want to get active merely for the sake of being active. Everything else being equal I would much rather let others do the work. However, when an active role is necessary to optimize the employment of capital you can be sure we will not be standing in the wings.

不會(huì)只是為了參與而參與溶推。如果別人能做的和我一樣，我寧愿讓別人代勞。當(dāng)然蒜危，如果積極參與公司管理能讓我們得到更好的回報(bào)虱痕，我們不會(huì)袖手旁觀的。

Active or passive, in a control situation there should be a built-in profit. The sine qua non of this operation is an attractive purchase price. Once control is achieved, the value of our investment is determined by the value of the enterprise, not the oftentimes irrationalities of the marketplace.

無論主動(dòng)參與或者被動(dòng)等待辐赞，在控股有限公司中其內(nèi)在的利潤(rùn)已經(jīng)確定部翘。這種控股投資的行為內(nèi)在價(jià)值來源于購(gòu)入的價(jià)格。一旦達(dá)到控股的比例响委，那么我們這筆投資的利潤(rùn)就取決于公司的價(jià)值新思，而非市場(chǎng)給的定價(jià)了。

Our willingness and financial ability to assume a controlling position gives us two-way stretch on many purchases in our group of generals. If the market changes its opinion for the better, the security will advance in price. If it doesn't, we will continue to acquire stock until we can look to the business itself rather than the market for vindication of our judgment.

這種既擁有經(jīng)濟(jì)能力又有意愿來控制公司的能力讓我們?cè)谫?gòu)買很多低估股票時(shí)有很多選擇余地赘风。如果市場(chǎng)在我們購(gòu)買過程中改變想法給其很高的定價(jià)夹囚，我們就售出獲利。如果不是邀窃，我們將會(huì)繼續(xù)購(gòu)買股票直到我們可以自己控制而不是期待市場(chǎng)的修正荸哟。

Investment results in the control category have to be measured on the basis of at least several years. Proper buying takes time. If needed, strengthening management, re-directing the utilization of capital, perhaps effecting a satisfactory sale or merger, etc., are also all factors that make this a business to be measured in years rather than months. For this reason, in controls, we are looking for wide margins of profit-if it looks at all close, we pass.

最終達(dá)到控股公司級(jí)別的投資至少需要過幾年才能實(shí)現(xiàn)。很多次的買入瞬捕，可能需要強(qiáng)化的管理層鞍历，優(yōu)化資金流向，促成讓人滿意的出售或者并購(gòu)等等肪虎，所有這些都需要以年為單位計(jì)劣砍。因此，對(duì)這類投資我們希望有不錯(cuò)的利潤(rùn)率扇救，如果預(yù)期收益只是和其他的投資類別相似刑枝，我們就不會(huì)去執(zhí)行。

Controls in the buying stage move largely in sympathy with the Dow. In the later stages their behavior is geared more to that of workouts.

控股類別的投資在早期的收益率很大程度上和道指相似爵政，不過在后期的操作更像是套利所涉及的范疇仅讽。

As I have mentioned in the past, the division of our portfolio among the three categories is largely determined by the accident or availability. Therefore, in a minus year for the Dow, whether we are primarily in generals or workouts is largely a matter of luck, but it will have a great deal to do with our performance relative to the Dow. This is one or many reasons why a single year's performance is of minor importance and, good or bad, should never be taken too seriously.

正如我之前提到的，這三類投資類別的比率很大程度取決于是否有好的投資標(biāo)的钾挟。因此，在道指下跌的某一年饱岸，我們主要的資金是放在股票市場(chǎng)還是套利中完全運(yùn)氣掺出，但是我們當(dāng)年相對(duì)于道指的投資表現(xiàn)卻決定于此。這也是為什么我們不要太在意某一年的收益率的好壞苫费，因?yàn)檎娴牟恢匾?/p>

If there is any trend as our assets grow, I would expect it to be toward controls which heretofore have been our smallest category. I may be wrong in this expectation - a great deal depends, of course, on the future behavior of the market on which your guess is as good as mine (I have none). At this writing, we have a majority of our capital in generals, workouts rank second, and controls are third.

隨著我們資產(chǎn)的增加汤锨，我可以預(yù)測(cè)的是我們第三類投資的比例會(huì)提高。也許我的估計(jì)是錯(cuò)的百框，不過這取決于整體市場(chǎng)的行為闲礼。在預(yù)測(cè)市場(chǎng)方面各位和我不相伯仲，我完全無力預(yù)測(cè)市場(chǎng)。在寫這篇文章時(shí)柬泽，我們大部分投資都在股票市場(chǎng)慎菲，套利排第二，控股公司為末位锨并。

Miscellaneous

雜項(xiàng)

We are starting off the year with net assets of 17,454,900. Our rapid increase in assets always raises the question of whether this will result in a dilution of future performance. To date, there is more of a positive than inverse correlation between size of the Partnership and its margin over the Dow. This should not be taken seriously however. Larger sums may be an advantage at some times and a disadvantage at others. My opinion is that our present portfolio could not be improved if our assets were 1 million or 5 million. Our idea inventory has always seemed to be 10% ahead of our bank account. If that should change, you can count on hearing from me.

我們今年年初凈資產(chǎn)達(dá)到1745.49萬美元露该。資產(chǎn)的快速增長(zhǎng)是否對(duì)未來投資表現(xiàn)有負(fù)面影響？截止目前第煮，正面的影響要大于負(fù)面解幼。因此不需要過多擔(dān)心。大規(guī)模的資金有時(shí)候是好事有時(shí)候是壞事包警。我的觀點(diǎn)是如果資產(chǎn)只有100萬或者500萬撵摆，是無法改善目前的投資組合的。我們理想的收益率應(yīng)該在高于銀行收益的10%害晦。如果情況有變台汇，我一定會(huì)寫信給大家

Susie and I have an investment of 2,392,900 in the Partnership. For the first time I had to withdraw funds in addition to my monthly payments, but it was a choice of this or disappointing the Internal Revenue Service. Susie and I have a few non-marketable (less than 300 holders) securities of nominal size left over from earlier years which in aggregate are worth perhaps 1% of our partnership interest. In addition we have one non- marketable holding of more material size of a local company purchased in 1960 which we expect to hold indefinitely. Aside from this all our eggs are in the BPL basket and they will continue to be. I can't promise results but I can promise a common destiny. In addition, that endless stream of relatives of mine consisting of my three children, mother, father, two sisters, two brothers-in-law, father-in-law, four aunts four cousins and five nieces and nephews, have interests in BPL directly or indirectly totaling $1,247,190.

Susie 和我在合伙公司總共有239.29萬美元的投資。除了每個(gè)月的工資外我第一次必須從合伙公司中提取資金篱瞎，不過這個(gè)選擇也許會(huì)讓國(guó)稅局失望苟呐？。Susie和我名義上擁有一些早年獲得的非流通股票資產(chǎn)（股東不超過300位）價(jià)值不超過在合伙公司資產(chǎn)的1%俐筋。除此之外牵素，我們還有在1960年購(gòu)入的一些當(dāng)?shù)毓镜牟豢沙鍪鄣挠行钨Y產(chǎn)。這些資產(chǎn)我們準(zhǔn)備永久擁有澄者。我們其余所有的資產(chǎn)都投入在了合伙公司笆呆。而且我們還有無數(shù)的親戚在合伙公司中擁有股份，他們的份額總計(jì)達(dá)到124.719萬美元粱挡。

Bill Scott is also in with both feet, having an interest along with his wife or $237,400, the large majority or their net worth. Bill has done an excellent job and on several or our more interesting situations going into 1964, he has done the majority or the contact work. I have also shoved off on him as much as possible of the administrative work so if you need anything done or have any questions, don't hesitate to ask for Bill if I'm not around.

Bill Scott 的主要資產(chǎn)都在合伙公司赠幕，他和他的妻子總共擁有23.74萬美元的份額。他的工作完成的很出色询筏，在1964年他將主要負(fù)責(zé)接待榕堰，我也盡量委任他管理的任務(wù)，所以各位如果有任何疑問而我碰巧不在嫌套，請(qǐng)聯(lián)系他逆屡。

Beth and Donna have kept an increasing work load flowing in an excellent manner. During December and January, I am sure they wish they had found employment elsewhere, but they always manage to keep a mountain of work ship-shape.

Beth 和 Donna 總是能在越來越多工作中顯得游刃有余冲杀。我打賭12月和1月份的大量的任務(wù)一定會(huì)使她們產(chǎn)生辭職的想法巩那，不過她們總是能順利完成沛膳。

Peat, Marwick, Mitchell has done their usual excellent job of meeting a tough timetable. We have instructed them to conduct two surprise checks a year (rather than one as in past years) on our securities, cash, etc., in the future. These are relatively inexpensive, and I think make a good deal of sense in any financial organization.

Peat, Marwick, Mitchell 一如既往地準(zhǔn)時(shí)完成苛刻的任務(wù)痪署。今年委托他們對(duì)我們的股票現(xiàn)金進(jìn)行兩次抽檢 （前幾年只進(jìn)行一次）运嗜。這種抽檢價(jià)格不貴可免，而且我認(rèn)為在任何金融機(jī)構(gòu)需要做這種檢查捂寿。

Let me know if anything needs clarifying. As we grow, there is more chance of missing letters, a name skipped over, a figure transposition, etc., so speak up if it appears we might have erred. Our next letter will be about July 15th summarizing the first half.

隨著我們規(guī)模的成長(zhǎng)酌畜，出現(xiàn)遺漏字母、跳過名稱谣旁、圖形錯(cuò)位等錯(cuò)位的可能性越來越大床佳，所以如果我們可能犯了錯(cuò)誤，請(qǐng)及時(shí)指出蔓挖。下一封信將在7月15日寄出夕土，總結(jié)我們上半年的表現(xiàn)。

Cordially, Warren E. Buffett

Appendix

附錄

TEXAS NATIONAL PETROLEUM

德州國(guó)家石油

This situation was a run-of-the-mill workout arising from the number one source of workouts in recent years -- the sellouts of oil and gas producing companies.

這類石油天然氣公司的整體出售案是近年來套利的主要來源瘟判。

TNP was a relatively small producer with which I had been vaguely familiar for years.

TNP是一家相對(duì)小一點(diǎn)的公司怨绣，很多年前我曾略微關(guān)注過。

Early in 1962 I heard rumors regarding a sellout to Union Oil of California. I never act on such information, but in this case it was correct and substantially more money would have been made if we had gone in at the rumor stage rather than the announced stage. However, that's somebody else's business, not mine.

早在1962年我就聽小道消息說它會(huì)整體出售給加利福尼亞聯(lián)合石油公司拷获。這種小道消息我從不會(huì)給予回應(yīng)篮撑，但是這個(gè)謠言目前證明是真的，而且如果在當(dāng)初我們采取行動(dòng)而不是在消息公示之后匆瓜，賺到的錢會(huì)比現(xiàn)在多很多赢笨，但這不是我們做事的方法。

In early April, 1962, the general terms of the deal were announced. TNP had three classes of securities outstanding:

在1962年四月初驮吱，交易細(xì)節(jié)被公開茧妒。TNP 擁有三類已發(fā)行證券：

(1) 6 1/2% debentures callable at 104 1/4 which would bear interest until the sale transpired and at that time would be called. There were 6.5 million outstanding of which we purchased $264,000 principal amount before the sale closed.

1. 6.5% 計(jì)息的公司債券將會(huì)在104.25的價(jià)格贖回，收購(gòu)發(fā)生前將繼續(xù)派息左冬，收購(gòu)之日將會(huì)被贖回桐筏。該類債券有650萬美元在外流通，我們?cè)谮H回之日前購(gòu)買了26.4萬美元拇砰。

(2) About 3.7 million shares of common stock of which the officers and directors owned about 40%. The proxy statement estimated the proceeds from the liquidation would produce $7.42 per share. We purchased 64,035 shares during the six months or so between announcement and closing.

2. 大約有370萬的流通股梅忌，公司職員和管理層持有40%的股份。委托書估計(jì)清算后每股股價(jià)在7.42美元除破。我們?cè)诠嬷掌鸬绞召?gòu)日期間購(gòu)買了64,035股.

(3) 650,000 warrants to purchase common stock at 7.42 for the workout on the common resulted in $3.92 as a workout on the warrants. We were able to buy 83,200 warrants or about 13% of the entire issue in six months.

3. 650,000 份認(rèn)股權(quán)證可以以每股 3.50 美元的價(jià)格購(gòu)買普通股牧氮。 依據(jù)委托書估計(jì)的每股7.42 美元，那么對(duì)該權(quán)證每股套利將獲利3.92 美元瑰枫。 我們?cè)诹鶄€(gè)月內(nèi)購(gòu)買 83,200 份認(rèn)股權(quán)證踱葛，約占整個(gè)發(fā)行量的 13%。

The risk of stockholder disapproval was nil. The deal was negotiated by the controlling stockholders, and the price was a good one. Any transaction such as this is subject to title searches, legal opinions, etc., but this risk could also be appraised at virtually nil. There were no anti-trust problems. This absence of legal or anti-trust problems is not always the case, by any means.

股東反對(duì)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)為零躁垛。該筆并購(gòu)是控股股東促成的剖毯，而且收購(gòu)價(jià)很不錯(cuò)。任何此類交易都需要進(jìn)行產(chǎn)權(quán)搜索教馆、法律意見等，但這種風(fēng)險(xiǎn)也可以評(píng)估為幾乎為零擂达。 不存在反壟斷問題土铺。 但是無論如何胶滋，這種沒有法律或反壟斷問題的并購(gòu)案并非總能遇到。

The only fly in the ointment was the obtaining of the necessary tax ruling. Union Oil was using a standard ABC production payment method of financing. The University of Southern California was the production payment holder and there was some delay because of their eleemosynary status.

唯一美中不足的就是需要必要的稅收裁定悲敷。聯(lián)合石油的財(cái)務(wù)時(shí)使用標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的ABC 生產(chǎn)企業(yè)的付款方式究恤。南加利福利亞大學(xué)是付款方，因此根據(jù)其董事會(huì)的資金狀況會(huì)造成付款的延遲后德。

This posed a new problem for the Internal Revenue Service, but we understood USC was willing to waive this status which still left them with a satisfactory profit after they borrowed all the money from a bank. While getting this ironed out created delay, it did not threaten the deal.

這給國(guó)稅局帶來了新的問題部宿，但我們認(rèn)為 USC 愿意跳過這個(gè)狀態(tài)，因?yàn)榧幢阍趶你y行借錢仍能獲得令人滿意的利潤(rùn)瓢湃。 雖然解決這個(gè)問題會(huì)造成延誤理张，但并沒有威脅到這筆交易。

When we talked with the company on April 23rd and 24th, their estimate was that the closing would take place in August or September. The proxy material was mailed May 9th and stated the sale "will be consummated during the summer of 1962 and that within a few months thereafter the greater part of the proceeds will be distributed to stockholders in liquidation.” As mentioned earlier, the estimate was $7.42 per share.

當(dāng)我們和公司在4月23/24號(hào)交涉的時(shí)候绵患，他們估計(jì)這筆交易應(yīng)該在八九月份可以結(jié)束雾叭。公開聲明在五月九日發(fā)表，其中講到交易會(huì)在1962年夏完成落蝙，并在隨后的幾個(gè)月把現(xiàn)金發(fā)放到股東手里织狐。正如之前所說，估計(jì)每股7.42 美元筏勒。

Bill Scott attended the stockholders meeting in Houston on May 29th where it was stated they still expected to close on September 1st.

Bill Scott 在5月29日出席了股東大會(huì)移迫，會(huì)上提到交易會(huì)在9月1日結(jié)束。

The following are excerpts from some of the telephone conversations we had with company officials in ensuing months:

下面就是我們隨后幾個(gè)月和公司之間的溝通內(nèi)容：

On June 18th the secretary stated "Union has been told a favorable IRS ruling has been formulated but must be passed on by additional IRS people. Still hoping for ruling in July.”

6.18. 董秘稱：工會(huì)被告知一項(xiàng)有利的 IRS 裁決被制定提交管行，但必須由其他 IRS 人員通過厨埋。 仍然希望在七月作出裁決。

On July 24th the president said that he expected the IRS ruling “early next week.”

7.24. 執(zhí)行長(zhǎng)稱IRS 裁決將在下周早期作出病瞳。

On August 13th the treasurer informed us that the TNP, Union Oil, and USC people were all in Washington attempting to thrash out a ruling.

8.13. 財(cái)務(wù)主管告訴我們揽咕，TNP、聯(lián)合石油公司和南加州大學(xué)的人都在華盛頓試圖推翻一項(xiàng)裁決套菜。

On September 18th the treasurer informed us "No news, although the IRS says the ruling could be ready by next week.”

在9月18日亲善，財(cái)務(wù)主管告訴我們沒有新消息，即便IRS說他們下周裁決會(huì)ready逗柴。

The estimate on payout was still $7.42.

預(yù)計(jì)仍將支付每股7.42美元蛹头。

The ruling was received in late September, and the sale closed October 31st. Our bonds were called November 13th. We converted our warrants to common stock shortly thereafter and received payments on the common of 3.90 February 4, 1963, and 15 cent on April 24, 1963. We will probably get another 4 cent in a year or two. On 147,235 shares (after exercise of warrants) even 4 cent per share is meaningful.

裁決在九月底正式作出，并購(gòu)在十月三十一號(hào)完成戏溺。我們的的債券在10月31日被贖回渣蜗。之后不久我們就講權(quán)證轉(zhuǎn)換成普通股。1962年12月14日收到每股3.5美元旷祸，1963年2月4日收到每股3.9美元耕拷，1963年4月24日收到15美分。很可能在未來一兩年收到最后的5美分托享。對(duì)于147,235 份股票來說即便是每股4美分也值不少錢骚烧。

This illustrates the usual pattern: (1) the deals take longer than originally projected; and (2) the payouts tend to average a little better than estimates. With TNP it took a couple of extra months, and we received a couple of extra percent.

這也側(cè)面反應(yīng)了一個(gè)通常的情況浸赫，并購(gòu)案拖的時(shí)間越長(zhǎng)，越有可能比預(yù)期獲得更好的收益赃绊。TNP案子比預(yù)想的更久既峡，不過我們也多了幾個(gè)點(diǎn)的收益。

The financial results of TNP were as follows:

TNP 投資收益如下：

(1) On the bonds we invested 260,773 and had an average holding period of slightly under five months. We received 6 1?2% interest on our money and realized a capital gain of 14,446. This works out to an overall rate of return of approximately 20% per annum.

1. 債券投資投入資金260773碧查， 平均持有時(shí)間略低于5個(gè)月运敢。我們這段時(shí)間我們收到了6.5% 的利息，實(shí)現(xiàn)利潤(rùn)14忠售，446美元传惠。這筆套利年化收益達(dá)到20%。 （怎么算的档痪，不同的資金投入時(shí)間不同涉枫？？）

(2) On the stock and warrants we have realized capital gain of 89,304, and we have stubs presently valued at 2,946. From an investment or 146,000 in April, our holdings ran to 731,000 in October. Based on the time the money was employed, the rate or return was about 22% per annum.

2. 在股票和權(quán)證的實(shí)現(xiàn)盈利89304腐螟，目前還有大約2946美元的剩余股份愿汰。從四月的第一筆146000美元的投資到十月總計(jì)投入731000. 根據(jù)資金投入時(shí)間來推算，年化收益率大約在22%乐纸。

In both cases, the return is computed on an all equity investment. I definitely feel some borrowed money is warranted against a portfolio of workouts, but feel it is a very dangerous practice against generals.

上面兩種情形的回報(bào)都是根據(jù)股權(quán)投資計(jì)算的衬廷。我真心覺得借錢投資這類收益保底的套利是可行的，但投資在股票上就太危險(xiǎn)了汽绢。

We are not presenting TNP as any earth-shaking triumph. We have had workouts which were much better and some which were poorer. It is typical of our bread-and-butter type of operation. We attempt to obtain all facts possible, continue to keep abreast of developments and evaluate all of this in terms of our experience. We certainly don't go into all the deals that come along -- there is considerable variation in their attractiveness. When a workout falls through, the resulting market value shrink is substantial. Therefore, you cannot afford many errors, although we fully realize we are going to have them occasionally.

其實(shí)TNP的案子是沒什么了不起吗跋。我們有的套利操作收益更高，也有的收益要差宁昭。不過這就是我們典型的套利運(yùn)作方法跌宛。我們盡可能獲取全面且確定的信息，持續(xù)跟進(jìn)积仗，并依據(jù)我們的經(jīng)驗(yàn)來評(píng)估當(dāng)前是形勢(shì)疆拘。我們當(dāng)然不能全程跟蹤所有的案子，這其中肯定會(huì)根據(jù)不同情況進(jìn)行取舍寂曹。當(dāng)套利失敗時(shí)哎迄，會(huì)造成市值大幅度縮水。因此隆圆，盡管常在河邊走難免不濕鞋漱挚，但是我們還是希望盡量不犯錯(cuò)。

DEMPSTER MILL MFG.

DEMPSTER MILL 制造

This situation started as a general in 1956. At that time the stock was selling at 18 with about 72 in book value of which $50 per share was in current assets (Cash, receivables and inventory) less all liabilities. Dempster had earned good money in the past but was only breaking even currently.

這筆交易起源于1956年渺氧。當(dāng)時(shí)股價(jià)是18美元旨涝， 而賬面價(jià)值大約72美元。其中50美元為減去負(fù)債后的流動(dòng)資產(chǎn)（現(xiàn)金侣背，應(yīng)收和庫(kù)存）颊糜。Dempster 在過去賺了很多錢但目前僅維持收支平衡哩治。

The qualitative situation was on the negative side (a fairly tough industry and unimpressive management), but the figures were extremely attractive. Experience shows you can buy 100 situations like this and have perhaps 70 or 80 work out to reasonable profits in one to three years. Just why any particular one should do so is hard to say at the time of purchase, but the group expectancy is favorable, whether the impetus is from an improved industry situation, a takeover offer, a change in investor psychology, etc.

定性來看秃踩，當(dāng)時(shí)的情形是不容樂觀的（所在行業(yè)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)激烈衬鱼，管理層也不行），但是賬面算出的利潤(rùn)讓人動(dòng)心憔杨。經(jīng)驗(yàn)告訴我這比套利在一到三年類應(yīng)該有7-8成概率獲得不錯(cuò)的利潤(rùn)鸟赫。很難說當(dāng)時(shí)是什么具體原因出手購(gòu)入，但是整體預(yù)期是向上的消别，無論推動(dòng)力是來自于市場(chǎng)環(huán)境變好抛蚤，并購(gòu)案或者投資者預(yù)期變化，等等寻狂。

We continued to buy the stock in small quantities for five years. During most or this period I was a director and was becoming consistently less impressed with the earnings prospects under existing management. However, I also became more familiar with the assets and operations and my evaluation of the quantitative factors remained very favorable.

我們連續(xù)五年持續(xù)地小部分購(gòu)買股份岁经。在這期間我都擔(dān)任公司董事，并漸漸對(duì)當(dāng)前管理層盈利能力不滿意蛇券。然而缀壤，我也借此能熟悉公司的資產(chǎn)和運(yùn)營(yíng)，并且定量分析的結(jié)果表明收益率仍然令人心動(dòng)纠亚。

By mid-1961 we owned about 30% or Dempster (we had made several tender offers with poor results), but in August and September 1961 made, several large purchases at 16-$25 range.

到了1961年塘慕，我們總共占有Dempster 股權(quán)的30%（曾經(jīng)多次邀約收購(gòu)股份都結(jié)果不佳），不過在1961年九月蒂胞，以30.25美元購(gòu)入了大量股權(quán)图呢，并促成了之后相同價(jià)格的要約收購(gòu)，從而占股比例達(dá)到了70%骗随。我們過去5年的購(gòu)入價(jià)格在16-25美元蛤织。

On assuming control, we elevated the executive vice president to president to see what he would do unfettered by the previous policies. The results were unsatisfactory and on April 23, 1962 we hired Harry Bottle as president.

在接管控制權(quán)后，我們將執(zhí)行副總裁提升為總裁鸿染，看看他不受以前政策的約束情況下表現(xiàn)如何指蚜。 結(jié)果并不令人滿意，1962 年 4 月 23 日牡昆，我們聘請(qǐng)了 Harry Bottle 擔(dān)任總裁姚炕。

Harry was the perfect man for the job. I have recited his triumphs before and the accompanying comparative balance sheets speak louder than any words in demonstrating the re-employment of capital.

Harry完美地完成了他的工作。我曾經(jīng)頌揚(yáng)過他的事跡丢烘，不過附上資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表可以更加說明他在重組公司的能力是多么驚人柱宦。

61-63年資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表對(duì)比

Harry:

(1) took the inventory from over 1 million reducing carrying costs and obsolescence risks tremendously;

1. 將400萬美元的庫(kù)存降為100萬美元，大幅縮減了維護(hù)成本和淘汰風(fēng)險(xiǎn)播瞳；

(2) correspondingly freed up capital for marketable security purchases from which we gained over $400,000

2. 將相應(yīng)的資金投資于可證券市場(chǎng)讓我們賺了40萬美金

(3) cut administration and selling expense from 75,000 per month;

3. 縮減管理和銷售費(fèi)用掸刊，從每月15萬降到7.5萬美元。

(4) cut factory overhead burden from 4.50 per direct labor hour;

4. 將工廠管理直接工時(shí)費(fèi)從6 美元減少到 4.50 美元赢乓；

(5) closed the five branches operating unprofitably (leaving us with three good ones) and replaced them with more productive distributors;

5. 關(guān)閉了5個(gè)不賺錢的分銷商（只留下三個(gè)還不錯(cuò)的）忧侧，同時(shí)請(qǐng)來了更高效的分銷商石窑；

(6) cleaned up a headache at an auxiliary factory operation at Columbus, Nebraska;

6. 解決了內(nèi)布拉斯加州哥倫布的一家輔助工廠運(yùn)營(yíng)中一個(gè)令人頭疼的問題；

(7) eliminated jobbed lines tying up considerable money (which could be used profitably in securities) while producing no profits;

7. 消除了占用大量資金而沒有利潤(rùn)的生產(chǎn)線（并投資在有利潤(rùn)的證券上）蚓炬；

(8) adjusted prices of repair parts, thereby producing an estimated $200,000 additional profit with virtually no loss of volume; and most important;

8. 調(diào)整維修零件的價(jià)格松逊，從而在幾乎沒有數(shù)量損失的情況下產(chǎn)生估計(jì) 200,000 美元的額外利潤(rùn)；

(9) through these and many other steps, restored the earning capacity to a level commensurate with the capital employed.

9. 通過這些和其他的步驟肯夏，將公司的盈利能力提升到了和投入相稱的地步经宏。

In 1963, the heavy corporate taxes we were facing (Harry surprised me by the speed with which he had earned up our tax loss carry-forward) coupled with excess liquid funds within the corporation compelled us to either in some way de-incorporate or to sell the business.

1963 年，我們面臨著沉重的公司稅（我對(duì)Harry 快速賺錢的速度感到驚訝驯击，以至于我們?nèi)衾^續(xù)經(jīng)營(yíng)下去將會(huì)承受很大的稅收損失）加上公司內(nèi)部流動(dòng)資金過剩烁兰，迫使我們以某種方式解散公司或出售業(yè)務(wù)。

We set out to do either one or the other before the end of 1963. De-incorporating had many problems but would have, in effect, doubled earnings for our partners and also eliminated the problem of corporate capital gain tax on Dempster securities.

我們會(huì)在1963年底之前采取行動(dòng)徊都。解散公司會(huì)有很多問題沪斟，但實(shí)際上會(huì)使我們的合作伙伴的收益翻倍，并且還消除了對(duì) Dempster 證券征收公司資本利得稅的問題暇矫。

At virtually the last minute, after several earlier deals had fallen through at reasonably advanced stages, a sale of assets was made. Although there were a good many wrinkles to the sale, the net effect was to bring approximately book value. This, coupled with the gain we have in our portfolio of marketable securities, gives us a realization of about 80 per share. Dempster (now named First Beatrice Corp. - we sold the name to the new Co.) is down to almost entirely cash and marketable securities now. On BPL's yearend audit, our First Beatrice holdings were valued at asset value (with securities at market) less a 200,000 reserve for various contingencies.

在早前幾筆交易過早的夭折之后主之，我們?cè)谧詈笠环昼妼①Y產(chǎn)出售了。盡管這比出售問題多多袱耽，但是基本賬面價(jià)值的以實(shí)現(xiàn)杀餐。這筆交易加上股票市場(chǎng)上價(jià)格提升帶來的收益讓我們每股價(jià)值達(dá)到了80美元。Dempster （現(xiàn)在更名為 First Beatrice Corp.——我們把這個(gè)名字賣給了新公司）現(xiàn)在幾乎完全是現(xiàn)金和有價(jià)證券朱巨。在 BPL 的年終審計(jì)中史翘，我們持有的 First Beatrice 資產(chǎn)按資產(chǎn)價(jià)值（包含市場(chǎng)上的證券）減去 200,000 美元的各種應(yīng)急準(zhǔn)備金進(jìn)行估值。

I might mention that we think the buyers will do very well with Dempster. They impress us as people of ability and they have sound plans to expand the business and its profitability. We would have been quite happy to operate Dempster on an unincorporated basis, but we are also quite happy to sell it for a reasonable price. Our business is making excellent purchases -- not making extraordinary sales.

我們認(rèn)為買家會(huì)把 Dempster 經(jīng)營(yíng)得很好冀续。 他們給我們留下了深刻的印象琼讽，他們是有能力的人，也有有擴(kuò)大業(yè)務(wù)和盈利能力的合理計(jì)劃洪唐。 我們很樂意以非法人形式經(jīng)營(yíng) Dempster钻蹬，但我們也很樂意以合理的價(jià)格出售它。 我們的業(yè)務(wù)是以出色的價(jià)格買入——而不是賣個(gè)高價(jià)凭需。

Harry works the same way I do -- he likes big carrots. He is presently a limited partner of BPL, and the next belt-tightening operation we have, he's our man.

Harry的工作方式和我一樣——喜歡有利可圖问欠。 他目前是 BPL 的有限合伙人，如果下次有類似的工作粒蜈，我們還是會(huì)喊上他顺献。

The Dempster saga points up several morals:

Dempster的案例體現(xiàn)了若干準(zhǔn)則：

(1) Our business is one requiring patience. It has little in common with a portfolio of high-flying glamour stocks and during periods of popularity for the latter, we may appear quite stodgy. It is to our advantage to have securities do nothing price wise for months, or perhaps years, why we are buying them. This points up the need to measure our results over an adequate period of time. We suggest three years as a minimum.

1. 我們的工作需要耐心。我們和那些高高在上的股票投資組合幾乎沒有共同點(diǎn)枯怖，在他們高高在上的時(shí)候注整，我們往往顯得乏善可陳。股價(jià)在幾個(gè)月甚至幾年不動(dòng)反而是我們的優(yōu)勢(shì)，這也是為什么我們會(huì)持續(xù)買入的原因肿轨。因此衡量BPL投資結(jié)果最好要按照3年起步寿冕。

(2) We cannot talk about our current investment operations. Such an open-mouth policy could never improve our results and in some situations could seriously hurt us. For this reason, should anyone, including partners, ask us whether we are interested in any security, we must plead the “5th Amendment.”

2. 我們不能討論當(dāng)前正在進(jìn)行的投資。這種大嘴的行為對(duì)我們的投資收益百害而無一益椒袍。因此驼唱，如果任何人（包括合伙人）問及我們是否對(duì)任何股票感興趣時(shí)。我們將行使第五修正案的賦予我們的權(quán)利--沈默權(quán)槐沼。