第4章? 文本與草案：黑格爾從法蘭克福到耶拿時(shí)期《精神現(xiàn)象學(xué)》之路(2)

The results of Schulze’s book and Fichte’s response were catastrophic for Reinhold’s career; his star sank as rapidly as it had risen, and Reinhold was never again to regain the prominence he briefly enjoyed.? Paid the absurdly low salary typical of the professoriate at Jena, Reinhold accepted a better offer from Kiel in 1794 and left Jena for good just as his reputation was beginning a rapid slide downhill. Away from Jena, he came to abandon the Kantian critical philosophy entirely and to adopt a theory of philosophy as equivalent to logic, all of which pushed him even further toward the philosophical periphery at the time.? Fichte arrived in Jena as Reinhold departed, and he quickly supplanted Reinhold as the great star in the German intellectual firmament.? Although at first Fichte seemed to accept certain basic Reinholdian claims — in particular, the claims about the need to arrive at an indubitable starting point for philosophy, the related distinctions between the “premises and the conclusions,” and between the “spirit and the letter” of Kant’s thought, and the need only to “complete” Kant’s philosophy - in fact he was to effect a wholesale shift in the nature of the debate, moving it away from Reinhold’s worries and in the direction of asking how it was possible in the first place for there to be the kind of selfdetermining subjectivity that Kant claimed was necessary.'^ Fichte stopped asking how we “constitute” a web of experience and started asking instead about the authority for the norms by which we make judgments about that experience.

? ? 舒爾策書與費(fèi)希特回應(yīng)的結(jié)果對(duì)于賴因霍爾德的生涯是災(zāi)難性的。賴因霍爾德作為一顆已然升起的學(xué)術(shù)新星很快墜落，他從此再也沒有回到他昔日短暫享有的輝煌兴猩。由于對(duì)在耶拿當(dāng)教授薪水低得荒唐而感到失望，賴因霍爾德于 1794 年接受了基爾一個(gè)更好的教職且永遠(yuǎn)地離開了耶拿酬诀。就在此時(shí)，他的名聲開始快速下滑。離開耶拿后，他開始徹底拋棄康德批判哲學(xué)爷贫，著手采納相當(dāng)于邏輯學(xué)的哲學(xué)理論认然，所有這些都進(jìn)一步將他推向當(dāng)時(shí)哲學(xué)的邊緣。賴因霍爾德前腳走漫萄，費(fèi)希特后腳到季眷，費(fèi)希特旋即取代賴因霍爾德，成了德國知識(shí)天宇中的巨星卷胯。雖然起初費(fèi)希特看來好像認(rèn)同賴因霍爾德的某些基本主張——特別是有關(guān)下列的種種主張：需要達(dá)到無可置疑的哲學(xué)起點(diǎn)子刮、作出“前提與結(jié)論”之間的相關(guān)區(qū)分、作出康德思想的“精神實(shí)質(zhì)與字面意義”之間的相關(guān)區(qū)分窑睁，以及僅僅需要“使”康德哲學(xué)“臻于完美”——但實(shí)際上他勢(shì)必完全改變了這場爭論的性質(zhì)挺峡，勢(shì)必使這場爭論擺脫了賴因霍爾德的擔(dān)憂，進(jìn)而使這場爭論朝著下列做法的方向發(fā)展：首先追問怎么可能存在那種被康德聲稱作為必需的有自決力的主觀性担钮。費(fèi)希特不再追問我們?nèi)绾巍熬幙棥苯?jīng)驗(yàn)之網(wǎng)橱赠，反而開始探問那被我們借以對(duì)經(jīng)驗(yàn)作出判斷的規(guī)范的權(quán)力。

Fichte’s principles are notoriously obscure, and Fichte spent many years trying to work them out before finally abandoning altogether his project of completing Kantian idealist philosophy. Fichte’s principles are, in their barest outline, something like the following. The first principle was the Kantian principle of the necessity of self- consciousness, which Fichte characterized as the principle of “I = F’ (and which he sometimes characterized as the Fs “self-positing”). The second principle was Fichte’s version of the Kantian notion that the unity of self-consciousness required some material to synthesize; Fichte characterized this necessity as the principle of the “Not-F’: The “F’ (the principle of the necessary unity of self-consciousness) is said to “posit” the not-I (that is, the necessary unity of self-consciousness requires some material that is not itself part of self-consciousness for its synthesizing activities to combine, and it must posit this material as something “other” than itself, something “given” to it).'^

? ? 費(fèi)希特的那些原理是出了名的晦澀難懂箫津，費(fèi)希特用時(shí)多年試圖將它們制定出來狭姨，然后最終完全拋棄他關(guān)于使康德唯心論哲學(xué)臻于完美的工程。費(fèi)希特的那些原理是苏遥，從它們的毫無內(nèi)容的輪廓意義上說饼拍，類似于下面的東西。第一條原理是康德關(guān)于自我意識(shí)的必要性原理田炭，這條原理被費(fèi)希特描繪為“自我=自我”原理（這條原理有時(shí)被他描繪為自我的“自我設(shè)定”）师抄。第二條原理是費(fèi)希特關(guān)于康德的自我意識(shí)的統(tǒng)一需要綜合某種質(zhì)料這個(gè)見解的翻版；費(fèi)希特將這種必要性描繪為“非我”原理：“自我”（自我意識(shí)必需統(tǒng)一原理）被說成“設(shè)定”非我（就是說教硫，自我意識(shí)的必需的統(tǒng)一需要某種質(zhì)料叨吮，這種質(zhì)料本身因自我意識(shí)的綜合活動(dòng)能起到組合作用而不構(gòu)成自我意識(shí)的一部分，“自我”必需把這種質(zhì)料設(shè)定成某種“不同于”它自身的東西瞬矩，設(shè)定成某種“被賦予”它的東西）茶鉴。

The third principle (which even Fichte himself had trouble stating and which went through numerous revisions) went something like this: Since the necessary unity of self-consciousness (Fichte’s “I = F’) itself necessarily requires something other than itself, but since it is necessary that it posit something as not-posited by itself, as “given,” it finds itself in a “contradiction” between holding that everything is a “posit” by the “F’ and that among the things that the “F’ must posit is that not everything with normative force is a “posit.” Because, Fichte argued, an agent cannot abide such a contradiction at the heart of his selfconception, he must eternally strive to overcome this contradiction by showing how any apparent “not-F’ (a brute “given” serving as a norm of judgment) is actually not just a “given” but can in fact be shown to be constructible out of what counts as the necessary conditions of selfconsciousness itself.'"^

? ? 第三條原理（這條甚至就連費(fèi)希特本人也難以加以陳述且被演繹出眾多版本的原理）內(nèi)容大致如下：因?yàn)樽晕乙庾R(shí)的必須的統(tǒng)一（費(fèi)希特的“自我=自我”）自身必須要有某種與它自身不同的東西，但是因?yàn)樗仨殞?duì)象設(shè)定為不是由某物自己設(shè)定的東西景用，必須將對(duì)象設(shè)定為“給予的東西”涵叮，所以它發(fā)覺自己陷入兩種“自相矛盾”的認(rèn)識(shí)中：一切事物都是由“自我”“設(shè)定”的，與其中“自我”必須設(shè)定的是有些東西由于規(guī)范的力量而成了“設(shè)定物”丛肢。因?yàn)槲Х剩M(fèi)希特辯稱，行動(dòng)者不能容忍自我概念深處的這種自相矛盾的認(rèn)識(shí)蜂怎，所以行動(dòng)者必須借助下列的做法永遠(yuǎn)奮力克服這種自相矛盾的認(rèn)識(shí)：說明任何貌似真實(shí)的“非我”（一個(gè)用作判斷規(guī)范的無情的“給予物”）實(shí)際上都不只是“給予物”穆刻，而其實(shí)都能被證明是用被認(rèn)作自我意識(shí)自己必需的條件建構(gòu)的。

To put Fichte’s conclusion in another way: None of the “givens” of experience possess any certainty, any unrevisability; their status as objects of knowledge is a status bestowed on them by our own selfgrounding activity.'^ Even the status of a relatively simple experience, such as “something looks red,” which just seems to be “given” to us, is a status that we bestow on that experience: It “l(fā)ooks” red to us because we construe it in terms of color concepts, in terms of something like, “the way things that really are red look in certain lighting conditions,” and so on.

? ? 換一種方式論述費(fèi)希特的結(jié)論：經(jīng)驗(yàn)的“給予物”一律不擁有任何必然性杠步，一律不擁有任何非修正性氢伟；經(jīng)驗(yàn)的“給予物”作為認(rèn)識(shí)對(duì)象的地位是一種由我們自己的自發(fā)活動(dòng)賦予經(jīng)驗(yàn)“給予物”的地位榜轿。甚至就連相對(duì)簡單的經(jīng)驗(yàn)（例如“物體看來是紅色的”——“紅色的”似乎只是我們“給予的”）的地位也是一種被我們憑經(jīng)驗(yàn)賦予的地位：事物之所以在我們“看來”是紅色的是因?yàn)槲覀兏鶕?jù)顏色概念來理解某物，是因?yàn)槲覀兏鶕?jù)比如下列的東西來理解某物：“在這些光照的條件下確實(shí)作為紅色的東西看來的狀況”等等朵锣。

Indeed, articulating the third principle gave Fichte so much trouble that during his development of it over the course of several years, he came to hold that the “I” could never theoretically demonstrate the full constructibility of the “Not-I” out of itself but must instead take it as a practical and infinite task to be achieved, thus leading himself to assert that the demands of practical reason were prior to the claims of theoretical reason - that “dogmatism” (the acceptance of the “Not-I” as a brute “given”) could not be overcome theoretically but only practically.''’

? ? 實(shí)際上谬盐，由于系統(tǒng)論述第三條原理給費(fèi)希特帶來這么多麻煩，在他對(duì)第三條原理加以闡述的多年間诚些，他逐漸認(rèn)識(shí)到“自我”絕不可能理論上證明出之于“自我”自身的“非我”的充分可建構(gòu)性飞傀，反而必須將可建構(gòu)性看作一項(xiàng)有待完成的實(shí)踐的和巨大的任務(wù)，這就從而致使他自己堅(jiān)定地?cái)嘌晕芘耄瑢?shí)踐理性的要求先于理論理性的主張——“獨(dú)斷論”（承認(rèn)“非我”作為無理性的“給予物”的“獨(dú)斷論”）不可能被從理論上加以克服而只能被從實(shí)踐上加以克服砸烦。

Fichte radicalized the Kantian idea of the “spontaneity” of the subject in synthesizing his experiences - the idea of a spontaneity that lay at the heart of all experience and theoretical knowledge - in a way such that even the notion of our own experiential passivity is something that we spontaneously “posit” for ourselves, and he took to describing the awareness of this radical, self-positing spontaneity as “intellectual intuition,” a kind of nonrepresentational awareness of our own activity of representing.'’ In Fichte’s hands, the joint ideas of the revisability of all our experience and our freedom in doing so - our “boundless” spontaneity which can only be 5^^bounded — became the hallmarks of what it would actually take to complete the Kantian project. The opposite view, that of taking the world as externally acting upon us and generating beliefs and actions in us, was characterized by Fichte as “dogmatism.”'* Fichte’s obscure but nonetheless powerful and highly original development of Kantian philosophy away from all reliance on “givens” quickly transformed what had been an Enlightenment ideal into something else: a Romantic exploration and celebration of freedom itself.

? ? 費(fèi)希特以某種方式使康德關(guān)于主體在綜合經(jīng)驗(yàn)時(shí)的“自發(fā)性”概念——一個(gè)處于全部經(jīng)驗(yàn)和理論知識(shí)中心的自發(fā)性概念——變得激進(jìn)化，所以甚至我們自己的經(jīng)驗(yàn)被動(dòng)性概念也成了某種被“我們”自發(fā)地為我們自己“設(shè)定”的東西绞吁，他開始把這基本的幢痘、自我設(shè)定的自發(fā)性意識(shí)說成是“理智直觀”，說成是一種關(guān)于我們自己的表象活動(dòng)的非表象意識(shí)家破。在費(fèi)希特手里颜说，像上述這樣做的過程中，我們的全部經(jīng)驗(yàn)和自由的修訂這一結(jié)合概念——我們只能自我限制的“無限的”自發(fā)性——變成實(shí)際上可以看作使康德哲學(xué)計(jì)劃臻于完美的標(biāo)志汰聋。相反的看法门粪，把世界當(dāng)作外在地影響我們且使我們產(chǎn)生信念與行為的看法，被費(fèi)希特描述為“獨(dú)斷論”马僻。費(fèi)希特對(duì)康德哲學(xué)作出晦澀但仍然有力和高度原創(chuàng)性的闡發(fā)庄拇，以及完全使康德哲學(xué)擺脫對(duì)“給予物”的依賴注服，很快把早已成為啟蒙運(yùn)動(dòng)理想的東西變成某種其他的東西：一種對(duì)自由本身的浪漫主義的探索和頌揚(yáng)韭邓。

Schelling and the Romantic Turn in Idealism

謝林與唯心主義浪漫轉(zhuǎn)向

If Fichte set the tone, Schelling helped to raise the stakes (and the embellishment of the language in which it was described) of philosophical idealism. Schelling was the quintessential Romantic. Experimental in temperament, always focused on the large view rather than the fine details, throwing off brilliant insights along the way, Schelling quickly became “the” philosopher for the Romantic circle that had formed at Jena, especially after Fichte’s spectacular dismissal from the university surrounding the charges of his alleged “atheism.” During that early period in Jena, Schelling’s thought developed rapidly, his publications were coming out as fast as he could write them, and each one, so it seemed, took a stance slightly different from the earlier ones. After his own rise to fame later in Berlin, Hegel was to offer a withering observation on much of his old friend’s output during this period: “Schelling conducted his philosophical education in public.”'"

? ? 如果費(fèi)希特為唯心主義哲學(xué)定下了調(diào)，那么謝林就舉起唯心主義哲學(xué)大旗（并提供哲學(xué)唯心主義被借以描述的語言裝飾品）溶弟。謝林是位典型的浪漫主義者女淑。由于秉性喜愛實(shí)驗(yàn)，由于總是大處著眼而非盯住細(xì)枝末節(jié)辜御，由于頻頻發(fā)表卓越的洞見鸭你，謝林很快成了那在耶拿形成的浪漫主義者同仁圈中“獨(dú)一無二”的哲學(xué)家，特別是在費(fèi)希特因四面受到對(duì)他所謂“無神論”的指責(zé)而突遭耶拿大學(xué)解雇后擒权，謝林更顯得是鶴立雞群袱巨。在耶拿時(shí)期，謝林思想發(fā)展非常之快碳抄，他的作品這邊寫出來那邊就發(fā)表愉老，似乎每篇作品都持有稍異于以前作品的立場。在他自己后來在柏林聲名鵲起后剖效，黑格爾勢(shì)必注意到老友謝林在這個(gè)階段著述甚豐嫉入，他自己深感自愧弗如：“謝林指揮著公共哲學(xué)教育焰盗〖氖瑁”

In the period from roughly 1794 to 1800, Schelling went through his rapid development. Beginning as a Spinozist, he quickly became a Fichtean; in 1795, he published Of the I as the Principle of Philosophy or On the Unconditional in Human Knowledge^ in which, although still appearing Fichtean in his overall argumentation (he still spoke of the “I’s” positing a “Not-I,” and so on), in fact he began to depart from Fichte’s thought in important ways. He then began to see the problems in Fichte’s own system, and by 1800 had published his System of Transcendental Idealism in which he articulated his own distinctive Romantic post-Fichtean form of idealism. Schelling drew out what he took to be the central principle of Fichte’s development of idealism and phrased it in a way that was to appeal to his Romantic admirers: “The beginning and end of all philosophy is - freedoml"

? ? 在大約從 1794 年至 1800 年這個(gè)時(shí)期蓝仲，謝林完成了他哲學(xué)思想的快速發(fā)展氧枣。盡管開始是個(gè)斯賓諾莎主義者驻右，他仍然很快就成了個(gè)費(fèi)希特主義者形葬；在 1795 年郑原，他發(fā)表《關(guān)于作為哲學(xué)原理的自我或論無條件的人類知識(shí)》這本書奇昙，在該書中纤控，雖然他的整個(gè)論證仍然顯露出費(fèi)希特主義面孔（他依然述及“自我”設(shè)定“非我”等等）欢瞪，實(shí)際上他在某些重要方面卻著手脫離費(fèi)希特思想影響捌议。他繼而開始看出費(fèi)希特自己體系中的問題，到 1800 年他就已發(fā)表了他的《先驗(yàn)唯心主義體系》這本著作引有，在該著中瓣颅，他系統(tǒng)地闡述他自己那別具一格的、浪漫主義的譬正、后費(fèi)希特哲學(xué)的唯心主義形式宫补。謝林制定出被他看作的費(fèi)希特唯心主義闡述的核心原理，并以一種旨在訴諸浪漫主義贊賞者的方式來敘述這樣的核心原理：“一切哲學(xué)的開端和結(jié)尾都是一一自由曾我》叟拢”

Just as Fichte had radicalized Kant, Schelling radicalized Fichte.? Fichte had spoken of how the “F’ necessarily posits for itself a “Not-F’ to account for its own activity; but Fichte’s “I,” Schelling argued, remained conditioned by something else. What was at stake, even on Fichte’s own terms, was the status of the “unconditioned” in our activities of self-positing, and Schelling took to calling this unconditioned totality at first the “absolute F’ and later simply “Being.”^' Likewise, Schelling radicalized Fichte’s notion of “intellectual intuition,” claiming that apprehension of the full, unconditioned freedom of the “absolute F’ was such a nondiscursive “intellectual intuition” and drawing the conclusion that since the “ultimate goal of the finite I is therefore an expansion toward identity with the nonfinite,” the “ultimate goal of all striving can also be represented as an expansion of personality to infinity, that is, as its own destruction.”^^ Fichte’s “infinite task” of overcoming all reliance on any “given” had suddenly been given a much more religious, even existential and Romantic twist.

? ? 正像費(fèi)希特早已把康德激進(jìn)化一樣，謝林也使費(fèi)希特激進(jìn)化抒巢。費(fèi)希特早就述及“自我”怎么必須為它自己設(shè)定一個(gè)“非我”以說明它自己的活動(dòng)贫贝；但是費(fèi)希特的“自我”，謝林辯稱蛉谜，依然受到其他東西的制約稚晚。很成問題的是，用費(fèi)希特自己術(shù)語說型诚，是“無條件者”在我們自我設(shè)定活動(dòng)中的地位客燕。謝靈起初喜愛把無條件的總體稱作“絕對(duì)自我”，后來把無條件的總體簡稱作“存在”狰贯。同樣也搓，謝靈使費(fèi)希特的“理智直觀”概念激進(jìn)化，聲稱對(duì)“絕對(duì)自我”的充分的無條件自由的領(lǐng)悟是這樣一種非推論的“理智直觀”涵紊，并得出結(jié)論：“有限自我的終極目的因此是向非限定的同一的擴(kuò)展傍妒，所以一切努力的終極目的也可以被說成是人格向無限的擴(kuò)展，也即也可以被說成是它自己的毀滅摸柄〔罚”費(fèi)希特關(guān)于克服對(duì)任何“給予物”的全面依賴的“無限任務(wù)”早就出人意料地被賦予一種更加宗教的、甚至存在主義和浪漫主義的扭曲塘幅。

However, Schelling himself became worried within a very short time about some of his own conclusions, and began working out what became known as the “philosophy of nature” {Naturphilosophie). Schelling thus embarked on his ambitious and greatly influential project of showing how the nature studied by the physicists was itself possible only if there was a “Nature” to be uncovered a priori by the philosophers that made it possible.“

? ? 然而昔案，謝靈本人在短時(shí)間內(nèi)擔(dān)心起他自己的某些結(jié)論尿贫，并著手制定著名的“自然哲學(xué)”（Naturphilosophie）。謝靈因此啟動(dòng)他雄心勃勃的踏揣、頗具影響的計(jì)劃庆亡，該計(jì)劃在于證明那由物理學(xué)家研究的自然本身是如何絕不可能存在的，除非存在著一個(gè)有待某些哲學(xué)家去揭示的先天的“自然”捞稿，而且他們使這樣的“自然”成為可能又谋。

One of the key notions in Schelling’s philosophy of nature (which was crucial for the development of Hegel’s thought in his early writings in Jena) was his idea that nature divides itself into various “potencies” (Potenzen). (The term Potenz was taken from the mathematical use of “power,” as when one speaks of 4 being 2 to the “second power.? Schelling’s general idea was roughly the following: An investigation of nature finds that nature necessarily divides itself up into various op- posed “potencies” out of a primordial unity that contains a primordial opposition {Ur-Gegensatz) within itself. One of the guiding images at work in Schelling’s reflections, as in so many other writings of the period, was that of the magnet: The magnet has positive and negative poles, but the poles are not self-subsistent; they exist only in terms of being united within the whole magnet. If one cuts a magnet in half, one does not have two magnet parts, one with a positive pole and one with a negative pole; one has two magnets, each with positive and negative poles. Each pole therefore can exist only when united with its opposite.? Schelling called this union the “indifference point” (for example, the point at which the magnet is neither positive nor negative). Each “potency” involves opposites that attract each other (like the positive and negative poles of a magnet), and nature progresses from simple to complex forms by multiplying its “potencies”; when the opposites come together, they multiply each other’s “potencies,” and the result is a new, higher, more “potent” natural form. Nature is inherently productive and develops of itself all these stages by virtue of its productivity, being spurred on by self-produced “checks” in nature that oppose such expansive, productive forces. (Schelling in fact tried to work out a kind of algebra for this conception of oppositions and potencies in nature, a formalism taken up by his less inspired imitators but which he himself soon discarded.)

? ? 謝林（對(duì)黑格爾耶拿早期作品中思想發(fā)展至關(guān)重要的）自然哲學(xué)的關(guān)鍵概念之一是謝林關(guān)于自然把自己分成各種不同“潛力”（Potenzen）的思想。（“Potenz”這一術(shù)語取自數(shù)學(xué)中使用的“乘方”娱局，像當(dāng)一個(gè)人述及4是2的“2次方”時(shí)一樣彰亥。）謝林總的思想可粗略地?cái)⑹鋈缦拢簩?duì)自然的研究使人發(fā)現(xiàn)大自然必然由于一個(gè)自身含有原始對(duì)立面（Ur-Gegensatz）的原始單位而把自己分成各種不同的對(duì)立的“乘方”。在謝林反思中起作用的指導(dǎo)性概念之一衰齐，像在那時(shí)其他許多著作中一樣任斋，是磁鐵這一概念：磁鐵具有正極和負(fù)極，但正負(fù)極不是自立的耻涛；它們只有從結(jié)合在整塊磁鐵中意義上說才是存在的废酷。如果把一塊磁鐵切成兩段，那么就得不到兩段磁鐵抹缕，一段帶有正極而另一段帶有負(fù)極澈蟆；如果人們有兩塊磁鐵，那么每一塊磁鐵都有著正極和負(fù)極卓研。因此每一極能夠存在趴俘，只有當(dāng)每一極都與它相反的一極結(jié)合在一起的時(shí)候。謝林把這種統(tǒng)一稱為“無差異點(diǎn)”（例如在這一點(diǎn)上磁鐵既不是正極也不是負(fù)極）奏赘。每個(gè)“潛力”都涉及一些相互吸引的對(duì)立面（像一塊磁鐵中的正極和負(fù)極一樣的對(duì)立面）寥闪，自然借助乘以它的“次方”而不斷從簡單的形式發(fā)展到復(fù)雜的形式；當(dāng)這些對(duì)立面合為一體的時(shí)候志珍，它們乘以彼此的“次方”橙垢，結(jié)果產(chǎn)生一種新的、更高的伦糯、更“有力的”自然形式。自然天生是多產(chǎn)的嗽元，并借助它的多產(chǎn)性而從它自身發(fā)展出這些階段敛纲，這些階段受到自然自我生產(chǎn)的“抑制”的促進(jìn)，這樣的“抑制”抵抗這些擴(kuò)展的剂癌、多產(chǎn)的力量淤翔。（謝林其實(shí)試圖創(chuàng)立一種關(guān)于自然中對(duì)立面和乘方概念的代數(shù)學(xué)，創(chuàng)立一種得到他缺乏靈感的模仿者接受的形式主義佩谷，但這樣的形式主義不久便遭到他本人的拋棄旁壮。）

The various alleged “indifference points” to be found in nature are, however, all unstable; they are not genuine “indifference points,” since a genuine “indifference point” would mean the cessation of all development in nature. The only true “indifference point” would be the “absolute” itself out of which all the other various oppositions (and therefore “potencies”) of nature develop, but, as he put it, the “absolute indifference point exists nowhere, but is, as it were, distributed among several individual points,” which in turn ensures the boundlessness of the universe.

? ? 然而监嗜，見于自然中的各種不同的所謂“無差異點(diǎn)”全都是不穩(wěn)定的；它們不是真正的“無差異點(diǎn)”抡谐，因?yàn)檎嬲摹盁o差異點(diǎn)”或許意味著自然中一切發(fā)展的停止裁奇。唯一真正的“無差異點(diǎn)”當(dāng)然是出于自然中一切其他不同的對(duì)立面（因此還有“次方”）的發(fā)展的“絕對(duì)”自身，但是麦撵，像他論述的刽肠，“絕對(duì)無差異點(diǎn)無處可尋，但似乎它分散在若干單個(gè)的點(diǎn)中”免胃，這反過來又保證宇宙的無限性音五。

In asserting all this, Schelling denied the validity neither of experimental empirical science nor of empirical investigation - his focus was always on what he saw as the false picture of nature presented by atomism and by the purely mechanical understanding of matter - nor did he advocate any kind of spiritualist conception of nature. He would have nothing to do with those who postulated a “vital force” to explain the way life emerges out of “dead” matter.His point was always that the study of the “potencies” revealed the a priori presuppositions about nature involved in the empirical scientific study of nature.

? ? 在作出上述斷言過程中，謝林既沒有否定實(shí)驗(yàn)的經(jīng)驗(yàn)科學(xué)的合法性羔沙，也沒有否定經(jīng)驗(yàn)研究的合法性——他的著眼點(diǎn)始終在于被他看作的由原子論和對(duì)物質(zhì)作純機(jī)械理解所描述的自然的錯(cuò)誤圖景——他也不主張任何種類的唯靈論的自然概念躺涝。他當(dāng)然與那些要求把“生命力”解釋成生命出于“死寂”物質(zhì)的方面的人毫不相干。他的見解始終如一：對(duì)“乘方”的研究揭示對(duì)自然的先天預(yù)想涉及對(duì)自然作經(jīng)驗(yàn)科學(xué)的研究扼雏。

Thus, so Schelling argued, post-Kantian idealism must pursue a double-edged strategy to avoid the skeptical charge. On the one hand, it must pursue the construction of the “Not-I” out of what the “I” finds necessary for its own self-identity, which culminates in a system of Kantian-Fichtean transcendental idealism. On the other hand, we must also develop a Naturphilosophie that shows how nature’s own dynamics require that it develop some “point” at which it can reflect on its own productive processes. At the end of both developments — transcendental idealism and Naturphilosophie — there is an “intellectual intuition” of the absolute, of a natural human creature nondiscursively intuiting the activity of nature’s freely determining itself to produce exactly those “points” at which nature comes within human selfconsciousness to a full consciousness of itself.

? ? 所以诞挨，謝林還堅(jiān)持認(rèn)為，后康德唯心主義必須追求一種雙刃策略以避免懷疑主義的指責(zé)呢蛤。一方面惶傻，后康德唯心主義必須追求出于“自我”所發(fā)現(xiàn)的它自己自我同一必需的“非我”的建構(gòu)，這在康德—費(fèi)希特先驗(yàn)唯心主義體系中達(dá)到了登峰造極的地步其障。另一方面银室，我們也必須發(fā)展一種自然哲學(xué)以表明自然自己的動(dòng)力怎么需要它發(fā)展出某個(gè)“點(diǎn)”，而且在這個(gè)點(diǎn)上它能夠反思它自己的多產(chǎn)的過程励翼。在兩種發(fā)展（先驗(yàn)唯心主義和自然哲學(xué)）的末端蜈敢，存在著關(guān)于絕對(duì)的“理智直觀”，存在著自然人的“理智直觀”汽抚，自然人非推論地直覺感受到自然自由地決定它自己的活動(dòng)以便精確地產(chǎn)生那些“點(diǎn)”抓狭，在這些點(diǎn)上，自然在人類自我意識(shí)領(lǐng)域逐漸充分地意識(shí)到它自身造烁。

The absolute itself is therefore that unity that unites the subjective “F’ and nature itself, and, as the condition of everything else, it can only be the object of an “intellectual intuition.” Schelling took himself to have shown that the division between “subject” and “object” can only be the self-display of the absolute itself, which is itself neither subject nor object, and as neither subject nor object, cannot be the “object” of discursive thought or sensible intuition. Schelling almost immediately thereafter began calling this “absolute” the “absolute Identity,” and his philosophy became known as “Identity philosophy.”

? ? 所以否过，絕對(duì)自身是一種聯(lián)合主觀的“自我”和自然本身的統(tǒng)一，作為其他一切事物的條件惭蟋，它只能是“理智直觀”的對(duì)象苗桂。謝林自以為已經(jīng)證明，區(qū)分“主體”和“客體”只能是絕對(duì)自身的自我炫耀告组，絕對(duì)自身既不是主體煤伟，也不是客體。絕對(duì)自身，作為既非主體亦非客體便锨，不可能是推論式思想的對(duì)象围辙，也不可能是感性直觀的“對(duì)象”。謝林幾乎立刻開始稱“絕對(duì)”為“絕對(duì)同一”放案，他的哲學(xué)以“同一哲學(xué)”聞名于世姚建。

But if the absolute is the object of neither thought nor sensibility, then of what faculty is it the object? Schelling concluded in his System of Transcendental Idealism that it could only be the “object” of imagination, and in particular, of artistic imagination. The artistic genius, as it were, “shows” us what cannot be “said.” In art we achieve the genuine “intellectual intuition” that shows us the unity of self-conscious life and nature, that shows us that we really are the way we must be if we are to be the free agents that we must think of ourselves as being. The hidden conclusion in all of this was of course the idea that those who did not “see” this, who did not have this kind of “intellectual intuition,” were those who were incapable of understanding and appreciating art in the first place. “Intellectual intuition” thus turned out to be available to the philosopher and the artist — who in these terms are conceived not so much as the “priests of truth,” as Fichte had described the philosopher, but more as a small circle of apostles of the absolute — and unavailable to those who are so mired in the finite that they cannot “see” what are the so-called necessary presuppositions are of their own selfconsciousness.

? ? 但是，如果絕對(duì)既不是思想的對(duì)象卿叽，也不是感覺的對(duì)象桥胞，那么它是何種官能的對(duì)象呢？謝林在他《先驗(yàn)唯心主義體系》中作出結(jié)論：絕對(duì)只可能成為想象力的“對(duì)象”考婴，特別是贩虾，只可能成為藝術(shù)家想象力的“對(duì)象”。仿佛藝術(shù)家的創(chuàng)造力“向”我們“表明”什么不可能得到“言說”沥阱。在藝術(shù)中缎罢，我們所達(dá)到的真正的“理智直觀”，向我們顯露自覺生活與自然的統(tǒng)一考杉，向我們顯露我們確實(shí)行進(jìn)在我們必須行進(jìn)的途中策精，如果我們想要成為我們必須把我們自己看作自由行動(dòng)者。隱含在上述論述中的結(jié)論當(dāng)然是這樣的想法：人們要是不“明白”以上的論述崇棠，要是不具有這種“理智直觀”咽袜，肯定無法理解和欣賞藝術(shù)。所以枕稀，“理智直觀”最終證明询刹，只有哲學(xué)家和藝術(shù)家才具有——他們用“理智直觀”這一術(shù)語來說話，甚至不被設(shè)想成“真理的祭司”萎坷，像費(fèi)希特早已把哲學(xué)家說成的凹联，而被設(shè)想成一小撮絕對(duì)的使徒——“理智直觀”因此最終證明是下面這些人不具有的：他們深陷無限者泥潭，以致他們不可能“明白”所謂必需的預(yù)想是什么哆档，他們因此成了他們自己的自我意識(shí)蔽挠。

Schelling’s aesthetic turn in his understanding of the intuition of the “absolute” was combined, not unsurprisingly, with a very anticommercial understanding of the relations between modern society and such philosophical truths. As Henry Crabb Robinson, an English student at Jena (and one of the first to bring the “new philosophy” to English attention), put it in a letter to his brother in 1802, Schelling simply dismissed all empiricist English philosophy, indeed even England itself, with the assertion, “it is absurd to expect the science of beauty in a country that values the Mathematics only as it helps to make Spinning Jennies and & Stocking-weaving machines. And beauty only as it recommends their Manufactories abroad.”^’

? ? 謝林在他對(duì)“絕對(duì)”的直觀理解過程中選擇了美學(xué)轉(zhuǎn)向，這樣的美學(xué)轉(zhuǎn)向是和下列東西結(jié)合在一起的瓜浸，這確實(shí)是令人感到非常驚奇的：謝林對(duì)現(xiàn)代社會(huì)與這些哲學(xué)真理之間的關(guān)系作出了極其反商業(yè)的解讀澳淑。像克利、克拉布斟叼、魯賓遜這位耶拿時(shí)期的英國學(xué)生（兼使“新哲學(xué)”引起英國人注意的開先河者之一）在 1802 年致兄弟的信中論述的一樣偶惠，謝林簡直就不把一切英國經(jīng)驗(yàn)論哲學(xué)放在眼里，實(shí)際上甚至連英國本身也不屑一顧朗涩。謝林同時(shí)斷言：“期待美學(xué)出現(xiàn)在一個(gè)重視數(shù)學(xué)僅僅因?yàn)閿?shù)學(xué)有助于創(chuàng)造斯皮寧、詹尼斯和斯托金紡織機(jī)的國家里绑改，這是一件極其荒唐可笑的事情谢床。而且人們之所以期待美學(xué)兄一，僅僅是因?yàn)槊缹W(xué)使他們的工廠在國外受到歡迎∈锻龋”

Holderlin’s Philosophical Revolution and His Influence on Hegel

荷爾德林的哲學(xué)革命與他對(duì)黑格爾的影響

Although Schelling’s views obviously had quite an influence on the development of Hegel’s own philosophy, the genuine impetus for Hegel’s development of his own views was his encounter in Frankfurt with Hblderlin’s thoughts on Fichtean idealism. It is quite clear that in 1795, Holderlin belonged to an animated circle in Jena involved in serious conversation about Fichte’s idealism and its relation to Kant. The best surviving evidence of Holderlin’s own entry into that debate consists of a short fragment of two pages titled (not by him but by his editors) “Judgment and Being” (“t/rto7 und Sein")}^ Although Holderlin never published it - the very existence of the piece itself was not even known until 1961 - Holderlin almost certainly discussed the ideas in it with Hegel, and it was those ideas that decisively turned Hegel away from the direction he had been taking at Berne. As Holderlin reconstructed things, Fichte’s three principles could be understood as falling into a schema of unity, sundering of the unity, and restoration of the unity (of the “I,” the “Not-I,” and the infinite progress). Holderlin argued, however, that the initial principle itself (the principle of self-positing self-consciousness, which Fichte characterized as “I = I”) could not in fact be the “absolute beginning” because self-consciousness already involves a “division” of itself from itself: The self (the “subject” of awareness) becomes aware of itself as an “object” of awareness. The first principle, therefore, cannot be “absolute,” since it already contains an “opposition” within itself.

? ? 雖然謝林的見解明顯對(duì)黑格爾自己的哲學(xué)發(fā)展產(chǎn)生了相當(dāng)大的影響出革，但真正推動(dòng)黑格爾自己見解向前發(fā)展的卻是他在法蘭克福時(shí)期遇到的荷爾德林對(duì)費(fèi)希特唯心主義所作的某些思考。十分清楚的是渡讼，在 1795 年骂束，荷爾德林屬于一個(gè)在耶拿十分活躍的同仁圈中的成員，這個(gè)同仁圈卷入一場關(guān)于費(fèi)希特唯心主義和它與康德關(guān)系的嚴(yán)肅的對(duì)話成箫。荷爾德林自己卷入那場爭論的現(xiàn)存最好證據(jù)在于只有兩頁紙的題為“判斷與存在”（Urteil und Sein）的簡短殘篇（不是他而是他著作編纂者加上去的題目）展箱。雖然荷爾德林生前從未發(fā)表這個(gè)殘篇——這篇作品本身確實(shí)存世甚至直到 1961 年時(shí)一直不為人知——但是荷爾德林幾乎無疑跟黑格爾探討過其中的某些觀念，正是那些觀念對(duì)黑格爾脫離他早在伯爾尼時(shí)期就一直秉持的思想方向起到了決定性的作用蹬昌。像荷爾德林重建某些東西一樣混驰，費(fèi)希特的三條原理可解讀為分成統(tǒng)一的圖式、統(tǒng)一的分裂和統(tǒng)一的恢復(fù)（“自我”皂贩、“非我”和無限過程的統(tǒng)一）栖榨。然而，荷爾德林辯稱明刷，初始原理本身（自我設(shè)定自我意識(shí)的原理婴栽，此原理被費(fèi)希特描述成“自我=自我”）之所以實(shí)際上不可能是“絕對(duì)開端”，是因?yàn)樽晕乙庾R(shí)已經(jīng)涉及根據(jù)它自身對(duì)它自身的“分切”：自我（意識(shí)的“主體”）意識(shí)到它自己是意識(shí)的“對(duì)象”辈末。所以愚争，第一條原理不可能是“絕對(duì)”的，因?yàn)樗谧陨碇幸呀?jīng)含有“對(duì)立”本冲。

Holderlin was proposing, as it turned out, something vaguely similar to what Schelling was about to propose at the same time (although it is unclear if Holderlin was aware at that point of Schelling’s own attempt).^'' Holderlin argued that the way in which Fichte had separated the “subject” from the “object” - that is, the way in which he had radicalized the Kantian project - made it impossible to see how such a separated “subject” and “object” could ever get back together again.? Fichte’s solution - that it was the subject’s own activity that did this, that the “subject” was the “absolute” ground of this - seemed wrong because the “subject” itself did not appear even to itself to be absolute but rather to refer to something else which was deeper and more fundamental than itself. The separation of “subject” and “object,” Holderlin concluded, was only the expression of a much deeper unity, which Holderlin called (following Spinoza and Jacobi) “Being.”^“ “Consciousness,” in Hblderlin’s treatment, as a relation of “subject” to “object” could not itself be basic; it had to derive from a yet more basic unity, a more basic apprehension on our part of something that, prior to all our particular orientations, served to orient us in general. Before we can deliberate on anything, we must already be oriented toward some terms that guide that deliberation and which are not themselves established by deliberation; that fundamental standpoint within our own consciousness out of which we orient ourselves was the “one,” “Being,” that of which we are experientially aware but of which we cannot be explicitly, fully conscious, since consciousness already presupposes a split between “subject” and “object,” between our being able to discriminate between our subjective experience of something and the object of that experience (between, for example, our experience of a tree and the tree itself). This “one” forms a kind of “horizon” of our consciousness without itself being an object of that consciousness, and the key to all of this lay in our own judgmental activities, in our own attempts at articulating judgments that “get it right” about ourselves and the world.

? ? 荷爾德林提出的東西准脂，像結(jié)果證明的，大體上類似于謝林同時(shí)將要提出的東西（盡管尚不清楚荷爾德林是否意識(shí)到謝林自己試圖提出的觀點(diǎn)）檬洞。荷爾德林論證道狸膏，一種早就被費(fèi)希特借以把“主體”和“客體”隔開的方法——也即一種被他借以把康德計(jì)劃激進(jìn)化的方法——使我們不可能看出這樣一種被分隔的“主體”和“客體”怎么可能有時(shí)再度聚首。費(fèi)希特對(duì)這個(gè)問題的解決辦法——正是主體自身的活動(dòng)可能使“主體”和“客體”有時(shí)再度聚首添怔，換句話說湾戳，“主體”構(gòu)成使“主體”和“客體”再度聚首的“絕對(duì)”基礎(chǔ)——之所以看來好像是錯(cuò)誤的，是因?yàn)椤爸黧w”自身甚至在它自己看來不是絕對(duì)的广料，而涉及比它自己更為深度的和更為基礎(chǔ)的其他東西砾脑。“主體”和“客體”的分隔艾杏，荷爾德林?jǐn)嘌匀鸵拢徊贿^表述的是一種更具有深度的統(tǒng)一，這種統(tǒng)一被荷爾德林（步斯賓諾莎和雅科比后塵）稱作“存在”。意識(shí)畅铭，在荷爾德林論述中氏淑，作為使“主體”和“客體”相聯(lián)系的東西，自身不可能被稱作基本的東西硕噩；意識(shí)必須源自一個(gè)更基本的統(tǒng)一體假残，必須源自一種更基本的領(lǐng)悟，就某種先于我們?nèi)烤唧w定位的炉擅、通常被用作給我們定位的東西而言辉懒。在我們能夠仔細(xì)思考事物之前，我們必然已被使得適應(yīng)某些術(shù)語谍失，這些術(shù)語引導(dǎo)我們思考眶俩，它們本身不為思考所確立；我們自己意識(shí)領(lǐng)域的基本觀點(diǎn)出之于我們?yōu)槲覀冏约憾ㄏ虻臇|西袱贮，這樣的基本觀點(diǎn)是“一”仿便、“存在”，以及被我們通過經(jīng)驗(yàn)意識(shí)到的但不可能被我們明確地充分地意識(shí)到的東西攒巍，原因在于嗽仪，意識(shí)已經(jīng)預(yù)先假定了“主體”和“客體”之間存在著一種分裂，并已經(jīng)預(yù)先假定了在我們關(guān)于某物的主觀經(jīng)驗(yàn)與經(jīng)驗(yàn)的對(duì)象之間（例如我們關(guān)于一棵樹的經(jīng)驗(yàn)與這棵樹本身之間）存在著一種能被我們區(qū)別的分裂柒莉。這“一”構(gòu)成一種關(guān)于我們意識(shí)的“視域”闻坚，而“一”本身不構(gòu)成我們意識(shí)的對(duì)象。所有這些的關(guān)鍵在于我們自己的判斷活動(dòng)兢孝，在于我們自己在嘗試系統(tǒng)論述一些可以“使我們正確理解”關(guān)于我們自己和世界的判斷窿凤。

This implied that Reinhold’s and Fichte’s search for a “first princi- pie” in philosophy was itself already doomed, since there could be no such first principle; instead, there could only be a prior, holistic predeliberative orientation within some “whole” that included our consciousness and its objects within itself. Fichte’s notion that the “I” must posit the “Not-I” was thus also doomed: It assumed that one side of the relation had to do all the work, as it were, when in fact we begin with a unity of thought and being that precedes all reflection on it. Neither the “subject” nor the “object” has any “original” determinateness on its own that would serve to ground or establish the determinateness of the other; if “realists” make the mistake of thinking that the “world” bestows determinateness on thought, “subjective idealists” such as Fichte make the mistake of thinking that thought imposes all the determinateness on the world. Neither “subject” nor “object” is primary or originary, and we must accept that we are always in touch with the world in all its general outlines. This acceptance necessarily precedes all our reflection, including even our various skeptical doubts about it.? That we have a sense of the “whole” that includes us, even if we cannot at first articulate it (except perhaps poetically), was the implication of Holderlin’s reflections.^^

? ? 這就暗示賴因霍爾德和費(fèi)希特從事哲學(xué)“第一原理”的研究本身是已經(jīng)注定是失敗的，因?yàn)楦静豢赡艽嬖谥@樣的第一原理跨蟹；反倒可能只存在著先天的整體論者事先考慮過的某種“整體”中定位雳殊，而且這種“整體”包含意識(shí)和意識(shí)自身領(lǐng)域的對(duì)象。費(fèi)希特關(guān)于“自我”必須設(shè)定“非我”的看法因此也注定是不能成立的：這種看法假定“自我”和“非我”的關(guān)系的一個(gè)方面必須是萬應(yīng)靈丹窗轩，好像其時(shí)實(shí)際上我們從思維與存在的統(tǒng)一開始夯秃，而且這種統(tǒng)一先于對(duì)費(fèi)希特上述看法的全部反思×∫眨“主體”和“客體”都不具有任何“原初的”獨(dú)立的確定性仓洼，而且這種確定性總是被用作基于或確立他者的確定性；如果說“實(shí)在主義者”錯(cuò)誤地認(rèn)為“世界”把確定性給予思想的話堤舒，那么“主觀唯心主義者”例如費(fèi)希特就錯(cuò)誤地認(rèn)為思想把一切確定性強(qiáng)加給世界色建。“主體”和“客體”都不是原始的或原初的東西舌缤，我們因此必須承認(rèn)我們總是與世界保持著聯(lián)系箕戳，通常從世界的全部概括意義上說是這樣某残。這種承認(rèn)必須先于我們的一切反思，甚至必須先于包括我們對(duì)世界的各種不同的懷疑論式的懷疑漂羊。我們能夠理解一個(gè)包含我們?cè)趦?nèi)的“整體”驾锰，縱使我們起初不可能闡明這個(gè)“整體”（或許除了詩意地闡明這個(gè)“整體”外）卸留，這就牽涉荷爾德林的深刻思考走越。

Holderlin’s reflections on Fichte and on the development of idealism in general had no less than an explosive impact on Hegel. In Berne, as Hegel had set himself to completing the Kantian program by applying it, he had dismissed Fichte’s and Reinhold’s works as being merely of interest to theoretical reason alone. Hegel’s own concern up until that point had been rather straightforwardly with the idea of the selfimposition of the moral law, with how that might be “applied” to history to show how Christianity had become a positive religion, and how mankind had, in Kant’s words, thereby imposed a form of tutelage on itself. In all these cases, though, Hegel’s diagnosis of the problem had landed him at a theoretical dead end. Now, under the influence of Holderlin, he saw how his project of applying the Kantian idea of selfimposition to specific social problems (particularly those connected with the Revolution) had in fact begged the question of what constituted self-imposition in the first place, indeed, had begged the question about all our judgmental activities. Fichte had shown that the theme of selfdetermination, if taken seriously, had to be developed on its own, and by virtue of his own difficulties in working out his system, had shown that it was not a self-evident idea that could simply be “applied.” Holderlin had now indicated to him not only that Fichte’s own philosophy had deeper problems within itself, but also that something like even a history of Christianity could not be understood outside of some deeper understanding of the kind of prereflective situating that goes on in conscious life before more determinate plans and projects are laid out. Hegel also came to see under Holderlin’s guidance that idealism as it had been developing could not be written off as ignoring the more experiential aspects of human life; at the heart of conscious life itself was an element of spontaneous activity that was not simply the application of underived conceptual form to given sensuous content. “Subjective religion,” as a way of orienting people’s “hearts,” required some account of how we orient our conscious lives in the first place, and Holderlin had shown that a full account of that was still outstanding.

? ? 荷爾德林對(duì)費(fèi)希特和唯心主義發(fā)展作出的通盤思考可與他對(duì)黑格爾產(chǎn)生的爆炸性影響相比肩。早在伯爾尼時(shí)期耻瑟，當(dāng)黑格爾打算借助運(yùn)用康德哲學(xué)來使康德哲學(xué)臻于完美的時(shí)候旨指，黑格爾就已對(duì)費(fèi)希特和賴因霍爾德著作抱有抵觸情緒，因?yàn)檫@兩人著作僅僅對(duì)理論理性本身感興趣喳整。黑格爾自己關(guān)心的觀念到那時(shí)已經(jīng)和盤托出：道德律的自我強(qiáng)加谆构，道德律的自我強(qiáng)加怎么可能被“應(yīng)用”于歷史以證明基督教如何早就成了實(shí)定宗教，以及人類怎么（用康德的話說）因此把法律的形式強(qiáng)加給它自身框都。不過搬素，在上述這些情況下，黑格爾對(duì)問題的診斷使他陷入理論上的僵局魏保。那時(shí)熬尺，在荷爾德林影響下，他看出他關(guān)于把康德的自我強(qiáng)加觀念應(yīng)用于具體社會(huì)問題（特別是與法國大革命相聯(lián)系的問題）的計(jì)劃實(shí)際上如何回避了某些首先構(gòu)成自我強(qiáng)加的東西的問題谓罗，更確切地說如何回避了我們一切判斷活動(dòng)的問題粱哼。費(fèi)希特已經(jīng)證明，自我決定的主題檩咱，如果嚴(yán)肅對(duì)待它揭措，必須被獨(dú)立地闡述，而且刻蚯，由于他自己在創(chuàng)立體系過程中遇到的諸多困難绊含，費(fèi)希特證明自我決定的主題不是一個(gè)只可被“應(yīng)用”的不證自明的觀念。荷爾德林現(xiàn)早已向他表明炊汹，不但費(fèi)希特自己的哲學(xué)自身具有更深度的問題躬充，而且甚至像基督教歷史的東西在下列情況下也不可能被人理解：不具有對(duì)那種前反思式情境的某些更深程度的理解，這種情境在更加確定的計(jì)劃和方案被制定出之前繼續(xù)存在于自覺的生活中兵扬。黑格爾同時(shí)逐漸看出麻裳，在荷爾德林引領(lǐng)下，唯心主義因?yàn)橐恢痹诎l(fā)展器钟，所以不可能被一筆勾銷津坑，也不可能忽視人類生活更為經(jīng)驗(yàn)的方面；處在自覺生活本身中心的是不僅僅把原初概念形式應(yīng)用于給定的感性內(nèi)容的自發(fā)活動(dòng)元素傲霸〗澹“主觀宗教”眉反，作為定位人“心”的方式，需要對(duì)我們?nèi)绾问紫榷ㄎ晃覀兊淖杂X生活作出釋述穆役，荷爾德林向世人證明寸五，他本人對(duì)我們?nèi)绾问紫榷ㄎ晃覀兊淖杂X生活作出了充分的釋述，這項(xiàng)工作在他那個(gè)時(shí)代仍然是非常出眾的耿币。

As Hegel absorbed Holderlin’s radical ideas, it became clear to him that his whole project of staging a career as a Lessing-like “educator of the people” was coming to a crashing end, since he had been trying to “apply” a set of ideas that were themselves already deeply in conflict with each other. If he really wanted to do what he set out to do, he simply was going to have to do things differently, and that realization shifted Hegel’s course onto the path he was finally to take.

? ? 當(dāng)黑格爾吸收荷爾德林的激進(jìn)想法的時(shí)候梳杏，在他看來十分清楚的是，他關(guān)于未來過著萊辛式的“人民教育家”生活的全部計(jì)劃逐漸顯露出泡湯的苗頭淹接，因?yàn)樗L期以來一直在試圖“應(yīng)用”的一系列思想本身已處于深度的相互沖突中十性。如果他真要去做他打算做的事情，那么他只不過打算必須做不同的事情塑悼，而這一愿望的實(shí)現(xiàn)改變了黑格爾在通往他最終選擇的道路上的進(jìn)程劲适。

“The Oldest System Program of German Idealism”

《德國唯心主義最早體系綱領(lǐng)》

Around this time Hegel wrote out a short manuscript which has come to be known as “The Oldest System Program of German Idealism.” (It is usually dated 1797.) The essay is very short and contains little argument; instead, it contents itself with simply announcing various lines of thought and with indicating in a sketchy way how they might possibly fit together in some future development. Although the manuscript is in Hegel’s own handwriting, it is by no means clear that it his own creation, and the question of its actual authorship has always remained a matter of controversy. In fact, it was originally attributed to Schelling, although for a while much scholarly opinion shifted to the view that attributes authorship of the piece to Hegel himself; the author, however, is most likely Holderlin.

? ? 大約在這一時(shí)期，黑格爾寫出了一篇內(nèi)容很短的手稿厢蒜，它就是現(xiàn)已眾所周知的《德國唯心主義最早體系綱領(lǐng)》（現(xiàn)時(shí)它通常被標(biāo)注的寫作時(shí)間是 1797 年）霞势。這篇論文很短，幾乎不含論證斑鸦；恰恰相反愕贡，它只是滿足于提出各種不同的思路和速寫式地表明這些不同思路如何可能完全適合將來的某種發(fā)展。雖然這份手稿系黑格爾自己的手跡鄙才，但絕不意味著它顯然就是他自己創(chuàng)作的作品颂鸿，有關(guān)它的實(shí)際歸屬問題仍然一直是眾說紛紜，莫衷一是攒庵。實(shí)際上嘴纺，手稿最初被認(rèn)為是謝林的作品，盡管有段時(shí)間很多學(xué)者的意見轉(zhuǎn)向這樣的看法浓冒，認(rèn)為這篇作品是黑格爾本人的栽渴；不過，它的作者很可能是荷爾德林稳懒。